Aukuso v Tahan [No 2]

1. [1]

   MACFARLAN JA: I agree with Simpson AJA.

2. [2]

   MEAGHER JA: I agree with the orders proposed by Simpson AJA. Those orders must be made because Mr Aukuso’s notice of motion was filed more than 14 days after the costs order was entered, and as no application to vary the costs order was made in that time, the failure to satisfy the limitation on the Court’s power under Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), r 36.16 (3A) could not be cured by any order under Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), s 14. What follows assumes a familiarity with the circumstances of that application which are set out by Simpson AJA.

3. [3]

   The plurality in Jeffery & Katauskas v SST Consulting (2009) 239 CLR 75; [2009] HCA 43 at [23] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ) said:

4. [4]

   UCPR r 36.16 (3A) confers a power to set aside or vary a judgment: Malouf v Prince (No 2) [2010] NSWCA 51 at [7] (McColl and Macfarlan JJA, Nicholas J). The condition for the exercise of that power is expressed to be that a notice of motion be filed within 14 days of the entry of orders. Having recognised that there is a limitation on the Court’s power, in determining whether any requirement as to filing may be dispensed with and the power exercised, this Court has drawn a distinction between the making of an application for an order, and the formal requirement in UCPR r 18.1 that it be done by the filing of a notice of motion; holding that an order dispensing with that filing requirement may be made and the limitation on the power satisfied where an informal application for the relevant order has been made to the Court within the prescribed time. See Hancock v Arnold; Dodd v Arnold [2009] NSWCA 19 at [11] (Ipp, McColl and Basten JJA); Roads and Traffic Authority of NSW v Refrigerated Roadways Pty Ltd (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 336 at [10] (Campbell JA, McColl JA and Sackville AJA agreeing); Kable v State of New South Wales (No 2) [2012] NSWCA 361 at [3] (Allsop P, Campbell and Meagher JJA agreeing), [9], [11] (Basten JA, Allsop P, Campbell, Meagher JJA and McClellan CJ at CL agreeing); Motorcycling Events Group Australia Pty Ltd v Kelly (No. 2) [2013] NSWCA 399 at [2] (Basten JA, Meagher and Gleeson JJA agreeing).

5. [5]

   In the present case neither of the written communications relied on by Mr Aukuso made any application to the Court to vary the costs order within time. The first, the letter of 8 June 2018 to Ms Tahan’s solicitors, gave notice that such an application was to be made. The second, the email to the Court of 15 June 2018, sought leave to file an application to vary the costs order. In doing so, it made clear that a formal application to vary the costs order was to be made. In these circumstances, dispensing with the requirements in UCPR r 36.16 (3A) for the filing of a notice of motion for the varying of the costs order does not assist Mr Aukuso because the condition for the exercise of the power conferred by that rule remains unsatisfied, no application to vary the costs order having been made to the Court within 14 days of that order being entered.

6. [6]

   SIMPSON AJA: By notice of motion filed on 20 June 2018, the appellant, Taelase Aukuso, seeks variation of a costs order made by this Court on 1 June 2018: Aukuso v Tahan [2018] NSWCA 117. The basis for the proposed variation lies in an offer of compromise made on behalf of Mr Aukuso on 28 February 2018 pursuant to Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (“UCPR”) 20.26.

7. [7]

   Provision is made for variation of orders by, relevantly, Rule 36.16 of the UCPR. By UCPR 36.11(1) any judgment or order of the court is to be entered. By subr (2), unless the court orders otherwise, a judgment or order is taken to be entered when it is recorded in the court’s computerised court record system (JusticeLink). JusticeLink shows that the order was entered into that system on the day it was made, 1 June 2018.

8. [8]

   In the ordinary course, an order may not be set aside after it has been entered: Bailey v Marinoff (1971) 125 CLR 529 at 530; Rockcote Enterprises Pty Ltd v FS Architects Pty Ltd (No. 2); Carelli v FS Architects Pty Ltd (No. 2) [2008] NSWCA 205 at [8]. However, by UCPR 36.16(3A), the court may set aside or vary a judgment or order provided that notice of motion seeking such an order is filed within 14 days after entry of the judgment or order. Although UCPR 1.12 provides that the court may, subject to the Rules, extend or abridge any time fixed by the Rules, subr (3C) of r 36.16 expressly excludes the operation of that rule in applications under subr (3A) (and subr (3B), although that subrule is not presently material). Accordingly, under UCPR, the time limit prescribed for filing an application for variation of an order once entered is a non-extendable 14 days.

9. [9]

   As indicated above, the order was entered on 1 June 2018. The notice of motion seeking variation was filed on 20 June 2018. It is therefore outside the time limited by the Rules.

10. [10]

    Section 14 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) is also relevant. It provides:

Background

1. [11]

   On 21 December 2011, the respondent, Ms Hana Tahan, was seriously injured after the motor vehicle she was driving collided with a vehicle then being driven by Mr Aukuso. Ms Tahan commenced proceedings in the District Court, claiming damages for personal injury which, she alleged, was caused by the negligence of Mr Aukuso. In the District Court she was successful. On 19 October 2017 the primary judge, Ashford ADCJ, found that Mr Aukuso was negligent in the manner in which he drove his vehicle, and was solely responsible for the accident. She declined to find contributory negligence on the part of Ms Tahan. She awarded Ms Tahan damages of $700,000. She entered judgment accordingly.

2. [12]

   Mr Aukuso appealed. On 1 June 2018 this Court upheld the appeal in part. It did not disturb the finding that Mr Aukuso was negligent, but held that Ms Tahan was contributorily negligent to the extent of 50%. It therefore reduced the amount of damages awarded by half, and awarded her $350,000. The orders made by the court were:

3. [13]

   It is order 4 that Mr Aukuso seeks, by the present notice of motion, to have varied. He seeks in its place an order that Ms Tahan pay his costs as assessed or agreed on the ordinary basis up to and including 28 February 2018, and on an indemnity basis thereafter.

4. [14]

   The notice of motion was supported by an affidavit affirmed by Mr Aukuso’s solicitor. Annexed to the affidavit were copies of correspondence between the legal representatives of the parties following delivery of judgment. That correspondence showed that, on 28 February 2018 (that is, two months prior to the date fixed for hearing of the appeal), Mr Aukuso’s solicitors had, pursuant to UCPR 20.26, made an offer of compromise. In short, the offer was for the judgment of the District Court to be set aside, and judgment entered for Ms Tahan in the sum of $350,000. (That, it may be noted, reflects precisely the orders that were ultimately made by this Court.) The offer was expressed to be open for 28 days. The solicitor added that, in the event that the offer was held not to comply with r 20.26, reliance would be placed on the principles established in Calderbank v Calderbank [1976] Fam 93; [1975] 3 WLR 586; [1975] 3 All ER 333, and Messiter v Hutchinson (1987) 10 NSWLR 525.

5. [15]

   There is no evidence of any response to this communication. As events have shown, the offer was not accepted.

6. [16]

   One week after delivery of judgment, on 8 June 2018, Mr Aukuso’s solicitors again wrote to Ms Tahan’s solicitors, referring to the offer of compromise, and indicating an intention to apply to the court for variation of order 4, such that costs be payable on the ordinary basis to 28 February, and thereafter on an indemnity basis. They asked for consent to the proposed order, or, alternatively, any alternative proposal, and the reasons therefor. There is no evidence of any reply to this letter prior to 19 June.

7. [17]

   On 15 June 2018 (the last of the 14 days prescribed by r 36.16(3A) for filing a notice of motion seeking variation), Mr Aukuso’s solicitors communicated by email with the Registrar of this Court. They sought leave to file an application for variation of order 4. (They did not require the leave of the court to do so). They copied Ms Tahan’s solicitors into the email. They did not file a notice of motion on that day.

8. [18]

   On 19 June Ms Tahan’s solicitors responded to the letter of 8 June. They advised that they did not consent to the order there proposed, and explained their reasons for adopting that position. On 20 June Mr Aukuso’s solicitors filed the present notice of motion, together with an affidavit to which was annexed the correspondence including the offer of compromise. Ms Tahan’s solicitors filed an affidavit affirmed on 27 June 2018, setting out some history of the proceedings prior to the hearing of the appeal. They raised some discretionary considerations in opposition to any variation of the costs order.

9. [19]

   The parties were directed to file written submissions and did so. Although those filed on behalf of Ms Tahan mentioned UCPR 36.16(3A) and (3B), they did not raise any jurisdictional issue. Nevertheless, it appeared to the court that a jurisdictional question may have arisen. It is, of course, the first duty of a court to determine whether it has jurisdiction to decide the questions it has been asked to decide: Federated Engine-Drivers & Firemen’s Association of Australasia v Broken Hill Proprietary Co Ltd (1911) 12 CLR 398 at 415; [1911] HCA 31; Re Nash [No 2] [2017] HCA 52. The court therefore invited the parties to provide further submissions in that respect, and also with respect to the discretionary matters raised on behalf of Ms Tahan. The court specifically drew attention to s 14 of the Civil Procedure Act, and to discussion of s 14 at [36.16.15] of Ritchie’s Uniform Civil Procedure NSW.

10. [20]

    The submissions that came forth in response to the invitation were not illuminating. Solicitors for Mr Aukuso maintained that the email of 15 June to the Registrar constituted substantial compliance with UCPR 36.16(3A). Apparently in support of that submission, they contended that the email of 15 June to the Registrar was “compliant with [UCPR] 18.2(2)(b) and 36.16”.

11. [21]

    UCPR 18.2(1) provides that a person may not move the court to make any order unless notice of motion has been filed and served on each person affected by the proposed order. Subrule (2) provides a number of exceptions to that rule, of which the second is:

12. [22]

    No evidence was provided that the preparation, filing or service of a notice of motion would have caused undue delay or other prejudice to Mr Aukuso. Reliance on r 18.2(2)(b) should be rejected. So also should be the contention that the email to the Registrar of 15 June achieved substantial compliance with r 36.16(3A). That subrule is specific in requiring a notice of motion; an email is not substantial compliance with such a requirement.

13. [23]

    Accordingly, no notice of motion in accordance with r 36.16(3A) was filed within the prescribed time.

14. [24]

    On that basis, Mr Aukuso’s application for variation should be rejected. However, the submissions also mentioned (as they had been invited to do) s 14 of the Civil Procedure Act. The entirety of the submission was:

15. [25]

    The submissions went on, with dubious relevance, to note that Ms Tahan’s solicitors had filed an application for special leave to appeal to the High Court.

16. [26]

    No mention was made of any authority in this Court concerning the application of s 14. No attempt was made to come to grips with the discussion to which reference had been made by the Court.

17. [27]

    The submissions made on behalf of Ms Tahan were equally terse. The author contented himself with referring to one decision of this Court (Malouf v Prince (No 2) [2010] NSWCA 51); as “stat[ing] the relevant principles”, and unhelpfully added:

18. [28]

    It has thus been left to this Court to conduct its own researches into the reach of s 14.

19. [29]

    The primary position as stated by Barwick CJ in Bailey v Marinoff is that, absent a specific statutory provision, an order of a court, once entered, is final and cannot be disturbed by the court that made it. The principle is a manifestation of the emphasis to be placed on finality of litigation.

20. [30]

    UCPR 36.16(3A) is a specific statutory provision such as envisaged by Barwick CJ. As an exception to the general rule, however, it is circumscribed by two requirements: the filing of a notice of motion, and that that notice of motion be filed within 14 days of the date of entry of the judgment or order. That the intention of the rule makers was to confine the operation of the rule within a strict time limit is apparent from subr (3C) which expressly excludes a general power provided by r 1.12 to extend time limits fixed by the Rules.

21. [31]

    It not infrequently happens that, in delivering judgment, the court makes costs orders in accordance with UCPR 42.1, which is to the effect that, in the absence of reasons to make a different order, the court should order that “costs follow the event”. The UCPR, however, provide a number of exceptions to that rule. It is in the context of costs orders that the interaction of s14 and r 36.16(3A) and (3C) has most frequently arisen.

22. [32]

    In Jeffery & Katauskas Pty Limited v SST Consulting Pty Ltd; Jeffery & Katauskas Pty Limited v Rickard Constructions Pty Ltd (2009) 239 CLR 75; [2009] HCA 43 the High Court was concerned with UCPR 42.3 (now repealed). Subrule 42.3(1) prohibited the court from making any order for costs against a person who was not a party to the proceedings; an exception was provided for by subr 42.3(2)(c) where the person had committed a contempt of court or an abuse of the process of the court. The High Court invited attention to s 14 of the Civil Procedure Act, but counsel resisted any temptation to invoke that provision. In that context, in what was plainly obiter, the majority (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ) the High Court said:

23. [33]

    In Hancock v Arnold; Dodd v Arnold (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 19, at the time when judgment was delivered, counsel for one party orally sought and was granted leave to make submissions as to a special order for costs. Written submissions were subsequently filed. No notice of motion seeking such an order was filed within the specified time. This court concluded that the power conferred by s 14 extended to dispensing with the requirement that a notice of motion be filed and held that the making of the oral application for leave to make submissions concerning costs was sufficient to justify such a dispensation, but specifically reserved the question whether the s 14 power extended to dispensation of the 14 day time limit. The court (Ipp, McColl and Basten JJA) said:

24. [34]

    The Court then observed (at [12]) that the exercise of the power under s 14 would be limited to what had been identified in the oral application and could not be extended to other relief.

25. [35]

    That approach was endorsed by Campbell JA (with whom McColl JA and Sackville AJA agreed) in Roads and Traffic Authority of NSW v Refrigerated Roadways Pty Ltd (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 336. In that case, a notice of motion had been filed within time, so that the express endorsement was obiter. Campbell JA did note that, although s 14 might provide a means by which an oral application made within time might ameliorate the stringency of the 14 day time limit, such amelioration lies entirely in the court’s discretion.

26. [36]

    In Spina v Permanent Custodians Ltd (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 419, orders had been made by consent that permitted an application to be made outside the 14 day time limit. The Court (Young JA, with whom Tobias and Campbell JJA agreed) doubted the validity of the orders, but noted “the possibility” that s 14 might permit dispensation with the rules.

27. [37]

    In Malouf v Prince (No 2) [2010] NSWCA 51, an application to vary certain orders was made within the 14 day time limit, but subsequently (outside the time limit) an application was made for further and more extensive variation. The Court (McColl and Macfarlan JJA, and Nicholas J) held that the subsequent application could not be entertained because it was made outside the “14 day window” (at [15] and [16]). The Court did not need to determine whether s 14 conferred power to vary the 14 day time limit as the applicant conceded that, even if the power existed, in the circumstances of the case its application would inevitably be rejected for discretionary reasons.

28. [38]

    In AT v Commissioner of Police, NSW (No 2) [2010] NSWCA 337, an application for variation of costs orders was made well outside the 14 day period. No oral application had been made within time. Basten JA with whom Beazley JA (as she then was) and Macfarlan JA agreed said:

29. [39]

    Once again, the Court found it unnecessary to determine the extent of the s 14 discretion, considering that, even if the discretion extended to the variation of a costs order, that was not an appropriate case for its exercise.

30. [40]

    Kable v State of New South Wales (No 2) [2012] NSWCA 361 was a variation on Hancock, and close in its facts to the present case. Although a notice of motion seeking variation of the costs orders was not filed within 14 days of the entry of judgment, notification of a request to be heard on costs was made by letter on the day after delivery of judgment. The Court, relying on s 14, dispensed with the requirement that a notice of motion be filed. However, (adopting a similar approach to that taken in Malouf) the dispensation was limited to the matters raised in the letter. Basten JA said:

31. [41]

    Allsop P said:

32. [42]

    In Motorcycling Events Group Australia Ltd v Kelly (No 2) [2013] NSWCA 399, consistent with earlier decisions, a timely oral application was found to be a sufficient basis for dispensing with the need for the filing of a notice of motion.

33. [43]

    The above review of decisions involving s 14 shows that this Court has been prepared to bifurcate the requirements imposed by r 36.16(3A). It has interpreted s 14 as conferring a discretionary power on the Court to dispense with the requirement that a notice of motion seeking variation of a judgment or order be filed within the prescribed time, although it has, as a matter of practice, confined the exercise of the discretion to circumstances in which adequate notice of the intention to seek variation has been given. It has impliedly (and sometimes expressly – see Allsop P in Kable) reserved the question of whether s 14 extends to dispensing with the time limits stated and therefore overrides r 36.16(3C). That approach might be seen to accommodate the interpretation mooted by the High Court in Jeffery & Katauskas: the need for a notice of motion is a “duty” imposed on the parties (which, the High Court suggested, might be a requirement subject to dispensation under s 14); the time limit of 14 days is a limitation on the power of the Court (to which, the High Court suggested, the s 14 power might not extend).

34. [44]

    The difference, as I understand it, between the approach taken above and that taken by Meagher JA is narrow, but not insignificant. Meagher JA would deny jurisdiction to vary an order unless an application (which may be made informally) to do so is made within the 14 day period. Notice of intention to make such an application is insufficient. His Honour does not construe the letter of 8 June to Ms Tahan’s solicitors, nor the email to the Registrar seeking leave to file an application, as an application. On that approach, jurisdiction depends upon whether the party seeking variation adequately formulates an “application” as distinct from giving notice of intention to make an application.

35. [45]

    On my reading of the authorities discussed above, notice, even if informal, has been held to be sufficient to enliven the s 14 discretion to dispense with the requirement of filing a notice of motion within the 14 day period. The judgments do not always identify with specificity what was put to the court by way of “application” within time. In Hancock it was “leave to make submissions on a special order for costs”. In Kable, “a request to be heard on costs” was made well within time. In each case, this Court treated the submission or request as sufficient to found dispensation with the requirement of filing a notice of motion.

36. [46]

    These decisions are not suggestive of a rigid distinction between an “application” and notice of intention to make an application, a distinction which might, in some cases, prove difficult to make. As the cases show, such issues often emerge at the time, or shortly after, judgment is delivered, and are not always clearly formulated.

37. [47]

    What remains outstanding is whether s 14 permits dispensation with the time limit. That question will not be resolved by this decision. That is because, within the 14 day period, Mr Aukuso by the email communication to the Registrar, copied to Ms Tahan’s solicitors - gave adequate notice in writing of his intention to seek variation of the costs orders. That should be seen as the equivalent of the oral notice given in Hancock, and the letter in Kable.

38. [48]

    In the above circumstances, to which may be added the fact that the notice of motion was filed only five days later, there can be no prejudice occasioned to Ms Tahan. No attempt was made to demonstrate that there was.

39. [49]

    I am therefore satisfied that it is appropriate to exercise the discretion conferred by s 14 to dispense with the requirement of r 36.16(3A) that a notice of motion be filed (within the 14 day period), and treat the correspondence as adequate notice. Since that notice was given within 14 days, it is unnecessary to consider the more difficult question of the interaction between s 14 and subrr 36.16(3A) and (3C).

40. [50]

    The application for variation of the costs order should be determined on its merits.

41. [51]

    The offer of compromise was expressed to be made in accordance with UCPR 20.26. Rule 20.26 makes provision for any party to make, by notice in writing, an offer to compromise any claim in the proceedings, in whole or in part, or on specified terms. It spells out the requirements of an offer of compromise within the meaning of the rule. Subr (4) of r 20.26 provides:

42. [52]

    The consequences of acceptance or non-acceptance of an offer of compromise are stated in UCPR 42.13A to 42.15A. Those rules, on their face, apply to offers made in the Supreme Court. However, by r 51.48, they are adapted to proceedings in this Court.

43. [53]

    The relevant rules are r 42.15 and r 42.15A. Rule 42.15, as adapted, for the purpose of this Court, provides:

44. [54]

    Rule 42.15A, as adapted, provides:

45. [55]

    Both parties proceeded on the basis that the relevant rule was 42.15.

46. [56]

    On 28 February 2018 Mr Aukuso’s solicitors served on Ms Tahan’s solicitors an offer of compromise expressed to be pursuant to r 20.26. The offer was to compromise “the whole of the claim” (ie the appeal) on the following terms:

47. [57]

    There is no evidence that Ms Tahan’s solicitors responded to the offer.

48. [58]

    There was no issue that the offer of compromise complied with the requirements of r 20.26. Mr Aukuso therefore contended that, as he (the defendant) had made an offer of compromise which had not been accepted by Ms Tahan (the plaintiff), and that Ms Tahan obtained a judgment no more favourable to her than the terms of the offer, (the judgment being identical to the offer) he was entitled, under r 42.15(2)(b)(i), to indemnity costs from 1 March 2018 (the day after service of the offer of compromise). (The same result would apply if r 42.15A were the operative rule).

49. [59]

    On behalf of Ms Tahan it was argued that the court should “order otherwise”.

50. [60]

    The principles upon which the Court should act in determining whether to depart from the prima facie position as stated in r 42.15 have been considered on a number of occasions. In New South Wales Insurance Ministerial Corporation v Reeve (1993) 42 NSWLR 100 (with respect to an earlier, but not relevantly different version of the rule) Gleeson CJ (with whom Clarke and Cripps JJA agreed), said:

51. [61]

    In Morgan v Johnson; Green v Lovatt; Gambrill v Cook (1998) 44 NSWLR 578, this Court considered three separate cases in which departure from “the prima facie” rule was under consideration. Again, the relevant rule was an earlier incarnation, but I do not understand the substance to be materially different. Mason P (with whom Sheller JA agreed), distilled five principles from relevant judicial decisions. Those five principles were stated as:

52. [62]

    In Leach v The Nominal Defendant (QBE Insurance (Australia) Ltd) (No 2) [2014] NSWCA 391 McColl JA repeated the observation of Gleeson CJ that it is impossible exhaustively to state the circumstances in which the discretion to depart from the prima facie rule might be exercised, and said:

53. [63]

    In the preceding paragraph, her Honour had adopted (and paraphrased) a view expressed by Hely J in Port Kembla Coal Terminal Ltd v Braverus Maritime Inc (No 2) (2004) 212 ALR 281; [2004] FCA 1437, to the effect that the requirement is:

54. [64]

    Consideration of Mr Aukuso’s proposition that the court should “order otherwise” calls for attention to some matters of history and procedure not previously mentioned.

55. [65]

    Mr Aukuso’s appeal was filed on 16 November 2017. By UCPR 51.24-51.33, he was required to prepare, file and serve a series of appeal books. Relevantly, these included a “Black Book”, containing the transcript of oral evidence and submissions in the proceedings at first instance, and a “Blue Book” (or books) containing copies of all documentary exhibits in those proceedings.

56. [66]

    On 14 February 2018 the Registrar of the Court of Appeal listed the appeal for hearing on 26 April 2018. By letter of the same date, he directed that, unless previously directed otherwise, the parties comply with a timetable which required, inter alia, Mr Aukuso to serve the Black and Blue (and other) books not later than 10 weeks before the date on which the appeal was fixed for hearing – that is by 15 February 2018. There was no evidence of any previous different directions.

57. [67]

    The Black and Blue books were not served until, at the earliest, 22 March 2018, and, at the latest, 26 March 2018. I say this because, annexed to an affidavit affirmed by a para-legal (Talal Krayem) in the employ of Ms Tahan’s solicitors, is a letter of service of 22 March (a Thursday). Mr Krayem stated in his affidavit that the books were not received by the solicitors until 26 March (a Monday). That has never been contradicted.

58. [68]

    Ms Tahan advanced four bases upon which, she contended, the Court should “order otherwise” than as specified in r 42.15(2)(b).

59. [69]

    The first and second were that her conduct in failing to accept the offer was reasonable in the circumstances. The particular circumstances to which she pointed was an assertion (made in an application for special leave to the High Court, yet to be heard) that the basis for the decision of this Court was not one put forward by Mr Aukuso, and not one that was argued in this Court. Indeed, a good deal of the submissions was devoted to explaining the alleged error of the approach of this Court. That, in my opinion, is a question not to be decided by this Court. And, as indicated above, the reasonableness of the rejection or non-acceptance of an offer is not determinative. Nevertheless I note in passing that the basis on which the Court found contributory negligence was the subject of extensive discussion at the hearing before it.

60. [70]

    The fourth basis was that the notice of motion was filed outside the time prescribed by r 36.16(3A). That has been dealt with in the context of jurisdiction, and is not more than peripherally material to whether this Court should depart from the prima facie rules. As mentioned above, the notice of motion was filed only 4 days outside the statutory period, and Ms Tahan had been put on notice within that period.

61. [71]

    The third basis for opposition, however, is of more merit. It lay in the dilatoriness of Mr Aukuso’s solicitors in serving the Black and Blue appeal Books. The offer of compromise expired on 28 March. At the earliest, the books were served on 22 March, but the evidence favours the conclusion that they were in fact served on 26 March. Both the Black and Blue Books contain material that would undoubtedly have been important in the assessment of the prospects of the appeal succeeding.

62. [72]

    In this respect, UCPR 20.26(4) is relevant. Rule 20.26(4) is confusing, in that, on one view, it appears to be directed only to offers made by a plaintiff: see Raad v VM & KTP Holdings Pty Ltd as Trustee for VM & KTP Nguyen Family Trust (No. 2) [2016] NSWSC 1233 at [26] per Davies J. The import of para (b) is unclear. The subrule, set out above (at 51), makes specific provision for a party in receipt of an offer of compromise before being given adequate notice of such particulars and documents as are necessary to enable full consideration of the offer, to give notice of the inability to assess the reasonableness of the offer. There is no evidence that Ms Tahan’s solicitors gave notice in accordance with that subrule.

63. [73]

    To the extent (if any) that r 20.26(4) applies to an offer made by a defendant, Ms Tahan’s failure to give notice is a relevant consideration, adverse to her case, but does not carry the necessary consequence that the late service of relevant material can be put to one side. In my opinion, service of the appeal books, at most six (and probably two) days prior to the expiration of the offer deprived Ms Tahan’s legal advisors of any reasonable opportunity to consider the offer in light of all relevant material. This was a case in which a number of witnesses gave conflicting accounts of the circumstances of the accident, and a good deal of documentary material was presented as exhibits. Evaluation of the offer of compromise called for careful analysis of all of that material. It is reasonable to conclude that that analysis could not reasonably have been done in two, or even six days. There is no evidence that Mr Aukuso made any attempt to offer an extension of the time permitted for acceptance of the offer.

64. [74]

    As a consequence, and taking full account of the principles stated by Mason P in Morgan and particularly the starting point that a litigant who declines to accept an offer of compromise and fails to achieve a better result faces paying the offeror’s costs on an indemnity basis, I have come to the view that a proper basis has been shown for departure from the prima facie rule and the notice of motion should be dismissed.

65. [75]

    I propose the following orders: