State of New South Wales v Moore (Preliminary)

1. [1]

   The plaintiff, the State of New South Wales, seeks by summons an order that the defendant, Aaron Moore, be subject to an extended supervision order (“ESO”) pursuant to ss 5B and 9(1)(a) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) (“the Act”) for a period of three years from the date of the order.

2. [2]

   In the interim the plaintiff seeks orders pursuant to s 7(4) of the Act for the appointment of two qualified psychiatrists and/or registered psychologists (or any combination of two such persons) to conduct separate examinations of the defendant and to furnish their reports to the Court, as well as an order directing the defendant to attend those examinations. The plaintiff also seeks an interim supervision order (“ISO”) against the defendant, pursuant to section 10A of the Act, for a period of 28 days from a date to be fixed by the Court, as well as an order pursuant to s 11 of the Act, directing the defendant to comply with certain conditions set out in the schedule to the summons during the period of the ISO. The plaintiff sought ancillary relief regarding access to the Court’s file.

3. [3]

   The defendant does not oppose the making of the orders for the appointment of experts, directing the defendant to attend those examinations, and the imposition of an ISO against the defendant for a period of 28 days. The defendant does however dispute the appropriateness many of the conditions proposed by the plaintiff as set out in the schedule to the summons.

4. [4]

   The defendant is in custody because of the revocation of his parole for the index offence (a serious act of domestic violence committed in December 2017, which enables the plaintiff to make this application), following the allegation of a further domestic violence offence on 5 June 2025. His whereabouts were unknown from 5 June 2025 until his arrest on 9 September 2025. The defendant has not been refused bail in connection with the fresh charge. The revocation of parole on 2 July 2025, effective from 11 June 2025, and inability to apprehend the defendant until 9 September, has resulted in the extension of his sentence to 24 February 2026.

5. [5]

   There is however desirability in dealing with this application quickly, as there is a hearing for review of the revocation of parole on 9 December 2025, and the existence of an ISO and its conditions may be relevant to that application. Further, there is a possibility (although it may be remote) that the extension of the expiry date of the sentence for the index offence may at that hearing be successfully challenged (such that it has already expired, requiring his release without the restriction of parole).

Statutory framework

1. [6]

   The plaintiff’s application for an ESO is brought pursuant to ss 5B and 9(1)(a) of the Act. Those sections provide as follows:

2. [7]

   The power to make an ESO pursuant to s 5B is discretionary. In that regard, the Court is guided by the objects of the Act, and the paramount consideration and matters set out in s 9 to which the Court must have regard in determining whether or not to make an ESO. Relevant provisions of the Act in these respects include the following:

3. [8]

   A “serious offence” is defined in s 4 and includes a “serious sex offence” and a “serious violence offence”. A “serious violence offence” is defined in s 5A(1) and includes a serious indicatable offence (relevantly, within the meaning of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)) that is constituted by a person:

4. [9]

   Section 5D of the Act provides that the Court is not required to determine that the risk of an offender committing a serious offence is more likely than not in order to determine that there is an unacceptable risk of the person committing such an offence.

5. [10]

   Section 7(4) of the Act provides that if following the preliminary hearing I am satisfied that the matters alleged in the supporting documentation would, if proved, justify the making of an ESO, I must make orders appointing two qualified psychiatrists and/or registered psychologists (or any combination of two such persons) to examine the defendant and furnish reports to the Court, and directing the defendant to attend those examinations.

6. [11]

   Section 10A of the Act is in the following terms:

The evidence

1. [12]

   A volume of material was tendered by the plaintiff, mostly in folders which were annexures to Ms Nichols’ affidavits. This material included:

   1. (1)

      Affidavit of Lucy Nichols affirmed on 7 November 2025, together with Exhibit LN-1;

   2. (2)

      Affidavit of Lucy Nichols affirmed on 21 November 2025;

   3. (3)

      Affidavit of Lucy Nichols affirmed on 2 December 2025; and

   4. (4)

      Affidavit of Erica Mulligan affirmed on 21 November 2025.

2. [13]

   The defendant did not rely on any additional evidence.

Documents provided to assist the Court

1. [14]

   I am considerably assisted by the parties’ submissions and a number of documents provided in accordance with the Supreme Court Practice Note SC CL 12. These include the statement of the plaintiff’s case and the joint statement of agreed facts. Written submissions for the plaintiff have also identified precisely where the evidence supporting various statutory factors I am required to take into account may be found. The table of conditions includes side by side comparison of the positions of the parties and the reasons therefor.

2. [15]

   As there is much that is agreed in these proceedings, and significant work put into summarising the evidence by the parties, these reasons to a significant extent incorporate aspects of these documents rather than endeavouring to describe the evidence myself. I have had regard to all of the more important aspects of the evidence (for example risk assessment reports, risk management report, sentencing remarks, Ms Mulligan’s explanation of the reason for and capacity to implement the proposed conditions, and the psychological report outlining the practical impact of the defendant’s cognitive impairment).

Unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision

1. [16]

   The defendant is presently 48 years old and a First Nations man. He has a significant criminal history of violent offending, dating back to the 1990s. The “index offence,” which provides this Court with jurisdiction to make an ISO and an ESO, is an offence of causing grievous bodily harm with intent to cause grievous bodily harm contrary to s 33(1)(b) of the Crimes Act. The index offence was committed on 26 December 2017.

2. [17]

   By virtue of s 5A(2A)(c) of the Act, this amounts to a “serious violence offence” within the terms of s 5A and thus also meets the definition of “serious offence” in s 4 of the Act, as set out in the analysis of the statutory framework above.

3. [18]

   I will address important aspects of the evidence by reference to the pertinent factors set out in s 9(3) of the Act (abbreviated in the following pages – see [7] above for their full terms). The joint statement of facts and written submissions of both parties have been of considerable assistance in focusing attention on and summarising this evidence.

4. [19]

   The index offence was committed whilst the defendant was on parole for an offence of reckless wounding contrary to s 35 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) committed in 2013. That earlier offence was committed against the defendant’s then-partner and involved hitting her with a hammer several times to the head. The defendant was sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of 5 years and 6 months for that offence. The index offence was one of causing grievous bodily harm with intent to cause grievous bodily harm. He was sentenced, following a guilty plea, to a term of imprisonment of 7 years and 6 months, with a non-parole period of 5 years. The sentence commenced on 27 May 2018 and was due to expire on 26 November 2025. For reasons earlier explained, this date has been extended to 24 February 2026.

5. [20]

   The defendant and the victim of the index offence were in a relationship for nine months and began residing together with the victim’s mother a week prior to the commission of the offence. On 26 December 2017, the victim returned home with her mother at 10:30 pm from a Christmas party. An hour later the victim entered the bedroom where the defendant was. The defendant was angry and called the victim a “slut” and a “dog” and said “You’re a cheating slut. Do you think I’m dumb?” to which the victim responded “Yeah I do think you’re dumb because I’ve been joined at your hip. How could I cheat? You can go. I don’t want you anymore.” The victim was about to leave the bedroom when the defendant grabbed her by the back of her head and threw her to the ground. The defendant straddled her and punched her to the face multiple times with both hands. The defendant pressed a pillow against the victim’s face then removed it to let her breathe. He then punched her in the face again and repeated this process as the victim went in and out of consciousness. The defendant then put his hands over her mouth and nose to stop her from breathing and said “If I can’t have you, no one will”. While this was happening, the victim tried to alert her mother by banging on the walls and screaming but the defendant covered her mouth. The victim reported that she had to pretend she was dead and not move.

6. [21]

   Between 11:30 pm and midnight, the victim’s mother heard the arguing and the banging on the walls. Around 5 am the next day, the victim’s mother observed the defendant leaving the house. She entered the bedroom to see the victim appear face down on the bed, appearing lifeless at first, then regaining consciousness. The victim could not communicate verbally due to the bleeding and swelling on her face, mouth and jaw. The victim was taken to the hospital and was found to have bilateral mandible fractures (fracture to her lower jaw) and required significant surgery to remove her wisdom teeth and have titanium plates and screws inserted.

7. [22]

   On 27 December 2017 the defendant returned to the house to collect his belongings. The victim’s mother refused him entry and asked him why he hurt her daughter. The defendant said “… because she had been talking to other guys”. The victim’s mother called police but the defendant had left by the time the police arrived. The police saw the defendant jump from a window of another house into the front yard and arrested him.

8. [23]

   The defendant was released to parole on 4 December 2023 but parole was revoked on 2 July 2025 (effective from 11 June 2025) including because of his outstanding charge.

9. [24]

   On 3 February 2025, Tahnee Liewes, Senior Psychologist, prepared a Risk Assessment Report (“RAR”) pursuant to s 6(3)(b) of the Act. The following relevant findings appear in the RAR:

10. [25]

    The Risk Management Report (“RMR”) prepared by Kerry-Anne Troeger, Senior Community Corrections Officer, on 19 May 2025 indicates that the defendant’s response to supervision since his relocation to Dareton has been unsatisfactory as he has disengaged with services and supports. Ms Troeger opines that intensive domestic violence and substance abuse interventions are imperative to mitigating the defendant’s ongoing risk to the community and his domestic partners, noting that the effective management of the defendant is contingent upon his willingness to engage with and maintain a structured treatment regime.

11. [26]

    The RMR recommends a suite of conditions to manage the defendant’s risk, in support of the following risk-mitigation measures outlined in the risk management plan which would be utilised if an ESO was made:

12. [27]

    The affidavit of Erica Mulligan, Manager of the Extended Supervision Order Team, Corrective Services, is referred to in more detail below in connection with the conditions to be imposed. Her evidence supports the necessity of an ESO / ISO, and the way in which some of the proposed conditions address the defendant’s risk. She is aware of the defendant’s cognitive impairment, and particular needs as an Aboriginal man, and with a strong connection to country. She explains the problems with living in a rural environment in the short term. She explains why the intensive rehabilitation and support the defendant requires on his release from custody can only realistically be met in a metropolitan area (which accords with the defendant’s proposed and approved residence on release).

13. [28]

    The defendant completed an introductory session of Managing Emotions and Domestic Abuse Program in 2010. It was noted that he contributed positively to group discussions during these introductory sessions.

14. [29]

    Whilst in custody, the defendant completed the EQUIPS Foundation Program in 2015, the EQUIPS Domestic Abuse Program and EQUIPS Addiction Program in 2017, and the EQUIPS Foundation Program in 2020.

15. [30]

    The defendant completed the SRP-VO on 6 November 2023, after being terminated from the program in June 2020 for spitting at a Justice Health Nurse and declining an offer to participate in the program in August 2022. He participated in the CSNSW Violent Offender Therapeutic Program (VOTP) Maintenance Program during his most recent period of parole, despite the program being discontinued.

16. [31]

    The defendant subsequently completed the SRP-VO. The defendant was described as attending most of the group-based sessions. He also attended regular individual sessions which focused on enhancing his comprehension of the program content, facilitating his engagement with professional supports and developing skills to manage cravings and urges for substance abuse. Whilst the defendant generally engaged in a meaningful manner, it was noted that he had difficulty, at times, regulating his emotions (slamming doors and walking out of rooms, verbally abusing and being aggressive towards staff and threatening to discontinue treatment). To the defendant’s credit, each incident was temporary and usually resulted in him recognising when his perception was inaccurate. Whilst the defendant was described to develop further insight and awareness into his violent offending he maintained some cognitive distortion and externalised responsibility for his offending towards the victim. He was noted to have deficits in insight in relation to his risk of committing domestic violence; specifically the link between his feelings of jealousy and the commission of domestic violence offences. It is important to highlight the impact of the defendant’s cognitive impairment on his behaviour. It is likely that his intellectual disability has contributed to his deficits in various cognitive skills, such as emotional regulation, impulse control and problem solving.

17. [32]

    The evidence indicates no suitable alternatives for risk reduction.

18. [33]

    The material indicates that the defendant’s cognitive impairment will cause significant difficulty for him in complying with ESO obligations, but that there are steps that can be put in place to ameliorate some of these problems. His recent past compliance with parole orders has been unsatisfactory, as set out above in considering the RMR.

19. [34]

    The defendant has a lengthy criminal history, all of which I have taken into account (and which has been available to a number of people whose reports or affidavits are before me).

20. [35]

    The index offence has been outlined above at [20]-[22].

21. [36]

    The defendant’s history of violent offending prior to the commission of the index offence includes the following:

    1. (1)

       Common assault: on 10 July 2002 the defendant punched the victim (his partner) in the jaw causing her to fall to the ground, before punching her several times in the back of the head and pulling her hair. After arriving home, the defendant threatened the victim and punched her again in the face.

    2. (2)

       Assault occasioning actual bodily harm (AOABH), armed with intent to commit indictable offence: on 2 December 1998, the victim was walking home through a park with his 12-year-old daughter when the defendant asked him for a beer and a cigarette. The victim stated he did not have them and the defendant lunged at him with a broken beer bottle. Following a struggle, the defendant broke a tree branch and threw it at the victim, striking him in the head which cut and bruised the victim’s head.

    3. (3)

       Violent disorder: on 25 November 1999, the defendant and co-accused were present at the scene of an accident caused by the victim. The defendant yelled at the victim, punched him in the nose and mouth, and kicked him in the shin. The offence was committed with co-accused who also assaulted the victim and damaged his vehicle. The defendant was in breach of bail and of a good behaviour bond when he committed the offence.

    4. (4)

       Intimidate police officer in execution of duty without actual bodily harm: on 20 February 2000 whilst police were placing a person into the rear of a police vehicle, the defendant questioned and swore at police. When asked to cease swearing, he made threats to police “come out to Nama and I’ll fuck you up” and “You are so dead”. The defendant was not interviewed at the time due to his level of intoxication and aggressiveness.

    5. (5)

       Common assault x 2 counts: On 30 July 2001, the defendant was screaming abuse at the victim whilst she held victim 2 (a child) in her arms before grabbing her by her hair and shaking her head. The defendant then pushed the victim off the bed whilst victim 2 was in her arms causing her to fall to the floor. The victim was 36 weeks pregnant at the time of the assault.

    6. (6)

       Common assault and Contravene ADVO: On or about 16 November 2001, the defendant told the victim that they would be moving to Tamworth and because the victim feared the defendant she agreed. In November 2001, the victim and defendant moved to Tamworth and resided in a caravan park. The victim reported daily assault in some form until December 2001 when she was able to speak with police. On 16 December 2001, the victim was nursing her youngest child when the defendant started an argument, picked up a broom and unscrewed the head and struck the victim across the back. The victim put down her child and the defendant punched the victim’s head and spat in her face. On 18 December 2001, the defendant threw the victim to the floor, punched the victim in the mouth and nose, causing them to bleed excessively. On 21 December 2001, the defendant approached the victim and threatened to cut the victim’s throat. The victim then approached the police and reported the incident. The defendant was arrested on 10 July 2002.

    7. (7)

       AOBH and >=3 people use violence cause fear: on 8 February 2002, the defendant and several others were involved in assaulting three victims who were walking home. The defendant was identified as being an agitator by inciting further violence. The victims went into their home where unknown persons attempted to gain access, before more people arrived and fought with the victims. The defendant was observed to punch one of the victims to the mouth in an upper cut type of punch. The defendant left the area and then returned and engaged in a fight with another of the victims.

    8. (8)

       Common assault: on 6 June 2002, the defendant and the victim (his sister) were involved in a heated argument after consuming alcohol together. The defendant broke a stick off a tree and told the victim to “go home” several times. He then used the stick to strike the victim’s arm, back and shoulders several times.

    9. (9)

       AOABH (DV): on 7 July 2005, the victim (his partner) was assaulted by the defendant and his co-accused (his sister) while at a party. The victim and the defendant were in a relationship on and off for nine years and had a child together. The co-accused approached and yelled at the victim “what’s going on between you and Bluey ya fucken slut?...” and punched the victim to the face several times causing her to fall to the ground, before kicking her approximately six times to the face area and three times to the stomach and breast area. The defendant then grabbed the victim by the hair and dragged her on the ground, before kicking her to the face and head area several times. The defendant and co-accused continued to repeatedly kick the victim until she blacked out. After the victim awoke, she stated to the defendant “I need to go to the hospital, I feel sick and my head hurts real bad. I can’t see out of my eyes properly.” The defendant responded “Na, you’ll be O.K. Otherwise the police will have to come out.” A short time later the victim walked to the toilet and vomited blood before walking to another house and called the police.

    10. (10)

        Common assault (DV): The defendant had a history with the victim and her boyfriend. On 9 August 2008, the defendant walked up to the victim and stated “Where is your bloke… tell him I am going to kill him”. The defendant then proceeded to empty out a stubbie of beer over the victim’s head.

    11. (11)

        Affray: On 1 December 2008, several children were playing in Namatjira Avenue, Dareton when some of the children started throwing rocks at each other. One of the children told his mother who then went to the house of the defendant. A group subsequently gathered arming themselves with sticks, rocks and bottles. The defendant gathered in another group and both groups (a total of 15 people) began fighting each other throwing rocks, sticks and bottles. Police witnessed the defendant walk towards the other group with a blade, he was asked to drop the blade and he refused.

    12. (12)

        Common assault (DV): On 26 December 2012, the victim was laying down and playing with her son. The defendant came into the room and kicked her in the head multiple times. The victim left the house and went to the police station to report the incident.

    13. (13)

        Reckless wounding (DV), Common assault (DV), AOABH (DV), contravene prohibition/restriction in AVO (domestic): on 13 April 2013, an AVO was served on the defendant to protect his partner of two years, with whom he shared a child (the victim). On 27 April 2013, the defendant located the victim and took her to his mother’s house. He threatened to kill the victim, pulled her by her hair and shirt which caused her to fall to the ground, before repeatedly striking the victim with a hammer to her head and face. The defendant attempted to get in the shower and immediately felt dizzy. As she was in the shower the defendant stood near her saying “You was down there chatting up boys and laying around with your own cousins” and “just tell me what happened or I’ll hit you with the hammer again.” The defendant then poured a bottle of cleaning liquid over the victim’s wounds. On 3 December 2014, the defendant was sentenced to 5 years and 6 months with a non-parole period of 3 years and 3 months. The defendant was on parole for this offence at the time of committing the index offence.

22. [37]

    There is nothing in the views of the sentencing judges which adds meaningfully to the consideration of whether the statutory test at this interim stage is met, nor my consideration of the conditions which should be imposed.

23. [38]

    The facts of the outstanding charge, if proved, support the existence of the risks identified in the RAR and other material before me.

24. [39]

    It was conceded by the defendant that the statutory preconditions in s 5B(a)-(c) of the Act are met, and I am satisfied that they are. Further, it is agreed that the requirements with respect to the application have been complied with. The Court has jurisdiction to grant the relief sought.

25. [40]

    The question for determination is whether the matters alleged in the supporting documentation would, if proved, satisfy me to a high degree of probability that the defendant poses an unacceptable risk of committing a further serious offence if he is not supervised under an ESO. As noted at the outset, the defendant accepts that they would.

26. [41]

    Taking all relevant matters into account, in considering the conclusion and reasoning of the RAR, I am satisfied to a high degree of probability that, if proved, the defendant poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision under an order.

27. [42]

    I must accordingly make orders for expert assessment. Taking into account the matters I have referred to, giving the safety of the community paramount consideration, I am not of the view that there is a discretionary reason to not make an ISO. I will accordingly make the orders sought by the plaintiff in those two respects.

Conditions

1. [43]

   Section 11(1) of the Act provides that “[a]n extended supervision order or interim supervision order may direct an offender to comply with such conditions as the Supreme Court considers appropriate” and includes a non-exhaustive list of conditions that may be imposed.

2. [44]

   To the extent that conditions are opposed, I have assessed their suitability by reference to the RAR, risk management report and the affidavit of Erica Mulligan, in particular. However also of significance in considering the conditions that are opposed is further evidence of the defendant’s cognitive impairment.

3. [45]

   The undated report of Danuta Banachowicz, psychologist, prepared for the National Disability Insurance Agency, describes the effect of the defendant’s primary diagnosis of cognitive impairment. He had been known to Statewide Disability Services since 4 January 2005. Ms Banachowicz described the defendant’s disability as long-standing and permanent. The defendant has very limited literacy skills. The impact of the defendant’s impairment on his daily life includes difficulty with reading and interpreting transport timetables, and struggling to work out how to get to a location on his own. He thus has difficulty accessing medical and other appointments. He can easily find himself lost and distressed. The defendant is easily confused and needs to have information explained in simple terms, and can appear to understand more than he in fact does. He has significant difficulty with identifying and planning future goals and organising tasks, and has poor memory and concentration.

4. [46]

   Erica Mulligan’s affidavit does indicate measures that will be implemented to address these concerns. She states that the ESO Team would implement a variety of communication strategies to ensure the defendant understands the conditions. These will include verbal explanations of each condition by the supervising officer using practical examples, reinforced at every reporting appointment. Audio recordings or visual aids of conditions and any directions or warnings will be created and saved to the defendant’s most frequently used device, to enable him to review them at any time. The team will prepare a tailored easy to read guide promptly after the conditions are imposed, this based on previous collaboration with the Council for Intellectual Disability. It uses simplified language and graphics to serve as a reference tool for the defendant.

5. [47]

   It is important to bear in mind the purposes of the legislation, and consider proposed conditions by reference to the demonstrated risks. Breach of conditions gives rise to the potential imposition of a criminal penalty with the prospect of imprisonment.

6. [48]

   I will address the contentious conditions in accordance with the headings in the schedule to the summons.

7. [49]

   The defendant opposed a proposed condition which would allow any direction which may or must be given in writing to be given electronically including by SMS or other messaging service. The defendant gave reasons for opposing this based on the need for verbal explanation, and the plaintiff proposed in response an altered condition that “Where a direction may be given in writing (or is required to be given in writing) it may be given electronically including by SMS or other messaging service. Written directions will also be given and explained verbally.”

8. [50]

   Although the defendant did not formally respond to this proposed alternative, I regard it as acceptable, particularly in light of the evidence of Ms Mulligan as to the steps that will be taken to enhance the prospects of Mr Moore understanding directions.

9. [51]

   The plaintiff submitted that one of the conditions of the ISO should require the defendant to not engage in any threatening, intimidating or abusive behaviour towards CSNSW or electronic monitoring staff involved in his supervision that would cause them to fear for their safety. The plaintiff submitted this to be reasonable, and able to promote clarity of parameters of behaviour for the defendant, in light of some aspects of his history which has involved him acting in a threatening and aggressive manner towards staff members and professionals whilst in custody and when supervised in the community. This contravenes the acceptance of supervision and guidance of a Departmental Supervising Officer (“DSO”) and obedience of all reasonable directions (which condition is to be imposed without opposition).

10. [52]

    The defendant opposed this condition on the basis that conduct which would cause a caseworker to fear for their own safety amounts to an offence contrary to s 13 of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal) Violence Act 2013 (NSW) or as an offence of common assault. The defendant submitted that the imposition of this condition would be extreme and out of proportion to the risk as any conduct that is deemed to be “abusive” or “impeding his supervision” could result in the defendant being imprisoned for up to 5 years.

11. [53]

    The plaintiff proposed that the defendant be electronically monitored and must not tamper with or remove the electronic monitoring equipment. The plaintiff relied on Ms Mulligan’s evidence which suggested that electronic monitoring would enable the ESO team to have “real-time” oversight of the defendant’s movements and be in a better position to mitigate high-risk scenarios, enforce exclusion zones and other restrictions on movements. Further, it was submitted that electronic monitoring would allow the DSO to detect any non-compliance.

12. [54]

    The defendant opposed electronic monitoring including because it was unnecessary, in light of other conditions to be imposed, and his prior offending has not consistently occurred in one location or type of location.

13. [55]

    The plaintiff proposed that the defendant should provide a weekly schedule of his movements, in advance, to a DSO. The plaintiff submitted that the provision of the schedule would allow a DSO to proactively conduct risk assessments of the defendant’s proposed activities and essentially limit his exposure to high-risk situations. In addition, to provide the defendant with some flexibility, the plaintiff proposed that the approved schedule of movements could be amended by the defendant if he sought approval 24 hours in advance from a DSO, or a shorter period if approved by a DSO. Erica Mulligan’s affidavit explained a proposed “dry schedule” which is not as detailed as other schedules expected under conditions of this kind.

14. [56]

    The defendant opposed the provision of a schedule of his movements, including because it was likely beyond his capabilities and serious penal consequences could flow from breaching this.

15. [57]

    The Offender Integrated Management Systems (“OIMS”) notes include numerous entries for aggressive and threatening behaviour by the defendant, in custody and in the community, particularly when thwarted in his efforts to obtain what he wants – especially pain medication. I take into account in particular entries dated 15 July 2018, 13 and 14 September 2018, 27 September 2018, 1 April 2019, 20 and 21 June 2021, 1 October 2021, 23 January 2022, 29 October 2024, and 25 November 2024. There have however been markedly less instances of such conduct in recent years, and also a number of instances recording clear explanation to the defendant of the unacceptability of such conduct.

16. [58]

    Bearing in mind the purposes of the legislation, and the relevant risks in the defendant’s case, I am not of the view that the prospect of the defendant threatening staff is such a pressing current problem that it cannot be dealt with by clear explanations to him as to what conduct is expected of him, if there is a problem, and the availability of the general criminal law and capacity for finding the defendant in breach of the condition that he accept supervision and direction of his DSO. Proposed condition 4 will not be imposed.

17. [59]

    Although electronic monitoring and schedules of movements often go hand in hand, I accept the submissions for the plaintiff regarding electronic monitoring and those of the defendant regarding a schedule of movement.

18. [60]

    Accepting that the primary object of the Act is to ensure the safety and protection of the community, it is vital that the defendant’s whereabouts can be known. I am aware of the high level of dislike the defendant had for electronic monitoring which was in place for a short time when he was released on parole, and his perception that people would wrongly think him to be a sex offender. However given the significant difficulties which eventuated in supervising him, I regard electronic monitoring as necessary at this stage in light of the identified risks. By the stage of a final hearing the defendant’s regime and reintegration in the community may be going so well that it is not required, if an ESO is granted.

19. [61]

    The impact of the defendant’s cognitive impairment on his daily living indicates that the schedule of movements, even as modified, is likely beyond his capacity. There are other ways of encouraging structure and pro-social activity in the defendant’s life, for example by the guidance that will be provided by his DSO.

20. [62]

    A number of conditions relevant to accommodation are agreed to. Conditions 10, 11, 13 and 14 are opposed. These would require a 9:00 pm to 6:00 am curfew, unannounced visits by the defendant’s DSO to the defendant’s approved address, and an obligation on the defendant to notify his DSO of visitors who enter and remain at his home or anyone who stays overnight.

21. [63]

    I am not of the view that the curfew is needed. There is to be imposed, without opposition, a requirement that the defendant not spend the night anywhere other than his approved residence without the approval of a DSO. The need for the other three conditions is supported by the RMR and evidence of Ms Mulligan, but will require clear explanation to the defendant.

22. [64]

    Opposed conditions 20 and 21 would prohibit entry into licensed premises without prior approval, and attendance at drug and alcohol rehabilitation courses as directed, with prior approval required for discharge. There are to be imposed by agreement drug and alcohol abstention conditions, and the requirement to submit to testing in relation to these. In light of the conditions that are to be imposed, I accept the submission for the defendant that condition 20 prohibiting entry into licensed premises is excessive.

23. [65]

    Regarding condition 21, the defendant proposed that notification after discharge from programs should suffice. However in light of the risks identified in the reports, I regard the condition as sought by the plaintiff appropriate. It would also seem easier for the defendant to comply with a clear direction that he is not to discharge himself (without approval) rather than leaving this up to him, with a responsibility to notify at a later time (when he could be directed to resume attendance).

24. [66]

    There is to be imposed, without opposition, a condition which prohibits the defendant from associating with any person specified by a DSO. Additionally to this, the plaintiff seeks, without limiting that condition, that the defendant promptly notify a DSO if he associates with any person who he knows is consuming or under the influence of alcohol, not associate with any person who he knows is consuming or under the influence of illegal drugs, and to promptly notify a DSO if he associates with any person held in custody. The plaintiff submitted that these were necessary to prevent relapse, and important in light of the reported drug use in the period when the defendant’s whereabouts were unknown between June and September 2025.

25. [67]

    I am prepared to order the second of these three parts of proposed condition 23 (to not associate with any person who he knows is consuming or under the influence of illegal drugs), but not the other two. Although I accept the plaintiff’s submission regarding the importance of reducing the risk of relapse into drug usage, the first and third aspects of this condition are not necessary, and the first very difficult to implement. The defendant is to have by agreement a general requirement to truthfully answer questions from a DSO or any other person supervising him about issues such as where he is or has been, who he is with or has been with, and the nature of his associations. In the absence of more particular evidence, this condition, and the obligation to not associate with any person the subject of the direction by his DSO, is adequate to deal with any perceived risk of association with people who may negatively influence the defendant.

26. [68]

    Proposed condition 24 would require the defendant to agree to a DSO disclosing his criminal history to another person (although he would be given the opportunity to do so first). The defendant sought amendment of this proposal to require him to agree to a DSO disclosing his criminal history to a person with whom he is in a domestic relationship, if a DSO considers the disclosure is reasonably necessary to address the commission of a serious offence.

27. [69]

    I accept generally the defendant’s proposal. The unrestricted capacity for the DSO to tell anybody of the defendant’s criminal history is unnecessary, invasive of the defendant’s privacy, and likely to cause stigma, anxiety and difficulty with reintegration into the community. The defendant’s proposal should be adopted, although the term should be “domestic or intimate relationship”.

28. [70]

    The defendant opposes conditions proposed by the plaintiff that prohibit his possession of firearms and prohibited weapons, and of certain other weapons such as knives (other than for domestic and other residential use), machetes and swords. This is submitted to address the defendant’s history of using or carrying weapons whilst committing criminal offences, including the index offence. The RAR was submitted to identify the use of weapons as an identified risk factor.

29. [71]

    The defendant submits that this proposed condition is not sufficiently connected to his pattern of offending, and he does not possess any licence to possess firearms thus this would be illegal anyway.

30. [72]

    The defendant’s violence has historically involved his own body or items opportunistically to hand – bottles, tree branches, a blade from a handsaw in 2008, a hammer and axe in 2013, a pillow in the commission of the index offence. The RAR and affidavit of Erica Mulligan do not in my view identify weapon carrying as a particular risk factor. Further, as the defendant submits, possession of the types of weapons the plaintiff seeks to prohibit would generally amount to criminal offences.

31. [73]

    Given the likely significant difficulties for the defendant in understanding the conditions to be imposed because of his cognitive impairment, it is important to have no more than are necessary. Conditions 25 and 26 are not necessary, and should not be imposed.

32. [74]

    Condition 27 as sought by the plaintiff requires the defendant to at all times carry a specified approved mobile phone and ensure his availability to answer calls, or return calls unable to be unanswered. There is a history of very significant unreliability in ability to contact the defendant, in part based on his habit of giving away or not carrying mobile telephones, then relying on others. The condition is opposed by the defendant because of the risk of non-compliance and exposure to up to 5 years imprisonment in the case of breach. However in my view this condition is essential for maintaining supervision of the defendant, and will need to be explained very clearly and strongly to him.

33. [75]

    I am not of the view that proposed condition 28 (compliance with directions about internet access and use of electronic devices), which is opposed, is sufficiently connected with any risk the defendant poses, and it will not be imposed.

34. [76]

    The two conditions relating to this area of regulation are those numbered 29 and 30, which would require the defendant to submit to extensive powers of search: of him, his residence or vehicle, any item, computer, device, storage facility and so on, and obligation to not destroy or interfere with any objects the subject of such searches. The evidence indicating some recent illicit drug usage was relied upon in submissions for the plaintiff. A report in evidence suggests that search devices will allow improper communications with victims to be identified. The defendant opposes these because of significant incursion into his liberty, and the availability of search by warrant or upon reasonable grounds, if there is a basis for it.

35. [77]

    I accept the submissions for the defendant on this issue. The evidence does not support the need for these conditions.

36. [78]

    Conditions 36, 37, 39, 40 and 41 relate to the defendant notifying his DSO of healthcare practitioners consulted, taking prescribed medication, the sharing of information, and the disclosure of his criminal history to healthcare professionals treating him to the extent that it is relevant to his risk of reoffending. These are opposed. One issue raised on his behalf was the prospect of deterring the defendant from seeking medical treatment.

37. [79]

    With the exception of condition 41, I am of the view that these conditions are necessary to ensure the defendant receives treatment appropriate to his risk factors. He engaged very poorly with such supports whilst last on parole. Condition 41 should permit disclosure of the defendant’s criminal history to a healthcare provider only if a DSO considers the disclosure necessary to address the risk of the commission of a serious offence.

ORDERS

1. [80]

   Accordingly, I make the following orders:

   1. (1)

      Pursuant to s 7(4) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW):

   2. (2)

      An order:

   3. (3)

      An order that access to the Supreme Court’s file in respect of any document shall not be granted to a non-party without the leave of a judge of the Court and, if any application for access is made by a non-party in respect of any document, the parties are to be notified by the Registrar so as to allow them an opportunity to be heard in relation to the application of access.

Part A: Reporting and Monitoring Obligations

1. [1]

   You must accept the supervision and guidance of a DSO and obey all reasonable directions of a DSO.

2. [2]

   Where a direction maybe given in writing (or is required to be given in writing) it may be given electronically including by SMS or other messaging service. Written directions will also be given and explained verbally.

3. [3]

   You must truthfully answer questions from a DSO, or any other person supervising you, about:

4. [4]

   You must agree to any information relating to your risk, supervision or rehabilitation being shared between those persons and agencies that are involved in your supervision including, but not limited to, a DSO, NSWPF and CSNSW.

5. [5]

   You must wear electronic monitoring equipment as directed by a DSO and must not tamper with or remove the equipment.

Part B: Accommodation

1. [6]

   You must live at an address approved by a DSO and notify a DSO of any intention to change your approved address or living arrangements.

2. [7]

   You must allow a DSO to visit you at your approved address at any time and to enter the premises at that address.

3. [8]

   You must not spend the night anywhere other than your approved address or any alternative approved addresses without the approval of a DSO.

4. [9]

   You must promptly notify a DSO of any visitor, other than approved visitors, entering and remaining at your approved address.

5. [10]

   You must promptly notify a DSO of any person staying overnight at your approved address (other than persons who ordinarily reside there).

Part C: Place and travel restrictions

1. [11]

   You must not leave New South Wales without the approval of the Commissioner, with the exception that you may visit Mildura, Victoria for an approved reason provided you give a DSO at least 24 hours’ notice of your intention to visit.

2. [12]

   You must not go to any place specified by a DSO.

Part D: Employment, finance and education

1. [13]

   You must take all reasonable steps to participate in programs as recommended by a DSO, including the development of a case management plan which may include employment, education, training or participation in personal development activities.

Part E: Drugs and alcohol

1. [14]

   You must not:

2. [15]

   You must submit to drug and alcohol testing.

3. [16]

   You must attend and participate in programs and courses for drug and alcohol rehabilitation as reasonably directed by a DSO and must not discharge yourself from such programs and courses without prior approval of a DSO.

Part F: Non-association

1. [17]

   You must not associate with any person specified by a DSO.

2. [18]

   Without limiting condition 17 you must:

3. [19]

   You must agree to a DSO disclosing your criminal history to a person with whom you are in a domestic or intimate relationship, if a DSO considers the disclosure is reasonably necessary to address the commission of a serious offence. Before any disclosure is made, you will first be given the opportunity to make the disclosure yourself within a timeframe as identified by a DSO.

Part I: Access to the internet and other electronic communication

1. [20]

   You must carry at all times a specified approved mobile phone and ensure that you are available to answer any call from a DSO or, as soon as reasonably practicable, return the call that you were unable to answer.

Part L: Personal details and appearance

1. [21]

   You must not change your name from Aaron MOORE or use any other name without notifying a DSO.

2. [22]

   If you significantly change your appearance you are to notify the DSO within 24 hours of that change.

3. [23]

   You must let a DSO photograph you, dressed, within one week of the commencement of these conditions and following any significant change to your appearance.

4. [24]

   If you change the details of any current form of identification or obtain further forms of identification, you must provide a DSO with such details.

Part M: Medical intervention and treatment

1. [25]

   You must undergo ongoing psychological or psychiatric assessment or counselling (or any combination of these) as directed by a DSO, including any therapy sessions, support and treatment programs the subject of the direction.

2. [26]

   You must notify a DSO of the identity and address of any healthcare practitioner that you consult.

3. [27]

   You must take medications that are prescribed to you by your healthcare practitioners and only in the manner prescribed.

4. [28]

   You must notify a DSO within 24 hours if you cease to take or decline to commence taking any medication prescribed for management of your mental health and/or substance use.

5. [29]

   You must agree to your treatment and service providers, including NDIS providers, and healthcare practitioners sharing information, including reports on your progress and attendance, and information you have told them, with each other and with a DSO.

6. [30]

   You must agree to any information obtained under condition 29 being shared between those persons and agencies that are involved in your supervision including, but not limited to, a DSO, NSWPF and CSNSW.

7. [31]

   You must agree to the disclosure of your criminal history to any healthcare provider if a DSO considers the disclosure necessary to address the risk of the commission of a serious offence.