TS v R

1. [1]

   BASTEN AJA: The Court is unanimous in concluding that this belated appeal against numerous convictions should generally not obtain an extension of time. Three grounds should be considered by the Court, but the appeal dismissed.

2. [2]

   The Court is also unanimous that the applicant have leave to appeal against the aggregate sentence imposed in the District Court, but that the appeal should be dismissed. The other members of the Court have written separately in relation to aspects of the sentence appeal. It is convenient to provide the following index to these reasons:

3. [3]

   INDEX

4. [4]

   On 17 June 2017, the Director of Public Prosecutions presented an indictment against the applicant, TS, containing 132 charges. The majority of the charges (125) related to the applicant’s abuse of his stepdaughter, KS, which commenced in 2009, shortly after her 12th birthday and continued until early 2014 when she was 16. Two further charges alleged indecent assaults upon a younger stepdaughter, JS, then aged 11 years in 2013. There were a further five charges alleging that the applicant administered an intoxicating substance to his wife and the mother of the girls, RL, with the intention of committing an indictable offence, the intended offence being that of having sexual intercourse with KS.

5. [5]

   At the beginning of a trial, the applicant entered pleas of not guilty to all offences. However, on the second day of the trial, he changed his pleas to guilty with respect to the 99 counts of sexual abuse of KS; these were 54 counts of sexual intercourse without consent in circumstances of aggravation under s 61J of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), 32 counts of sexual intercourse with a child between 10 and 16 under s 66C(2) and (4), and nine counts of aggravated indecent assault under s 61M(2). The applicant also pleaded guilty to two counts of using a child for pornographic purposes, one under s 91G(1)(a) when KS was under 14 years and one under s 91G(2)(a) when KS was over 14 years, and two counts of possessing child abuse material (involving KS) under s 91H(2). The prosecution withdrew a further count of sexual intercourse with a child (count 3). The remaining 32 counts fell within the following categories:

6. [6]

   In substance all the counts to which the applicant pleaded guilty were supported by video-recordings of the offences being committed. Following his arrest his wife discovered 79 video clips and several hundred still photographs. The three sexual offences involving KS on which he went to trial (counts 1, 2 and 4) were not filmed. The largest area of dispute related to the 22 counts of administering an intoxicating substance, namely Travacalm. The prosecution case was that on those 22 occasions, KS was drugged and then subjected to sexual abuse, which was filmed. The offences relating to RL (the mother) were also committed, on the prosecution case, as a method of ensuring that she did not become aware of his conduct with KS: his intention to have sexual intercourse thus related to his continuing and persistent abuse of KS.

7. [7]

   The applicant was acquitted on one count of administering an intoxicating substance to RL (count 130). Otherwise, he was convicted following a trial by jury in June and July 2017 on all the remaining counts to which he had entered pleas of not guilty. He was sentenced on 22 November 2017 to an aggregate sentence of imprisonment for 32 years, with a non-parole period of 24 years to date from his arrest, on 14 January 2014.

Issues on appeal

1. [8]

   Following his sentencing, the applicant filed a notice of intention to appeal on 6 December 2017. An application to extend the notice of intention to appeal was refused on 18 June 2020 on the basis that the applicant had already been granted three extensions of time. On 14 December 2020, the applicant filed a notice of application for an extension of time to appeal and a document containing 26 grounds of appeal in relation to both his convictions and his sentence. Although it appeared that the applicant had received a grant of legal aid on 14 January 2019, which was extended on 15 May and 29 August 2019, the notice of appeal, together with the grounds (which covered 11 handwritten pages) was prepared and signed by the applicant in person.

2. [9]

   Ten months later, on 18 October 2021, a further document was filed adding six additional grounds. On 22 June 2022, a week before the hearing of the appeal, a further document was filed alleging further particulars of procedural unfairness (ground 2), seeking to rely upon “new evidence” (grounds 15 and 35) and alleging “overloading” of the indictment (ground 33).

3. [10]

   On 26 May 2022, the applicant sought leave to have RL called for cross-examination at the hearing of the appeal. The Registrar declined to issue a notice to RL to attend the hearing. The applicant indicated he wished to persist with that application and was advised that the matter could be raised at the hearing of the appeal. The application was abandoned at the commencement of the hearing.

4. [11]

   There was some limited explanation given as to the reasons for the delay, evidence which was necessarily limited because it did not disclose the steps taken under the grant of legal aid, nor at what stage the applicant no longer had legal representation, nor the circumstances in which legal aid was presumably terminated.

5. [12]

   Delay in appealing against conviction following a trial by jury, can give rise to a variety of issues. An important issue is whether success on the proposed appeal would result in a re-trial. In this case, having been refused pre-trial bail, the applicant had served some six years of his sentence prior to lodging his appeal. Further, some three years had elapsed since the trial. The likelihood that witnesses would be required to give evidence again at a re-trial might provide a powerful consideration against a lengthy extension of time to appeal. Particularly would that be so in circumstances where the events giving rise to the charges must have been traumatic for the victim, where the victim had been subjected to extensive cross-examination by her abuser and where that situation was likely to be repeated.

6. [13]

   In the present case, the Director opposed an extension of time, or the grant of leave to appeal, on the basis that the proposed grounds lacked merit. The proper approach in the present case, while mindful of the potential effects of the delay, is to consider the merits of the proposed appeal.

7. [14]

   However, that is not a straightforward task. The applicant’s written submissions were discursive and ran to several hundred pages (not consecutively numbered). The hearing of the proposed appeal lasted for two days, most of which involved the applicant addressing the Court. He did so fluently and coherently. Nevertheless, many, indeed most, of the issues raised were untenable and would have been patently untenable to a legal representative.

8. [15]

   The applicant’s written submissions (including the last filed a week before the hearing), were each responded to by written submissions from the Director. Indeed, it was the Director’s submissions in response which led the applicant to identify further grounds of appeal.

9. [16]

   The grounds may be characterised for the purposes of addressing them in the following manner:

10. [17]

    The challenge to the aggregate sentence will be dealt with after addressing the grounds challenging the convictions. Nevertheless, two points should be made at this stage. First, as counsel for the Director identified, there was an error in the approach taken by the sentencing judge which required the appeal against sentence to be upheld and the applicant re-sentenced. That error involved the consideration of a standard non-parole period in relation to 32 counts under s 66C(2) and (4) when, at the time of the offending, there was no standard non-parole period for those offences and the introduction of that sentencing guideline did not apply to offending which had pre-dated the statutory amendment.

11. [18]

    The second matter to note is the nature of the sentencing exercise. Given the number of counts to which the applicant pleaded guilty or was convicted (130), the indication of the individual sentences which would have been imposed on each count, even absent the error conceded by the Director, was an exercise which provided little practical assistance in determining an appropriate aggregate sentence, as even a high level of accumulating the multiple counts within each of the categories of offences would have resulted in an aggregate sentence well in excess of the sentence ultimately imposed. Accordingly, although this Court will need to re-sentence the applicant and indicate sentences for each count as mandated by s 53A(2)(b) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) (“Sentencing Procedure Act”), the determination of an appropriate aggregate sentence will need to reflect this Court’s assessment of the objective seriousness of the offending viewed as a whole, it being a coherent course of serious criminal conduct almost entirely referable to the persistent sexual abuse of KS over some four years.

12. [19]

    For the reasons set out below, the applicant will be refused leave to appeal against his convictions. Further, no lesser sentence than that imposed by the trial judge is warranted.

Conviction appeal – grounds alleging procedural flaws

1. [20]

   Ground 32 (only identified in a document filed on 18 October 2021) read as follows:

2. [21]

   Generally, the withdrawal of a plea of guilty would require that the conviction be set aside and the charge or charges be remitted for a trial. If that course were required, there might be questions as to the basis of the other verdicts given by the jury and the aggregate sentence would need to be set aside. However, as was clear from the applicant’s submissions, what he intended was to have this Court substitute verdicts for the alternative offences under s 66C. No doubt in principle, that course would be available. However, there would remain a question as to the circumstances in which, years after the pleas were entered and the applicant sentenced, an attempt was made to withdraw the pleas. Because the application is based upon a misunderstanding as to legal principle, that enquiry need not be undertaken.

3. [22]

   Section 61J relevantly provides:

4. [23]

   The alternative offence to which the applicant proposed to plead, namely that under s 66C(2), reads as follows:

5. [24]

   It may be noted that the maximum sentence in respect of each offence is imprisonment for 20 years. It should also be noted that s 66C(2) only applies with respect to a child under the age of 14 years. One of the charges laid under s 61J (count 119) may have arisen (the charge identified a period spanning her 14th birthday) when KS was between the ages of 14 years and 16 years, which was a period covered by s 66C(4) for which the maximum sentence was imprisonment for 12 years.

6. [25]

   Importantly, for present purposes, the basis of the application was that the applicant had been misled by statements made by the trial judge at the commencement of the trial and after pleas of not guilty had been entered with respect to every count on the indictment. The procedural steps and the observations by the judge must therefore be identified.

7. [26]

   On 27 June 2017, the jury was empanelled and the judge gave some brief instructions as to their function and obligations. The jury was then excused until the following morning so that other matters could be attended to. The judge then put on record a brief summary of the procedural history of the matter, noting that the applicant had originally been represented by a solicitor, Ms Gray. Ms Gray briefed counsel who had withdrawn shortly before the trial commenced “as a result of a conflict”. [1] Ms Gray continued to assist after she was unable to obtain alternative counsel. The applicant then being unrepresented, the judge explained the next stages in the process and arranged that he be provided with a list of charges broken down into their elements. In particular, the judge foreshadowed what directions the jury would be given in relation to consent, lack of which was an element of the s 61J offences of sexual intercourse without consent and with the applicant knowing that KS was not consenting. The judge continued: [2]

8. [27]

   There was no response from the applicant at that stage, and the Court reconvened the following morning, 28 June 2017.

9. [28]

   The foreshadowed document was produced and a copy given to the applicant. The judge explained again the elements of the s 61J offence, and how that would be explained to the jury. Apart from that which had been explained the day before (and which he substantially repeated) the judge also stated: [3]

10. [29]

    The judge outlined the elements of the other sexual assault offences, including the charges of aggravated sexual assault pursuant to s 66C(2) and s 66C(4), where lack of consent was not an issue.

11. [30]

    The judge then referred to the importance of the applicant understanding those principles at the outset, because the prosecutor would open the case to the jury. The judge noted that the applicant would also have the opportunity to open. The explanation continued: [4]

12. [31]

    Following some further discussion, the judge indicated that the jury would be brought back and the indictment would be read again to allow the applicant to plead guilty to the charges in respect of which he agreed he had no defence. That course was taken the following morning.

13. [32]

    The applicant, having noted that no such application was made with respect to the offences under s 61M(2), submitted: [6]

14. [33]

    As is perfectly clear from the explanation given by the trial judge extracted above, two separate factors were identified as relevant to the question of consent. First, with respect to the charges under s 66C, the question of consent did not arise because, as a result of the complainant’s age, she was legally not capable of consenting. Secondly, with respect to the charges under s 61J, the judge’s comments as to incapacity were expressly directed to the fact that in each case the prosecution was asserting that the complainant was sedated or, as the applicant asserted, asleep. That she was not conscious was amply demonstrated by the video clips. Those offences did not turn on the legal capacity of the complainant to give effective consent. Accordingly, the judge’s comments were entirely correct as a matter of law and it appears that the applicant so understood them at the time. The assumption underlying ground 32 (namely that consent was vitiated by age) misrepresented the judge’s statements. Accordingly, the legal basis for the application to withdraw the pleas did not arise; nor was there any evidence of a misunderstanding as to the law at the time the pleas were entered. Ground 32 was untenable.

15. [34]

    Where it is established that a tribunal is infected by a reasonable apprehension of bias, the judgment or determination must be set aside and the process repeated. Because the decision is legally ineffective, the proper course, where bias is alleged, is to address that question before addressing any other grounds of appeal. [7]

16. [35]

    There are potentially a number of grounds for establishing an apprehension of bias: in the present case the ground was prejudgment, based on statements made by the judge in the course of the trial. That ground is tested by asking, hypothetically, whether a fair-minded, non-lawyer observer, with some knowledge of the trial process and hearing what was said in that context, might reasonably think that the judge might not determine whatever needed to be determined impartially having regard to the evidence. [8]

17. [36]

    The first point to be noted is that the trial judge was not the tribunal of fact in relation to the determination of the guilt of the applicant. On the other hand, he was responsible for determining the appropriate sentence. However, at least in respect of the conviction appeal, the expression of an opinion by the trial judge (by words or conduct) will generally only be relevant if made in the presence of the jury and thus likely to influence the judgment of the jury. In theory it can also affect decisions as to the admission of evidence or other legal rulings by the judge, but that possibility did not arise in the present case.

18. [37]

    The submissions in support of ground 1 were discursive, covering 145 pages. References to events in the course of the trial were interspersed with lengthy extracts from judgments in other matters. An index was provided which identified 56 events during the course of the trial, although there was a degree of overlap and some of the particulars summarised other issues. Quite a number of the particulars identified matters which were the subject of separate grounds of appeal. These will be separately addressed below.

19. [38]

    The applicant’s primary written submissions were supplemented by five pages (identified as ground 1A) adding a further particular of prejudgment, namely that the judge had asserted the applicant had “groomed” KS before any evidence had been presented to the jury.

20. [39]

    Importantly, such complaints are to be addressed having regard to the circumstances of the trial. A number of matters were pertinent. First, because the applicant was unrepresented, the judge was obliged to provide explanations to him as to the course of the trial, and the steps he could take at various stages, both before and during the hearing. Secondly, while the judge was aware of the prosecution case, he was not fully aware of the case the defence would run. Nevertheless, as is commonplace in such circumstances, he engaged with the applicant in order to be able to provide him with relevant information. Thirdly, it was important to distinguish between discussion with the applicant in the absence of the jury and exchanges which took place in their presence. It was most unlikely that the former would lead to unfairness in the conduct of the trial. As to the latter, the judge was required to rule on objections as they occurred.

21. [40]

    Such occasions not infrequently arise when a witness is being cross-examined by or on behalf of the accused. Questions may be formulated in terms which contain assumptions or hidden ambiguities. On a number of occasions, the judge intervened to reformulate questions. Where there was no apparent prejudice in doing so, that was done in the presence of the jury. Where there was a need for the judge to explore the matter being raised in more detail, it was on occasion done in the absence of both the jury and the witness. Such events are both necessary and commonplace in the course of criminal trials.

22. [41]

    Excessive interference in the conduct of a trial can lead to an unfair trial, whether or not it leads to an apprehension of bias. It is usual to see far more interventions in the cross-examination by an unrepresented litigant than in circumstances where counsel is conducting the cross-examination. In respect of the cross-examination of KS, a legal representative was appointed, in accordance with usual practice, who asked questions provided by the applicant. When the questions became repetitive and were rejected, the lawyer, Mr Boutros, enquired whether he should exercise his discretion and not ask the question. On other occasions, the judge reformulated the question for the witness to answer.

23. [42]

    It is, of course, possible that a series of interventions by a trial judge, each justifiable in its own terms, may cumulatively give rise to a reasonable apprehension on the part of a lay observer that the judge may have prejudged the guilt of the accused. However, it is necessary to bear in mind, as noted above, that the judge is not the fact-finder in a trial with a jury and that there are occasions in the course of a trial with an unrepresented accused when the judge may feel it necessary to have a robust discussion with the accused in relation to the conduct of the trial. Where possible, that will be done in absence of the jury and the lay observer would understand that that is done so that the jury will not hear the substance of the discussion.

24. [43]

    Finally, it is necessary to observe that a trial judge has an important, but sometimes difficult, job of ensuring a fair trial in circumstances where the unrepresented accused, perhaps having his or her own agenda, may not appreciate what appears to the judge to be a self-destructive course.

25. [44]

    It is convenient to start with ground 1A, which was a complaint that the judge had formed a view that KS was groomed before evidence was called.

26. [45]

    The observation relied upon arose in a context which has been partly explained above. It occurred on 28 June 2017 at which time the judge was clearly informed as to the nature of the case and had prepared a document setting out what the prosecution was required to prove. After a lengthy statement by the trial judge, the applicant said, “I will not deny the facts of that, those things did occur”. He then described some of the matters shown on the videos. [9] In the course of the further discussion, the judge expressed an appreciation of the applicant’s position and the basis on which he declined to plead guilty to the charges which he appeared to admit. It then became apparent that the applicant was concerned as to what the judge would rely upon during the sentencing proceedings were he to plead guilty. He referred to the “relationship” with KS which he wished to portray as consensual. The following exchange then took place: [10]

27. [46]

    There was nothing in this exchange which would have suggested to the lay observer that the judge had formed a firm view as to an aspect of the matter, which was not, in any event, relevant to the question of guilt or innocence. The judge recognised that and returned immediately to the topic of whether pleas should be entered. The applicant then said: [11]

28. [47]

    To suggest that the reasonable lay observer might have inferred from this exchange that the judge might have formed a firm view as to the issue of grooming or otherwise is without substance.

29. [48]

    It is convenient to turn next to the complaints of excessive interference in the applicant’s cross-examination of witnesses. As will be explained further below, it was part of the prosecution case that the applicant had used a meat tenderiser to crush up Travacalm (travel sickness) tablets in order to sedate his wife. The source of that information was KS. It was part of the applicant’s case that the police had failed adequately to investigate the claim because officers present at the applicant’s home on 13 January 2014, when he was arrested, did not take the meat tenderiser for examination. Accordingly, there was a question as to whether KS had told them about the use of the meat tenderiser on the evening of 13 January or not until her recorded interview on 14 January. At trial, KS gave evidence over three days. On the third day, being the sixth day of the trial, she was asked in cross-examination: [12]

30. [49]

    KS was then asked to identify whom of some seven officers she had told; she said “yes” to Detective Darley’s name. After she had denied remembering who the others were, the judge asked the following question:

31. [50]

    The intervention may have been adverse to the applicant’s interests, although it is by no means clear that it would have been significant. The questions earlier in the cross-examination and immediately thereafter demonstrated that KS was unclear as to when she had spoken to the police about particular issues. There being no record of the conversation on 13 January 2014, some three years earlier, the judge may have been concerned that her simple affirmative answer, “yes”, might have been misleading. The issue, which had been identified in the absence of the witness and the jury, was that KS told the police “different versions on different days of her knowledge of Travacalm” and “hasn’t been consistent”. [13] There followed a lengthy debate with the applicant as to whether her evidence was in fact inconsistent. The lay observer would likely have identified the judge’s intervention as intended to clarify an answer in order to reveal whether there was any degree of inconsistency.

32. [51]

    There were other examples of intervention in the cross-examination of KS, on many occasions there being discussion as to the purpose of the question and precisely what was sought to be asked. On some occasions the judge rejected the question; on other occasions the judge reformulated the question. There was a significant degree of repetition in the questioning which led the questioner, Mr Boutros, to enquire: [14]

33. [52]

    Another example of which the applicant complained was the rejection of the following question: [15]

34. [53]

    The prosecutor objected and the judge rejected it on the grounds of relevance. The applicant then sought to discuss the issue and the jury and the witness were asked to leave the courtroom. The applicant then sought to justify the question on the basis that it went to the credibility of the witness and was therefore relevant to how the first two charges came about. He submitted that “[i]f [KS] was capable of lying at 11 before anything else happened, then she was certainly capable [of] lying about the first two incidents that this occurred”. [16] The judge maintained his ruling that the question was irrelevant.

35. [54]

    In fact, the events the subject of counts 1 and 2 were not denied by the applicant, but only the circumstances as to how they came about, the applicant contending that KS, then 12 years of age, was the instigator. The following exchange then took place: [17]

36. [55]

    It is undoubtedly correct that there were numerous interventions by the trial judge in the cross-examination of KS. Whether or not a lay observer would have thought the judge was excessively interventionist is an open question: however, the transcript provides no basis upon which to conclude that the lay observer might think the judge might be prejudging the guilt of the applicant. Each issue was addressed with a focus on the evidence, the issues at the trial and the degree of repetition.

37. [56]

    The applicant gave evidence, his evidence-in-chief being taken by way of questions asked by an independent agent. The interventions were more limited, although, as the trial judge pointed out, some matters concerning KS had not been raised with her in cross-examination, [18] and many of the questions were leading questions, but were not dismissed on that basis. [19] Having given details of the ages of the children in the family, the ensuing question was: [20]

38. [57]

    The judge intervened to clarify what was meant by the question and answer, although entirely helpfully to the applicant.

39. [58]

    The applicant was permitted to give evidence as to the first incident between himself and KS, stating that “just out of the blue [KS] just put her hand out and grabbed me on the penis and said, ‘cock grab’”. [21] The judge noted that this had not been put to KS, but the applicant was allowed to give the evidence about it in some detail. The same occurred in relation to a second incident, alleging that KS had no clothes on and had asked the applicant to kiss her vagina. [22] The applicant also gave evidence that KS had seen him and RL having sex. [23] Again, the matter was not put to either KS or RL.

40. [59]

    There was one matter where the judge did intervene when it was put by the applicant’s agent that RL had asked him in front of KS, “are you sleeping with your dad?”. The question was ineptly framed, but clearly indicated a question by RL to KS in front of the applicant. The judge interjected, not for the first time: [24]

41. [60]

    The intervention was in fact mistaken; in fact, the judge had been involved in the questioning. Both questions were asked of KS in the following passage: [25]

42. [61]

    The judge’s intervention (about which the applicant separately complained) duly resulted from a perceived ambiguity as to whether the answer, “no”, related to being asked the question by her mother, or the answer she gave to her mother. There was nothing inappropriate in the intervention. However, it appears to have been evidence which the judge had forgotten when the applicant gave evidence of such a question being asked.

43. [62]

    While the judge was mistaken, and it may be assumed that the hypothetical lay observer would have noted the error, there is no possibility that such an observer would have inferred that the judge might have intervened because of a prejudice against the applicant.

44. [63]

    It has been necessary for the Court to read most of the transcript of the trial (of some 700 pages), both to deal with the large range of grounds, including the particularised claims of apprehended bias, and in order to determine whether the verdicts were unreasonable and unsupportable on the evidence. It is therefore appropriate in this context to record some general observations in relation to the manner in which the trial proceeded.

45. [64]

    First, although the applicant was unrepresented and not legally trained, as the judge noted, he was clearly a person of some intelligence. Secondly, his inexperience in formulating questions, cross-examining witnesses and giving evidence, combined with his own intimate knowledge of the details of the family, frequently led to situations where the trial judge was required to intervene. The overall impression from reading the transcript is that the interventions were generally appropriate, explanations were given to the applicant and, although most frequent in relation to the evidence of KS, the interventions were reasonable and measured. The submission that a hypothetical lay observer might at any stage have formed the view that the judge had revealed a prejudgment as to the guilt of the accused was misconceived. In dealing with a jury trial, the element of prejudice must be assessed by reference to the fairness of the trial and the impression which the jury might have obtained. Indeed, the appropriate test of apprehended bias in such a case may best be understood by considering the position of the reasonable juror and whether he or she might have apprehended that the judge might have formed his own opinion as to the guilt of the accused. It is, of course, well-understood that juries may look to the judge for inadvertent indications of whether a witness should be believed or not and whether the accused is guilty as charged, and juries are routinely advised not to take any notice of such perceived views of the judge as to the facts.

46. [65]

    However the matter is tested, there is no basis to grant leave with respect to grounds 1 and 1A.

47. [66]

    It is convenient to deal at this stage with claims of procedural unfairness so far as they are able to be isolated. By way of explanation, there was a claim of procedural unfairness in relation to the evidence of the pharmacologist, Mr Farrar, which is combined with a challenge to the admissibility of parts of his evidence which will be dealt with below.

48. [67]

    The substance of ground 2, as particularised by the applicant, was that the trial judge failed to:

49. [68]

    The frequency with which persons accused of serious criminal trials have, either through choice or want of available representation, defended themselves means that the role of the trial judge in such circumstances has been the subject of frequent restatement. While the obligation to provide information, but not to advise the accused, has already been adverted to, it is convenient to set out the well-known statements of the principles.

50. [69]

    In MacPherson v The Queen [26] Gibbs CJ and Wilson J stated:

51. [70]

    Mason CJ stated, at 534:

52. [71]

    MacPherson was concerned with the voluntariness of a confession; the principles stated are, however, generic. While the principle is well-established, there is, inevitably, flexibility in its application. Its application is bounded by three considerations. One is that the judge cannot be an advocate for the accused and must maintain a position of impartiality. Secondly, the judge’s ability to assist will be limited by his or her knowledge of the circumstances. There may be occasions, as occurred in the course of this trial, where the accused appears set upon a course which may not be in his or her interest with respect to obtaining an acquittal. Through inadvertence, inexperience, or a focus on other matters, an accused may, through cross-examination or adducing evidence, bolster the prosecution case in a manner not available to the prosecution. That may occur in circumstances where the evidence is not only technically inadmissible, but potentially prejudicial. Thirdly, as recognised by Mason J in MacPherson, the obligation of the trial judge is to do whatever can be done to ensure that the patience of the jury and the efficient disposal of public resources are not depleted through unnecessary and irrelevant cross-examination or tender of evidence.

53. [72]

    Any consideration of the manner in which the trial judge dealt with the applicant should commence with a consideration of the hearings which occurred on 15 August 2016 (when there was an application by the accused to vacate the trial date set for a week hence) and a second hearing on 2 November 2016 when a trial date of 5 June 2017 was confirmed. There were further pre-trial hearings on 5 June, 6 June, 13 June, 15 June, 19 June and 27 June 2017, when the jury was empanelled. Prior to empanelment, when it was apparent that the applicant would be unrepresented, although he was still assisted by his solicitor, Ms Gray, the judge took the applicant through the charges in order to understand whether the foreshadowed pleas would be entered and, if not, the basis upon which the applicant was resisting that course. (The key elements of the assistance have been set out above.) On 27 June there was further discussion of the charges, following which the judge gave standard directions to the applicant as to the onus of proof, the judge’s role and that of the jury in the trial, and how the Court would proceed, in the absence of the jury, in debating issues of law or evidence. [27] The instructions included an explanation of the process of empanelling the jury, the opening by the prosecutor, and the fact that the accused would then also have the right to address the jury. The judge explained the purpose of the opportunity for the accused to open and, at the end of the explanations, expressed some concern as to what the accused would say if he did open his case. [28] In the course of explaining the court procedure, the judge stated: [29]

54. [73]

    After discussing the possible bases upon which the applicant was proposing to plead, the judge returned to discuss the empanelment process. [30] The explanation concluded with the following statement: [31]

55. [74]

    Mr Park, it appears, was there to assist the applicant with the empanelment process. The applicant then asked a number of questions concerning the elements of the charges of administering an intoxicating substance.

56. [75]

    Following a short adjournment, Mr Park advised the Court that there was a possibility of pleas to some charges and sought time to explore the matter further with the applicant. The judge was troubled that there had been ample time to do that and determined that the empanelment of a jury would take place that afternoon, but the jury would be sent home without any further activity so that pleas could be taken the following day.

57. [76]

    Following the empanelment of the jury, the trial judge gave the usual explanation to the jury of their role in the proceedings and the jury were then discharged for the day. The judge, in discussions with the prosecutor, turned to the procedural history, which has been noted above. The judge recorded that the committal for trial occurred on 25 November 2015, some 19 months before the date on which he was hearing the matter. An indictment was presented on 4 February 2016, at which time the applicant was not arraigned, but had counsel appearing for him. Counsel continued to appear for him over some 16 months, until counsel sought leave to withdraw on 6 June 2017.

58. [77]

    On the afternoon of 27 June, the judge indicated that he would address some further comments to the applicant “in relation to the process specifically in respect of the Crown calling witnesses and your ability to be able to, through a representative, ultimately ask questions of the complainants”. [32] On the following morning, the judge provided a document which contained the elements of the various counts, noting that, in consultations with counsel and his solicitor, no doubt the applicant had already been through those matters. Nevertheless, the judge’s explanation proceeded over some two pages of transcript. [33] There was further discussion as to the pleas and the explanations given by the applicant as to his position in relation to the charges generally. It became clear that, in relation to the 22 charges of administering an intoxicating substance to KS were to be determined by the jury, as the applicant was asserting that KS was asleep and not drugged. Counts 1, 2 and 4, concerning KS but not supported by video recordings, were also to be determined by the jury, as were all the charges involving RL and JS.

59. [78]

    The jury then returned and the applicant entered pleas in the terms which have been discussed above. The jury then returned, and the applicant was re-arraigned. After the re-arraignment and in the absence of the jury, the trial judge explained to the applicant how he might open his case, cross-examine the witnesses called by the prosecution, object to evidence being led or tendered and give evidence himself if he elected to do so. The judge explained further to the jury how the process of the trial would operate, matters which must also have been heard and digested by the applicant. At the beginning of his explanation, the judge noted that both the prosecution and the applicant would require some little time to consider how to proceed in relation to the remaining charges of not guilty. [34] There followed an opening address by the prosecutor, which again directed the attention of those in court (including the applicant) to the case which was being presented. The applicant then addressed the jury by way of opening, with only one interruption from the trial judge. The evidence then proceeded, with the investigating police officer being called by the prosecution.

60. [79]

    In summary, the steps taken by the trial judge up to that point to ensure that the applicant had a full understanding of the nature of the case brought by the prosecution, in full awareness of the extensive opportunities that the applicant had had to obtain legal advice, undoubtedly fulfilled the obligation of a trial judge dealing with an unrepresented accused. The exchanges with the accused demonstrated that he was able to ask questions to clarify issues, particularly in relation to the elements of the alleged offending. Not only could there be no complaint of inadequate assistance up to that point, but the further complaints which are made must be viewed in the light of what had occurred to that point.

61. [80]

    On Monday, 3 July 2017 (the fourth day of the trial) the applicant began his cross-examination of the investigating officer, Detective Senior Constable Darley. At his request, the Court took a short break to allow him to organise his papers. [35] When the jury returned and cross-examination continued, the applicant sought to ask questions about the production of an Apple iPad which was said to be found in the course of the search of his premises, which he asked to be brought to court. The judge suggested he ask a question in relation to a statement by KS that something had been recorded on an iPad and he responded, “if the iPad’s not here then I can’t ask the question”. [36] At the applicant’s request, the jury was excused so that he could speak to the judge. In the absence of the jury, he said: [37]

62. [81]

    The reference to “Chris” was to Mr Chris Elias, a clerk from the solicitor’s office who had been in court on a number of occasions assisting the applicant. The judge then said in response:

63. [82]

    The discussion between the applicant and the judge, with contributions from the prosecutor, continued over some nine pages of the transcript. To the extent that the applicant complains about the refusal of an adjournment to obtain legal representation, the procedural history of the matter sufficiently demonstrates that the judge was entitled to take the view that (i) there had been reasonable opportunities to obtain counsel and (ii) a further opportunity was unlikely to produce the desired result. It was not a situation in which the trial miscarried because a further adjournment was not permitted. It is apparent that the applicant was then seeking private representation, apparently having been refused legal aid. There is no evidence that he was indigent.

64. [83]

    Grounds 2(i)-(iii) were without substance and provided no sufficient basis for a grant of leave to appeal with respect to those issues. Ground 2(iv) will be addressed below.

65. [84]

    An additional aspect of ground 2(i) filed on 22 June 2022 made specific complaint about the failure of the trial judge to inform the applicant of his procedural rights to object that Ex EE was obtained improperly or unlawfully. It is convenient to address it before turning to ground 2(iv).

66. [85]

    Exhibit EE was both a recording and a transcript of the recording of a conversation on 13 January 2014, involving the confrontation between KS and the applicant in the presence of RL, and a subsequent conversation between KS and her mother after the applicant had left. Both were recorded by KL on her iPhone. If the recordings were unlawful, it was because they contravened s 7(1)(b) of the Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW), which makes it unlawful to use a listening device to record a private conversation to which the person is a party. However, there was no offence under s 7(1)(b) if RL, as a principal party to the conversation, recorded it and it was “reasonably necessary for the protection of [her] lawful interests” or the recording was not made “for the purpose of communicating or publishing the conversation … to persons who are not parties to the conversation”: s 7(3)(b).

67. [86]

    With respect to the first conversation, there is no doubt that RL consented to the recording: she made it. If the applicant and KS were aware of the conversation being recorded on the iPhone, their consent would be implied. The evidence did not reveal whether or not they were aware. Nor was there any evidence that RL made the recording for the purpose of communicating or publishing it to others. However, it was clear from her evidence that she made both recordings at a time when she was suspicious of the relationship between the applicant and KS and, as she said during the first recording, thought that KS was alleging that she had been sexually abused by the applicant. As the recipient of information that serious crimes had been, or might have been, committed, it is clearly arguable that the exception in s 7(3)(b) applied, on the basis that, if no complaint or confession were forthcoming, she would not have intended to provide the recording to any other person, but that if it were, she would be compelled to take the matter to police and would need to be in a position to justify taking such action. It was therefore justified in order to protect her own interests.

68. [87]

    No doubt it is true that these matters might have been pursued had the trial judge informed the applicant that there was a possible argument that the recording was unlawfully obtained. However, a perusal of the transcripts would have immediately revealed that nothing was disclosed in those conversations which had not been admitted by the applicant. At no stage did he deny having a sexual relationship with KS while she was under the age of 16 and under his special care. It was not the function of the trial judge to advise the applicant about possible legal bases for objecting to the tender of Exhibit EE which had no practical bearing upon the resolution of the issues in dispute at the trial.

69. [88]

    Further, it was not correct to say, as the applicant submitted, that the evidence was inadmissible. Even if it were improperly or unlawfully obtained, its admissibility was dependent upon different principles. The evidence, so far as it was relevant, involved a complaint by KS to her mother that the applicant had been drugging her mother to allow him to have a sexual relationship with her (KS), which the mother would not discover. That evidence was relevant and admissible as evidence of complaint in circumstances where the applicant’s defence was not that RL was not drugged, but that she was drugged by KS. That was an issue explored by the applicant in his cross-examination of KS. The early complaint was admissible under s 66 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) and as evidence to re-establish the credibility of KS in the face the challenge to her evidence that the applicant was drugging RL, pursuant to s 108(3) of the Evidence Act.

70. [89]

    Somewhat curiously, the applicant also complained that the judge gave inadequate directions concerning the recordings, referring to RL’s evidence of the recordings “without referring to the actual recordings themselves”. [38] In fact the judge reminded the jury both of specific passages in her evidence which were not the subject of recording and some which were. [39] In fact, the recorded evidence was little more than background to a critical conversation in which she telephoned the applicant and gave the following evidence as to the conversation: [40]

71. [90]

    There would need to be a clear case of a potentially serious miscarriage of justice to justify challenging verdicts some five years after the trial, in circumstances where the applicant had had the benefit of legal representation before the trial, and the opportunity to obtain legal aid after the trial. That justification is notably missing in this case. An extension of time should be refused.

72. [91]

    There was a degree of equivocation in ground 2(iv) as to whether the applicant was suggesting that the trial judge should not have allowed the prosecutor to make a closing address, or that he should have controlled what the prosecutor was saying to prevent it being forceful and prejudicial to the applicant. However, neither in the written submissions nor in the course of oral argument (where the issue was very briefly touched on [41] ) did the applicant identify in what respect the prosecutor addressed in terms which were prejudicial. It may fairly be said that the address was forceful, if that means persuasive, but that was a function of an extremely strong prosecution case.

73. [92]

    It is fair to say that the authorities are less than clear as to the appropriate role for a prosecutor in addressing the jury. In Varley v The Queen [42] the High Court addressed a submission that there had been a departure “from the usual practice of the Crown in not addressing where an accused is unrepresented”, resulting in a miscarriage of justice. Barwick CJ noted, and accepted, [43] views expressed by this Court in the following terms: [44]

74. [93]

    This Court further noted in Varley that the Solicitor-General, who appeared for the prosecution, expressed the view, with which the Court agreed, “that it would have been an irresponsible act on the part of the Crown if it declined to make a final address, if it declined to direct the jury’s attention to those portions of the solid volume of evidence in the case which the Crown felt might assist it”.

75. [94]

    Following the decision of the High Court in Varley, Street CJ in this Court in R v EJ Smith [45] noted that, while it may be a usual practice for the Crown not to address, “it goes no further than that. It is not a rule of practice, still less is it a rule of law.”

76. [95]

    In R v Zorad [46] this Court accepted that there was “a practice in New South Wales whereby the Crown does not address in such circumstances, but it is not a rule of practice, still less is it a rule of law” repeating the statement in EJ Smith. The Court continued: [47]

77. [96]

    The reasoning continued: [48]

78. [97]

    The Court in Zorad further stated that “[i]n every case, the decision whether the Crown Prosecutor should exercise his right to make a closing address is for the trial judge to make in the exercise of his discretion. The fact that the transcript may be silent upon the subject does not mean that the judge did not turn his mind to it …. There has been nothing shown by the appellant in the present case to suggest that the judge failed to exercise that discretion or that he did so wrongly”. [49]

79. [98]

    Each of the cases to which reference has been made was a case in which other irregularities were relied upon. In each case this particular ground was rejected. In similar circumstances in MS v R, [50] such a complaint was upheld. Macfarlan JA stated that the present practice is that the Crown prosecutor does not make a closing address where an accused is unrepresented, referring to Zorad. Whether that is true as a statement of fact is not known. There may well be cases such as Varley, where it is generally accepted that the prosecutor would be remiss in his or her duty in failing to make a final address. [51] However, in a single sentence, and in disregard of the reasoning in Zorad suggesting that silence in the transcript does not mean that the trial judge has not turned his or her mind to the question, the Court in MS held that, there being no indication in the trial transcript that the judge had turned his mind to the question, there was an “irregularity as there were no circumstances which rendered it appropriate to depart from the ordinary practice.” [52]

80. [99]

    Beech-Jones J took a different view in MS, stating: [53]

81. [100]

    In a careful and thorough consideration of the exercise of the power to permit a prosecutor to address the jury, Judge S Norrish QC in the District Court placed weight on the task of the trial judge required to sum up the prosecution case to the jury in circumstances where the prosecutor has not undertaken that function. [54] Apart from the possibility of error or omission, a likely consequence of the judge undertaking that function is to give to the prosecution case the authority of the independent judicial officer, who otherwise stands above the fray. The court not infrequently hears complaints from appellants that, in failing adequately to sum up the defence case, the judge failed to give equal weight to defence and prosecution cases. Indeed, a claim that the summing up was unbalanced was raised in the present case. Relevantly for present purposes, the important consideration is that to require the judge to be the source of presentation of the prosecution case is effectively to undermine the purpose of not letting the prosecutor address, namely to avoid unfairness to the accused.

82. [101]

    The prosecutor is, in any event, under an obligation not to resort to emotive appeals, and not to diminish the important function of the jury by reference to colloquialisms and loose thinking. [55] No doubt that obligation is enhanced in circumstances where the accused is unrepresented. That point should be made to the prosecutor in clear terms if the issue arises, and the judge may need to be alert to intervene if the boundary of appropriate conduct is being challenged. None of that supports the proposition that the prosecutor not be allowed to address.

83. [102]

    Unless there is to be a new legal obligation to consider the exercise of the discretion as to whether the prosecutor should address or not, the reasoning of Beech-Jones J is to be preferred. It is consistent with the underlying rationale of the “practice”, namely that the role of the trial judge is to ensure a fair trial, absence of which results in a miscarriage of justice, under the third limb of s 6(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW). [56] Unless there were demonstrable unfairness in allowing the prosecutor to address the jury, whatever the general practice, there is no sufficient basis to set aside the resulting conviction or convictions. Indeed, if the judge is not persuaded that to allow a final address to the prosecutor would result in the trial being unfair to the accused, the source of the power of a judge to deny one party an opportunity to address the jury is by no means clear.

84. [103]

    Before leaving this topic, it is convenient to deal with one other aspect of ground 2 involving a complaint that the prosecutor made a false statement with respect to count 1 on the indictment. Count 1 involved an indecent assault alleged to have occurred between 14 May and 31 August 2009 when KS was 12 years of age. The prosecutor, in dealing with counts 1, 2 and 4 commenced: [57]

85. [104]

    After noting the subject matter of the three charges, the prosecutor continued: [58]

86. [105]

    He then read an extract from the evidence of KS and continued: [59]

87. [106]

    The applicant submitted that the prosecutor was wrong to suggest that he had accepted “that it was quite possible that he did”. That statement, he submitted in this Court, was “contrary to the evidence at trial”. [60] When invited to identify the error, the applicant stated: [61]

88. [107]

    Thus, the contended error was that the prosecution had particularised count 1 as the “first occasion” and he did not agree that it was. That challenge might be thought to be a matter of little moment, but taking it at face value, it was, nevertheless, misconceived. The count was not particularised as the first occasion on which sexual contact occurred, nor was the prosecutor’s questioning, which had proceeded as follows: [62]

89. [108]

    The questioning was directed expressly, not to the first occasion that anything of a sexual nature occurred, but the first occasion that KS remembered. There was no error in the prosecutor’s summary to the jury of the evidence with respect to count 1. Further, when the applicant addressed the jury, he said: [63]

90. [109]

    The prosecutor’s address covered a little more than 10 pages of the transcript. There was no other specific challenge to the prosecutor’s address. In the course of it, the applicant objected at one stage to a reference to “his ensuite bedroom” noting that he had said “bathroom”. [64] The prosecutor apologised and corrected his submission, for which the applicant thanked him.

91. [110]

    The significance of the complaint raised in this Court as to the accuracy of the prosecutor’s closing address (which was without substance) is that there was nothing else relied upon to suggest that the address was unfair or strayed beyond the evidence. Nor, to the objective observer, is there anything in the transcript which could be so described. There was nothing in the address to which the applicant was not well able to respond, and he did respond in his own closing address.

92. [111]

    If, contrary to the view taken above, there was error on the part of the trial judge in permitting the prosecutor to address the jury, the error did not involve a breach of some fundamental legal principle, did not in any practical sense lead to an unfair trial and therefore did not involve a miscarriage of justice. If, contrary to the view expressed above, there was an error, the appeal in that respect should be dismissed because there was no substantial miscarriage of justice which has actually occurred, within the terms of the proviso to s 6(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act. Nevertheless, because of the legal uncertainty attending the issue, it is appropriate to grant an extension of time and leave to appeal with respect to ground 2(iv). The appeal should be dismissed.

Conviction appeal – grounds relating to admissibility of evidence

1. [112]

   The proposed grounds of appeal raised a number of challenges to the admissibility of evidence adduced by the prosecutor at trial. No objection was taken in relation to any of these matters and, accordingly, the applicant requires leave pursuant to r 4.15 of the Supreme Court (Criminal Appeal) Rules 2021 (NSW), as well as an extension of time. Some of these grounds also alleged failure to direct the jury as to the problems with the evidence if the evidence were held to be properly admitted. Relevant complaints as to jury directions are addressed separately, where necessary.

2. [113]

   First, ground 6 alleged failure on the part of the trial judge to exclude videos of the complainant, KS, asleep. Exclusion was required, it was submitted, pursuant to s 137 of the Evidence Act on the basis that the danger of unfair prejudice outweighed the probative value of the videos. Alternatively, if the videos were not excluded, the judge should have limited the use to be made of the videos because a “particular use of the evidence might … be unfairly prejudicial to a party” or be “misleading or confusing”, within the terms of s 136 of the Evidence Act.

3. [114]

   The videos depicted the applicant having sexual intercourse with or otherwise indecently assaulting KS. The applicant asserted that their only relevance was to prove the commission of the sexual acts the subject of his pleas of guilty entered before the jury on his re-arraignment. However, that was not so. The purpose of tendering the videos was to prove that, with respect to the multiple offences under s 38(a) of the Crimes Act, KS was not simply asleep when the applicant sexually or indecently assaulted her, but that she had been sedated. The videos were also tendered to establish, by inference, that it was the applicant who had administered the Travacalm (an intoxicating substance with sedative effect) with the intention of sexually assaulting KS. The videos did not, of course, reveal the applicant actually administering any intoxicating substance: it was KS’ comatose state, together with her audible heavy breathing including, in many instances, with the applicant quite vigorously manipulating her genitalia, which allowed for the inference to be drawn that she was under the influence of the sedative. The provenance of the videos was not in doubt: The applicant used a video camera to record his serial sexual abuse of KS. He entered pleas of guilty to the multiple sexual offences the videos recorded. If the inference of sedation were accepted by the jury, the videos supported the drawing of two further inferences namely that, (i) the applicant was the person who administered the sedative to KS and (ii) his intention in doing so was to sexually assault her.

4. [115]

   In short, the videos to which exception is taken provided evidence capable of establishing each of the three elements of s 38(a) offences. Their probative force was powerful, if not overwhelming. The applicant submitted that they had to be excluded if they were not free from ambiguity. However, that is not a correct statement of the statutory proscription in s 137.

5. [116]

   It remains to consider the prejudicial effect relied upon by the applicant. The submissions, covering some 50 closely handwritten pages, provided remarkably little assistance in that regard. The closest the applicant came to identifying such an effect was in stating that the jury were required to watch the material over a period of two days, although each of the videos accounted for no more than a few minutes of running time. (The still photographs were of a far greater number.)

6. [117]

   There may indeed have been a degree of revulsion experienced by members of a jury in viewing what might best be described as numerous occasions of violation of an unconscious female child. However, that effect was an inherent concomitant of the probative value of the videos in establishing his criminal intention; it did not constitute “unfair prejudice”. Further, the applicant himself tendered graphic videos of him having sexual intercourse with the complainant, KS, when on his case she was aged 16, in order to demonstrate the nature of their “relationship”. However, the powerful effect of the videos and the photographic evidence lay in their emphatic demonstration of KS’ heavily drugged state. Had objection been taken to the tender of this material (which it was not), there is no plausible basis on which the trial judge would have rejected the video and photographic evidence under s 137 of the Evidence Act.

7. [118]

   Further, there was no relevant manner in which the use of the videos could have been limited, pursuant to s 136. The applicant did not suggest any feasible limitation.

8. [119]

   It follows that ground 6 does not warrant a grant of leave to appeal.

9. [120]

   Ground 7 challenged the admissibility of evidence of an uncharged act of anal intercourse. The reference to an “uncharged act” revealed that, as the submissions made clear, the applicant considered the evidence was admitted to demonstrate a tendency, in the absence of a tendency notice as required by ss 97 and 99 of the Evidence Act.

10. [121]

    The evidence was not admitted as tendency evidence. The evidence was in the form of a video recording of an apparently sedated KS being moved from a supine position across to the edge of her bed where the applicant attempted to have anal intercourse with her. Because it may be inferred that significant pain was inflicted in the course of that attempt, and KS was visibly only partly roused by his actions, it became a source of direct evidence of the fact that KS had been administered an intoxicating substance. The steps needed to rouse the victim demonstrated with a degree of clarity that she was not merely sleeping, as the applicant submitted to the jury. Although the applicant’s attempt to have anal intercourse with KS was likely to have caused revulsion in some, if not all, members of the jury, there is no reason to think that was the result of the impermissible use of the evidence as tendency evidence, as distinct from the impact of that which the video recorded the accused doing to KS in proof of the fact that she was sedated. As the Director noted, there is a danger in giving a tendency direction in circumstances where the risk of the jury adopting an impermissible course of reasoning was remote.

11. [122]

    This Court stated recently in Faraj v R: [65]

12. [123]

    Indeed, as counsel for the Director noted, an anti-tendency direction might merely show the jury a forbidden path of reasoning, which could be counterproductive.

13. [124]

    Leave to rely upon ground 7 should be refused.

14. [125]

    Although grounds 8 and 31 complained that there was an error in the indictment with respect to events which took place in early January 2014, in effect the applicant sought to limit the scope of the evidence as to those events and it is convenient to address the submissions here.

15. [126]

    Count 4 alleged that, between 2 January 2014 and 11 January 2014, the applicant had sexual intercourse with KS, a young person under his special care because of her age, pursuant to s 73(1) of the Crimes Act. Count 129 alleged that between the same dates, the applicant administered an intoxicating substance to RL with the intention of enabling him to have sexual intercourse with KS, being under his special care. Although other counts of the indictment were particularised on a “between dates” basis, with some counts involving a time frame significantly greater than the nine-day period in counts 4 and 129, the applicant contended that there was no reasonable basis for the Crown to allege that the offending the subject of those two counts occurred within a nine-day period. Rather, on the basis of the evidence of a general practitioner at Liverpool Hospital, who saw KS on 14 January 2014, the applicant contended that count 4 should have identified an event that took place “on the 9 January 2014 at around midnight”. That was the date recorded in the general practitioner’s contemporaneous note of her conversation with KS. [66] That specific date was confirmed by the applicant in cross-examination of the doctor as being the date which KS had stated was “the last time that she had sexual intercourse”. The doctor also agreed that KS had told her “that she did not have sex in the previous seven days before [14 January]”. [67] The doctor explained that her question to KS had referred to consensual sexual intercourse with another person, not the applicant. The applicant also adduced evidence from the doctor that KS was menstruating when she saw KS at Liverpool Hospital on 14 January.

16. [127]

    Other evidence identified the date of the last offending as an evening of the day when the family had been to Brighton Beach. The mother, RL, had identified that as 7 January in her evidence-in-chief. It was the applicant’s case that the date was 3 January. [68]

17. [128]

    KS told her mother about the offending on the afternoon of 13 January 2014. Because RL then contacted police, that date is not in doubt. However, there was clearly conflicting evidence as to the last occasion on which the applicant administered a drug to RL and had intercourse with KS. The fact that, on 14 January, KS had identified the last date of intercourse as 9 January was not conclusive. Nor was the precise date significant.

18. [129]

    The applicant submitted, by reference to the High Court judgment in Palmer v The Queen, [69] that when the precise date is known, it is a critical element of the offence and should be stated in the charge. However, Palmer does not stand for such a principle. Rather, it was a case in which a sexual assault offence was charged as having occurred on 4 July in a particular year. The prosecution case turned on evidence that that was the date in question. The applicant had a reliable alibi for that date (and the days on either side). In those circumstances, the High Court found that the conviction for the offence committed on 4 July was unsupportable on the evidence. That case turned on its own facts, which are not comparable with the present case. There being doubt as to the precise date on which the last offending occurred, but not that it did occur, the prosecutor was entitled to lay a charge involving a range of dates.

19. [130]

    In one sense the applicant’s submissions did not turn on a fault in the pleadings, but on an inconsistency in the evidence. There is no doubt that the evidence supported the conclusion that count 4 (intercourse with KS) and count 129 (administering an intoxicating substance to RL) occurred on the same day. The applicant then reasoned that KS had nominated the relevant date as 3 January 2014, and KS had said that the offence, the subject of count 4, occurred on 9 January. The applicant relied upon the inconsistency as demonstrating that the convictions on those counts were unsafe.

20. [131]

    That reasoning should not be accepted. It was well-open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt on the evidence that both events occurred, and that they occurred on the same day. The date was not critical. The jury may have been satisfied that the subject assault and the administration of an intoxicating substance occurred on a particular date, or they may not have been. This was not a case in which the accused asserted a credible alibi for a particular date identified in the charge, or the date on which, according to the weight of the evidence, the offence must have occurred. Grounds 8 and 31 do not warrant a grant of leave.

21. [132]

    Ground 13 involved three separate limbs. The first, which may be seen as a complaint of procedural unfairness, was a failure by the prosecutor to provide pre-trial disclosure of a third expert report from the police pharmacologist, Mr John Farrar. There were also complaints that Mr Farrar was not qualified to give the evidence and that the trial judge misdirected the jury with regard to his expert qualifications and his opinions.

22. [133]

    Dealing first with the question of procedural unfairness, the applicant’s complaint concerned a third statement prepared by Mr Farrar dated 3 June 2017. The applicant accepted that it was served on his legal representatives on 5 June 2017 but stated that he did not become aware of it until Mr Farrar was giving his evidence-in-chief. It is convenient to consider this complaint at this stage, because the requirements of the statute mirror the general law obligation in relation to the fairness of the trial, discussed by the High Court in Mallard v The Queen. [70]

23. [134]

    As has been noted, the trial did not in fact commence until 28 June 2017; Mr Farrar was called on 7 July 2017. Section 141(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) requires a prosecutor to give “notice of the prosecution case” in accordance with s 142. The obligation is to provide pre-trial disclosure “before the date set for the trial … and in accordance with a timetable determined by the court”: s 141(2). Pursuant to s 142(1)(h), a copy of each report by an expert witness must be contained within the prosecution’s notice.

24. [135]

    The requirements of s 177 of the Evidence Act, referred to by the applicant, relate to service of an “expert certificate”, which must be effected no later than 21 days before the hearing or such other date as the court may direct. There was an analyst’s certificate tendered, but this provision did not relate to Mr Farrar’s report.

25. [136]

    Even if s 177 were engaged in the present case, the third report of Mr Farrar was properly served in accordance with s 149(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act by email on 5 June. Although counsel then briefed formally withdrew the following day, Ms Gray (who also received a copy of the report) continued to assist the applicant and was recorded in the transcript as appearing for him on 19 June 2017.

26. [137]

    The contents of the third statement were largely anodyne. As appears from the evidence led from Mr Farrar, it identified the videos which he had viewed, which he asserted revealed a girl in a state of sedation. The videos were those relevant to counts 16, 20, 27 and 37. [71] A section of the statement admitted as Ex LL identified the video files viewed by Mr Farrar and did nothing more. Once that became clear, the applicant took no objection to the material, which is unsurprising. This aspect of ground 13 must be rejected for two reasons. First, it is not shown that there was any non-compliance with the statutory requirements of pre-trial discovery. Secondly, there was no possibility of procedural unfairness in any practical sense. Leave should not be granted with respect to that ground.

27. [138]

    The police conducted two interviews with KS, on 14 January 2014 and 23 April 2014 respectively. At the time of the trial, KS was 20 years of age and, accordingly, the recorded interviews could not be relied upon as her evidence-in-chief. The prosecutor led her evidence orally before the jury in the usual manner. He did not seek to tender the records of the police interviews. [72] That was explained to the applicant prior to KS giving her evidence. [73] The applicant then explained that he would himself wish to play the records of interview so as to compare what KS told the police with what might be observed and heard on the videos of the sexual activity. He sought thereby to reveal inconsistency, without having to question KS. [74] The trial judge observed that any evidence he sought to introduce must be relevant and he did not understand at that stage how the records of interview would be relevant. The matter was left on the following basis, the judge stating: [75]

28. [139]

    KS gave her evidence, commencing on the fourth day of the trial (3 July 2017). Given the nature of the charges to which the applicant had pleaded not guilty, most of which in relation to KS involved her being drugged (or, as the applicant contended, asleep), direct evidence beyond the videos was limited. The evidence-in-chief of KS covered some 34 pages of transcript. KS was cross-examined by an independent person, Mr Boutros, on behalf of the applicant for the rest of day four, largely by reference to statements made by her to Detective Jenkins and based on her record of interview of 23 April 2014. The purpose of the cross-examination was, in part, to establish the closeness of the relationship between the applicant and KS and the level of distance between KS and RL. The answers were relied on by the applicant as revealing a motivation for KS to drug RL, in order to keep her sexual activity with the applicant secret. [76]

29. [140]

    In the course of the cross-examination of KS, there was a break at which time the applicant drew the judge’s attention to the fact that, in her first interview, KS had stated that she never saw the applicant give her mother Travacalm. [77] The judge pointed out that the question had related to “a tablet” and that Travacalm had not been specifically identified. The applicant then took the judge to the mother’s statement where she had said that KS had described to her how he would prepare Travacalm to be given to the mother. The description was quite detailed. However, the judge described that as “consistent with the evidence she’s given so far”. [78] After reading out a further passage from the mother’s statement, the judge said: [79]

30. [141]

    There was further discussion in relation to that issue, to which it is not necessary to refer. The discussion with the judge then moved on to evidence demonstrating motivation and the relevance of certain text messages. When the cross-examination resumed, the applicant, through his agent, put to the witness a passage that had been discussed with the judge. KS agreed that the record accorded with her memory of what she had told the police officer. [80] There was a further passage put to the witness to which she responded that the record also conformed with her memory of what she had told police.

31. [142]

    The procedure adopted was entirely appropriate. It did not involve playing to the jury either the first record of interview of 14 January 2014 (which contained 920 questions over 84 pages), or the second interview of 23 April 2014 (which included 350 questions over 37 pages). Relevantly for the issues in the trial, the primary purpose of the cross-examination of KS was to cast doubt on her denials that she had administered Travacalm to her mother, which was the applicant’s defence to counts 126-130.

32. [143]

    At the beginning of the cross-examination, the questions prepared by the applicant omitted reference to the passages in the interviews which were being put to KS. There was a suggestion of prejudice in the applicant’s explanation that he had expected that the interviews would have been played. But, as the judge explained, it would be necessary to identify the specific questions in any event. [81]

33. [144]

    The judge’s explanation as to why the records of interview, as a whole, were not admissible was correct. It was also correct to advise the applicant as to how he might use the specific passages in the records of interview on which he sought to rely to demonstrate inconsistency with the answers given by KS in the court. After some initial difficulties, during which the judge assisted in formulating questions, the applicant was successful in putting questions and getting answers from KS. The challenge to the rejection of the interviews must be dismissed.

34. [145]

    It should be noted that in respect of ground 9, the applicant’s submissions extended to 114 handwritten pages. They sought to rely upon sections of the Evidence Act which were patently irrelevant. One part relied on the failure of the judge to make an independent assessment of the interviews with KS for the purposes of making a ruling under s 192 of the Evidence Act. The submissions suggested that the prosecutor had agreed that portions of the interviews should be played, but it is not apparent from the transcript that such a concession was made. Much later in the trial, on 10 July 2017, the applicant repeated a request for the playing of so much of the interviews as involved KS describing the events which constituted counts 1 and 2, which he said were inconsistent in the two interviews. The discussion which followed referred to potential inconsistency between what KS said in the interviews “as opposed to what is on the video evidence … and there are 32 occasions then that goes down to the credibility of [KS]”. [82]

35. [146]

    The discussion then returned to the question of the inconsistencies in KS’ statements as to how the sexual touching commenced. [83] The position taken by the prosecutor was that, if the applicant in giving evidence referred to portions of the interviews, it would probably be necessary to play them. [84] That was not a course which, understandably, the judge proposed to permit unless KS was returned to the witness box for the applicant to put further matters to her. Although the judge expressed reluctance to do so, it is clear that the prosecutor accepted that while “regrettable, but if that needs to be done, perhaps it should be done”. [85]

36. [147]

    So far as the recall of KS was concerned, the judge accepted that her recall was necessary: the following exchange then took place: [86]

37. [148]

    The applicant then explained that if he put to her the questions, she would merely deny them. There was further discussion to the effect that, if he were to maintain an allegation which had not been put to KS, she should be recalled. The prosecutor agreed. The applicant maintained that he did not wish to put her back on the stand, concluding: [87]

38. [149]

    The discussion then turned to other matters, including the applicant’s claim that KS initiated the indecent assaults, including on the first occasion. [88] He then agreed he had not put that matter to KS in the witness box. A similar ruling was indicated in respect of that issue, although it was by no means clear that the applicant was raising any point which went to a defence, rather than, perhaps, an excuse for him behaving in the way that he did. Ground 9 did not warrant a grant of leave to appeal.

39. [150]

    Although it does not bear on the ground currently under consideration, it is clear that the trial judge was troubled by the applicant’s proposal to put more evidence before the jury as to KS’ behaviour, the likely effect of which would be to confirm that the sexualisation of KS was the result of the applicant’s conduct.

40. [151]

    The applicant submitted that the charges (by which he meant the evidence) were incapable of supporting the offences in relation to RL. The gravamen of the complaint was that the prosecutor led no evidence of an intention to commit any offence with KS on the dates on which it was alleged that RL was sedated.

41. [152]

    Leaving aside count 130 which was specific to 7 January 2014, and as to which the applicant was acquitted, there were two other counts (127 and 128), alleging specific dates and two other counts (126 and 129) alleging dates within a range, the last being between 2 January and 11 January 2014. That was the period in which there was evidence that the applicant had intercourse with KS, but there was a dispute as to whether it occurred on a particular date in that week. With respect to the earliest count, 126, a range of six months was specified, after RL gave birth to her youngest son.

42. [153]

    The substance of the applicant’s submission in respect of this material was that there was no proof that the administration of Travacalm to RL occurred on a date on which he had intercourse or otherwise engaged in sexual activity with KS. In part, the submission alleged that the range of dates should have been restricted to March 2011, on the evidence relating to the birth of their son. However, there were offences in relation to KS allegedly committed on 25 April and on various dates thereafter.

43. [154]

    The dates of offending against KS were not, in any event, of critical importance. The jury were asked to infer that the intention of the applicant in administering the sedative was to allow him to commit an indictable offence in relation to KS, secure from discovery by RL. That element of the offence was satisfied without there having been such an indictable offence committed on the date the substance was administered. There was ample evidence to support the jury finding that the applicant had such an intention in sedating RL. Indeed, in so far as the applicant’s defence to the charges was that KS administered the sedatives, it must have been inferred that her intention was to allow for sexual activity with the applicant. In any event, if the jury were persuaded that it was the applicant who had administered the substance to RL, the inference as to his intention, though a matter to be inferred from the circumstances, was likely to be accepted as a matter of course.

44. [155]

    There was no sufficient support for ground 30 to warrant a grant of leave to appeal.

45. [156]

    Three items were the subject of this ground, being (i) a video of the kitchen where the meat tenderiser and plastic cups said to be used by the applicant for crushing and dissolving Travacalm tablets were found and the bedroom where an empty pill container was found (Ex X); (ii) the pill bottle located under the bed (Ex Y), and (iii) the meat tenderiser (Ex HH). The ground on which it was submitted that this material was inadmissible was that its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value, relying on s 137 of the Evidence Act.

46. [157]

    Part of the applicant’s challenge appears to have been based on his contention that the police had carried out an inadequate investigation at his home on 13 January 2014 and the relevant items had been discovered by members of the family thereafter and provided to police.

47. [158]

    On the night of 13 January, the police attended to investigate sexual abuse claims. It does not appear that any significant search of the premises was undertaken on that occasion. [89] The location of the meat tenderiser was not unusual and the videos were found by RL and provided to police. Evidence of the meat tenderiser being found by RL and delivered to police was given by the investigating officer at the commencement of the trial. [90] The meat tenderiser was the subject of testing and traces of Travacalm were found on it. The video footage (Ex X) was played in court and admitted as an exhibit. [91] It is not clear that the pill bottle played any significant role in the trial, but there was nothing prejudicial about its tender. The relevance of the bottle was peripheral. The label showed that the bottle had contained Temazepam tablets which the applicant took for insomnia from which he had suffered after a medical procedure in 2008. The contents of the bottle had been supplied in April 2013. He was asked whether he had ever given Temazepam to KS. As he had correctly noted, the s 38 offences concerned conduct in 2009 and 2010, but he agreed that he had been taking Temazepam from 2008. When asked whether he had administered that substance to KS, he simply denied ever giving any intoxicating substance to anybody. [92]

48. [159]

    Curiously, the applicant’s written submissions in relation to this ground claimed that “[t]he wrongly admitted evidence inevitably led to the jury returning a guilty verdict to all [counts under s 38 of the Crimes Act]”. [93] He submitted that “[t]here was a real risk that the jury might use the evidence … as positive proof of the appellant[‘s] guilt of administering an intoxicating substance to both [KS] and [RL]”.

49. [160]

    These propositions were fanciful. The most relevant of the three exhibits was the meat tenderiser, and its presence as an exhibit was insignificant in comparison with the probative force of the analyst’s certificate showing that it contained residue of Travacalm. There was no prejudicial effect as a result of the tender of any of the three exhibits. Ground 14 lacked substance and did not warrant a grant of leave to appeal.

50. [161]

    The indictment contained two counts, 131 and 132, alleging indecent assaults on JS when she was 11 years of age. JS told her mother about the applicant’s misconduct on two occasions. The first was a complaint to her mother on 13 January 2014 immediately after RL had told JS that KS had said things about the behaviour of the applicant. Eight days later, she gave a recorded interview to police which constituted her evidence at the trial, given her age.

51. [162]

    The evidence of the first complaint was brief, but consistent with her account to police. [94] Because JS stated that the events had occurred some months earlier (in 2013) the applicant submitted they were not fresh in her memory and should not have been admitted. He relied upon s 66(2) of the Evidence Act, providing an exception to the hearsay rule, where the occurrence of the asserted fact was fresh in the memory of the person making the representation or complaint. He referred to the reasoning of the High Court in Graham v The Queen, [95] which held that the word “fresh” in s 66 connoted a close temporal relationship between the occurrence and the time of complaint. However, s 66 now includes subs (2A) which had the effect of removing the temporal constraint. It is now accepted that something may be fresh in the memory of a person, especially if it had some emotional impact at the time of the occurrence, even if there has been a significant lapse of time. [96] That provision commenced on 1 January 2009; its effect was discussed by Whealy J in R v XY. [97] There was no reason to conclude that the events were not fresh in JS’ memory at the time of her complaint in January 2014.

52. [163]

    Ground 29 being based on a misapprehension as to the law, leave should be refused with respect to this ground.

Conviction appeal – grounds relating to jury directions

1. [164]

   Although ground 3 asserted error on the part of the trial judge in not giving a “‘Longman’ direction” and a “‘Crofts’ direction”, in oral submissions the applicant accepted that the available directions were constrained by the requirements of s 294 of the Criminal Procedure Act and s 165B of the Evidence Act. In oral submissions in this Court, the applicant identified the “significant forensic disadvantage” which he had suffered, in the terms of s 165B(2), by reference to a list of largely theoretical disadvantages. For example, he stated: [98]

2. [165]

   Not one of the matters raised in that passage could have had any relevance to count 1. In any event, the applicant admitted the conduct, the subject of count 1, merely contending that it was not the first occasion on which he had indecently assaulted KS.

3. [166]

   With respect to the charges involving RL, he referred to the inability to obtain toxicology and pharmacology evidence, presumably designed to demonstrate that she had not been administered Travacalm. As was pointed out by the Court, it was not his case that RL was not drugged, but rather that it was not he who did it. He then suggested that the problem arose as to the particular date of the last occasion, namely whether it was 3 or 9 January, or some other date between 2 and 11 January 2014.

4. [167]

   With respect to the assaults on KS, he said that “the delay in the complaint by KS prevented the finding of the video files of KS asleep between those periods of time, June to September 2010”. [99] He suggested that toxicology results could have detected Travacalm had it been administered at that time. The applicant also suggested that sleep studies might have then been available to determine whether or not KS was a deep sleeper, as he alleged.

5. [168]

   These issues were largely beside the point: the video records which he took of his sexual interference with KS were powerful evidence that at the time of those events, being the events the subject of the charges, she was drugged. The idea that he suffered a forensic disadvantage in defending those charges was fanciful.

6. [169]

   There was no request for a direction with respect to delay and leave to rely upon ground 3 should be refused.

7. [170]

   In support of ground 4 the applicant submitted that the jury should have been directed as to the manner in which to approach the evidence of KS “who was implicated in the matter”. [100] A similar direction was said to have been appropriate in relation to the evidence of RL who was also “implicated in the matter”. The applicant submitted that a warning should have been given in accordance with s 165 of the Evidence Act.

8. [171]

   Section 165 provides for warnings to be given to the jury in a number of circumstances where the evidence is of a kind that may be unreliable. The class of evidence relied upon was that of “a witness who might reasonably be supposed to have been criminally concerned in the events giving rise to the proceeding”. It was also said, more vaguely, that all three witnesses had a motive to lie, a consideration which did not fall within the specific terms of s 165.

9. [172]

   With respect to RL, the applicant’s case was that she had some knowledge or at least intimation of sexual activity occurring between the applicant and KS. The evidence in that regard was scant, but even if the assumption were accepted, it did not make RL a participant in his criminality.

10. [173]

    With respect to KS, the applicant’s case was that she was indeed the person responsible for administering the sedative to RL. It is, as senior counsel for the Director submitted, more usual that such a warning is required where the other witness is a co-accused or otherwise someone implicated in the crime committed by the accused. In circumstances where that is not part of the prosecution case, but rather a contradiction of the prosecution case, a somewhat different warning might be in order. That is not to say, however, that no warning is appropriate in such circumstances. A criminal who turns informer may have done so to implicate another in his or her own criminality.

11. [174]

    With respect to JS there was little more than an allegation that she and RL concocted her evidence against the applicant.

12. [175]

    In the course of the summing up, the trial judge commenced with the usual directions to the jury about their role, the burden of proof and the elements of the charge. He summarised the principal elements of the evidence led by the prosecution, and then turned to the specific charges, which he dealt with in order. The directions commenced with the first counts (count 3 having been withdrawn): [101]

13. [176]

    Having summarised the evidence in respect of the other matters, the judge repeated what he had said about counts 1, 2 and 4 and addressed in similar terms counts 131 and 132 in respect of JS. With respect to the complaints by JS, he noted that there had “obviously been a delay in making her complaint about those two occurrences”. [102] He advised the jury that they could take the delay into account in assessing the credibility of JS and noted the applicant’s argument that “her delay in making that complaint is inconsistent with the conduct of a truthful person who had been sexually assaulted in that way and so, in effect, you should regard her evidence as being unreliable and, indeed, false”. [103] The judge then gave a direction consistent with the terms of s 294(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act.

14. [177]

    During a break in the summing up and in the absence of the jury, the judge discussed with the prosecutor whether a direction should be given in respect of delay in complaining in respect of KS’ evidence. Noting that delay can go to the credibility of the complainant, the judge observed that “in this case it’s not in question that all of the acts occurred. I’m talking about the sexual acts”. [104] He accepted that such a direction should be given with respect to the evidence of JS. Having received reassurance from the prosecutor, the judge turned to the applicant and explained the nature of the direction commonly given with respect to delay in complaining. He gave a direction in summary form, concluding, “‘if she did not do what you would have expected that person to do, that is, to complain to somebody’, as in the case of [JS], ‘then that may indicate that the allegations are false’. That has applicability to JS’ case. It doesn’t quite have applicability to–”. [105] The applicant said, “yeah, I understand”. The applicant made no submission in respect of that direction nor, when given an opportunity, at the end of the summing up.

15. [178]

    The lack of a request for a particular direction of the kind now complained of engages the requirement for leave in r 4.15 of the Supreme Court (Criminal Appeal) Rules 2021 (NSW). However, that requirement need not be applied with its usual strictness in the case of an unrepresented accused. The real question is whether any substantial basis has been demonstrated for such a direction.

16. [179]

    So far as counts 1, 2 and 4 (relating to KS) are concerned, the statement that the jury must be convinced of the truthfulness and reliability of KS was, if anything, unduly favourable to the applicant. As has been made clear in the foregoing discussion, the applicant did not deny the substance of the allegations, at least with respect to counts 1 and 2. Indeed, the prosecution assertion that he admitted the conduct which constituted count 1 was correct. (His qualification to his admission was immaterial.) Nor did he challenge KS’ evidence with respect to count 2. Count 4 was the subject of a still photograph taken by the applicant. Only its timing appears to have been challenged.

17. [180]

    To give a fair direction with respect to the possible doubt which might arise from the delay in complaining, it would have been necessary to reiterate the evidence of grooming, KS’ own evidence that the sexual advances were routine and accepted, and the applicant’s evidence of a consensual relationship between him and KS. That would not have assisted the applicant’s case.

18. [181]

    So far as KS’ evidence relating to the drugging of her mother was concerned, she was cross-examined as to her involvement in that activity and gave simple denials. The applicant’s case was that the jury should disbelieve her in that respect. However, a warning that her evidence might be deemed unreliable, because she was being asked to admit to her own criminal activity, would not usually be needed and would require some care in its formulation. The applicant had made clear in his address his allegation that KS had administered the sedatives to RL. He had said: [106]

19. [182]

    That aspect of his closing address, and his primary case with respect to the charges concerning RL, were directly addressed in the summing up. [107]

20. [183]

    The elements of ground 4 do not warrant a grant of leave.

21. [184]

    The applicant asserted that there had been inadequate directions as to the elements of the charge of administering an intoxicating substance with intent to commit an indictable offence. The elements of the charge were set out in a document provided to the jury, as to which the applicant made no comment in his submissions and which is, on its face, correct. The judge told the jury that there was no dispute that Travacalm was an intoxicating substance, a proposition with which the applicant does not take issue. Accordingly, there were three matters to be considered by the jury, namely (i) was KS sedated, (ii) if so, did the applicant administer the sedative, and (iii) was it done with an intention to enable him to sexually assault KS?

22. [185]

    The prosecution case was that the video recordings of the offences, being the creation of the applicant, demonstrated that KS was sedated. They also showed the applicant engaged in sexual activities with KS, including licking her genitals and ejaculating over her genitals. If she had been sedated in each case, it was an inference relied on by the prosecution that the applicant was the person responsible for sedating her. His own activities in sexually assaulting her were relied upon to demonstrate his intention in carrying out the sedation.

23. [186]

    The applicant’s case was that she was not sedated, but asleep. The issues thus required no particular focus on the elements of the charge. The focus was, correctly, upon the inferences which could be drawn from the evidence, namely the video recordings. There was also evidence of KS that she had no consciousness of the events in question taking place, but that she was showed video clips by the applicant after the event. [108] There was also the evidence of Mr Farrar which supported what might have been an obvious conclusion, that KS appeared to be sedated in the four video recordings which she was shown. [109]

24. [187]

    There was no substance in this complaint. The submissions in support of it suggested that the summing up was weighted in favour of the prosecution and against the defence case. That was the subject of ground 12.

25. [188]

    The complaint that the summing up was unbalanced must turn upon a reading of the whole of the transcript of the summing up, which ran for some 87 pages. Having read the whole document (and parts more than once) it may be accepted that it left a clear impression that the prosecution case was strong and the defence case was weak. However, with knowledge of the evidence in the case, there was no undue weight given to some evidence over other evidence, nor to some submissions over other submissions. The fact was that, with respect to the charges under s 38 in relation to KS, which were the focus of the submissions for the applicant, the evidence was overwhelming. The inevitable consequence of a balanced summing up was to reflect the actual weight of the evidence objectively assessed.

26. [189]

    The ground was dealt with cursorily by the Director in written submissions, leading the applicant to complain during the hearing that his ground had raised “22 separate issues” and that none had been addressed by the Director. There were indeed 22 “particulars” listed under ground 12. However, many were the subject of other grounds and some were patently hopeless. For example, particular (i) complained of a failure by the judge to mention the evidence of a witness, Ms Sparre, who worked for the pharmaceutical company producing Travacalm and whose evidence was said to be “critical to the defence case”. It was true that the trial judge did not refer to it in his summing up, but that was no doubt because the judge considered it, in the context of the case, largely anodyne. It is true that the applicant referred to Ms Sparre’s evidence in his address, [110] but it was by no means clear what inference the jury was expected to draw from either the evidence or the submissions.

27. [190]

    Other particulars of ground 12 related to evidence of the “relationship” between the applicant and KS. By that, the applicant meant a sexual relationship. It was a relationship which he described in his own evidence as inexcusable, appalling behaviour on his part, and “appalling, disgusting, vile, abhorrent”. [111] It is clear that it was important to him that the relationship was “consensual” and he resisted KS’ later assessment of her role as “forced”. As the judge sought to explain on more than one occasion, including in relation to a video recording which he tendered, showing him having sexual intercourse with KS, this emphasis was both irrelevant and potentially damaging. The charges distinguished between those occasions on which there was no opportunity for consent and those when KS appeared to be consenting. In the latter case, the charges laid under s 66C contained no element of lack of consent.

28. [191]

    Other particulars failed to have regard to the applicant’s own case. For example, particular (x) alleged that the judge failed to mention “the significant issue of how busy [RL] was and this was the cause of her tiredness”. [112] It was not the applicant’s case that RL was not sedated.

29. [192]

    It may be that ground 12 should be treated as a checklist of all the complaints the applicant had in relation to his trial and the directions to the jury. However, there is no point in dealing with it on that basis given the irrelevance of many of the points and the fact that those which are coherent with the applicant’s case at trial are dealt with elsewhere.

30. [193]

    Ground 12 does not warrant a grant of leave to appeal.

Conviction appeal – unreasonable verdict grounds

1. [194]

   Each of grounds 5 and 5A, as pleaded, relying on the first limb in s 6(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act, focused on the convictions on 22 counts under s 38(a) (administering an intoxicating substance to KS). The challenge had, in effect, three limbs. First, the applicant submitted that there was no direct evidence that KS had been administered any form of sedative. (This complaint was also found as ground 30.) In particular, there was no direct evidence of the applicant administering a sedative. Secondly, there was an absence of any evidence that the applicant not only administered a sedative, but did so with the requisite specific intention of committing an indictable offence, namely sexually assaulting KS. Thirdly, it was submitted that, in so far as the prosecutor relied upon the videos as evidence that KS was sedated, they in fact showed no more than that she was soundly asleep.

2. [195]

   The last submission was critical to the analysis. Although expressed for the most part in the submissions as an affirmative proposition, it would have been sufficient to suggest that the videos were not capable of removing the reasonable possibility that KS was asleep and not sedated. The submission should be addressed as if so presented.

3. [196]

   For the purpose of considering the strength of this ground, the Court was provided with, and viewed, the video evidence of KS relevant to each of the 22 counts of administering an intoxicating substance to her. The evidence in the videos is profoundly compelling. It revealed in almost all cases a girl who was either breathing heavily and noisily or snoring. Each of the videos revealed interference by the applicant with both the bedding and the position of the girl lying on the bed. In some of the recordings the interference was more violent than in others. However, to a lay observer, the recordings could not have left any reasonable doubt but that the girl was heavily sedated.

4. [197]

   Mr Farrar, whose evidence has been considered above, was shown four of the videos and formed the same view. The applicant challenged his expertise in that respect. However, the views of a pharmacologist, with knowledge of the chemical contents of the substance administered and knowledge as to the effect of those chemicals on the human body, can reasonably be expected to have expertise with respect to the possible connection between the administration of a chemical and the resultant effect. In any event, compared with the persuasive and dramatic evidence of the videos, it is unlikely that the jury needed to place significant reliance on the opinion of Mr Farrar.

5. [198]

   As the applicant submitted, everything came back to the video recordings, including as a basis for Mr Farrar’s evidence. There being no reason why the jury should have had a reasonable doubt, from viewing the video recordings, that in each case KS was under sedation; the remaining elements were readily satisfied. The applicant was visible in the videos and had, in any event, entered pleas of guilty to the sexual assaults which they recorded. He was also indisputably the person who had produced the video recordings. In those circumstances, it was fanciful to suggest that there was any reasonable possibility that someone other than the applicant had administered the sedation; it was also fanciful to suggest that the sedation was administered otherwise than for the purpose of the applicant sexually assaulting KS, as occurred in each case.

6. [199]

   As to the convictions under s 38(a) with respect to the sedation of KS, the suggestion that they were unreasonable must be dismissed. There was no basis to grant leave to appeal on this ground in relation to those convictions.

7. [200]

   There were four further convictions under s 38(a), relating to the administration of an intoxicating substance to RL. There was a separate ground which challenged the conclusion that, if RL had been sedated, there was no evidence of an intention to commit an offence on KS, which has already been dismissed. It was not the principal ground of defence that RL had not been sedated. Rather, as has been noted, the applicant’s defence was that KS had sedated her mother to allow KS to continue her sexual activities with the applicant, uninterrupted by her mother.

8. [201]

   KS gave evidence that the applicant had admitted that he was sedating RL. KS also denied his suggestion in cross-examination that she had sedated her mother. The applicant submitted that there was an issue as to the credibility of this evidence given by KS. However, not only was the defence implausible, but there were many respects in which KS had been demonstrated to be a truthful witness. She gave evidence over a period of some three days. The jury had ample opportunity to assess her credibility in the witness box. There was nothing in the transcript of her evidence which provided any basis for doubting her truthfulness or reliability in respect of this evidence. If, as was plainly open to the jury, KS was accepted as a truthful and reliable witness with respect to the sedation of her mother, this ground of appeal must fail. There is no sufficient basis to grant leave with respect to this ground in relation to the counts under s 38(a) involving RL.

9. [202]

   The evidence regarding the three assaults on KS which were not the subject of pleas (counts 1, 2 and 4) has already been considered in detail above in relation to specific challenges. As has been noted, it does not appear that the applicant denied that activity of the kind identified in counts 1 and 2 took place, and, indeed, suggested that it took place on more than one occasion. There was ample evidence upon which the jury was entitled to accept counts 1 and 2: an acquittal would have appeared perverse.

10. [203]

    With respect to count 4, the applicant denied having intercourse with KS at any stage after late 2013. Nevertheless, the evidence of KS, the evidence of the sedation of RL, the opportunity for intercourse to occur and the ongoing sexual obsession of the applicant with KS, rendered her account entirely plausible. Accordingly, there was no basis for granting leave with respect to this ground in relation to any of counts 1, 2 and 4.

11. [204]

    There remained the challenge to the convictions with respect to JS.

12. [205]

    The nature of the evidence in this regard has been identified in considering the specific challenge to the admissibility of the complaints by JS. The transcript of the evidence given by JS was entirely plausible; it was not apparent that there was any obvious reason for the jury to reject her evidence. Although the applicant denied it, he also stated that JS “would never come up with a story like this on her own”. [113] That statement would no doubt have been understood by the jury to affirm the truthfulness, if not the reliability of JS’ account, absent some evidence that her story had been concocted by someone else, presumably her mother. There was no such evidence. Further, her account included her writing a letter contemporaneously with the events addressed to her mother and stepfather (the applicant). The letter was intercepted by her stepfather. This was a detail which provided no particular objective source of information in confirmation of her account, the letter not having been recovered, but gave a ring of plausibility to her evidence. It was put to JS in cross-examination both that her mother had told her what to say and that she had made up the story to support her sister when she heard of her treatment by the applicant. It was a matter for the jury to assess her denials of those suggestions and assess her truthfulness.

13. [206]

    The evidence of RL commenced on the afternoon of 5 July 2017. It continued through much of the following day. The cross-examination of RL over some two pages confirmed her evidence as to having taken JS aside, told her that her stepfather had been hurting KS and, before telling her any detail, asking if he had ever hurt her (JS). The cross-examination was to the following effect: [114]

14. [207]

    The cross-examination included the following passage in relation to the letter which JS had said she had left on the computer desk addressed to both her mother and stepfather: [115]

15. [208]

    RL then confirmed that she “didn’t know the letter existed until [JS] told me”. [116]

16. [209]

    It was not put to RL that she had suggested any aspect of the complaint made by JS. It was not even suggested that she had told JS what had happened to KS before JS recounted her story. The only implicit challenge to RL’s account in her cross-examination in relation to JS was obtaining confirmation that she had not sought to record what JS said on her iPhone.

17. [210]

    There was no substance in the challenge to the reliability of the evidence given by JS in respect of the counts involving her. Leave to rely upon this ground in relation to those counts should be refused.

18. [211]

    It follows that leave should be refused with respect to all aspects of grounds 5, 5A, 29 and 30.

Miscellaneous grounds

1. [212]

   It remains to deal with two grounds which do not readily fit within other categories.

2. [213]

   Ground 10 appeared to have two main limbs. First, there was a complaint that item 40 in the Crown brief (being 15 screenshots of text messages from the applicant’s iPhone) was not contained in the material which was provided to him prior to trial. The respondent’s position in that regard was twofold: first, the prosecutor did not have those messages because the police had not supplied them to the Director; secondly, the applicant had them at the time of the trial.

3. [214]

   On 4 July, the second day of KS’ evidence, there was a discussion between the judge and the applicant in the absence of the jury and KS as to two areas of questions he wished to pursue with her. One related to her evidence that she had told the police about seeing him crushing tablets to make her mother sleep. Those questions were read out to KS who agreed that the record of interview accorded with her recollection of what she had told the police. [117] The second matter concerned a series of text messages between the applicant and KS. They appeared in a bundle of documents shown to the trial judge. The judge spent some little time sorting through to see what was in the bundle. The applicant’s explanation was as follows: [118]

4. [215]

   The applicant then corrected the judge, noting it was text messages and not videos that revealed the relationship, the discussion then continued: [119]

5. [216]

   It appears that the material was obtained from the police rather than from the Director, and it was not disclosed in the original Crown brief because the Director did not have it. There was, therefore, no breach of the statutory scheme for disclosure, and, since it was clear that the applicant was preparing his case based on the material, there was no unfairness to the applicant.

6. [217]

   The applicant used some of the text messages in cross-examining Detective Senior Constable Deas, noting that the messages next to the name KS contained a “love-heart”. Detective Deas was the officer who had downloaded material from the applicant’s two iPhones. [120] There was no substance in ground 10 and no reason to grant leave with respect to it.

7. [218]

   Ground 35 was first lodged with the registry of the court shortly before the hearing of the proposed appeal. It related to a complaint by the applicant that police had deleted messages from his iPhone which he believed were important for his defence. On 5 April 2022, he lodged a complaint with the Law Enforcement Conduct Commission seeking an investigation of his complaint. The Commission referred the matter to the police who responded on 30 May 2022, referring to an investigation undertaken by Chief Inspector Bright and advising that no further action was to be taken. Perhaps unfortunately, the letter added a reference to the matter currently before this Court which, it was said, “will provide you with an alternate and satisfactory means of redress through the court. In that forum you and your legal representation has the ability to examine the actions/conduct of police”.

8. [219]

   The material annexed to ground 35 included correspondence from the applicant’s then solicitor in February 2016 seeking copies of deleted messages from the two iPhones and an iPad.

9. [220]

   There has never been a finding that any items were deleted by police. In the course of his recorded interview with police, the applicant was asked whether he had deleted items and replied “no”. Whatever the truth may be, it is not an issue which can be investigated by this Court and ground 35, first lodged almost five years after the trial, is misconceived. Leave to rely upon ground 35 should be refused.

Conclusions – proposed conviction appeal

1. [221]

   As noted at the outset of these reasons, the appeal in this matter was lodged out of time. The majority of the grounds were identified in a notice of appeal lodged on 14 December 2020, more than three years after the trial and the sentencing. A further six grounds were added 10 months later, in October 2021. Finally, a further two grounds were added (grounds 33 and 35) and two other grounds expanded on (grounds 2 and 15) shortly before the hearing in this Court, namely on 22 June 2022, including further elements of procedural unfairness, a complaint in relation to the sentence appeal that the indictment was overloaded and a final ground with respect to the conviction appeals seeking to rely on new evidence in relation to the credibility of RL. (The last ground was not pressed.)

2. [222]

   In the circumstances, the appropriate course, followed by senior counsel for the Director in his written submissions, was to assess the merits of the proposed grounds. As the applicant required leave in relation to most (but perhaps not all) of the proposed grounds under s 5(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act, and in respect of a number pursuant to r 4.15 of the Supreme Court (Criminal Appeal) Rules, it would be sufficient to categorise the grounds into those which warrant a grant of leave and those which do not. It would then be sufficient to refuse an extension of time with respect to those grounds for which leave is not to be granted. However, the course of the hearing (over two days) and the scope of the reasons set out above, render it somewhat artificial to refuse an extension of time. Nevertheless, the temporal element is relevant, and potentially decisive in so far as a particular ground might warrant the setting aside of a verdict and hence a possible re-trial. On the other hand, the delay, whilst partly a function of the extraordinarily lengthy and repetitive submissions filed by the applicant, is also in some part a result of the time taken by the Director to respond.

3. [223]

   The primary matter warranting a grant of leave, as recorded above, is ground 2(iv) concerning the address by the prosecution at trial. If leave be granted with respect to that matter, it is also appropriate to grant leave with respect to grounds 1 and 1A alleging a reasonable apprehension of bias. As has been noted, a large volume of material with respect to those grounds was either misconceived or otherwise unsupportable. Nevertheless, the issue as to the level of intervention by a trial judge in relation to the presentation of a case by an unrepresented accused involves a matter of potential importance and some degree of uncertainty as to the application of relevant legal principles. In relation to each of those matters, there should be an extension of time within which to appeal up to and including 14 December 2020 and a grant of leave to appeal. Nevertheless, the appeal, limited to those grounds must be dismissed. Otherwise, the appropriate course is to refuse an extension of time within which to appeal with respect to the remaining grounds.

Sentence appeal

1. [224]

   On 22 November 2017, the trial judge sentenced the applicant on 130 counts. One count of the 132 counts on the indictment was withdrawn before the applicant was re-arraigned, at which time he pleaded guilty to 99 counts. The jury returned a verdict of not guilty to one of the remaining 32 counts.

2. [225]

   The judge, appropriately, imposed an aggregate sentence. The judge made clear his intention to impose an aggregate sentence that was an appropriate measure of the total criminality involved in the commission of the 130 offences and to fix an aggregate non-parole period reflecting the minimum period of imprisonment the applicant should serve. He imposed a term of imprisonment of 32 years to date from 14 January 2014, with a non-parole period of 24 years.

3. [226]

   In accordance with s 53A(2)(b) of the Sentencing Procedure Act, the judge indicated the individual sentences he would have imposed on each count, were each offence to be assessed individually. The judge also observed that the large number of individual sentences made the application of sentencing principles difficult, if not impossible, in the sense that even were he to notionally partly accumulate the indicative sentences in order to reflect the repeated and persistent sexual abuse of KS, a manifestly excessive sentence would have resulted.

4. [227]

   A dominating factor in that assessment was that the 54 counts charged under s 61J and a number of counts charged under s 61M(2) [121] were committed during the 22 occasions when KS was filmed while sedated (that is, during the commission of the s 38(1)(a) offences). The judge was satisfied the applicant filmed the sexual assaults to satisfy an “insatiable lust” for his stepdaughter, [122] and to have access to films of his sexual abuse of her.

5. [228]

   The judge noted that the remaining sexual offences to which the applicant had pleaded guilty and were the subject of the sentencing exercise involving KS, namely 25 offences charged under s 66C(2), seven offences charged under s 66C(4) (and perhaps two offences charged under s 61M(2)), were also recorded on film, but KS was not sedated during the commission of those offences.

6. [229]

   In respect of each of the 54 offences charged under s 61J, variously involving penile penetration, digital penetration, penetration by an object or cunnilingus, the judge found no principled basis for differentiating between them in his assessment of their objective seriousness, whether by the nature or the duration of the offending conduct. He expressly stated that in his assessment of objective seriousness, he did not propose to rank the acts of sexual intercourse hierarchically. [123]

7. [230]

   In the result, each of the 54 offences under s 61J was assessed to be just above the mid-range, and each of the 26 offences under s 66C(2) and the seven offences under s 66C(4) at about the mid-range. Of the ten offences against KS under s 61M(2), nine were assessed at about the mid-range and the first count on the indictment (which involved touching KS’ chest) was assessed at the lowest end of the scale of objective seriousness. The two s 61M(2) offences involving JS (involving a touching of her bottom and her chest) were assessed towards the lower end of the scale of objective seriousness. The offending against both his stepdaughters, but KS in particular, involved what the judge found to be an “appalling breach of trust”. [124]

8. [231]

   The judge also assessed the objective seriousness of the 22 counts of administering an intoxicating substance to KS with intent to have sexual intercourse with her at just above the mid-range. [125] In making that assessment, the judge found that the applicant’s behaviour involved a degree of planning in the preparation of the sedative disguised in food and drink with sufficient potency to totally deprive KS of her mental and physical capacities. The judge was satisfied that the applicant administered the sedative to KS in order that he might commit whatever sexual acts he wished and to render her so compliant that he could record his commission of those acts upon her on film, manoeuvring her into an optimal position to film those acts without any resistance from her. The judge found the range of sexual acts the applicant intended to perform on KS by the administration of the intoxicating substance placed each of those offences as just above the mid-range.

9. [232]

   With respect to the offences charged under s 91H(2), the judge assessed that offending as below the mid-range, and the two offences charged under s 91G as slightly below the mid-range. The offending constituting the breach of s 91H(2) was comprised in 11 SD memory cards in the applicant’s possession which contained 79 videos and 778 still images. In accordance with the NSW Child Exploitation Tracking Scheme (CETS), that material was categorised on an ascending scale of seriousness from 1-5: 66 videos and 753 photographs fell on the CETS scale. Of the videos, 51 were in category 4, 153 photographs were in category 4, and 538 photographs in category 1. In assessing objective seriousness as below the mid-range, the judge took into account that the photographic material was intended for the applicant’s own use, that there was no question of dissemination or transmission of the material, and therefore the risk of the material being seen or acquired by vulnerable persons was low.

10. [233]

    The applicant raised 14 separate grounds of appeal against the aggregate sentence, most alleging discrete errors in the sentencing process. There was also a ground asserting that the aggregate sentence was manifestly excessive.

11. [234]

    It is not, however, necessary to address the grounds individually in order to determine whether the applicant should be re-sentenced. As senior counsel for the Director explained, the trial judge made two errors in the course of the sentencing, although the critical error was not the subject of a ground of appeal.

12. [235]

    The critical error arose as follows. In summarising the offences for which the offender stood to be sentenced, the judge identified the relevant maximum penalty and, where appropriate, the relevant standard non-parole period for each offence or group of offences. There were 26 counts of aggravated sexual intercourse with a child between the ages of 10 and 14 years contrary to s 66C(2) of the Crimes Act and a further seven counts of aggravated sexual intercourse with a child between 14 and 16 years, contrary to s 66C(4).

13. [236]

    With respect to the offences under s 66C(2), the judge identified a standard non-parole period of 9 years’ imprisonment, and with respect to the offences under s 66C(4), a standard non-parole period of 5 years. However, at the time the offences were committed there was no standard non-parole period for those offences. The relevant standard non-parole periods were enacted by legislation which commenced on 29 June 2015, and which expressly stated that the amendments did not apply to offences committed before the commencement of the 2015 Amendment Act. [126] The Sentencing Procedure Act also provided that the amendments did not apply to offences committed before the amendments commenced. [127]

14. [237]

    The Director accepted that the error was of a kind which would require the Court to re-exercise the sentencing discretion pursuant to the principles established in Kentwell v The Queen. [128] That is, the Director accepted that, like the maximum penalty, a standard non-parole period is an important guidepost to be considered when fixing the sentence for a particular offence and when indicating individual sentences. Given the terminology of s 54A(2) and s 54B of the Sentencing Procedure Act, that conclusion must be accepted. The fact that a failure to comply with s 54B is said not to invalidate the sentence (subs (7)) does not contradict that conclusion. Had the error affected only a handful of indicative sentences within the 130 convictions, a different conclusion might have been available. Particularly might that have been so in circumstances where, as noted above, even quite significant changes in the level of the indicative sentences would not affect the aggregate sentence. However, in this case the error affected the indicative sentences of 33 counts and was therefore capable of affecting the aggregate sentence imposed.

15. [238]

    Secondly, as the applicant noted in ground 21, and the Director accepted, in considering the objective seriousness of the 33 counts under s 66C, the judge found that those involving penile vaginal intercourse where the offender ejaculated in KS were objectively more serious as the offender “was exposing her to the real risk of pregnancy”. [129] It was not in dispute that the offender had, prior to committing any of these offences, undergone a vasectomy and hence the reason for treating those offences as objectively more serious was mistaken.

16. [239]

    There is no need to determine whether, either on the agreed facts or the facts found for sentencing purposes, that error alone would have required this Court to re-exercise the sentencing discretion; however, taken in combination with the standard non-parole period error, this Court must re-sentence the applicant.

17. [240]

    It follows that the proper course is for this Court to re-exercise the sentencing discretion; there is no need for further consideration of the other errors identified by the applicant. However, the matters raised by the applicant in his written submissions will be taken into account in re-sentencing.

Re-sentencing

1. [241]

   In re-sentencing it will not be necessary or appropriate to repeat what has been said about the detail of the offending, nor to describe the content of the videos. It will be necessary to determine the objective seriousness of the individual counts and indicate appropriate individual sentences.

2. [242]

   The applicant complained that the sentencing exercise had been made overly complex by the “overloading of the indictment”, many of the offences having been charged because he had recorded his sexual activity with KS over four years. It may be noted that there is an offence of maintaining an unlawful sexual relationship with a child (Crimes Act, s 66EA), known as persistent sexual abuse of the child, which, at the time of the relevant offending, carried a maximum penalty of 25 years’ imprisonment. The maximum penalty has since been increased to imprisonment for life. Had that offence been charged and found proved, the sentencing exercise may have been less complex, at least in the sense that it would have overcome the need to indicate sentences for something in the order of 100 sexual offences, allowing the s 38(1)(a) counts, the offences involving JS, and the offences involving the possession of child abuse material to be laid separately. That, however, is not to the point. As the trial judge appreciated and as observed above, the prosecutor having elected to frame the indictment as presented, the only appropriate sentence was an aggregate sentence, obliging the Court to make a written record of the sentence which would have imposed for each offence had separate sentences been imposed.

3. [243]

   The judge gave careful consideration to the applicant’s subjective circumstances. [130] It is unnecessary to repeat the judge’s assessment of the weight of those circumstances in the sentencing exercise, including, in particular, the applicant’s health problems.

4. [244]

   The judge took into account the applicant’s age, education and employment. With the exception of concerns about his health, the applicant’s history was largely unremarkable. It involved no prior history of criminality, nor abuse of alcohol or drugs. For the early offending he was entitled to leniency as a first offender in indicating sentences for the first two counts on the indictment, each of which was particularised as having been committed on a “between dates” basis, the first count between May and August 2009 and the second count between May 2009 and May 2010. However, given that from June 2009 the offending continued on a monthly basis over four years, and often on repeated occasions within the same month, the weight of the fact that counts 1 and 2 were the first charged on the indictment is deserving of little weight in assessing their indicative sentences in the re-sentencing exercise.

5. [245]

   The judge referred to a report prepared by Dr Gerald Chew, a consultant psychiatrist working with Justice Health. Dr Chew considered that the applicant did not suffer from any significant mental illness, but “could not exclude a diagnosis of paraphilia today”.

6. [246]

   The applicant took issue with the finding of the sentencing judge that there was “no evidence of mental illness (depression)” (ground 20). However, there was little basis in the evidence for a different view. In her evidence at trial RL accepted that there were personality changes following the onset of the applicant’s ill health. [131] At the sentencing hearing, the applicant relied upon a report of a consultant psychologist, Mr Watson-Munro, obtained on 14 November 2017. On the basis of a self-reporting questionnaire canvassing psychological and physiological symptoms of depression and anxiety over the past fortnight, Mr Watson-Munro stated that the test “confirms my clinical impressions of [the applicant] referrable to a depressive disorder (severe and recurrent) … according to DSM-5 criteria”.

7. [247]

   It may be accepted that the applicant suffers from anxiety and depression. The judge noted that the applicant claimed his depressive illness had developed after an operation 2007. [132] It is necessary to take into account, as did the trial judge, that the applicant re-joined the workforce in a career development business with his wife after recovering from surgery, employment which continued up until the time of his arrest. During that time he also worked part-time selling solar panels. There was no error in the judge’s ultimate finding that the applicant did not, at the time of sentence, suffer from any diagnosed mental illness or substance-induced mood disorder (an immunosuppressant drug was prescribed after the operation). The judge accepted (as does this Court on re-sentence) that the applicant has some vulnerability to the increased risk of infection and disease by reason of his pre-existing medical conditions will render his experience of custody as a serving prisoner more difficult. Those matters must be taken into account in the re-exercise of the sentencing discretion.

8. [248]

   The applicant described himself in his written submissions on re-sentence as “no longer a younger man, but a man now 50 years old with chronic health issues”. Again, so much may be accepted. It is appropriate to give full weight to the health problems suffered by the applicant, which need not be particularised. They do not permit the Court to impose a sentence which does not reflect the total criminality for which he has now been convicted, but, allowing that his imprisonment will weigh more harshly upon him than it would upon a healthy prisoner, should impose a sentence which is no more harsh in its effects.

9. [249]

   Although Dr Chew reported in 2017 that the applicant was “remorseful”, the judge made no express finding of remorse. It may be accepted that the applicant regrets the circumstances in which he now finds himself, but the evidence does not support a finding that he has insight into the harm he has caused to KS. He challenged the finding of the sentencing judge that he groomed KS (ground 21). He claimed that the evidence of KS that, “[f]rom the age of 12, I was groomed to just come to acceptance with it [the sexual abuse]”, were the words of an adult and not of a 12-year-old girl. That was undoubtedly true: KS was 20 years of age when she gave evidence at the trial. The submission continued:

10. [250]

    In one discrete passage of the sentencing judgment, where the judge found that the three counts of administering an intoxicating substance committed in June 2009 and the five counts committed in July 2009 were attempts to prepare KS physically for what the applicant ultimately intended would be sexual intercourse with her when she was not sedated, he referred to the applicant having “groomed” KS to normalise his sexual abuse of her. [133] The judge went on to observe that, on each of the 22 occasions where an intoxicating substance was administered to KS, the applicant committed multiple breaches of s 61J, involving variously penile penetration and the insertion of objects into her vagina and into her anus. The trial judge found the following: [134]

11. [251]

    It is also useful to quote KS’ evidence in cross-examination, where, having described sexual intercourse with the applicant as “forced”, she was asked to explain what she meant by that and responded: [135]

12. [252]

    In re-examination, KS said, “… it was a confusing situation for me being 12 and also him being my father that I knew it was wrong but I didn’t – I felt like I should have that trust in him to not – to take me out of a bad situation but he was my dad so I didn’t have. … I didn’t know how to reach out for help.” [136]

13. [253]

    It is clear from those passages that KS was endeavouring to explain that she did not know how to reach out for help because the applicant had “groomed” her to accept what was happening between them. She had said earlier in her evidence that, although she did not want to do the things she was shown to have done with the accused in the videos recording sexual activity whilst she was asleep, she had come to accept her conduct and his because there was nothing she could do, or felt she could do, to stop what was happening. She said, “[i]t just became like a – like a regular thing, like – it was like I didn’t have any, like choice in it really. It was just – it became like a routine”. [137]

14. [254]

    For the applicant to continue to reassert in his submissions on sentence that he had not groomed KS to have sexual intercourse with him and that she was a “willing” participant, was to show a complete lack of insight into his offending, contradicting any suggestion he is genuinely remorseful.

15. [255]

    The applicant also sought to rely upon a three-page letter addressed to KS as demonstrating his remorse. The letter was not sent: it contained paragraph numbers which placed it squarely within the category of written submissions.

16. [256]

    The offending covered by the 130 convictions for which he was to be sentenced occurred over a four-year period. Although the applicant stated on more than one occasion during his trial that he was ashamed of his conduct and understood it was wrong, he also maintained at trial that KS was the instigator of the sexual activity attributed to him as sexual offending. He attributed to her responsibility for sedating her mother so that the sexual intercourse in which she was a willing and active participant could continue. The applicant continued to seek to attribute responsibility for his criminal conduct to others, including his wife, by making unsubstantiated claims of abuse, controlling behaviour and domestic violence he claimed to have suffered in the family home.

17. [257]

    The applicant asserted that the judge did not take into account “the domestic abuse and control” exerted by his wife, RL. He characterised this as “domestic violence which contributed to his depression and the wayward sexual behaviour”. The applicant’s repeated claims about the roles played by both KS and RL as instigating or participating in his criminal behaviour do not aggravate the objective seriousness of his offending as a matter of law, but they diminish any suggestion that he had insight into his offending. It is clear, he did not.

18. [258]

    The applicant described himself as being sentenced “for a stale crime”, but that characterisation should not be accepted. It was not one crime, and the conduct was not stale. His offending involved multiple offences committed over a four-year period. At the time he was arrested and charged on 14 January 2014, that offending was not “stale”, in fact, the last offence was committed on about 7 January 2014 when he administered to his wife an intoxicating substance with the intention to have sexual intercourse with KS. The last occasion on which the applicant had sexual intercourse with KS was merely days prior to 13 January 2014.

19. [259]

    The applicant’s underlying complaint was that there had been a delay between the date he admitted his sexual abuse of KS in February 2014 and the time of sentence on 22 November 2017. Some weight may be given to the fact that the applicant was in custody awaiting trial for more than three years. However, there was nothing to suggest that that delay, whilst unsettling, should be attributed to the prosecution. There is nothing in the materials to indicate that he had at any time earlier than the presentation of the indictment on the first day of the trial, formed a firm intention to enter pleas of guilty to 99 offences, which might then have been the subject of separate sentencing proceedings before the balance of the offences were listed for trial.

20. [260]

    It is convenient to address first the appropriate discount with respect to the 99 guilty pleas entered by the applicant at the commencement of the trial. The judge gave careful consideration to the discount, having regard to the procedural history which has been outlined above. He correctly described the pleas as “late pleas”. [138] He later described them as “very late” pleas. [139] He nevertheless concluded that there was a significant utilitarian benefit which warranted a discount of “about 15%”.

21. [261]

    For two reasons, 15% should be considered a generous allowance. First, the applicant’s prevarication continued throughout a lengthy period when he had legal representation and continued until the day before the commencement of the trial. Secondly, he maintained pleas of not guilty to all the charges of administering an intoxicating substance, thus requiring that the videos, which were the primary evidence of both the sedation offences and the sexual offences, to be played to the jury. KS was required to give evidence. The utilitarian benefit of the pleas to the sexual offending was therefore quite limited. Yet the discount was 60% of what is generally regarded as the top of the range. [140] Although the applicant asserted in his written submissions (ground 25) that a discount of 25% should have been applied on each of the indicative sentences on the 99 counts to which he had pleaded guilty, there was no basis for a discount of that order given the timing of the plea.

22. [262]

    There was more substance in ground 17, which noted that the trial judge did not specify a starting point and that, if one were calculated by reference to the discount, at least some of the indicative sentences might be regarded as excessive. The ground suggested that the sentence for count 2, which attracted no discount was the same as for similar offences the subject of pleas. The appropriate indicative sentences will be dealt with shortly.

23. [263]

    It is convenient to commence with the earliest offending, namely counts 1 and 2. Count 1 dealt with an occasion when the applicant came up behind KS (then aged 12 years) and started touching her on the chest on top of her clothing. He continued for a short while and then stopped. The judge regarded this act as falling at “the lowest end of the scale of objective seriousness”. [141] That assessment should be accepted. Had that been an isolated offence, it would not have warranted a custodial sentence. However, it was not an isolated offence and was not to be dealt with in isolation. While it was the first charged offence of a sexual nature, progressively more serious offences were committed in June and July 2009, including a multiplicity of serious sexual offences after the applicant had first administered to KS an intoxicating substance in June 2009. Count 1 was not the subject of a plea and, accordingly, no discount applied. A fixed term of 7 months should be indicated for count 1.

24. [264]

    Count 2, a charge under s 66C(2), was committed in the same period as count 1 but involved sexual intercourse (cunnilingus) with KS then aged between 12 and 13 years. Although the sentencing judge did not include count 2 when assessing the objective seriousness of the acts charged under s 66C(2), it was intrusive and took place over a period which the victim identified as about five minutes. The applicant gave an explanation as to the circumstances in which the offence occurred, namely that whilst his wife was at a concert, KS ran into his bedroom naked, pointed to her vagina and asked the applicant to kiss her, an explanation which the trial judge rejected, suggesting that it defied credulity. Counts 1 and 2 were, as the judge noted, first steps on a course of grooming of KS so that she would come to accept more serious invasions of her body. Because count 2 was the first offence involving penetration of KS’ genitalia, a moderation of the indicative sentence might have been appropriate were it not that the remaining 25 counts attracted a sentencing discount of 15%. Each would attract the same individual sentence.

25. [265]

    The offences of aggravated indecent assault against JS (counts 131 and 132) occurred between January 2013 and November 2013 when JS was 11 years and involved indecent touching. The conduct did not continue when JS took objection. The offences were below the mid-range of objective seriousness. Although these were the only offences involving JS, the applicant obtains no leniency as a first offender, having by that time been serially sexually abusing KS for many years. He was convicted after a plea of not guilty and obtains no discount. Each warrants an indicative term of 12 months’ imprisonment.

26. [266]

    There were 22 counts of administering an intoxicating substance to KS with intent to commit an indictable offence, each of which was evidenced by a video recording taken by the applicant. As the judge noted, with few exceptions, the videos revealed that the child was “so heavily sedated that no matter what sexual act was performed upon her, she did not stir”. [142] She could be heard breathing heavily and even snoring on occasions. The judge further noted that the “constant filming of each of these episodes that involved the repetitive and similar sexual acts was intended for his own sexual gratification”. There can be no other explanation, other than commercial exploitation which was not supported by the evidence nor suggested at the trial.

27. [267]

    The video evidence demonstrated that the offences extended from June 2009 to September 2010. The judge described the administration of the sedative as “an appalling breach of trust” being administered “in such a quantity so as to totally deprive her of her mental and physical faculties”. [143] The trial judge assessed the offending as falling just above the mid-range for offences of that type. That assessment should be accepted.

28. [268]

    The sedation offences against KS were part of an ongoing course of criminal conduct with no differentiating features so far as the elements of that offence were concerned and attract the same level of objective seriousness as assessed by the trial judge. The deep state of sedation to which KS was subjected, as shown in the videos, precludes a more lenient assessment.

29. [269]

    The 54 charges laid under s 61J of the Crimes Act (sexual intercourse without consent and in circumstance of aggravation) covered the 22 occasions when KS was sedated and unable to consent. Two other charges under s 61M(2) (aggravated indecent assault) were also referrable to those 22 occasions. On some occasions there was more than one video. It followed that, on average, there were two sexual assaults on each occasion of sedation. On 11 September 2009, covered by one sedation charge, there were six separate offences charged under s 61J, two involving penetration of the vagina by an object (a strawberry), two involving cunnilingus, one involving digital penetration of the vagina and one involving digital penetration of the anus. It is clear that, having administered the sedative with intent to have sexual intercourse with KS, the sexual acts he then committed were entirely opportunistic. That is, the applicant used a deeply sedated child to sexually assault her in the manner and form, and for the duration, that satisfied his sexual appetite.

30. [270]

    As the trial judge observed, there was little purpose in distinguishing the objective seriousness of each offence. Had separate sentences been imposed for each offence, there would no doubt have been a high level of concurrency in respect of offences which took place on one occasion. Each of the offences under s 61J involved what the judge described as “an abhorrent breach of trust” [144] and the gravity of each was said to fall just above the mid-range for offences of their type. As the judge noted further, KS “was virtually reduced to an inanimate object with whom he was able to do whatever he pleased and film himself whilst he was doing it”. [145] Those observations should be accepted: they apply also to the lesser offences under s 61M(2).

31. [271]

    With respect to the multiple counts of sexual offending which took place while KS was sedated, it is necessary, in specifying individual sentences, to avoid double-counting the objective seriousness of the sexual offences because they were committed whilst KS was sedated.

32. [272]

    The further offences which were captured on the video recordings occurred whilst KS was conscious and involved in the activity. The counts under s 66C(2) and (4) did not involve any element of lack of consent. The critical factors in each case were the age of the victim and the circumstance of aggravation. The lack of consent distinguished the s 61J offences from those under s 66C, although where the child was under 14 years, the maximum penalty in each case was 20 years’ imprisonment. The first set of such charges were found on a video dated 8 February 2010.

33. [273]

    The applicant submitted that the erroneous increase in the objective seriousness attributed to the s 66C offences by the sentencing judge, where the applicant had ejaculated inside KS also occurred in relation to the s 61J offences where ejaculation had occurred. However, perhaps curiously, the judge did not refer to the risk of pregnancy in relation to the s 61J offences. In relation to count 35, which involved an offence under s 61M(2), where ejaculation occurred onto KS’ vagina and anus, the judge elevated the objective seriousness to “just above the mid-range”. [146] That basis of distinction may not have been erroneous in circumstances where it was not said to involve any real risk of pregnancy.

34. [274]

    Overall, the offending to which pleas were entered may be seen, in respect of the differing offences, as generally in the mid-range of objective seriousness for such offending.

35. [275]

    Because this aspect of the exercise is a minority view, it may be covered briefly and without a table setting out the detail.

36. [276]

    The circumstances of the case raise a question as to how the culpability arising on a single occasion was reflected in the determination of indicative sentences. By way of example, on 17 June 2009, there was video-recorded conduct which gave rise to three offences under s 61J (aggravated sexual assault), together with one offence under s 38(a) (administering an intoxicating substance). The trial judge indicated individual sentences of 8 years in respect of each s 61J offence, and 9 years in respect of the s 38(a) offence. On one view, there was inherent in those sentences a significant degree of double-counting. However, assuming a 15% discount for each of the s 61J offences, the nominal starting point for each was higher than that for the administration of the sedative, because, having faced trial and being found guilty, no discount applied to that offence. The total of the four offences (without discounts) was 37 years 3 months, for events which occurred on one occasion. Clearly a judge sentencing for those four offences would direct that the three offences under s 61J be served concurrently, or with a small degree of accumulation, with the longer offence (having regard to the discount of the s 61J offences) being that of administering the sedative. In that event, the utilitarian discount of the pleas diminishes to close to zero. Certainly, the value of the discount would not be reflected in the proportion of the indicative sentences for the guilty pleas as against the sentence for the offence which was not the subject of a discount.

37. [277]

    Given these difficulties, on one view the judge was correct not to attempt to apply the discount in an arithmetical exercise. The alternative conclusion is that the judge simply disregarded the discounting exercise. That is quite unlikely, given that he spent two pages of the judgment setting out his reasoning in favour of a discount “of about 15%” in respect of the pleas.

38. [278]

    In my view, an appropriate sentence for each of the s 38(a) offences involving KS is 5 years’ imprisonment. Those involving RL warranted lower sentences, each of 2 years.

39. [279]

    With respect to the s 61J offences, with a starting point of 6 years, the discounted sentence is in each case 5 years, with a non-parole period of 3 years 9 months. With respect to the s 66C(2) (other than count 2) and s 66C(4) offences, using a starting point of 4 years, each sentence will be 3 years and 4 months. The same sentence (undiscounted) should be indicated for count 2. The same individual sentences should be indicated in relation to the offences under s 61M(2), namely 3 years and 4 months with non-parole periods of 2 years and 6 months. The offence charged under s 73(1), on which the applicant went to trial, would warrant a sentence of 3 years.

40. [280]

    Counts 122-125 included two counts of using a child (one over and one under 14 years) for pornographic purposes and two counts of possessing child abuse material. As the judge noted, the material depicted KS in 79 videos and 778 still images. The judge considered the possession offences fell below the mid-range for offences of their type, because “only one child was involved, the material was intended for his own use, there was no question of dissemination or transmission and the risk of the material being seen or acquired by vulnerable persons was low”. [147] This assessment should be accepted. A similar assessment was made with respect to the offences of using a child for the production of child abuse material.

41. [281]

    The judge indicated a sentence of 4 years for the offence under s 91G(1)(a) (suggesting a starting point of 56 months) and 3 years and 4 months for the other offences (suggesting a starting point of 4 years). Again one might expect a high degree of concurrency, but the individual sentences may be accepted.

42. [282]

    The dominant sentencing principle in determining an aggregate sentence is the principle of totality. The applicant’s offending extended over four years. The sexual abuse of KS was extensive, gross, and degrading. That KS was the primary victim of the applicant’s criminal offending with, on one view, incidental criminal offending against JS and RL, does not serve to ameliorate the length of the aggregate sentence which must reflect the total criminality of the offending. The ultimate question for this Court is whether, in exercising its re-sentencing power under s 6(3) of the Criminal Appeal Act, the Court should be satisfied that some other sentence, and in particular a lesser sentence, is warranted in law and should have been passed.

43. [283]

    I am not so satisfied. The corruption of the childhood of a young girl immediately she appears to reach puberty, was serious criminal misconduct. To obtain personal sexual gratification from a stepdaughter who was subject to the care of the applicant as her father, is, as the sentencing judge noted, an iniquitous breach of trust. To continue that conduct over a period of four years, including having sexual intercourse on a regular basis, and administering a sedative to facilitate the sexual abuse of his stepdaughter, demonstrates a level of commitment to self-gratification and a lack of insight which defies explanation.

44. [284]

    There are, however, two considerations which need to be weighed in this case. First, because it should be accepted that the period in custody will weigh more heavily upon the applicant than it would upon a healthy person, the actual period in custody should be less than it would otherwise be in order to achieve the same level of punishment.

45. [285]

    Secondly, the sentences indicated with respect of those offences where a plea of guilty was entered should reflect that fact. Section 53A(2) of the Sentencing Procedure Act obliges the court to take into account, pursuant to s 22, the guilty pleas in the indication of sentences for those offences to which the applicant pleaded. [148] However, in a sentencing exercise of this kind, whilst ensuring full transparency in the indicative sentences, given the number of offences involved, the discount for the guilty pleas will have little or no impact on the aggregate sentence.

46. [286]

    In indicating sentences for individual offences, a 15% discount has been applied where pleas of guilty were entered, although, as explained above, for other reasons, the sentences for those offences relative to other offences in the same category may differ only marginally. Issues of concurrency and or accumulation are taken into account in determining the aggregate sentence, albeit on a notional basis.

47. [287]

    The application of the obligation imposed on the court by s 22 of the Sentencing Procedure Act in relation to an aggregate sentence is not easily identified. However, to allow transparency to the effect of the discounts granted in relation to the pleas, one course might be to identify a rough proportion of the sentences which were the subject of the pleas and therefore the entitlement to a discount, and apply that proportion of the discount to the aggregate sentence. Thus, if the total of the indicative sentences were 100 years, of which 65 years were attributable to sentences subject to a 15% discount, the proposed aggregate sentence of 12 years could be discounted by two-thirds of 15%, or 10%. It has been suggested that such an exercise cannot be carried out. [149] However, in some circumstances, it is one way in which an offender can be given the benefit of individual discounts, and allows s 22 to have an operation in relation to the sentence in fact imposed.

48. [288]

    There is a complicating factor in this case which renders the proposed arithmetical exercise difficult, if not misleading. As noted above in considering how to determine individual sentences, four offences which occurred on one occasion will be served almost entirely concurrently with the longest sentence. If that were for the offence under s 38(a), which did not attract a discount, the utilitarian discount of the pleas diminishes to close to zero. Certainly, the value of the discount would not be reflected in the proportion the indicative sentences for the guilty pleas bear to the sentence for the offence which was not the subject of a discount.

49. [289]

    With respect to each of the s 38(a) offences, that difficulty arises in varying degrees. On some dates there was only one other offence under s 61J (for example, 27 June and 4 July 2009). On another occasion, there were four offences under s 61J (11 July 2009). On one occasion, there were six offences under s 61J following one event of sedation (11 September 2009). If one of the offences of aggravated sexual assault were to be taken as the primary offence with respect to one occasion, and the sedation offence was treated as a secondary offence which would be accumulated to a small degree, then the reverse result would flow from the discounting of the primary s 61J offence.

50. [290]

    In the present case, the proportion of the total of the indicative sentences identified by the sentencing judge for the guilty pleas was 75%. An alternative course would be to take the number of the serious charges to which the applicant pleaded as a proportion of the total number of convictions, which would give a similar statistic (99/130 or 76%). However, to treat the aggregate sentence as subject to a discount of, say, 11.2% (75% of 15%) would not necessarily provide a realistic application of the benefit provided under s 22 of the Sentencing Procedure Act.

51. [291]

    There is, however, another factor revealed by this analysis, namely that the entry of pleas of guilty to all the offences (but only the offences) recorded on the video discs, all of which had to be played to the jury in any event, demonstrated the lack of any significant utilitarian value in the pleas. There are two available ways to deal with this consideration. One is to abandon the attempt to give transparency to the effect of the guilty pleas, by simply taking them into account, without arithmetical calculation, in determining the aggregate sentence. That was the course adopted by the sentencing judge. The alternative is to give some slight numerical discount of the aggregate sentence. If the discount were 5%, a sentence of 32 years would indicate a starting point of about 34 years. That figure would be entirely within the range of an appropriate sentence for the totality of the offending. It would follow that I am still comfortably satisfied that no lesser sentence than that imposed by the sentencing judge was warranted.

52. [292]

    There was a separate challenge in the applicant’s grounds to the refusal of the judge to find special circumstances, so as to vary the proportion of the non-parole period and the balance of the term, pursuant to s 44 of the Sentencing Procedure Act (ground 18). The applicant’s contentions in that regard rested on two propositions: first, that a sentence with a non-parole period of 24 years would effectively result in institutionalisation, and, secondly, the sentence was his first term in custody. Various other factors were also relied upon, including his health and his age.

53. [293]

    All these considerations were relevant, but the question for the sentencing judge was whether a lesser period of custody would reflect the total criminality. He was satisfied rather that the statutory ratio properly reflected the totality of the applicant’s criminal conduct. [150]

54. [294]

    The balance of the term of the aggregate sentence was 8 years, in accordance with the statutory ratio. No purpose would be served by increasing that period. While the matters raised by the applicant had relevance to the determination of whether to vary the statutory ratio, they were also matters which were taken into account in fixing the overall term of the sentence. Matters such as his health conditions would be double-counted if they were relied upon as special circumstances reducing the custodial period. Furthermore, while the statutory ratio is commonly varied in the case of a person serving his or her first term of imprisonment, the purpose of such a variation is to provide an extended opportunity for rehabilitation in the community. The length of the current sentence, and the applicant’s circumstances, deprive that consideration of significance.

55. [295]

    The judge did not err in failing to find special circumstances and this Court should not do so in re-sentencing.

56. [296]

    The indicative sentences have been reassessed and reflect the facts and circumstances of the individual offending and relevant sentencing principles, including, where appropriate, the application of a 15% discount. Although for some offences they differ from those indicated by the sentencing judge, that does not diminish the judge’s assessment of the applicant’s overall criminality.

57. [297]

    Having taken into account the subjective history and current health of the applicant, as discussed above and as more fully set out in the reasons of the sentencing judge, and bearing in mind the objective seriousness of the overall course of offending, no lesser sentence than that imposed by the sentencing judge is warranted. Accordingly, the applicant should have leave to appeal against his sentence, but the appeal should be dismissed.

Orders

1. [298]

   The Court should make the following orders:

   1. (1)

      Subject to order (2), refuse the applicant an extension of time within which to appeal from his convictions following verdicts of guilty returned on 18 July 2017.

   2. (2)

      With respect to grounds 1, 1A and 2(iv),

   3. (3)

      With respect to the aggregate sentence imposed in the District Court on 22 November 2017:

2. [299]

   FULLERTON & GARLING JJ: On the application by TS for an extension of time, leave to appeal, and the appeal against his convictions, we agree with the orders proposed by Basten AJA. We also agree with his thorough and comprehensive reasons.

3. [300]

   Appeal grounds 5, 5A and 30 focus on the convictions for 22 offences contrary to s 38(a) of the Crimes Act consequent upon the verdicts of guilty returned by the jury, and assert that those convictions should be set aside on the basis that the convictions were unreasonable, or else, having regard to the evidence, could not be supported: s 6(1), Criminal Appeal Act.

4. [301]

   In considering those grounds and the applicant’s submissions with respect to them, we have carefully read the transcript of the whole of the evidence of the trial, and we have viewed each of the videos which were tendered as exhibits in the trial. Those videos were taken by the applicant himself and showed in detail his interactions with KS. Having done so, we do not have any doubt at all, and are thoroughly convinced, that the verdicts returned by the jury were soundly based. There is absolutely no merit in these grounds of appeal.

5. [302]

   On the application for leave to appeal and to appeal against his aggregate sentence, we agree with by Basten AJA that no lesser sentence than that imposed in the District Court is warranted. We also agree generally with his reasons.

6. [303]

   Regrettably however, we are unable to agree with [275]–[278], and [286]–[290] of Basten AJA’s reasons.

7. [304]

   It is convenient if we first address our difference of view with respect to his Honour’s reasons at [286] to [290].

8. [305]

   In those paragraphs of his reasons, Basten AJA deals with the perceived difficulties in this case with the lack of transparency when the effect of allowing the discount for pleas of guilty is only reflected on the indicative sentences and not on the aggregate sentence which was in fact imposed. His Honour’s reasons propose other possible methods of giving effect to any such discount.

9. [306]

   As we have indicated, we do not agree with these paragraphs. In our view, s 53A(2)(b) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 is clear in its terms requiring that discounts for pleas of guilty are to be taken into account and allowed for when stating the indicative sentence. In our view, it is contrary to this provision to calculate discounts on, or to take into account and apply their effect to, aggregate sentences

10. [307]

    As well, previous decisions of this Court, with which we agree, do not support the approach taken by his Honour with respect to the calculation of the effect of a discount for pleas of guilty on aggregate sentences: see Glare v R [2015] NSWCCA 194 at [12]; Bao v R [2016] NSWCCA 16; Elsaj v R [2017] NSWCCA 124 at [56]; PG v R [2017] NSWCCA 179 at [71]-[92].

11. [308]

    We next address our differences of view with respect to his Honour’s reasons at [275]–[278].

12. [309]

    The objective seriousness of each of the 54 offences contrary to s 61J(1) of the Crimes Act, was assessed by the trial Judge as being just above the mid-range. We agree with that assessment. We agree that it was necessary in considering the individual sentences indicated for these offences to be careful not to double‑count any element contributing to that assessment with the elements contributing to the assessment of objective seriousness of the 26 offences contrary to s 38(a) of the Crimes Act.

13. [310]

    Our view is, for the reasons given above, that it is necessary to ensure that the 15% discount for the late pleas of guilty is given effect to when the indicative sentences are determined.

14. [311]

    The maximum penalty for an offence against s 61J(1) is 20 years’ imprisonment with a standard non-parole period of 10 years. These are important guideposts for consideration when sentencing is being undertaken.

15. [312]

    Taking into account all of these, and all other relevant matters, we assess the appropriate sentence to be indicated for each of these offences as 8 years with 6 years indicated as the non-parole period.

16. [313]

    In coming to this conclusion, we recognise that there is a significant difference from the sentences indicated by Basten AJA of 5 years with a non-parole period of 3 years 9 months. It is our view that such indicative sentences are too low to reflect the objective seriousness of the applicant’s conduct and the maximum penalty fixed for these offences.

17. [314]

    We are also unable to agree with the individual sentences which his Honour indicates for the 26 offences contrary to s 38(a) of the Crimes Act, namely 5 years for the offences against KS and 2 years for the offences against RL.

18. [315]

    All of these offences were assessed by the trial Judge as being just above the mid-range of objective seriousness. We agree with that assessment. No discount for pleas of guilty are applicable. The maximum penalty for an offence against s 38(a) is 25 years.

19. [316]

    We have come to the conclusion that the appropriate sentence to indicate for each of these offences is 9 years insofar as the victim was KS, and 7 years for the four offences in which the victim was RL.

20. [317]

    For clarity, we set out below a schedule of the indicative sentences which we think are appropriate.