Commissioner of Police (NSW Police Force) v Adam

By Further Amended Summons filed in Court today, the Commissioner of Police (the “Commissioner”) seeks to challenge an order made by Humphreys LCM on 21 May 2021 ordering the Commissioner to pay the costs of the defendant, Mr Zeyiad Adam, thrown away by reason of an adjournment of a hearing due to occur on that day.

As I will explain, at the time the order was made, Mr Adam was facing criminal charges. As these proceedings only concern the test applied by the Presiding Magistrate in awarding him costs, the only matter necessary to note about those charges is that the principal prosecution witness against him was a person who will be referred to as “RP”. Further, given that this judgment is being delivered in open court, it is also necessary to note that on 12 November 2021 the charges against Mr Adam were dismissed. Nothing raised on the appeal or addressed in this judgment concerns the reasons for that dismissal.

On 7 May 2020, Mr Adam was arrested and charged. During preliminary hearings in the Local Court he entered pleas of not guilty. The charges were listed for hearing on 6 November 2020. An affidavit sworn by Mr Adam's solicitor in this Court contends that the hearing on 6 November 2020 was adjourned because it was alleged that a relative of RP, who had accompanied her to Court, abused and spat on Mr Adam in the foyer of the Court. The hearing was adjourned until 21 May 2021 at Liverpool Local Court.

A doctor's certificate dated 19 May 2021 records that RP was seen by a doctor on that day. She was described as "suffering from an acute medical condition requiring referral to hospital for further investigation". The certificate said that she was "not fit to attend Court this week." A New South Wales Health form dated 20 May 2021 indicates that RP was admitted to Liverpool Hospital on 19 May 2021 and released the following day. The form states that she was unfit for "work/school/usual activities" from 19 May 2021.

At around 2:13pm on 20 May 2021, the New South Wales Court Service Centre sent an email to the Liverpool Local Court indicating that RP had telephoned to indicate that she was sick and vomiting, had been admitted to hospital and was unable to attend Court. The notes indicated that RP intended to forward a medical certificate to the Court.

At 2:21pm on 20 May 2021, RP sent an email to Liverpool Local Court in which she gave an account of her symptoms, indicated that she did not feel fit to attend Court and asked to delay the proceedings for two weeks. She attached to the email the two medical certificates to which I have already referred.

At 2:28pm on 20 May 2021, RP sent a copy of the email she had sent to the Liverpool Local Court to the general email address for the Liverpool Police prosecutors.

In his affidavit, Mr Adam's solicitor states that around 2:45pm on 20 May 2021 he was contacted by a police prosecutor who advised of his intention to apply for an adjournment of the hearing on the basis that RP was sick. Mr Adam's solicitor responded that the application for an adjournment would be opposed. During the course of the conversation he referred to the effect of the proceedings on his client's professional standing.

At 3:14pm on 20 May 2021, a police prosecutor forwarded RP's email to the Liverpool Local Court Registry and foreshadowed making an application to vacate the hearing date. The email expressed an understanding that the application would be opposed.

At 4:14pm on 20 May 2021, RP sent an email to the officer in charge advising that she did not feel well enough to attend Court.

As noted, the matter was listed for hearing on 21 May 2021 in the Local Court sitting at Liverpool. When the matter was called on, the prosecutor applied for an adjournment. The application was opposed. The medical certificate and RP's email to the Court were tendered along with a further medical certificate dated 21 May 2021 from a doctor certifying that she was not fit to attend Court "this week." In opposing the application for an adjournment, counsel for Mr Adam referred, amongst other matters, to the inadequacy of the medical evidence, the earlier adjournment and the effect on his client of the proceedings.

The Presiding Magistrate gave ex tempore reasons for granting the adjournment. Those reasons thoroughly canvass the relevant issues. Ultimately, and notwithstanding some misgivings about the medical evidence, her Honour accepted that RP was unfit to attend Court that day and granted the adjournment.

Towards the conclusion of her judgment, her Honour noted that she had "significant sympathy" for Mr Adam's position by reason of the adjournment. After giving reasons, her Honour observed that "there is a remedy perhaps available in relation to costs". Counsel for Mr Adam then made an application to the Court for costs. The following exchange occurred:

After this, the prosecutor then submitted that costs should be limited to "one day in the circumstances that there was no contact from the complainant". Her Honour then observed, "[y]es, well, in relation to being just and reasonable, Mr Stanton, it must only be the costs thrown away of today." Counsel for Mr Adam, Mr Stanton, accepted that that was appropriate. Her Honour then listed the matter for hearing on the following Monday, 24 May 2021. The prosecutor then invited counsel for Mr Adam to nominate a figure for the costs thrown away which counsel did, being the sum of $7,000 inclusive of GST. There was further discussion about the quantification and the exchange of documents to support the figure nominated. Mr Adam's solicitor's affidavit confirms that material was sent to the prosecutor that day supporting the claimed amount.

Although it was not entirely clear from the transcript, it appears to be common ground that on 21 May 2021 an order was made requiring the Commissioner to pay Mr Adam's costs thrown away in the amount of $7,480.

The hearing of the charges against Mr Adam commenced on 24 May 2021 and, as noted, they concluded in his favour in November 2021. In the meantime, on or about 15 June 2021, the costs were paid. On 18 June 2021, the Commissioner commenced these proceedings.

Section 56(1)(e) of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (the “CAR” Act) confers on a prosecutor a right of appeal to this Court against an order for costs made against them by the Local Court in summary proceedings, which are not with respect to an environmental offence, "but only on a ground that involves a question of law alone". The Commissioner's Further Amended Summons seeks to invoke this right and also seeks to invoke the Court's judicial review function confirmed by s 69 Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW). Given the matters sought to be argued and the existence of an express right of appeal, I will dismiss that part of the proceedings that seeks judicial review under s 69.

As for s 56(1), "[a] question of law alone" as distinct from a question of law or a complaint about error of law, is a question that "can be stated and considered separately from the facts with which it may be connected in a given case" (see Williams v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 278 at 287; [1986] HCA 88 per Gibb CJ at [314] per Wilson and Dawson JJ).

Even so, a conclusion of mixed fact and law can be challenged on an appeal restricted to a question of law alone if it can be determined that that conclusion "[p]roceed[ed] from a misdirection of law" (Williams at 287). In R v PL [2009] NSWCCA 256 at [27], Spigelman CJ stated that a contention that a presiding judicial officer erred may involve a question of law alone if a stand alone legal proposition can be identified which was a "distinct and separate step in the reasoning process".

In Bimson, Roads and Maritime Services v Damorange Pty Limited [2014] NSWSC 734 at [41], I stated as follows:

Leaving aside the approach to materiality that is referred to in this passage, the end result is that an appeal on a question of law alone may raise a question of law, the answer to which is obvious. Further, the appeal will only "involve” that question of law alone if that answer was a "distinct and separate step in the reasoning process" of the court below (PL supra), even accepting that such a step may only be implicit in the lower court's reasoning. Answering that question will only of itself lead to a conclusion that a decision should be set aside if the court either addressed that question incorrectly or proceeded on an assumption as to the answer which was incorrect and it was material to the outcome. If the court did not proceed on a misapprehension as to the law, then, at most, its decision will only be affected by an error or mixed fact of law and no question of law alone will ultimately either arise or be involved in the proceedings (see White v DPP [2021] NSWSC 1629 at [13]).

This is all significant because the "grounds" of appeal identified in the Further Amended Summons do not seek to identify a question of law alone, instead they contend as follows:

Some of these grounds refer to ss 216(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act (“CPA”) which governs the Presiding Magistrate's power to award costs in the circumstances of this case. Section 216 provided:

The Commissioner’s submissions referred to the possibility that the exercise of this power to award costs on an adjournment against the prosecutor might also be governed by s 213 of the CPA. It is ultimately not necessary to decide that issue.

When all is said and done, the real complaint sought to be raised by the Commissioner in these proceedings is encompassed by ground 1 of the Further Amended Summons. Ultimately, the Commissioner contended that the Presiding Magistrate did not determine whether there was any unreasonable conduct or delay on his part before awarding costs. Recast in terms of s 56(1) of the CAR Act, the relevant question of law alone that arises in these proceedings is "[w]hat is the appropriate test to apply in determining to award costs against a party such as a prosecutor resulting from an adjournment?" The short and obvious answer is that such costs can only be awarded if the Court is satisfied that the innocent party has incurred additional costs "because of the unreasonable conduct or delays” of the prosecutor. Having answered that question by reference to s 216(2), the next question that arises is whether the Presiding Magistrate acted on a basis contrary to that understanding. With respect to her Honour, the answer to that question is clearly “yes”. Her Honour's reasons were understandably brief. However, her Honour's reasons were also very clear. On two occasions her Honour referred to whether it was “just and reasonable” to award costs in favour of Mr Adam. Her Honour awarded costs on the basis that it was just and reasonable because her Honour concluded that Mr Adam had suffered prejudice from the adjournment and that the adjournment was not his fault. Her Honour acted on the basis that the awarding of costs was not governed by any consideration or whether there was any unreasonable conduct or delays on the part of the Commissioner. Her Honour made no such finding against the Commissioner. Indeed there was no submission to that effect made to her Honour, nor was there any evidence of any such unreasonable conduct on the part of the Commissioner. Instead, all the evidence demonstrated was that, almost instantaneously upon being advised by RP that she was unwell, the relevant prosecutor informed Mr Adam's solicitor and the Court that an application for an adjournment would be made.

Overall, it seems that instead of identifying the correct test by reference to s 216(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act and applying it, her Honour instead applied the test for costs that prevailed in this state following the decision in Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534 especially at 569.

Given that conclusion, it is not necessary to address in detail the balance of the grounds of appeal via an analysis which seeks to identify some anterior question of law alone. However, for the sake of completeness, I will say something briefly about each ground.

In relation to ground 2, there was no failure on the part of her Honour to give appropriate reasons for the costs order. Although her Honour's reasons were brief, they set out with clarity the basis upon which the order was made, although it did, as I found, involve an adoption and application of the wrong legal test.

So far as ground 3 is concerned, I do not consider her Honour made any such finding. As I stated, her Honour never expressly found that there was any unreasonable conduct on the part of the Commissioner. No such submission was made to her Honour and there was no evidence that would support such a conclusion.

Ground 4 of the Further Amended Summons is encompassed by ground 1.

Grounds 5 and 6 appear to be directed towards the quantification of the claim and the necessity to demonstrate that the costs awarded are costs incurred “because” of the relevant unreasonable conduct or delay (see Council of the City of Sydney v Trico Constructions Pty Limited [2015] NSWLEC 56 at [135]).

I have set out the course of events that occurred after her Honour decided to award costs in relation to quantification. The prosecutor submitted that the costs should be limited to one day. Counsel for Mr Adam agreed on that course. There was an exchange that arrived at a figure which overall seemed to be accepted by everyone as reasonable. In a busy forum such as the Local Court, I see no error in that process. Of course the position may be different if a very large and contentious sum of costs had been awarded.

In his careful submissions in this Court, counsel for Mr Adam referred to the history of the proceedings, the inadequacy of the medical evidence and the delay of RP in advising of her medical difficulties. However, ultimately those matters do not affect the fact that her Honour adopted the wrong test and that there was otherwise no basis of finding there was any unreasonable conduct or delays on the part of the Commissioner.

It follows that the appeal will be allowed and the costs order will be set aside. The Further Amended Summons sought restitution of the amount of costs that have been paid over. Counsel for Mr Adam conceded that if the costs order was set aside, that order would follow.

So far as costs in this Court are concerned, during the course of argument, I raised with the solicitor for the Commissioner whether, in the event his client was successful, such costs should be awarded. I was concerned about a number of matters. The costs application was in fact instigated by her Honour's comments. An appeal under s 56(1) of the CAR is directed to matters of principle. As I understood it, in this appeal the Commissioner was not so much concerned about the payment of the particular sum to Mr Adam, but the proposition that, where the prosecutors immediately pass on evidence they had received from a complainant which is used for the basis of an adjournment, they should nevertheless incur a costs order.

I was also concerned that, given the relatively modest amount of costs that were in issue, an order for costs in this Court would be disproportionate. In the end result, the solicitor for the Commissioner did not press an application for costs in this Court.

Accordingly, I make the following orders: