Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Sideris

1. [1]

   THE COURT: By Summons filed on 10 December 2024, the Council of the Law Society of New South Wales (the Council) sought:

   1. (1)

      a declaration that Mr George Sideris (the Respondent) is not a fit and proper person to remain on the Roll of Australian lawyers (the Roll) maintained by the Supreme Court of New South Wales, pursuant to s 22 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW) (LPUL);

   2. (2)

      an order that the Respondent’s name be removed from the Roll; and

   3. (3)

      an order that the Respondent pay the Council’s costs of the proceedings.

2. [2]

   These orders were sought pursuant to s 23(1)(c) of the LPUL which empowers this Court to order the removal of the name of persons from the Roll on the recommendation of the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal (the Tribunal).

3. [3]

   The inherent jurisdiction and powers of the Supreme Court with respect to the control and discipline of Australian lawyers are not affected by anything in ch 5 of the LPUL which deals with professional discipline. So much is stated in LPUL s 264(1). The objectives of ch 5 include the monitoring, promotion and enforcement of the professional standards, competence and honesty of the Australian legal profession: LPUL s 260(c).

4. [4]

   The Tribunal is empowered, if it thinks fit, to recommend that a lawyer’s name be removed from the Roll if, after completing a hearing into the lawyer’s conduct, it finds the lawyer guilty of unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct: LPUL s 302(1)(f). That is what occurred in the present case: Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Sideris (No 2) [2024] NSWCATOD 121 at [147(1)] (Stage 2 Decision or TD2).

5. [5]

   As Brereton JA observed in Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Clifton [2021] NSWCA 340 at [7] (Clifton):

6. [6]

   The Court is not bound to follow the Tribunal’s recommendation that the practitioner’s name be removed from the Roll; it retains the responsibility to be satisfied that the orders sought are appropriate on the facts found which is to say that the Court must independently exercise the power under s 23(1)(c) of the LPUL on the evidence and material before it: de Robillard v Council of the New South Wales Bar Association; Council of the New South Wales Bar Association v de Robillard (No 2) [2024] NSWCA 299 at [227] (de Robillard), quoting Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Leslie [2021] NSWCA 59 at [30] (Leslie). Absent any challenge to the Tribunal’s findings by way of an appeal (and there has been no such challenge in this matter), it is open to this Court to accept those findings and the Tribunal’s characterisation of the practitioner’s conduct: see Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Yoon [2020] NSWCA 141 at [22], [32]-[33] (Yoon); Clifton at [8]-[9]; Leslie at [30]; and de Robillard at [222]-[224].

7. [7]

   The jurisdiction is protective and, as Spigelman CJ observed in New South Wales Bar Association v Cummins (2001) 52 NSWLR 279; [2001] NSWCA 284 at [20]:

8. [8]

   Removal from the Roll is the appropriate order where it is demonstrated both that the lawyer is presently not fit to practise and is likely to be unfit for the indefinite future: Council of Law Society of New South Wales v Green [2022] NSWCA 257 at [67] (Green). Because of that present and future focus, as at the time of the determination in this Court, it may be relevant for the Court to receive and consider evidence of events subsequent to the decision of the Tribunal, and consideration may also be given to what occurs in the course of the hearing in this Court.

9. [9]

   Removing a legal practitioner’s name from the Roll is a serious step and should occur only in very serious cases where, for example, the character and conduct of the practitioner is seen to be “inconsistent with the privileges of further practice”: see Barristers’ Board v Darveniza [2000] QCA 253; (2000) 112 A Crim R 438 at [38].

Background and overview

1. [10]

   The Respondent was admitted to the legal profession in New South Wales on 3 July 1987, and held a practising certificate in each year from 13 July 1987 to 30 June 2022. The Respondent has not held a practising certificate from 20 October 2022 to the present date.

2. [11]

   The origin of this application lies in actions by the Respondent in acting for his elderly mother-in-law, Mrs Norma Sim, in her dealings with the Salvation Army (TSA) and its then solicitor, Mr Luke Geary of the firm Mills Oakley, in relation to the mother-in-law’s liability to pay a Refundable Accommodation Deposit and the balance of that deposit. TSA was the provider of Mrs Sim’s aged care accommodation.

3. [12]

   On 18 May 2021, Mr Geary sent an email to the Respondent stating that he acted for TSA, was in the process of confirming TSA’s instructions, and to “Please direct any further correspondence concerning this matter to my office”.

4. [13]

   By email dated 5 July 2021, Mr Geary again requested that the Respondent direct any correspondence concerning the dispute to his office, as opposed to TSA directly. This request was repeated by Mr Geary in what the Tribunal described as “increasingly direct terms” by emails on 8 July 2021, 30 August 2021, 6 September 2021, 19 October 2021 and 29 October 2021: TD1 [19].

5. [14]

   The Respondent was and remains adamant that, in his dealings with TSA, he was acting in his capacity solely as a caring son-in-law and not in his capacity as a solicitor. This founded his argument that the conduct of which Mr Geary ultimately complained to the Law Society, and which underpins the Tribunal’s recommendation and the Council’s application, did not involve the Respondent acting in his capacity as a solicitor and thus did not entail a breach of rr 33 and 4.1.2 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015 (NSW) (Conduct Rules). The relevant version of r 33 is quoted below (at [24]). Rule 4.1.2 provided (and still provides) that a solicitor must “be honest and courteous in all dealings in the course of legal practice”.

6. [15]

   The Tribunal disagreed with the Respondent’s contention as to the capacity in which he acted, following a close analysis of the facts and the terms of the very great deal of correspondence sent by the Respondent directly to TSA, including that bypassing its then solicitor, Mr Geary: Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Sideris [2024] NSWCATOD 3 at [98]-[147] (Stage 1 Decision or TD1). The Respondent was found to be acting as a legal practitioner in the course of the dispute between his mother-in-law and TSA from 1 July 2021 to 17 February 2022: TD1 [129]. It is apparent from the correspondence detailed in the decision that the finding was soundly based. As the Tribunal held, the Respondent referred to himself both explicitly and implicitly as a solicitor in his correspondence with TSA and Mr Geary on multiple occasions.

7. [16]

   The “no contact” rule, as r 33 is sometimes known, has a long pedigree in the legal profession; direct contact by one party’s solicitor with the other party rather than through his, her or its solicitor, being described as “extremely unprofessional” as long ago as 1847: Jones v Jones (1847) 5 Notes of Cases in the Ecclesiastical and Maritime Courts 134 at 140. In Re Margetson and Jones [1897] 2 Ch 314 at 318–19, Kekewich J described this professional rule as “highly consonant with good sense and convenience, because otherwise solicitors cannot really do their duty, and it is impossible for business to be properly conducted unless the solicitors have the full confidence of their clients and are enabled to communicate the one with the other upon that footing”. In Legal Practitioners Conduct Board v Wharff [2012] SASCFC 116, the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia stated that:

8. [17]

   In the present case, each breach of the no contact rule was found to be unsatisfactory professional conduct and, by reason of persistent breaches of r 33, after Mr Geary had requested that the Respondent deal directly with him as TSA’s solicitor, the Tribunal at TD1 [167]-[168] characterised the conduct considered cumulatively as professional misconduct, being conduct which involved a substantial or consistent failure to reach or maintain a reasonable standard of competence and diligence: LPUL s 297(1)(a).

9. [18]

   When Mr Geary raised his complaint with the Respondent and requested that he deal with him as TSA’s solicitor rather than directly with TSA, the manner and tone of the Respondent’s correspondence with him and later the Law Society deteriorated to such an extent that the Tribunal also found that the Respondent had breached r 4.1.2 of the Conduct Rules. Indeed, the Tribunal (at TD1 [188]) characterised the Respondent’s breaches of the rule as “deliberate and wilful” after Mr Geary had written to him saying:

10. [19]

    Courtesy and civility by and between practitioners are critical to the administration of justice, respect for and the reputation of the legal profession and ultimately, respect for the rule of law. “The importance of courtesy in the legal system, and in the relationship between the legal profession, the court system, and general public should not be understated”: Legal Profession Complaints Committee v in de Braekt [2013] WASC 124 at [28] (de Braekt). The Full Bench of the Western Australian Supreme Court in de Braekt at [30] also referred to the admonition of Benham CJ of the Supreme Court of Georgia in Butts v State 546 SE 2d 472 at 486 (2001):

11. [20]

    The importance of legal practitioners displaying an appropriate standard of courtesy and civility was emphasised by Allsop J in Barghouthi v ING Custodians Pty Limited [2003] FCA 636 at [16] who said “[c]ourtesy and civility are not bourgeois affectations. They are not the mark of the effete or inept litigator. They are part of a practitioner’s overriding duty to the court, indeed to the standards of the profession and to the public.” We agree.

12. [21]

    Other authorities are to like effect: Garrard (t/as Arthur Anderson & Co) v Email Furniture Pty Ltd (1993) 32 NSWLR 662 at 667; Griffin v The Council of the Law Society of New South Wales [2016] NSWCA 364 at [105]-[106]; McDonald v Legal Services Commissioner (No 2) [2017] VSC 89 at [6]; Barkla v Allianz Australia Insurance Limited [2018] FCA 2070 at [79]; see also G E Dal Pont, Lawyers’ Professional Responsibility (Lawbook Co, 8th ed, 2025) at 767; FT Horne, Cordery on Solicitors (Butterworths, 8th ed, 1988) at 273.

13. [22]

    As will be seen, the Respondent’s correspondence both before and indeed after the Tribunal’s decisions was grossly discourteous, coarse, disrespectful, gratuitously offensive, improperly threatening and wholly unprofessional. Its continuation after the Tribunal’s decisions also rendered the Respondent’s apology to the Tribunal on 24 August 2024, shortly after the Stage 2 Decision recommending his removal from the Roll, utterly hollow and disingenuous. This apology is extracted at [49] below and is dealt with in greater detail later in these reasons.

The “no contact” rule – a preliminary matter in relation to rule 33

1. [23]

   Rule 33 of the Conduct Rules, as in force at the time of the hearing before the Tribunal, provided that:

2. [24]

   As at the time of the impugned conduct, r 33 was expressed in different terms (only being amended from 1 April 2022). It had provided that:

3. [25]

   Regrettably, the Tribunal referred to the wrong version of r 33 in holding that the Respondent had breached it. It did not refer to the version of r 33 that was in force at the time of the Respondent’s impugned conduct.

4. [26]

   Ms Morgan SC, who appeared together with Ms Dunlop for the Council, properly drew this matter to the Court’s attention but submitted that there was no relevant difference so as to give rise to jurisdictional error, making reference in this context to LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2024) 280 CLR 321; [2024] HCA 12 at [14] (LPDT).

5. [27]

   We agree that, while unfortunate, the reference to the wrong version of r 33 by the Tribunal was not material in the sense that the decision could not “realistically” have been different had there been no error: LPDT at [14]. Although there are textual differences between the two versions of the rule, nothing turned on those differences in the present case. The impugned conduct would equally have breached either version of the rule and we are independently satisfied that it did.

6. [28]

   The Respondent did not contend otherwise.

The Tribunal’s findings

1. [29]

   The Tribunal’s Stage 1 and Stage 2 Decisions have already been referred to. The first involved the findings of professional misconduct; the second resulted in the Tribunal’s recommendation that the Respondent’s name be removed from the Roll. Both decisions are extremely detailed and contain close analysis of the conduct which led to the Tribunal’s ultimate findings. That conduct was principally manifested in correspondence between the Respondent and Mr Geary, and then other lawyers including those representing the Council in the proceedings before the Tribunal. Many examples of such correspondence (or extracts of it) were set out in the Tribunal’s decisions.

2. [30]

   The Respondent did not appeal from either the Stage 1 or Stage 2 Decisions (and indeed did not attend the Stage 2 hearing). While aware of the Tribunal’s decisions, he indicated in the course of the hearing before this Court that he had not read either decision and was “not interested” in doing so.

3. [31]

   Although the essence of the Tribunal’s decisions has already been noted, the gravity of the potential removal of a practitioner’s name from the Roll and the imperative of fostering the public interest by maintaining full accountability of those in the profession and involved in the administration of justice requires that further, more detailed reference be made to the Tribunal’s findings: Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Li [2024] NSWCA 218 at [8]; Green at [59]; Council of the New South Wales Bar Association v Einfeld [2009] NSWCA 255; (2009) 258 ALR 768 at [16].

4. [32]

   In its Stage 1 Decision, in relation to the breach of r 33 of the Conduct Rules, the Tribunal reasoned as follows:

5. [33]

   In relation to the breach of r 4.1.2 of the Conduct Rules, the Tribunal reasoned as follows:

6. [34]

   On 9 August 2024, following a further hearing, the Tribunal made orders recommending that the Respondent’s name by removed from the Roll: TD2 [147]. Certain aspects of both the hearing and the Tribunal’s decision should be highlighted.

7. [35]

   First, as has already been noted, the Respondent did not appear at the Stage 2 hearing on 12 June 2024. The Tribunal observed (at TD2 [10]) that:

8. [36]

   There had been much correspondence between the Respondent and the Law Society, its legal representatives (Hicksons Lawyers) and the Tribunal leading to the State 2 hearing. The Tribunal said that “[t]he vast majority of these emails contain discourteous language, insults directed at various persons, the Law Society or Tribunal, or threats to commence legal action against individuals, the Law Society or the Tribunal”: TD2 [22]. These communications spanned almost 400 pages.

9. [37]

   The Tribunal gave examples of this correspondence and the language contained in it, noting that the recipients of the “discourteous, offensive or otherwise inappropriate correspondence” included employees of the Law Society (including in-house solicitors) and solicitors at Hicksons: TD2 [25].

10. [38]

    The Tribunal instanced one email in which the Respondent wrote “FUCK off the lot of you you bunch of idiots” and “Let me be a littler nicer – FUCK OFF” and others which stated “Better still” or “So simply put” before attaching images of a middle finger: TD2 [25]. The Tribunal noted at TD2 [26] that another theme which emerged from the correspondence was:

11. [39]

    The Tribunal also made reference to 12 emails or letters which the Respondent sent to the Supreme Court and its Registry which are characterised by similar kinds of language, threats and discourteous conduct as are found in his communications to the Law Society, its lawyers or the Tribunal in the context of these disciplinary proceedings: TD2 [28].

12. [40]

    The Tribunal also engaged in a close analysis of correspondence after the Stage 1 hearing for the purposes of assessing whether the Respondent exhibited any genuine insight, contrition or remorse in relation to the conduct which founded the findings of professional misconduct. The Tribunal concluded that it did not: TD2 [100]. We agree with that finding which was further reinforced by our consideration of the Respondent’s conduct after the Stage 2 Decision (dealt with below) and indeed in the course of the hearing before us where the Respondent appeared.

13. [41]

    The absence of any insight, especially in relation to the finding of professional misconduct in respect of r 4.1.2, was confirmed by the tone and language of much of the correspondence which took place after the Stage 1 Decision and which has been referred to at [36]-[40] above. As the Tribunal noted, the Law Society, its employees and lawyers, have been the recipients of an unrelenting stream of discourteous, insulting or offensive correspondence from the Respondent: TD2 [102]. The Tribunal continued:

14. [42]

    Anticipating our conclusion on the Council’s application in this Court, we agree with this assessment.

15. [43]

    In considering the appropriate protective orders to make, the Tribunal observed that it was “difficult to see that there is genuine insight demonstrated, let alone remorse or contrition”: TD2 [99]. The Tribunal found that, while the Respondent offered an apology for potentially breaching r 33 of the Conduct Rules (TD2 [92]), he showed no remorse or contrition, evidenced by his email to the Law Society on 28 November 2023, where he said “I have no remorse as I was acting for my mother in law you pathetic human being”: TD2 [94].

16. [44]

    The Tribunal found that, given the “continuing and entrenched” pattern of the Respondent’s behaviour, it was not confident that the Respondent would not repeat the same type of conduct: TD2 [110]. The Tribunal noted that the Respondent’s “failure to appreciate the wrongfulness and gravity of proven misconduct goes towards a finding of unfitness. One reason is that it increases the risk of its recurrence and with it, the need to protect the community from misconduct of that kind”: TD2 [111]. The Tribunal further held that (TD2 [112]):

17. [45]

    The Tribunal also had regard to the fact that:

    1. (1)

       the Respondent’s use of profanities was “extreme”; and

    2. (2)

       the Respondent flouted the legal professional rules, exemplified by continuing to reference a non-existent law firm and calling himself a “solicitor” 25 times despite his practising certificate being cancelled: TD2 [114]-[115].

18. [46]

    In turn, the Tribunal was “satisfied, on the civil standard, that at the time of [its] determination the respondent is not fit to practise as a legal practitioner”: TD2 [124]. The Tribunal was also satisfied that such unfitness to practise was likely to be indefinite because the Respondent did not show insight which demonstrated an understanding as to what the improper conduct was, and how to ensure no such circumstance occurred again: TD2 [125].

19. [47]

    The Tribunal held that there was utility in making the Roll removal recommendation because:

    1. (1)

       specific deterrence was required to send the Respondent a clear message that the type of behaviour cannot be tolerated; and

    2. (2)

       a reprimand or fine would not be sufficient to enhance public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession: TD2 [133]-[134].

20. [48]

    The Tribunal therefore made the Roll removal recommendation, finding that there was “no viable alternative that would adequately protect the public and avoid bringing the profession into disrepute”: TD2 [136].

21. [49]

    By email dated 21 August 2024, following the Stage 2 Decision, the Respondent sent the following message to the President of the Tribunal, Justice Armstrong, and others including Ms Stevenson (a solicitor employed by Hicksons Lawyers), the President of the Law Society and an NCAT affiliated address as follows:

22. [50]

    On 26 September 2024, the Council resolved to commence and prosecute proceedings in this Court, seeking the orders referred to at [1] above.

Proceedings in this Court

1. [51]

   Proceedings were commenced in this Court by Summons on 10 December 2024. The service of those proceedings was not straightforward and it is convenient to refer to some interactions between the Respondent and the Council’s lawyers in relation to it for reasons that will become apparent.

2. [52]

   By email dated 7 January 2025 directed to the Respondent, the Law Society, through its solicitors attached “by way of service” the Summons and a supporting affidavit and exhibit of Ms Griswold. The email requested:

3. [53]

   By email dated 8 January 2025 at 11.05am, the Respondent replied:

4. [54]

   By email on the same day at 11.12am, the Respondent stated:

5. [55]

   By email dated the same day at 12.03pm, the Respondent added “Again - - simply put … piss off all of you”.

6. [56]

   By email dated 11 February 2025 at 3.10pm, the Respondent wrote to Ms Stevenson of Hicksons Lawyers and various others, stating:

7. [57]

   Pausing there, and putting aside for the moment the continuing gross discourtesy and unprofessional language, it will be apparent that the Respondent was insisting on personal service of the Court documents, asserting that he lived in Filia, Greece and directing that the Summons and supporting affidavit be physically served on him there. The Respondent was asked about a number of these documents and statements contained in them by members of the Court in the course of the hearing and, in particular, his claim that he lived in Filia, Greece, at which he had requested the court documents be served.

8. [58]

   The following exchange occurred:

9. [59]

   Subsequently, the Respondent was asked what would have been the purpose of communicating what, on his account, was historical information to the place where he was born, which he had last visited a number of years earlier and which was now deserted, to the solicitor who was attempting to serve documents on him, his wholly unsatisfactory answer was:

10. [60]

    This was not so much a matter for apology as it was telling, not only in terms of it amounting to a clear attempt to avoid service but doing so by reference to false statements as to the Respondent’s habitual abode and wholly implausible and tendentious explanations for his false statements to the solicitor for the Law Society.

11. [61]

    Regrettably, this was not the only material which raised more than serious questions about the Respondent and his fitness to practice. On 26 February 2025, the Respondent wrote to the Law Society’s solicitor after she had emailed him courteously to inform him of directions made the previous day by the Registrar of the Court of Appeal for the preparation of the hearing of the Summons. The Respondent replied later the same day as follows:

12. [62]

    Four observations can be made about the statements made in this email. First, and most obviously, the inappropriateness of the language is patent: “CRAP”; “the shit that Anthony Lean was going on about”; “the other clown”; “the bullshit imposed on me”; “that idiot Lean”; “fucking mess”. Second, the continuation of this tone and language exposed the Respondent’s purported apology referred to above at [49] as not worth the paper it was written on. Third, the statement “so I can stay in Filia in Greece” implied that that is where the Respondent was and yet he told the Court at the hearing that that was where he was born, where he had last visited years before and which he told the Court was now deserted. Fourth, the statements in the present tense that he had to deal with a “sick grandmother” and a “grandfather near death” were inconsistent with other material before the Court and the Respondent’s own acknowledgement to the Court that his grandmother had died well prior to the date of this email (first, he said that this had occurred in 2023 and subsequently placed it earlier) and that his grandfather, said to be “near death” at the time of the email, had died even earlier.

13. [63]

    In relation to the Respondent’s email dated 26 February 2025, the following exchange occurred:

14. [64]

    Returning to the Summons, the Council particularised its case that the Respondent was not a fit and proper person to remain on the Roll by reason of and reference to the Tribunal’s findings that the Respondent was guilty of professional misconduct and its subsequent recommendation to remove the Respondent’s name from the Roll.

15. [65]

    It relied upon particular findings made in both of the Tribunal’s decisions. The Council also tendered evidence on the hearing of the Summons relating to the Respondent’s conduct and interactions with the Law Society and the Tribunal subsequent to the Stage 2 Decision.

16. [66]

    The Respondent relied upon three affidavits he had sworn, on 13 May 2025, 22 May 2025, and 9 July 2025. He also tendered four exhibits.

17. [67]

    Exhibit 1 was a letter from his mother-in-law, Ms Norma Sim, dated 7 July 2025. During the hearing, the Respondent acknowledged that he authored the document:

18. [68]

    Exhibit 2 comprised two emails sent by Mr Jonathan Park, a Senior Client Director of Professional and Managed Services at “Open Text”. One of these, dated 17 September 2021 sent to another employee of Open Text, Mr Peter Perez, stated that:

19. [69]

    Exhibit 3 was a letter dated 10 July 2025 signed by the Respondent and Dr Fiona Sim, the Respondent’s wife. The letter relevantly stated:

20. [70]

    Exhibit 4 was a letter authored by Dr Fiona Sim dated 14 July 2025 which relevantly provided that:

21. [71]

    The Respondent drew attention to the report of Associate Professor Anthony Samuels, a consultant psychiatrist, of 7 June 2023. The doctor had examined the Respondent at the Law Society’s request in May 2023 in the context of the Respondent’s application for a practising certificate. The final paragraph of the report was as follows:

22. [72]

    As may be seen by reference to the correspondence to which the Tribunal referred in its Stage 2 Decision which post-dated Dr Samuel’s report (and which has been referred to above), as well as the Respondent’s correspondence post-dating the Stage 2 decision which was put before the Court by the Council in an Affidavit of Tayah Lee Stevenson affirmed 17 March 2025 and some of which has already been referred to, Dr Samuel’s satisfaction that the Respondent “is aware that his past approach has been unproductive and ill-advised and that he fully understands that in order to get his practising certificate approved, that he needs to fully comply with the requirements of his professional body and to communicate in a professional manner in all settings” has not been vindicated.

23. [73]

    At this point it is relevant to make reference to some further communications made by the Respondent after the Stage 2 Decision but prior to the hearing in this Court.

24. [74]

    By email dated 20 February 2025 at 9.07pm directed to Ms Stevenson and various other lawyers employed at Hickson Lawyers, the Respondent said:

25. [75]

    By email dated 21 February 2025 at 8.36am, the Respondent stated:

26. [76]

    By email dated 21 February 2025 at 9.26am directed to Ms Stevenson and others, the Respondent said:

27. [77]

    By email dated 21 February 2025 at 5.54pm directed to the Respondent, Ms Stevenson said:

28. [78]

    By email dated 21 February 2025 at 7.08pm, the Respondent said:

29. [79]

    By email dated 21 February 2025 at 7.11pm, the Respondent said:

30. [80]

    By email dated 21 February 2025 at 7.25pm directed to Ms Stevenson, the Respondent said:

31. [81]

    By email dated 21 February 2025 at 7.40pm directed to Ms Stevenson, the Respondent said:

32. [82]

    By email dated 21 February 2025 at 9.17pm directed to Ms Stevenson, the Respondent said, after attaching a screenshot of a memorial service notice for a particular person:

33. [83]

    By email dated 22 February 2025 at 4.55pm directed to Ms Stevenson, the Respondent said, after attaching a photo of a man, “And here is the man that died / you clowns inky think about yourselves”.

34. [84]

    By email dated 23 February 2025 at 9.25pm directed to Ms Stevenson, the Respondent stated:

35. [85]

    By email dated 23 February 2025 at 9.43pm directed to Ms Stevenson, the Respondent said “I suggest you all read the attached which was provided by prof Samuels at the request of the Law society and which was rejected by the clow3n Anthony Lean”.

36. [86]

    By email dated 24 February 2025 at 8.09am directed to Ms Stevenson, the Respondent said “I cannot attend as I am Ill myself from heart failure and I have to look after my ill mother in law - see attached”, accompanied by a photo of what appears to be the Respondent’s mother in law.

37. [87]

    By email dated 24 February 2025 at 9.33am directed to Ms Stevenson, the Respondent said “This is me today and you clowns are more worried about NCAT / f~~~~~~K NCAT”, followed by a photo of himself in a hospital bed.

38. [88]

    By email dated 24 February 2025 at 4.35pm directed to Ms Stevenson, the Respondent stated:

39. [89]

    By email dated 25 February 2025 at 10.39am directed to the Respondent, Ms Stevenson said:

40. [90]

    By email dated 25 February 2025 at 11.29am directed to Ms Stevenson, the Respondent said:

41. [91]

    The email continued, marking up Ms Stevenson’s above email dated 25 February 2025 at 10.39am as follows:

42. [92]

    In terms of the Respondent’s continuing fitness for practise, much of this correspondence speaks for itself.

Determination

1. [93]

   Written and oral submissions were made on behalf of the Council.

2. [94]

   The Respondent also made oral submissions and much of his Affidavit material in effect comprised submissions albeit that its admission was not the subject of any limitation. Much of the Respondent’s address was directed towards the point he had made persistently, including in the course of the Tribunal proceedings, namely that his engagement with TSA and Mr Geary was in his capacity as Mrs Sim’s son-in-law and not as a solicitor and that he was motivated to help an old lady who had helped him in the past.

3. [95]

   The Respondent’s motivation may be accepted for present purposes but is not to the point. There is no doubt that in representing Mrs Sim’s interests he was acting in his capacity as a solicitor and the Tribunal so found, based upon analysis of a large number of written communications. No challenge was ever made to that conclusion either by way of appeal or by any submission to this Court which did not rise above pure assertion.

4. [96]

   What was remarkable was the Respondent’s complete lack of insight in relation to the serious findings of professional misconduct that had been made against him by the Tribunal. That lack of insight was manifested in various ways, not least of which was the continuing stream of vituperative correspondence after the Tribunal’s decisions which only vindicated its findings, including as to the Respondent’s lack of insight. The lack of insight was further reinforced by the Respondent’s remarkable admission that he had not read the Tribunal’s two decisions and was “not interested” in doing so.

5. [97]

   The importance of the “no contact” rule which founded the first aspect of the Tribunal’s finding of professional misconduct has already been referred to: [16] above. Adherence to that rule is fundamental to legal practice. The Respondent’s conduct was only consistent with either the absence of any understanding or appreciation of the rule or a wilful defiance of it. It is not a difficult rule with which to comply and, as the Tribunal held, the Respondent persisted in direct communication with TSA notwithstanding courteous requests that he not do so.

6. [98]

   The great importance of courtesy by and between practitioners has also already been noted: see [19]-[21] above.

7. [99]

   The Respondent’s conduct before, during and after the Tribunal’s two hearings has been the very antithesis of the professional courtesy that is required of legal practitioners, as reflected in r 4.1.2 of the Conduct Rules. To a large extent, the Respondent has made the case for his lack of current and continuing fitness to practice out of his own mouth as the sustained verbal barrage set out at length above makes apparent. It reveals a complete lack of understanding or appreciation of what is expected and required of a legal practitioner admitted to the Roll. It is not just that the language is consistently coarse but it also discloses a complete absence of respect for individuals, institutions and the Tribunal. The extreme lack of courtesy and understanding is matched by a wholesale absence of any self-discipline by the Respondent in his professional communications.

8. [100]

   The Respondent sought to explain at least some of his language by saying he had been “under a heck of a lot of stress”, including because of his concern about his mother-in-law’s accommodation with TSA and various claimed concerns about other relatives. Even if the Respondent is given the benefit of the doubt as to the existence of such concerns, this does not come close to explaining, let alone excusing, his conduct. It is the nature of legal practice that practitioners may be interacting in the course of disputes whilst under personal or professional strain. That fact is itself connected to the importance of maintaining civility in discourse so as ensure that disputes can be managed and resolved professionally, in the interests of both clients and the community. Sometimes great personal pressure can lead to intemperate or ill-judged behaviour, later regretted, and this may be called in aid by way of explanation and mitigation. The concerns raised by the Respondent were of a vague and generalised kind. Moreover, the long period over which the Respondent’s impugned conduct has occurred undermines any attempt to rely on any such explanation. So, too, does his lack of insight or genuine remorse.

9. [101]

   Beyond that, no excuse for the Respondent’s conduct has been proffered and, in point of fact, the Respondent emphasised that he had been given a clean bill of psychiatric health by Dr Samuels when examined in 2023. He also relied upon his wife’s positive medical assessment of him: see [70] above. In many respects, that makes his conduct even more egregious in that it establishes that he was not labouring under any medical condition when conducting himself as he has over the last several years. We have already pointed out that Dr Samuels’ understanding and positive prediction in relation to the Respondent in the final paragraph of his report has not been vindicated.

10. [102]

    Nor is it to the point that the Respondent may be (or has in the past been) a technically competent lawyer. We infer that this was the purpose of the tender of a testimonial from Mr Jonathan Park, set out at [68] above. The Respondent’s fitness to practise is not a function of any technical competence (upon which we make no comment); rather it is a matter of whether this Court, in exercising what is a protective jurisdiction, considers that his conduct renders him unfit to remain on the Roll.

11. [103]

    What emerged during the hearing as the Respondent’s attempts to evade service of these proceedings and the false statements made as to his whereabouts, his requirements for physical service in Filia, Greece, and the reasons proffered to the solicitors for the Council for his asserted absence from the jurisdiction and other priorities (see [56]-[63] above) have also factored into our assessment. This Court must insist on the maintenance of the highest standards of honesty and integrity in the performance of duties by legal practitioners: Yoon at [34].

12. [104]

    Admission to legal practice and presence on the Roll of Australian lawyers is a privilege and not a right. Admission is contingent upon continuing adherence to a lawyer’s oath or affirmation sworn or made on admission to the legal profession: Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Croke [2024] NSWCA 195 at [11]. That oath or affirmation, sworn or made at the outset of a lawyer’s career, is one of a continuing and critical nature and significance. The privilege of admission will be withdrawn in cases where a lawyer is established not to be a fit and proper person to continue in practice.

13. [105]

    In its current form, the oath or affirmation requires lawyers admitted to the Roll maintained by the Court to undertake “truly and honestly [to] conduct yourself in the practice of a lawyer of the Supreme Court of New South Wales and faithfully to serve as such in the administration of the laws and usages of this State”. That form has not in substance changed since the Respondent’s admission to practice in 1987. The laws and usages of this State include the Conduct Rules, faithful and continuing adherence to which is fundamental to the good standing of the legal profession and to an individual’s current and continuing fitness to practice as a lawyer of this Court.

14. [106]

    Breach of the Conduct Rules and findings of professional misconduct will not necessarily result in the removal of a person’s name from the Roll. That is a very serious and very public consequence for any legal practitioner. The Court is aware of the reputational consequences of this course for any legal practitioner but its responsibility is to ensure, in the public interest, and for the protection of the public, that only practitioners who are fit and proper to practise law are permitted to do so.

15. [107]

    The ultimate question for this Court, as Gleeson JA recently said in de Robillard at [236], is whether the Respondent is a fit and proper person to remain on the roll. As noted above, that involves consideration of whether the lawyer is presently not fit to practise and is likely to be unfit for the indefinite future. As his Honour continued:

16. [108]

    Regrettably, we have come to the clear conclusion, based upon the materials before us and in light of submissions made to us, including in response to questions from the Bench, that the Respondent does not meet the description of a fit and proper person to remain on the Roll. We also consider that he is likely to remain unfit to practise for the indefinite future.

17. [109]

    In our assessment the Respondent’s conduct “betoken[s] unfitness to be held out by the court as a member of a profession in whom confidence could be placed”: Kennedy v The Council of the Incorporated Law Institute of New South Wales (1940) 13 ALJ 563 at 563-564 per Rich J.

18. [110]

    We would make the following orders:

    1. (1)

       Declare that the Respondent, Mr George Sideris, is not a fit and proper person to remain on the Roll of Australian lawyers maintained by the Supreme Court of New South Wales, pursuant to s 22 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW);

    2. (2)

       Order that the name George Sideris be removed from the Roll; and

    3. (3)

       Order that the Respondent pay the Applicant’s costs of the proceedings.