Karimi v Rasouli

These proceedings concern a dispute regarding the administration of the estate of the late Mike Rasoli (also known as Mohsen Rasouli) [1] (the deceased), who died intestate on 2 January 2024. The deceased was 45 years of age at the time of his death and does not appear to have been married, to have been in a de facto relationship, nor to have had children. The deceased is survived by his mother and the plaintiff, Narges Karimi (Ms Karimi), his sister and the defendant, Shahnaz Rasouli (Ms Rasouli), and a number of other siblings. The deceased’s father is also said to be deceased.

Letters of administration for the deceased’s estate were granted to Ms Rasouli on 26 April 2024 (the Grant), with the Inventory of Property attached to the Grant indicating that the estimated value of the estate, at least at the time of the Grant, was in the order of $1,556,762.38. The nature of the estate included real estate, cash deposited with various banks, a life insurance policy, and shares in companies. I consider that the variety of assets which formed part of the deceased’s estate indicates there is a level of complexity in relation to the estate.

The Grant discloses that the basis of the grant to Ms Rasouli was as

The reference to Ms Rasouli as Ms Karimi’s “attorney” is said to arise from a document dated 11 January 2024 (the putative Power of Attorney). On its face, within the putative Power of Attorney, Ms Karimi appointed Ms Rasouli as her attorney for the purposes of making an application for Letters of Administration in the State of New South Wales of the estate of the deceased and to carry out the administration of the deceased’s estate following a grant. Clause 6.1 of the document allowed for its revocation. The clause provided that Ms Karimi could revoke (or suspend) the powers and authorities granted within the putative Power of Attorney by written notice from her to Ms Rasouli.

To the extent the putative Power of Attorney document was valid, Ms Karimi revoked that appointment on 18 July 2024 in accordance with cl 6 of that document.

Ms Karimi is currently around 87 years of age and lives in Tehran, Iran. In these proceedings, she is represented by Sydney law firm Cambridge Law. Mr Javid Ahmadi Igder is a solicitor employed by Cambridge Law who has given evidence that he speaks fluent English and Persian (elsewhere referred to as Farsi). In one of the affidavits he has affirmed in these proceedings, he states that he personally has spoken to, by telephone, and otherwise communicated with Ms Karimi in relation to obtaining her instructions in these proceedings.

Ms Karimi provided a written statement for use in the proceedings. I will return to this statement when I discuss the evidence below. In this statement, Ms Karimi says she speaks and writes Persian fluently. However, she cannot speak, write or read English.

I infer that Mr Ahmadi Igder and Ms Karimi spoke or wrote in Persian when they communicated and when Mr Ahmadi Igder obtained instructions, noting Mr Ahmadi Igder did give direct evidence in his affidavit affirmed 15 July 2025 of reading specified documents to Ms Karimi in Farsi.

By way of further background, Ms Karimi stated she and her husband had nine children, and that the deceased emigrated to Australia in about 2009. I infer that the deceased was born in Iran. Ms Karimi also stated that she and the deceased kept in contact after he left for Australia.

There is no evidence that the deceased ever made a will in either Australia or Iran, and it is not in dispute that he died intestate. Accordingly, the deceased’s estate will be distributed in accordance with the intestacy provisions of the Succession Act 2006 (NSW) (Succession Act). More particularly, as the deceased died without a spouse or children, Ms Karimi will be entitled to the whole of the estate of the deceased as the sole surviving parent, in accordance with s 128 of the Succession Act (TR P25 L22-23).

By Summons filed on 24 February 2025, supplemented by a Points of Claim document filed on 20 June 2025 (POC) (the Registrar in Probate ordered the provision of the POC on 27 May 2025), Ms Karimi seeks orders which include an order for the revocation of the Grant, together with an order appointing a new administrator.

In the POC, Ms Karimi identified three bases on which she claims the Grant should be revoked. The first two bases relate to the initial basis of the Grant, being the putative Power of Attorney. First, she pleads the putative Point of Attorney has been revoked (POC [15]-[17]). Second, Ms Karimi challenges the validity of the putative Power of Attorney itself on a “non est factum” basis, given Ms Karimi’s inability to read and write English and an apparent misrepresentation as to the circumstances of the signing of the putative Power of Attorney (POC [19]-[20]). Either because the putative Power of Attorney was revoked or because it ought to be set aside, Ms Karimi says as a consequence, the Grant should be revoked (POC [23]). The third pleaded basis for the revocation of the Grant is an alleged failure to administer the estate (POC [21]-[22]).

At the hearing of the Summons, Mr A Berriman of counsel appeared on behalf of Ms Karimi. Mr Berriman provided written submissions (PWS) and made further oral submissions on Ms Karimi’s behalf in support of the application. In her written submissions, Ms Karimi did not press the second basis for revoking the Grant pleaded in the POC (being the challenge to the initial validity of the putative Power of Attorney on the “non est factum” basis), and accordingly, Mr Berriman indicated that the relevant part of the POC, [19]-[20] of that pleading, was not pressed (TR P17 L36-38).

Ms Rasouli appeared for herself in the proceedings. Whilst English did not appear to be her first language, Ms Rasouli appeared to be able to understand the content of the proceedings and was able to indicate orally her views in relation to the application, as well as make relevant and responsive submissions in relation to evidence and the issues before the Court.

Sitting at the bar table with Ms Rasouli was her friend, Ms K Emamvardi. Notwithstanding that no formal application was made for Ms Emamvardi to provide Ms Rasouli with assistance during the hearing (such as in the capacity of a McKenzie friend), Ms Emamvardi would occasionally repeat (I inferred) to Ms Rasouli issues that had been raised in a language other than English (which I assumed to be Persian). Ms Emamvardi also occasionally spoke to the Court communicating Ms Rasouli’s views as to certain matters on her behalf. No objection on the part of the plaintiff was taken to this course. I allowed the occasional assistance provided by Ms Emamvardi as it appeared to facilitate the progress of the proceedings, noting however that Ms Rasouli at all times retained the role of a self-represented party.

Given Ms Rasouli’s status as a self-represented party, following clarification with both parties as to what the real issues for determination were, I explained to Ms Rasouli basic information about court practice and procedure to ensure a fair trial for both parties, while clearly indicating that I could not advise her on how to exercise her legal rights (TR P11-17). (See, eg, Hamod v New South Wales [2011] NSWCA 375 at [309]-[316] (Beazley JA, Giles and Whealy JJA agreeing); Bauskis v Liew [2013] NSWCA 297 at [67]-[70] (Gleeson JA, Beazley P and Barrett JA agreeing); Mohareb v Local Court of New South Wales [2024] NSWCA 235 at [37] (Kirk and McHugh JJA).)

On the morning of the hearing, immediately prior to its commencement, the parties asked for time to confer to see if there could be any agreement in relation to the issues before the Court. I acceded to this request and the hearing eventually commenced at 11:00am.

At the commencement of the hearing, Mr Berriman informed the Court that Ms Rasouli no longer opposed the orders that were being sought. Ms Rasouli confirmed this position.

Ms Rasouli indicated that her real concern was that she was to be criticised for the work she had done attending to her brother’s affairs after his death, including concern that there might be some allegation as to some dishonesty on her part (TR P9-10).

I informed Ms Rasouli that it was my understanding, having reviewed Ms Karimi’s written submissions, that no such allegations were to be made against her. However, to clarify the position of Ms Karimi, I called on Mr Berriman to indicate the approach that was to be taken by Ms Karimi. Mr Berriman stated the following from the bar table (TR P10 L6-15):

Ms Rasouli acknowledged the statement made by Mr Berriman on behalf of Ms Karimi (TR P10 L19) and extended her thanks (TR P10 L33-50).

The Court was greatly assisted by the approach taken by the legal representatives for Ms Karimi, Mr Berriman and his instructing solicitor, Mr Rahal, and by Ms Rasouli herself, in coming to an agreed position on the issues before the Court, and for ensuring that the processes undertaken in the course of the hearing were conducted in a courteous and respectful manner.

Notwithstanding that Ms Rasouli did not oppose the orders sought by Ms Karimi, the Court must still be independently satisfied that it ought to make the orders sought.

For the reasons which follow, the Court is satisfied that it ought to make the orders sought for the revocation of the Grant and the appointment of a new administrator. These are in essence the orders sought by Ms Karimi as set out in the Summons, varying only to whom the fresh grant of Letters of Administration will be granted, as discussed at [41]-[46].

Ms Karimi read and relied on two affidavits provided by Mr Ahmadi Igder, affirmed on 18 February 2025 and 15 July 2025, as well as a number of documents, including various communications between the parties.

Ms Karimi also read and relied on a statement provided by herself, dated 4 July 2025 (the statement of Ms Karimi).

Counsel for the plaintiff acknowledged that the statement of Ms Karimi was “a little unorthodox” in that it was translated and read to her by her solicitor, Mr Ahmadi Igder, given he is fluent in both Persian and English. Mr Ahmadi Igder read and translated the statement and arranged for it to be signed via WhatsApp video call (TR P17-18).

Ms Rasouli was asked whether she objected to any of the evidence that Ms Karimi sought to tender. Initially, Ms Rasouli raised concerns about the truthfulness of aspects of the documentary evidence. However, the evidence Ms Rasouli was concerned about was not directly relevant to any of the issues to be decided and was not relied on in the submissions of Ms Karimi (TR P16 L34-49; P21 L30-38). I had explained to Ms Rasouli that if Mr Berriman took me to any evidence in the course of his submissions that she did not agree with, she could let me know, and that I would make a ruling then in relation to that evidence (TR P17 L13-25, P19-20). Mr Berriman did not object to this approach. Ultimately, Ms Rasouli did not object to any of the evidence.

With respect to the statement of Ms Karimi, r 31.2 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (UCPR) states:

Whilst the statement of Ms Karimi is not in the form of an affidavit, and thus on its face not compliant with r 31.2, I considered the following matters relevant as to whether I should make any order that the statement of Ms Karimi be nevertheless admitted:

Consequently, I decided to admit the statement of Ms Karimi, noting that its deficiencies would affect its probative value. The orders at the end of this judgment will include an order that the evidence in chief of Ms Karimi is not required to be given by affidavit and may be given by witness statement, as effective from the date of the hearing pursuant to UCPR r 36.4(3).

As Ms Rasouli raised no objections, each of the remaining affidavits and other associated documents were also admitted into evidence.

I also raised with Ms Rasouli whether she had any evidence she wished to put before the Court. I noted that she had already provided my Chambers with a bundle of documents but informed Ms Rasouli that I had not reviewed the contents of the bundle. Ms Rasouli asked for me to “have a look [at] all of them” (TR P8 L39-49).

Following this request, I explained to Ms Rasouli that documents put before the Court need to be relevant to the issues that need to decided. I asked her to explain how her bundle of documents was relevant to those issues (TR P9 L5-15).

Ms Rasouli did not take me to individual parts of the bundle. However, she explained that the purpose of the bundle was to show that she was an honest person, and to explain the steps she had taken in relation to the administration of the estate to date. It was at that point of the proceedings that I called upon Ms Karimi to indicate whether Ms Rasouli’s honesty was a fact in issue, which triggered the statement made on behalf of Ms Kamiri quoted above at [20] (TR P9 L17-P10 L4).

Following this clarification and having already explained to Ms Rasouli that all evidence ultimately before the Court needed to be relevant to a fact in issue, I confirmed with Ms Rasouli that as her honesty was not in issue, the bundle of documents going to her honesty was not relevant and thus did not need to be before the Court (TR P10 L42-45). In response to this, Ms Rasouli thanked the Court (TR P10 L47-50).

No witnesses were required for cross-examination.

In her written submissions, Ms Karimi relied on three bases to support the revocation application (PWS [25]-[28]) (formatting as in original):

Ms Karimi repeated and explained these submissions orally (TR P22-28). The only departure from the written submissions was that Ms Karimi no longer proposed Mr Kaveh Ariyan as administrator, as discussed at [41]-[42] below (TR P27 L8-9).

Ms Rasouli did not seek to be heard in reply to the oral submissions made by Mr Berriman. She did, however, seek to raise issues related to the administration of the estate in so far as she sought to explain her own past conduct (TR P30 L29-33). However, on this issue, Ms Karimi repeatedly confirmed in the course of submissions that no criticism was being made of Ms Rasouli in relation to her administration of the estate, save for a more general submission as to a lack of progress.

Ms Karimi initially sought a fresh grant of Letters of Administration be ordered in favour of Mr Kaveh Ariyan (PWS [28]).

However, early in the course of the hearing, I drew Mr Berriman’s attention to the prayer for relief which sought to have Mr Ariyan appointed as administrator. I foreshadowed my concern that there was no proper evidence before me from Mr Ariyan himself as to his consent to taking on this responsible position, nor any evidence as to his experience and expertise in relation to the administration of deceased estates, nor whether he proposed to charge for the work he may undertake in the role (TR P6 L25-45, P7 L21-46). It was conceded there was no evidence of Mr Ariyan’s expertise (TR P7 L26-49).

At the end of the hearing, Ms Karimi sought leave to file a further affidavit to be provided by another person, not being Mr Ariyan, whose appointment as administrator was sought, setting out this alternative person’s consent to act as administrator, their expertise and qualifications, their confirmation they have no conflict of interest in relation to the administration of the deceased’s estate, and their fees (TR P31 L30-P32 L40). Ms Rasouli did not object to this application.

I granted that leave and asked that the affidavit be provided by email to my Chambers by no later than 4:00pm on Monday, 9 February 2026.

In accordance with that order, an affidavit of Sayed Khedr sworn on 8 February 2026 was provided to my Chambers by email on Monday, 9 February 2026 at 8:21am. Ms Rasouli was copied into that email.

That affidavit relevantly contained the following evidence:

Given the narrowing of the issues by the time of the hearing, the relevant facts relied on supporting the application, being those set out at [1] to [10] in the Background and chronology section of this judgment, were not contested. Having reviewed the whole of the evidence before me, I accept the evidence cited which underpinned those relevant facts, and the facts and events set out in the Background and chronology section can therefore be taken as findings of the Court. In relation to [5], my reasons for that specific finding are contained below at [54].

In relation to the affidavit of Mr Khedr, my Chambers did not receive any further email from Ms Rasouli objecting to that affidavit or otherwise raising any other matter. I therefore accept the relevant evidence in his affidavit as set out above.

The Court may at any time, upon the application of any person interested in the estate, revoke a grant of administration: Probate and Administration Act 1898 (NSW) s 66(a). In making submissions as to the legal principles to be applied in revocation applications and the making of a fresh grant, Ms Karimi cited and relied on the principles set out by Richmond J in Turch v Tripolone [2025] NSWSC 86 at [129]-[133]. I agree with and gratefully adopt the summary of principles cited therein. For convenience, I will reproduce those paragraphs below:

Having regard to the principles set out above, it is clear that the primary concern of the Court in considering any revocation and fresh appointment application is to ensure that the estate is efficiently and properly administered in the interests of the parties beneficially entitled to it (see also, Lester v Brown [2022] NSWSC 716 at [111] (Hallen J)).

Having regard to the procedural and factual background set out above, together with the relevant legal principles and the further evidence in relation to Mr Sayed Khedr provided by Ms Karimi, the following issues arise for consideration:

I am of the view that it is in the interests of the due administration of the estate of the deceased that I make an order for the revocation of the Grant, as sought.

In reaching this conclusion I have had regard to the submissions made, noting Ms Rasouli ultimately did not wish to be heard in reply to Ms Karimi’s submissions, and the evidence as a whole. The reasons that the Grant should be revoked are essentially those contained in [25]-[28] of Ms Karimi’s written submissions. For the reasons below, I accept those submissions.

First, I accept Ms Karimi’s submission that the basis of the Grant no longer exists, being the appointment of Ms Rasouli as attorney. As I found earlier at [5] above, Ms Karimi validly revoked this appointment as long ago as 18 July 2024. The written notice by which I consider the putative Power of Attorney was revoked was an email dated 18 July 2024 from Mr Rahal to various lawyers at a firm known as MistryFallahi Lawyers who appear to have been acting for Ms Rasouli. In that email, amongst other matters, Mr Rahal stated “our client now terminates/revokes any alleged power of attorney said to have been given …”. Again noting that Ms Rasouli made no submissions suggesting the putative Power of Attorney was still effective, I accept that an email from Ms Karimi’s solicitors to the solicitors who were then acting for Ms Rasouli constituted written notice by Ms Karimi to Ms Rasouli of the revocation of the putative Power of Attorney for the purposes of cl 6.1, such that any powers and authorities conferred by that document were validly revoked by reason of Mr Rahal’s email dated 18 July 2024.

I note that Ms Karimi, in her written submissions, also referred to a document titled “Deed of Revocation” dated 20 June 2025, which was in evidence, as providing a further justification to say Ms Rasouli’s appointment as attorney had been revoked. The document was signed by Ms Karimi herself and contains an attestation by Mr Ahmadi Igder that he translated the contents of this Deed to Ms Karimi. Clause 1 refers to Ms Karimi’s signing of the putative Power of Attorney. Clauses 2-4 provide further background information. Clauses 5-6 read as follows:

The language of the Deed of Revocation is clear. However, there is no evidence that the Deed of Revocation was actually ever given to Ms Rasouli (such as to constitute written notice to her, as cl 6.1 of the putative Power of Attorney required for an effective revocation of power) prior to being (presumably) served with Mr Ahmadi Igder’s affidavit affirmed 15 July 2025, which annexed that Deed of Revocation. It might be that upon receipt of a copy of that Deed of Revocation, the document could at that point constitute the necessary written notice to Ms Rasouli revoking her power and authority under cl 6.1 of the putative Power of Attorney. In any event, in light of both my conclusion that the putative Power of Attorney was revoked in July 2024 and Ms Rasouli not making submissions on this issue, the effectiveness (or not) of the Deed of Revocation need not be explored.

Second, I accept Ms Karimi’s submission that even if the basis of the Grant did still exist, the evidence has not revealed any steps taken by Ms Rasouli towards realising the assets of the estate of the deceased or attempts to distribute the assets. Considering it has been nearly two years since the Grant, this lack of progression in relation to the administration of the deceased’s estate is a roadblock to its efficient and proper administration, and justifies the revocation of the Grant.

Third, I accept Ms Rasouli has evinced a reluctance or ambivalence to continue as administratrix. There are in evidence two emails from Ms Rasouli, dated 27 September 2024 and 1 October 2024, in which Ms Rasouli seems to quite expressly suggest she would no longer like to administer the deceased’s estate. Ms Karimi acknowledged that there is a later email from Ms Rasouli dated 21 November 2024 where she says she has changed her mind and requests Mr Rahal to stop putting into motion any process to remove her as administratrix. However, I do not consider this email changes anything in light of the fact that at the hearing, Ms Rasouli did not oppose the revocation of the Grant.

For those reasons, orders should be made to revoke the Grant.

I am of the view that it is in the interests of the due administration of the estate of the deceased that I make an order that Letters of Administration of the estate of the deceased be granted to Mr Sayed Khedr.

In reaching this conclusion, I have had regard to the affidavit evidence provided by Mr Khedr himself. In particular, I note that Mr Khedr is a solicitor and thus an officer of this Court. His evidence firmly establishes that he has the appropriate and relevant experience and expertise to enable him to administer the estate of the deceased, noting that Mr Khedr has deposed to having prior experience administering estates.

I accept Ms Karimi’s submissions that there is utility in appointing a new administrator, having regard to the lack of progress concerning the administration of the estate. I accept Ms Karimi’s submissions, having regard to the evidence, that it appears the estate remains to be administered and distributed, such that the deceased’s estate would benefit from the appointment of a fresh administrator.

I further note that Ms Rasouli has made no objection to his appointment.

The plaintiff sought an order for her costs to be paid out of the estate on the ordinary basis. Ms Rasouli did not oppose this application.

Having regard to all of the circumstances of the case, and in the exercise of the Court’s discretion pursuant to Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 98(1), I will make the costs order sought. I consider that the application was properly brought and is in the interests of the due administration of the estate. I therefore consider that it is proper that the costs be paid from the estate.

It will be noted that in all likelihood, Ms Karimi will be the sole beneficiary of the estate of her son, in which case she will be bearing the burden of any such costs order in the long run, in any event.

Ms Rasouli, as a self-represented litigant, understandably did not make any submissions in relation to her own costs. As such, I will make no order in relation to her costs, with the intention that she bear her own costs, if any.

For the reasons set out above, I make the following orders: