Aslan v Pucci (No 7)

HIS HONOUR: This matter comes back before me today again for the purposes of an ex parte application brought by the plaintiff seeking to reinstate freezing orders which were made against the first defendant by Rothman J on 23 May 2025 and continued by Wright J on 29 May 2025, but then discharged by me on 15 July 2025 (see Aslan v Pucci [2025] NSWSC 881 (“Aslan v Pucci No 1”)).

The reason that I discharged the freezing orders made against the first defendant at that time was because the first defendant is a bankrupt and his affairs are under the control of his trustee in bankruptcy. Further, at that time the plaintiff did not have leave to proceed against the first defendant.

As indicated in Aslan v Pucci No 1, although I discharged the orders as against the first defendant, I made orders continuing the freezing orders against the second, third, seventh and sixteenth defendants. Other than the seventh defendant, the other defendants are what is described in the various judgments in this matter as the Pucci defendants.

The nature of the claim pursued by the plaintiff is set out in Aslan v Pucci No 1. The plaintiff pursues all of the defendants in the tort of conspiracy. She alleges that she was duped, scammed or deceived into lending money to the first defendant while she was in a romantic relationship with him. He then promptly took the money and has not repaid it whilst at the same time immediately terminating his relationship with her. The plaintiff alleges that all of the Pucci defendants were involved in this scamming of her and she sues all of them in conspiracy.

This is the seventh judgment that I have delivered in the proceedings. There are earlier judgments by Rothman J and Wright J. The constant theme pursued by the plaintiff is that the Pucci defendants are moving their money and assets around so as to potentially defeat any judgment she might obtain. She has already established that there have been share transfers in the sixteenth defendant from one defendant to another and that the first defendant entered bankruptcy and that the second defendant has previously been bankrupt.

Subsequent to obtaining leave from the Federal Court to proceed against the first defendant, the plaintiff gave notice to the first defendant and indeed all of the Pucci defendants that she would be making an application to reinstate the original freezing orders. At the same time, she pursued an application against the second and third defendants as to non-compliance with the original freezing orders made (see Aslan v Pucci (No 6) ]2026] NSWSC 357).

For various reasons, although she gave notice to the Pucci defendants that she wished to reinstate the freezing orders made against the first defendant, that application was not determined prior to this time.

On 30 March 2026, the plaintiff contacted my chambers seeking to pursue an ex parte application in respect of freezing orders as against the first defendant. She provided my chambers with a notice of motion. I thus listed the matter for hearing today. There is no appearance by the other defendants as the plaintiff is pursuing this application ex parte. I granted leave to the plaintiff to file a motion in court on her undertaking to pay the filing fee. In support of her application she relies on two affidavits, being her affidavits of 20 March 2026 and 30 March 2026, respectively.

I outlined the principles which apply in determining whether freezing orders should be made in Aslan v Pucci No 1 at [54]-[59]. As is well known, I am required to be satisfied of two matters. Firstly, that the plaintiff has a prima facie case or a good arguable case; and secondly, that there is a risk that assets of the defendant might dissipate. I have already dealt with the issue of whether the plaintiff has a prima facie or good arguable case (see Aslan v Pucci No 1).

The orders sought by the plaintiff in her motion are sought pursuant to r 25.11 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW). That is, the plaintiff seeks a general restraining order as well as specific orders in respect of motor vehicles, including a Tesla Model 3 motor vehicle registered in the name of the first defendant (“the Tesla motor vehicle”). She also seeks the same type of orders that have been made against the other defendants limiting the amount which can be spent by the first defendant. Further she seeks an order that the sixth defendant be restrained from disposing or transferring any interest in a property at 81 Gerald Road, Illawong.

Having regard to the evidence relied upon by the plaintiff I am satisfied that orders 1, 2 and 3 should be made ex parte. Order 1 is what might be described as a general restraining order, restraining the first defendant from disposing of any assets. Order 2 relates generally to any motor vehicles and specifically the Tesla motor vehicle.

I am satisfied that the orders should be made ex parte as having regard to all of my earlier judgments and all of the matters relied upon thus far in these ongoing proceedings there is a risk that the first defendant might dispose of any motor vehicles, including the Tesla, if he was made aware of the application in advance.

However, I am not satisfied that the other orders sought by the plaintiff should be made ex parte. Those other orders relate to the ongoing financial management of the first defendant in terms of the amount he can spend per week and the requirement that he provide bank statements and other financial documents every eight weeks. Further, orders 8 and 9 relate to a company which appears, according to the plaintiff, to be under the control of the sixth defendant.

In the circumstances, I make the following orders: