Litigation Fund WCX Pty Ltd v Aversa

These proceedings are yet another chapter in the ongoing dispute involving the plaintiff, Litigation Fund WCX Pty Ltd, in its pursuit of Rosario and Antonia Aversa (collectively, the Aversas) for the repayment of funds said to have been advanced by Litigation Fund to the Aversas. Those funds are alleged to have been advanced for the purposes of funding class action proceedings brought by the Aversas against Transport for New South Wales (TfNSW) concerning the construction of the WestConnex motorway in Sydney (WestConnex proceedings).

Robert Coshott is the sole director, secretary and shareholder of Litigation Fund. He is also the sole director and secretary of Coshott Family Pty Ltd, a company which also became involved in the pursuit of the Aversas. Mr Coshott holds ten ordinary shares of the 11 ordinary shares comprising the issued capital of Coshott Family. In other words, Mr Coshott has control of both Litigation Fund and Coshott Family.

Mr Coshott is also a former solicitor and has frequently appeared for Litigation Fund or self-representing himself at hearings in multiple proceedings in this court over many years.

The Aversas and Litigation Fund have brought competing interlocutory applications in these proceedings.

First, the Aversas have applied by notice of motion filed 29 September 2025 to summarily dismiss these proceedings pursuant to r 13.4 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (UCPR) or strike out the statement of claim pursuant to r 14.28 of the UCPR. In the alternative, the Aversas seek an order that Litigation Fund give security for the Aversas’ costs of the proceedings together with ancillary orders that the proceedings be stayed until such security is provided, or dismissed if the security is not provided within 30 days.

Secondly, Litigation Fund filed its own notice of motion on 1 October 2025 seeking summary judgment pursuant to r 13.1 of the UCPR against the Aversas.

For the reasons set out below, I have determined that these proceedings should be summarily dismissed on the basis that they are as an abuse of process and that Litigation Fund should pay the Aversas’ costs of the proceedings. As a result, Litigation Fund’s application for summary judgment should be dismissed and the Aversas’ application for security for their costs does not arise for determination.

The relevant history of the various claims brought in the Local Court of New South Wales and in this court concerning the funds provided to the Aversas in relation to the WestConnex proceedings is set out below.

On 21 September 2021, Coshott Family filed a further amended statement of claim in the Local Court (Local Court proceedings) in which it joined the Aversas as the third and fourth defendants and Collins & Thompson Pty Ltd as the second defendant to proceedings which Coshott Family had brought against David Thompson in relation to the advance of funds of $50,000 for the purposes of the WestConnex proceedings.

The claims which were brought by Coshott Family against the Aversas in the further amended statement of claim was for moneys had and received and restitution for unjust enrichment.

On 21 October 2022, Magistrate Greenwood of the Local Court dismissed all of the claims made by Coshott Family in the Local Court proceedings on the basis that Coshott Family had failed to prove that it had advanced any money (T8). Magistrate Greenwood also ordered Coshott Family to pay the costs of David Thompson, Collins & Thompson Pty Ltd and the Aversas on an ordinary basis to 22 September 2011 and thereafter on an indemnity basis or as agreed or assessed (T29). In the course of delivering judgment in the Local Court proceedings, Magistrate Greenwood made the following findings about the credibility and reliability of Mr Coshott’s evidence (T3):

On 24 October 2022 (just three days after the judgment dismissing the Local Court proceedings), Litigation Fund brought proceedings against the Aversas in the Common Law Division of this court (Common Law proceedings) by filing the statement of claim. Trevor Hall of Hall Partners was acting for Litigation Fund at the time of the preparation of the statement of claim. Mr Coshott, as the sole director of Litigation Fund, swore an oath verifying the truthfulness of the allegations of fact in the statement of claim on 21 October 2022 and must therefore be taken to have read and understood it.

The statement of claim alleged that Litigation Fund had entered two agreements with the Aversas together and one agreement with Rosario alone (together, the agreements), and Litigation Fund had terminated the agreements after giving notice to the Aversas that they were in breach of each of them. In an unparticularised manner in the statement of claim, Litigation Fund claimed that the Aversas were liable to pay Litigation Fund $350,000 under each of the agreements and a further amount of $150,000 alleged to have been paid under the agreements.

It is necessary for me to set out the procedural history of the Common Law proceedings in some detail in light of the nature of the arguments that have been raised on these applications.

On 29 November 2022, the Aversas filed substantially identical defences to the statement of claim in the Common Law proceedings in which they admitted that they had entered into the three agreements with Litigation Fund but denied that they had breached those agreements and denied that they were liable to pay any amount to Litigation Fund as alleged.

Also on 29 November 2022, the Aversas filed a cross-claim in the Common Law proceedings in which they sought orders that there were no legally enforceable agreements between themselves and Litigation Fund, that the agreements were void ab initio or that the agreements be set aside. The contention that there were no legally enforceable agreements was based on the allegation that Litigation Fund was not incorporated at the time of the agreements. The contention that the agreements were void ab initio was based on alleged misleading and deceptive conduct of Litigation Fund prior to the entry into the agreements contrary to s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law, being Schedule 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth). The contention that the agreements should be set aside was based on the allegation that each of the agreements was unjust within the meaning of s 4 of the Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW).

On 14 March 2023, Registrar Jones made directions in the Common Law proceedings, including the following:

On 31 March 2023, Litigation Fund filed the amended statement of claim in the Common Law proceedings. Trevor Withane of Ironbridge Legal was acting for Litigation Fund at the time of the preparation of the amended statement of claim. Mr Coshott, as the sole director of Litigation Fund, swore an oath verifying the truthfulness of the allegations of fact in the amended statement of claim on 30 March 2023 and must therefore be taken to have read and understood it.

At this time, Litigation Fund had known for just over four months that the Aversas alleged that the agreements were not legally enforceable.

The amendments in the amended statement of claim were a wholesale restatement of the claims against the Aversas. In the amended statement of claim, Litigation Fund stated that the purpose of the agreements was to facilitate the provision of funding to the Aversas for the WestConnex proceedings. The essence of the amended claims were that:

On 4 April 2023, Registrar Jones made directions in the Common Law proceedings extending the time for Litigation Fund to file and serve any defence to the cross-claim to 6 April 2023.

On 6 April 2023, Litigation Fund filed its defence to the cross-claim in the Common Law proceedings. Trevor Withane of Ironbridge Legal was acting for Litigation Fund at the time of the preparation of the defence to the cross-claim. Mr Coshott, as the sole director of Litigation Fund, swore an oath verifying the truthfulness of the allegations of fact in the defence to the cross-claim on 6 April 2023 and must therefore be taken to have read and understood it, as well as the cross-claim to which it responds that had been received just over four months earlier.

In the defence to the cross-claim, Litigation Fund admitted that it was not incorporated at the time of the agreements but stated that the agreements were affirmed following its incorporation and otherwise denied the allegations made in relation to the misleading and deceptive conduct and the unjust agreements.

On 21 April 2023, the Aversas filed their defences to the amended statement of claim in the Common Law proceedings, which were substantially identical. In their defences, the Aversas explicitly denied that the agreements were legally binding and stated that they were “purported agreements”.

On 11 May 2023, Registrar Jones made directions in the Common Law proceedings, including the following:

Litigation Fund did not file and serve any reply to the defences to the amended statement of claim by 31 May 2023 or at any other time.

On 1 June 2023, Registrar Jones made directions in the Common Law proceedings, including the following:

On 7 July 2023, Registrar Hedge made directions in the Common Law proceedings, including extending the time for Litigation Fund to file and serve its evidence to 13 July 2023 and extending the time for the Aversas to file and serve their evidence to 17 August 2023.

On 26 July 2023, Registrar Jones made directions in the Common Law proceedings, including the following:

On 25 August 2023, Litigation Fund filed and served its evidence.

On 3 September 2023, Registrar Hedge made directions in the Common Law proceedings, including extending the time for the Aversas to file and serve their evidence to 29 September 2023 and for Litigation Fund to file and serve any reply evidence by 13 October 2023.

On 17 October 2023, the Aversas sent an email to Litigation Fund stating that they were in the process of drafting an amended statement of cross-claim and intended to provide a copy to Litigation Fund within 14 days.

On 18 October 2023, Registrar Hedge made directions in the Common Law proceedings, including the following:

On 15 November 2023, the Aversas sent an email to Litigation Fund attaching a proposed amended statement of cross-claim.

On 16 November 2023, Registrar Hedge made directions in the Common Law proceedings, including the following:

On 16 November 2023, Litigation Fund sent an email to the Aversas advising that it did not consent to the filing of the proposed amended statement of cross-claim.

On 29 November 2023, the Aversas filed a notice of motion seeking leave to file the proposed amended statement of cross-claim and for a further extension of time for filing their evidence.

On 5 December 2023, Registrar Hedge fixed the date of 22 February 2024 for the hearing of the Aversas’ notice of motion seeking leave to file the proposed amended cross-claim.

On 22 February 2024, Registrar Jones heard the Aversas’ notice of motion seeking leave to file the proposed amended cross-claim and reserved judgment.

On 1 March 2024, Registrar Jones dismissed the Aversas’ notice of motion seeking leave to file the proposed amended cross-claim.

On 8 March 2024, Registrar Hedge made directions in the Common Law proceedings, including the following:

On 15 March 2024, the Aversas filed and served their evidence.

On 5 April 2024, Litigation Fund filed a notice of motion seeking a review of the orders made by Registrar Hedge on 8 March 2024 and, if that order was not granted, an order that the hearing fixed for 2 May 2024 be vacated. Litigation Fund also sought orders against the Aversas that they pay amounts they had been ordered to pay in respect of costs and provide security for Litigation Fund’s costs of the cross-claim.

On 24 April 2024, Registrar Jones ordered that the notice of motion filed 5 April 2024 be listed for consideration at the hearing fixed to commence on 1 May 2024.

Mr Coshott gave evidence on affidavit before me that in March/April 2024 Litigation Fund had become dissatisfied with the conduct of the proceedings by Ironbridge Legal and, on 26 April 2024, Ironbridge delivered to Litigation Fund the file in the proceedings.

Mr Coshott also gave evidence on affidavit before me, which stated:

On 1 May 2024, in relation to Litigation Fund’s notice of motion filed 5 April 2024, McNaughton J declined to review the orders of Registrar Hedge made on 8 March 2024 and vacated the hearing fixed for 2 May 2025. Her Honour dismissed the application by Litigation Fund seeking an order that the Aversas pay costs to Litigation Fund and noted that Litigation Fund did not press its application for security for costs of the cross-claim.

Also on 1 May 2024, McNaughton J made further directions in the Common Law proceedings, including the following:

Mr Coshott gave evidence on affidavit before me that:

There is no other explanation provided by Litigation Fund as to why it had taken until May 2024 for it to form the view that it should seek to plead its alternative claims.

On 21 May 2024, Litigation Fund filed a notice of motion in the Common Law proceedings (Common Law motion) seeking leave to file a further amended statement of claim in which it was sought to assert alternative claims against the Aversas to the effect that:

On 1 July 2024, Registrar Hedge listed the Common Law motion for hearing on 1 August 2024 and made directions for the filing and service of submissions.

On 1 August 2024, Registrar Jones heard the Common Law motion and reserved judgment.

On 12 August 2024, Registrar Jones dismissed the Common Law motion on the basis that the proposed amendments were embarrassing and not in the interests of justice, and that the Aversas would suffer prejudice if Litigation Fund was allowed to file the proposed further amended statement of claim as it might jeopardise the upcoming hearing. Registrar Jones concluded that it would be inconsistent with the dictates of justice in s 58 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) (CPA) to allow the amendments.

Litigation Fund did not seek to review the decision of Registrar Jones not to allow the amendments in the draft further amended statement of claim.

On 25 and 26 November 2024, the Common Law proceedings were heard by McNaughton J and judgment was reserved.

On 15 May 2025, McNaughton J delivered judgment in the Common Law proceedings dismissing the amended statement of claim and ordering that Litigation Fund pay the costs of the Aversas: Litigation Fund WCX Pty Ltd v Aversa [2025] NSWSC 469. In summary, McNaughton J held that Litigation Fund had failed to prove that there was any binding agreement between Litigation Fund and the Aversas (at [117]–[119]) and, even if there was any binding agreement, Litigation Fund had failed to prove that there had been any breaches of them (at [133]–[134] and [151]–[153]).

Litigation Fund did not appeal the decision of McNaughton J.

There was affidavit evidence from the solicitor for the Aversas (Christopher Morris) that the Aversas incurred $225,874.56 in costs in the Common Law proceedings. Those costs are yet to be assessed.

On 13 August 2025, Litigation Fund commenced these proceedings by filing the statement of claim. Litigation Fund claims that the Aversas have been unjustly enriched at its expense and seeks restitution of the monies alleged to have been provided to the Aversas plus interest, damages and costs.

On 25 September 2025, each of the Aversas filed a defence in substantially identical form. In summary, the Aversas put in issue the alleged unjust enrichment and raised substantive defences to the claims, including that Litigation Fund is estopped from bringing these proceedings based on issue estoppel and/or Anshun estoppel and these proceedings are an abuse of process.

There was affidavit evidence from the solicitor for the Aversas (Christopher Morris) that the Aversas are likely to incur $71,830.00 in costs in these proceedings.

The court’s power to summarily dismiss proceedings is contained in r 13.4 of the UCPR. Relevantly, rr 13.4(1) and (2) of the UCPR provide:

For many decades, the shorthand expression of the applicable principles for the determination of an application to summarily dismiss proceedings has been described as the “General Steel test”, which derives from the decision in General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125; [1964] HCA 69, in which it was held by Barwick CJ at 128–9 that:

In Agar v Hyde (2000) 201 CLR 552; [2000] HCA 41, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ commented on the General Steel test in the following way at [57] (citation omitted):

This expression of principle was endorsed in Batistatos v Roads & Traffic Authority New South Wales (2006) 226 CLR 256; [2006] HCA 27, Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ at [46] (where it was also said that the General Steel test should not be given “canonical force”) and in Spencer v Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118; [2010] HCA 28, French CJ and Gummow J at [24].

In Shaw v New South Wales (2012) 219 IR 87; [2012] NSWCA 102, Barrett JA (with whom Beazley, McColl and Macfarlan JJA and McClellan CJ at CL agreed) at [32] elaborated on the General Steel test for summary dismissal as follows:

This assessment is to be made by taking the case of the party bringing the claim at its highest, meaning that the party applying for summary dismissal must accept the truth of all allegations in the claim and the ranges of meaning which assertions in the claim are capable of bearing: see Simmons v New South Wales Trustee and Guardian (2014) 17 BPR 33,717; [2014] NSWCA 405, Gleeson JA (with whom Beazley P and Barrett JA agreed) at [200], citing Penthouse Publications Ltd v McWilliam (Court of Appeal (NSW), Priestley and Meagher JJA and Wardell AJA, 15 March 1991, unrep); Agius v New South Wales [2001] NSWCA 371, Giles JA (with whom Priestley and Powell JJA agreed) at [24].

The Court of Appeal decision in GR v Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice [2023] NSWCA 239, similarly dealt with an interlocutory application for summary dismissal, with Adamson JA observing at [123]:

In exercising my discretion under r 13.4 of the UCPR, I must also have regard to the requirements of ss 56 and 57 of the CPA.

The overriding purpose of the CPA and the UCPR in their application to civil proceedings in this court is to facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings: s 56(1) of the CPA. I must seek to give effect to that overriding purpose when I exercise any power in the CPA or the UCPR: s 56(2) of the CPA.

In seeking to give effect to the overriding purpose, I must have regard to the objects of the just determination of the proceedings, the efficient disposal of the business of the court, the efficient use of available judicial and administrative resources, and the timely disposal of the proceedings at a cost affordable by the respective parties: s 57(1) of the CPA.

The decision of Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 589; [1981] HCA 45 established what has become known as an Anshun estoppel (or the extended principle in Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 115; 67 ER 319) and how it differs from res judicata and issue estoppel.

In Anshun, Gibbs CJ, Mason and Aickin JJ at 602–603 stated the estoppel principles in the application to the facts of that case involving a failure by a defendant to raise a defence, in the following terms:

The modern expression of an Anshun estoppel is contained in a series of decisions of the High Court.

In Tomlinson v Ramsey Food Processing Pty Ltd (2015) 256 CLR 507; [2015] HCA 28, French CJ, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ at [22] described an Anshun estoppel as follows (footnotes omitted):

In Timbercorp Finance Pty Ltd (in liq) v Collins (2016) 259 CLR 212; [2016] HCA 44, French CJ, Kiefel, Keane and Nettle JJ at [27] said of an Anshun estoppel (footnotes omitted):

In Timbercorp, the plurality at [56] said that an Anshun estoppel is not based upon degrees of similarity and it had been made clear in Anshun that there could be no estoppel “unless it appears that the matter relied upon as a defence in the second action was so relevant to the subject matter of the first action that it would have been unreasonable not to rely on it”.

It was also observed in Timbercorp by the plurality at [60] that in Anshun it was generally accepted that a party will be estopped from bringing an action where, if it succeeds, it would result in a judgment which conflicts with an earlier judgment and in such a circumstance the litigation should be regarded as concluded by the earlier proceedings.

A party seeking to rely on an Anshun estoppel bears the onus of establishing the factual foundation for it: Clayton v Blunt (202) 272 CLR 1; [2020] HCA 44, Kiefel CJ, Bell and Gageler JJ at [28]–[31].

The circumstances in which an Anshun estoppel is in issue may often involve the consideration of whether the subsequent proceedings are an abuse of process. But there is not complete overlap between them. The decisions in Tomlinson and Timbercorp have also described the manner in which an abuse of process might arise.

An abuse of process and its relationship to estoppel was described in Tomlinson by French CJ, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ at [24]–[26] as follows (footnotes omitted):

The High Court endorsed this expression of an abuse of process in Timbercorp at [69].

The High Court also dealt with abuse of process in UBS AG v Tyne (2018) 265 CLR 77; [2018] HCA 45. In UBS, Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ stated at [1] that the varied circumstances in which the use of the court’s processes will amount to an abuse, notwithstanding that the use is consistent with the literal application of its rules, do not lend themselves to exhaustive statement but that either of two conditions enlivens the power:

The plurality in UBS at [43] also endorsed Tomlinson at [26] in the description of an abuse of process. The importance of the overriding purpose of “just, quick and cheap”, reflected in the federal equivalent of s 56 of the CPA, in the determination of an abuse of process was also emphasised in UBS by Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ at [45]–[46] in the following way:

The importance of conducting proceedings consistent with the overriding purpose were also emphasised in UBS at [55], and particularly at [59] where it was said:

In UBS, Gageler J at [61] agreed with the reasons of Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ and gave additional reasons, observing at [70] that the question of whether the claim sought to be brought in the later proceedings “should” have been brought in the earlier proceedings cannot be determined solely by reference to interests of the parties to the proceedings because there is also a public interest in the timely and efficient administration of civil justice, which must form part of the consideration.

The Aversas submit that the three agreements that are the subject matter of these proceedings were the subject matter of the Common Law proceedings, which have been finally determined and no appeal was brought seeking to overturn that judgment. The Aversas say that Litigation Fund seeks to advance a fresh cause of action in connection with the agreements or, in the alternative, seeks to re-agitate an issue which has already been determined.

The Aversas submit that the principles of an Anshun estoppel operate to restrain parties from raising an issue in fresh proceedings where that issue was so closely connected with the subject matter of an earlier proceeding that it should have reasonably been raised at that time. The Aversas argue that because the new cause of action in these proceedings of alleged unjust enrichment is directly connected to the subject matter of the Common Law proceedings, Litigation Fund is estopped from bringing these proceedings.

The Aversas also say that the court is empowered to prevent the misuse of its processes that, if allowed, would result in unfairness, harassment or damage to the integrity of the justice system. They say that this is the third set of proceedings that Mr Coshott as the sole director of Litigation Fund has caused to be commenced against the Aversas in connection with the agreements. They say that all previous proceedings have been unsuccessful and that the respective decisions have not been appealed. The Aversas submit that these proceedings are an abuse of process and that the court should not permit Litigation Fund to prosecute them.

Litigation Fund says that in asserting an Anshun estoppel, the Aversas bare the onus of proof, and the Aversas have not satisfied that onus.

Litigation Fund submits that the circumstances in this case are that Litigation Fund sought to amend the pleadings in the Common Law proceedings by raising these claims/issues in May 2024, some six months before the hearing on 25 November 2024, but Litigation Fund was not allowed by the court to raise these claims/issues. Litigation Fund submits that this is a clear circumstance in which it was reasonable for Litigation Fund not to raise the claim/issues in the Common Law proceedings.

Litigation Fund says that the Aversas opposed leave being granted to Litigation Fund to rely on the proposed further amended statement of claim in the Common Law proceedings and that they now complain that these claims were not raised in the Common Law proceedings.

Litigation Fund also submit that if the assertion that it cannot recover monies paid under the mistake that the agreements were binding/valid because the claim of Anshun estoppel is upheld, the Aversas will be unjustly enriched at the expense of Litigation Fund. In support of this submission, Litigation Fund relies on the following:

In my view, for the reasons set out below, these proceedings are an abuse of process of this court and must be summarily dismissed.

The Aversas have now been vexed with three sets of proceedings over four years involving the very same subject matter, being the agreements alleged to have been entered into pursuant to which funding was provided for the Aversas in relation to the WestConnex proceedings. The first proceedings were the Local Court proceedings brought by Coshott Family against the Aversas in September 2021. The second proceedings were the Common Law proceedings brought by Litigation Fund against the Aversas in October 2022. The third proceedings are these proceedings brought by Litigation Fund against the Aversas in August 2025. Those three proceedings have all been brought by two entities controlled by the same person – Mr Coshott. Applying UBS, Mr Coshott is the single directing mind and will of both Coshott Family and Litigation Fund, which are both under his common control for the purposes of all three proceedings.

It is true that Litigation Fund sought to make allegations in the alternative in the Common Law proceedings, which are essentially the same allegations it now makes in these proceedings, but was prevented from doing so by the order of Registrar Jones made on 12 August 2024. But no review of that decision was sought by Litigation Fund.

In the sense described in Tomlinson and UBS, it would be both unjustifiably oppressive to the Aversas and would bring the administration of justice into disrepute to allow Litigation Fund to bring claims now that it has already been prevented from bringing in the Common Law proceedings. This court has already concluded that it would be contrary to the dictates of justice in s 58 of the CPA for Litigation Fund to be allowed to bring the same claims in the Common Law proceedings. To allow Litigation Fund to have another attempt to bring the same claims in these proceedings would be even more inconsistent to the overriding purpose in s 56 of the CPA. Twice before the Aversas have had to defend proceedings involving the same subject matter and incur significant costs in doing so. This court has already devoted considerable resources over the past three years to determining the controversy between Litigation Fund and the Aversas over the same subject matter. That was especially the case in relation to the Common Law proceedings, which were subject to close case management, numerous directions hearings and many interlocutory applications before they were finally determined by McNaughton J. There was also no appeal from the decision of McNaughton J.

As emphasised in UBS by Gageler J at [70], the question of whether the same claims sought to be brought in these proceedings “should” have been brought in the Common Law proceedings cannot be determined solely by reference to interests of Litigation Fund and the Aversas as parties to the proceedings. I must also consider the public interest in the timely and efficient administration of justice. It would be neither timely nor efficient administration of justice to allow Litigation Fund to repeatedly reframe its case against the Aversas, especially in circumstances where this court has already determined that Litigation Fund was not permitted to bring the same claims in the Common Law proceedings.

Mr Coshott has also failed to provide an adequate explanation as to why it took him so long to seek to file the further amended statement of claim making the alternative claims in the Common Law proceedings. It is not sufficient for him to say that it was the fault of his solicitors, particularly given his own experience as a solicitor, including appearing for Litigation Fund as its director at multiple hearings in proceedings in this court. This is particularly so in light of the following matters:

In these circumstances I have a high degree of certainty that it is an abuse of process for Litigation Fund to now seek to run claims in these proceedings which should have been brought in the Common Law proceedings in sufficient time that would not have caused them to have been rejected. The court should not spend any further public resources on Litigations Fund’s various permutations of its claims in an unnecessarily protracted dispute and the Aversas should not be further troubled with yet more time and expense in defending them. The timely and efficient administration of justice by this court demands that these proceedings be dismissed, as does the unjustifiable oppression caused to the Aversas by them.

It is not necessary for me to consider whether an Anshun estoppel also arose in the present circumstances. The application of the inherently more broad and flexible principles in relation to abuse of process demand that I summarily dismiss these proceedings.

For the reasons stated above, I propose to make the following orders: