Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales v Emmanual Majak (aka Emmanuel Deng)

1. [1]

   The contemnor, Emmanual Majak, is to be punished for four charges of contempt arising out of his refusal to attend court to give evidence and his refusal to take an oath or affirmation when called to give evidence in a murder trial before Hamill J.

2. [2]

   By summons filed on 29 May 2025, the Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (“the Prothonotary”) charged Mr Majak with four counts of contempt of this Court. The four charges allege that he is guilty of the following four separate contempts of this Court.

   1. (1)

      On 1 July 2024, the contemnor wilfully refused to attend court to give evidence at a pre-trial hearing in the proceedings (“the pre-trial hearing”);

   2. (2)

      On 2 July 2024, the contemnor wilfully refused to take an oath or affirmation when called to give evidence at the pre-trial hearing;

   3. (3)

      On 19 August 2024, the contemnor wilfully refused to attend court to give evidence in the joint trial of Mr Diallo, Mr Karise, AD and AG (“the joint trial”); and

   4. (4)

      On 22 August 2024, the contemnor wilfully refused to attend court to give evidence in the joint trial.

3. [3]

   The Prothonotary seeks declarations that the contemnor is guilty of these four contempt charges, an order that the contemnor be punished or otherwise dealt with for such contempts, and any such order as the Court considers fit.

4. [4]

   These contempt proceedings were first listed for directions on 25 June 2025. On that date, the contemnor’s solicitor placed on the record that there was an indicative plea of guilty to the charges. An adjournment was sought on the basis that the solicitor had only recently received instructions and wished to have a further conference with the contemnor. When the matter was next listed on 30 July 2025, the parties handed up Short Minutes of Order in which it was noted that the contemnor would be entering pleas of guilty to the four charges in the Statement of Charge contained in the summons.

Proceedings on penalty

1. [5]

   At the hearing on penalty, Dr David Kell SC appeared with Ms Jillian Caldwell for the Prothonotary and Mr Geoff Harrison appeared for the contemnor. The evidence relied upon by the Prothonotary included signed Agreed Facts, the decision of Hamill J in R v Diallo & Ors (No 11); Re referral of witness Deng aka Majak for contempt [2024] NSWSC 1086 (“R v Diallo & Ors (No 11)”) (the contempt judgment), the sentencing remarks of Hamill J for the five co-offenders (R v Diallo & Ors (No 17) (Sentence) [2024] NSWSC 1650), the contemnor’s criminal history, an inmate profile document and supplementary information regarding the status of the contemnor’s outstanding charges.

2. [6]

   The contemnor relied on the psychiatric report of Dr Olav Nielssen dated 18 December 2025.

3. [7]

   Both parties provided helpful written submissions. There was significant agreement between the Prothonotary and Mr Majak as to the relevant principles and their application to the objective and subjective factors of this case.

Background and circumstances of the contempts

1. [8]

   The factual background and circumstances of the contempts are set out in the Agreed Facts filed on 21 September 2025. The following summary is based on these Agreed Facts.

2. [9]

   On 1 September 2021, there was a violent melee between two groups of young men. One man was killed and two others were seriously injured. Mr Diallo, Mr Karise, AD and AG were subsequently charged with several offences, including an offence of murder and two offences of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm contrary to ss 18(1)(b) and 27 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). YA was charged with manslaughter and two offences of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm contrary to ss 18(1)(b) and 27 of the Crimes Act. The names of AD, AG and YA are subject to non-publication orders made by Hamill J.

3. [10]

   The criminal proceedings against those five accused were listed for a pre-trial hearing before Hamill J in this Court from 1 July 2024 to 30 July 2024 at the Sydney West Trial Courts (“SWTC”) in Parramatta. On 10 April, a subpoena was issued at the request of the Crown to the contemnor to attend to give evidence in the proceedings. The subpoena was served on the contemnor on 6 June 2024.

4. [11]

   I note that the contemnor also goes by the name Emmanuel Deng and is referred to as such in the transcript of the proceedings before Hamill J from time to time.

5. [12]

   On 19 June 2024, Hamill J made an order pursuant to s 77 of the Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Act 1999 (NSW) (“CAS Act”) directing the Commissioner of Corrective Services to have the contemnor, who was in custody at the Metropolitan Remand and Reception Centre (“MRRC”) at Silverwater, attend the Supreme Court at Parramatta on 1 July 2024 for the purpose of the proceedings.

6. [13]

   On 1 July 2024, the proceedings were listed for the pre-trial hearing at the SWTC. The contemnor was brought from the MRRC to the cells in the basement of the SWTC.

7. [14]

   The proceedings commenced at approximately 10:20am. Hamill J inquired whether there were “witnesses for the Basha today”. The Crown Prosecutor indicated that there should have been three witnesses giving evidence, but there was only one witness, the contemnor, who was at the SWTC.

8. [15]

   Following discussions between Hamill J and counsel about logistical matters, including the fact that threats had been made by an unidentified witness against the accused in the proceedings, his Honour had the following exchange with a Corrective Services officer:

9. [16]

   His Honour said he would adjourn the proceedings until the contemnor was in the witness box and the accused were in the courtroom.

10. [17]

    Correctional officers visited the contemnor in the cells. They informed him that he was required to go up to court to give evidence. He refused to go up to court, saying words to the effect of “I am not going” and “No. I am not going up”.

11. [18]

    When the proceedings recommenced, Hamill J asked the Crown Prosecutor what was happening with the contemnor. The Crown Prosecutor responded:

12. [19]

    His Honour subsequently requested a solicitor, Mr Fung, who had advised the contemnor on the privilege against self-incrimination and who was in court, to come forward. Hamill J and Mr Fung then had the following exchange:

13. [20]

    His Honour requested Mr Fung to ascertain whether the contemnor was prepared to give evidence by audio visual link (“AVL”) the next day or the following day.

14. [21]

    Mr Fung left the courtroom. When Mr Fung returned later that same day, he advised his Honour that, “Mr Deng does not wish to give evidence via AVL either”.

15. [22]

    On 2 July 2024, Hamill J made an order pursuant to s 77 of the CAS Act directing the Commissioner of Corrective Services to have the contemnor attend the court via AVL on that date for the purpose of giving evidence as a witness in the proceedings.

16. [23]

    Later that morning, the contemnor attended, or was taken to, the AVL suite at the MRRC. The AVL commenced at approximately 10:41am. The following exchange then occurred between his Honour, the contemnor, the Crown Prosecutor and the court officer:

17. [24]

    The contemnor walked out of the AVL suite almost immediately upon being told that the court officer was about to administer an oath or affirmation. The AVL concluded at approximately 10:44am.

18. [25]

    On 29 July 2024, Hamill J directed that YA be tried separately from his four co-offenders. On 30 July 2024, a jury was empanelled in the joint trial of Mr Diallo, Mr Karise, AD and AG, which was listed for hearing from 31 July 2024 to 23 September 2024.

19. [26]

    On 14 August 2024, Hamill J made an order pursuant to s 77 of the CAS Act directing the Commissioner of Corrective Services to have the contemnor attend the Supreme Court at Parramatta on 16 August 2024 for the purpose of giving evidence as a witness in the joint trial. The contemnor was ultimately not required to give evidence until 19 August 2024.

20. [27]

    On 19 August 2024, the contemnor was brought from the MRRC to the cells in the basement of the SWTC.

21. [28]

    The proceedings commenced at 10:05am. After the Crown Prosecutor indicated that it was his preference to call the contemnor first, Hamill J asked correctional officers to discuss what action to take if there were “issues getting this witness up”. His Honour adjourned the proceedings for a short period.

22. [29]

    Correctional officers, including Thomas Steinfelder and Anshal Dewan, visited the contemnor in the cells. Mr Steinfelder advised him that he was required to go up to court to give evidence, but the contemnor refused to do so. When Mr Steinfelder asked the contemnor why he did not want to go up to court, the contemnor said words to the effect of “I don’t want to testify. I don’t want to say anything”. Mr Steinfelder informed the contemnor that he could be charged with contempt if he did not testify. The contemnor then said words to the effect of, “No. I am not doing it. I don’t care. I’ll just get a slap on the wrist”.

23. [30]

    Hamill J was advised that the contemnor was refusing to come up to court to give evidence, following which his Honour requested that the correctional officers in charge see him in chambers. Mr Steinfelder and Mr Dewan attended on Hamill J in chambers and advised his Honour that the contemnor did not want to go to court or to give evidence. His Honour asked the officers to pass on a direction to the contemnor to come to court and to give evidence.

24. [31]

    Mr Steinfelder again went to see the contemnor in the holding cells and informed him of Hamill J’s direction that he go to court to give evidence. The contemnor said words to the effect of, “No. I’m not going”.

25. [32]

    When the proceedings resumed, the following exchange occurred between his Honour and Mr Steinfelder in the absence of the jury:

26. [33]

    Hamill J asked his associate to contact Mr Fung, and another solicitor who was acting for the contemnor in different proceedings, to indicate that the contemnor needed legal advice concerning contempt proceedings. Mr Fung attended court later that day. The following exchange then occurred between his Honour and Mr Fung:

27. [34]

    Mr Fung left the courtroom. When he returned, the following exchange occurred between his Honour and Mr Fung:

28. [35]

    On 21 August 2024, Hamill J made an order pursuant to s 77 of the CAS Act directing the Commissioner of Corrective Services to have the contemnor attend the Supreme Court at Parramatta on 22 August 2024 for the purpose of giving evidence in the joint trial.

29. [36]

    On 22 August 2024, the contemnor was again brought from the MRRC to the cells in the basement of the SWTС.

30. [37]

    The proceedings commenced at 10:04am. Before the morning break, in the absence of the jury, Hamill J asked the court officer to check with the cells to see whether the contemnor was prepared to come up to court.

31. [38]

    The court officer called Corrective Services and asked whether the contemnor was in the holding cells and, if so, whether he was willing to come up to court. A correctional officer went to see the contemnor in the holding cells and advised him that he was required to go to court. The contemnor said he was not willing to go up to court.

32. [39]

    At 11:20am, the court officer sent an email to Hamill J’s associate, stating “correctives have confirmed that Mr Majak is refusing to come up to court when called”.

33. [40]

    When the proceedings resumed, the following exchange occurred between his Honour and the Crown Prosecutor:

34. [41]

    On 18 September 2024, Hamill J directed, pursuant to Pt 55, r 11(1) of the Supreme Court Rules 1970 (NSW), that the Prothonotary commence proceedings for contempt of court against the contemnor: R v Diallo & Ors (No 11).

35. [42]

    On 23 September 2024, the jury in the joint trial returned verdicts of not guilty for the offence of murder and one offence of attempted murder, but verdicts of guilty for the offence of manslaughter, one offence of attempted murder and one offence of wounding with intent to inflict grievous bodily harm with respect to Mr Diallo, Mr Karise, AD and AG.

36. [43]

    On 1 November 2024, YA was arraigned on an indictment containing one count of manslaughter and two counts of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm contrary to ss 18(1)(b) and 27 of the Crimes Act. He entered pleas of guilty to those offences.

37. [44]

    On 20 December 2024, Hamill J sentenced each of the five offenders to various terms of imprisonment: R v Diallo & Ors (No 17).

38. [45]

    YA has appealed against his sentence, which is listed for hearing before the Court of Criminal Appeal on 16 February 2026. Mr Diallo, Mr Karise and AD have filed notices of intention to appeal against their convictions and sentences. As of the date of this judgment, no notice of appeal has been filed on behalf of these three offenders.

Relevant principles

1. [46]

   The power of the Supreme Court to impose a penalty for contempt derives from its inherent jurisdiction to safeguard the administration of justice and uphold the rule of law. In addition, Pt 55, r 13 of the Supreme Court Rules provides as follows:

2. [47]

   An offence of contempt is a common law offence. This means that the maximum penalty is at large. The Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) (“Sentencing Act”) does not apply to contempt matters: Dowling v Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (2018) 99 NSWLR 229; [2018] NSWCA 340 (“Dowling”) at [49] per Basten JA (Meagher JA agreeing). Although the statutory considerations contained in provisions such as ss 3A, 5(1) and s 21A of the Sentencing Act do not apply when a punishment is imposed for contempt, those factors generally reflect common law principles, which remain applicable. The forms of punishment that may be imposed are those specified in Pt 55, r 13 of the Supreme Court Rules.

3. [48]

   The key principles applied by the court in imposing a penalty for contempt of court are derived from the decision in Registrar of the Court of Appeal v Maniam [No 2] (1992) 26 NSWLR 309 in which Kirby P observed the following at 314–316:

Objective seriousness

1. [49]

   In order to establish a contempt in the face of the court, it must be established beyond reasonable doubt that the contemnor did an act which had the tendency to interfere with or undermine the authority, performance or dignity of the courts or those who participate in their proceedings: Witham v Holloway (1995) 183 CLR 525 at 538–539; [1995] HCA 3 (McHugh J). By his pleas of guilty the contemnor accepted that his conduct comprising each charge represented a contempt of court, occurring as it did on four occasions at both the pre-trial hearing and the joint trial.

2. [50]

   A wilful refusal to give evidence is regarded as a serious contempt that is apt to undermine the rule of law and interfere with the administration of justice. As Kirby P observed in Registrar of the Court of Appeal v Raad (unreported, NSW Court of Appeal, NSW, No 40585 of 1991, 9 June 1992) at 14:

3. [51]

   It was common ground that I would assess the objective seriousness of the four contempts having regard to the matters enumerated by Dunford J in Wood v Staunton (No 5) (1996) 86 A Crim R 183 at 185 (“Wood v Staunton (No 5)”). That case involved a contemnor who refused to give evidence at the Royal Commission into the NSW Police Service. Dunford J identified ten matters usually taken into account in assessing the proper punishment for contempt as follows:

   1. (1)

      The seriousness of the contempt proved;

   2. (2)

      Whether the contemnor was aware of the consequences to himself or herself of what he or she did;

   3. (3)

      The actual consequences of the contempt on the relevant trial or inquiry;

   4. (4)

      Whether the contempt was committed in the context of serious crime;

   5. (5)

      The reason for the contempt;

   6. (6)

      Whether the contemnor has received any benefit by indicating an intention to give evidence;

   7. (7)

      Whether there has been any apology or public expression of contrition;

   8. (8)

      The character and antecedents of the contemnor;

   9. (9)

      General and personal deterrence; and

   10. (10)

       The need for denunciation of the contempt.

4. [52]

   It seems to me that of these factors the first six are relevant to the assessment of the objective seriousness of the contempts and the remaining four are relevant to the contemnor’s subjective case and general sentencing principles. I will address factors (6)-(10) when considering the contemnor’s subjective case below.

5. [53]

   It was common ground that the contemnor was aware that he may be charged with contempt of court. This was made clear by his exchange with Hamill J and the exchanges between his Honour and Mr Fung I have extracted above. Dr Nielssen also opined in his report that the contemnor “would probably have had the capacity to understand the warning that he might face a further charge if he did not assist”.

6. [54]

   Although there is some ambiguity in the comment by the contemnor that he would “just get a slap on the wrist” (see above at [29]), I accept Dr Kell’s submission that in the context of the exchanges with Mr Feng it was inconceivable that the contemnor would have received advice that he would receive only a “slap on the wrist” for refusing to give evidence in a murder trial. Mr Harrison did not contend otherwise.

7. [55]

   It was accepted by the contemnor that his conduct deprived the Court and the jury of the opportunity to hear the contemnor’s evidence about the melee during which the offences were committed.

8. [56]

   As for the potential significance of the contemnor’s evidence, it remains unknown. It can be put no higher than as described by Hamill J in the contempt judgment (at [4]). After noting that it was anticipated that the contemnor, along with four other potential witnesses, would give evidence on a Basha inquiry his Honour then observed the following:

9. [57]

   I am prepared to infer that the contemnor could have given relevant evidence at the trial and that his actions frustrated the administration of justice. But I am unable to find that the contemnor’s conduct directly affected the outcome of the proceedings given that it cannot be determined what evidence he could have given.

10. [58]

    The contempt occurred in the context of a joint trial for murder, which has a maximum penalty of life imprisonment, attempted murder, which has a maximum penalty of 25 years’ imprisonment, and wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, which also has a maximum penalty of 25 years’ imprisonment.

11. [59]

    The contemnor did not give evidence at his contempt proceedings nor provide any statement or affidavit. In Dr Nielssen’s report, he denied that he was afraid of any of the accused or obliged to them in any way. His only explanation for refusing to give evidence was that he “... just didn’t want to”. There was no evidence before the Court of any subjective fear expressed by him.

12. [60]

    On behalf of the contemnor, it was accepted that there was no rational explanation for the contempts other than perhaps “misguided loyalties”.

13. [61]

    The contemnor had not received a benefit for indicating an intention to give evidence in the proceedings.

14. [62]

    I have considered these six factors in Wood v Staunton (No 5) relevant to the assessment of objective seriousness. The contemnor refused to give evidence at a murder trial, the most serious of criminal offences carrying life imprisonment. He has not been able to provide an adequate explanation for his conduct and he was well aware of the consequences of his actions. On the other hand, this is not a case where the trial could not proceed because of the absence of the contemnor’s evidence, and I am unable to make a finding as to the actual consequences of his conduct.

15. [63]

    I am satisfied that each of the four contempts of court are reasonably serious examples of contempt based on a witness’s refusal to be sworn or attend court or give evidence. I have considered the four contempts separately and I am not satisfied that any of them could be assessed as being more or less serious than any of the others .

Subjective matters

1. [64]

   Mr Majak’s subjective case was set out in Dr Nielsen’s report. Mr Majak is 23 years old. He was born in Egypt. His parents are of Dinka heritage from South Sudan. His family moved to North Sudan and Egypt as refugees. They resided in Egypt for several years before being accepted as refugees to Australia. The contemnor was two years old when he arrived in Australia.

2. [65]

   Mr Majak is the second oldest of seven children. His father was a farmer and a Christian Pastor, and his mother once had a cleaning business but ceased that work to look after her children. No other members of Mr Majak’s family have been in “any kind of trouble”. He receives visits from his parents in prison.

3. [66]

   Mr Majak attended Catholic schools in the Western suburbs where his family reside. He did not report any conduct problems, nor any problems with literacy or numeracy. He completed studies to Year 12 in a Juvenile Justice Centre. Upon leaving school, he has worked in construction and as a bricklayer’s labourer but was unemployed when he last entered custody.

4. [67]

   Whilst playing basketball he suffered an ankle injury for which he required an operation. This involved the insertion of a metal plate and twelve screws. He otherwise has had no health problems.

5. [68]

   Mr Majak did not report any contact with mental health services as a teenager, although he saw counsellors while in juvenile detention. He reported seeing a psychologist “every month or so” in custody which he described as “mainly to catch up”. He denied ever becoming depressed or paranoid and did not believe that he had a mental condition. He has never attempted or contemplated suicide. He also denied ever experiencing any symptoms of any psychotic illness.

6. [69]

   Mr Majak described his alcohol use as a problem in the past as he would drink to intoxication and have amnesia and disturbed behaviour. He does not propose to resume drinking upon his release.

7. [70]

   He started smoking cannabis as a teenager and described it as “an issue” in the past. He had used MDMA occasionally but denied using methamphetamine because he has seen “what it does to people”. Mr Majak reported that prior to his arrest his only substance abuse was “...just pot every now and again”.

8. [71]

   Regrettably, he became addicted to opioid pain relief medication after breaking his ankle. Mr Majak reported that the only medication he is currently on is buprenorphine (Bividal) which is an opioid replacement. He takes a relatively high dose of 128mg per month by long acting injection.

9. [72]

   It was common ground that it would be open to apply a discount of 25% to the otherwise appropriate sentence to take into account the utilitarian value of the contemnor’s early pleas of guilty: R v Thomson and Houlten [2000] 49 NSWLR; 383 NSWCCA 309.

10. [73]

    There was no evidence of any apology or contrition before the Court other than the pleas of guilty. It is to be observed that the contemnor made statements to Hamill J including, “[c]harge me with contempt. I’m not going to help you with anything” and “just charge me”.

11. [74]

    Mr Majak is 23 years old with a range of convictions for offences unrelated to the present matter, including convictions for an offence of assaulting a police officer in the execution of duty contrary to s 60(1) of the Crimes Act; an offence of hindering or resisting police in the execution of duty contrary to s 60(1AA);offences of participating in a criminal group contrary to s 93T; offences of being carried in a conveyance taken without the consent of the owner contrary to s 154A(1)(b); offences of shoplifting contrary to s 117; and an offence of dealing with property suspected of being the proceeds of crime contrary to s 193C(2).

12. [75]

    The contemnor accepted that his antecedents are such that they do not entitle him to leniency.

13. [76]

    It is well established that there is a need not only for denunciation in the sentence imposed, but also a need for the sentencing principle of general deterrence. As Johnson J observed in R v Bilal Razzak [2006] NSWSC 1366 at [78]:

14. [77]

    There is authority for the proposition that personal deterrence may be of minimal importance in punishing for contempt as it is unlikely a contemnor would be called as a witness again: Trad v Pickles Auction Pty Ltd; In the matter of Carl Trad [2006] NSWSC 1177 at [19] per Hamilton J. Despite this, it was accepted on behalf of the contemnor that there is a possibility that he may be a Crown witness in the future, especially in light of the potential appeals of Mr Diallo, Mr Karise and AD, which may lead to a retrial if successful. A further relevant factor in this regard is that the contemnor has a relatively lengthy criminal history for a man who is still only 23 years old.

15. [78]

    I am satisfied that the principle of specific deterrence still has relevance to the sentence to be imposed.

Comparable cases

1. [79]

   The Prothonotary attached a schedule summarising the penalties imposed in 34 other cases in which a contemnor refused to give evidence. Those sentences cover the date range from 1991 until 2024. A similar table was put before the Court in The Prothonotary v Patrick [2023] NSWSC 1077. As I observed in that matter at [56]-[58], having considered that schedule, I am satisfied that they all differ in a number of ways and no two cases can ever be seen as truly comparable.

2. [80]

   Having regard to the sentences imposed since 2000, with the exception of three cases (Ireland AJ v Russell [2001] NSWSC 468, Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of NSW v Jalalabaddi [2008] NSWSC 811 and Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of NSW v Ceren [2016] NSWSC 1187), a sentence of imprisonment has been imposed in every case; although in some cases the sentence was suspended.

3. [81]

   The length of the sentences imposed varies from 21 days imprisonment to 4 years and 6 months imprisonment. In Principal Registrar of Supreme Court of NSW v Tran (2006) 166 A Crim R 393; [2006] NSWSC 1183, a case involving the refusal to give evidence in a criminal trial, Buddin J observed at [37] that “it would only be in an exceptional case that a custodial sentence would not be imposed for an offence of this kind”.

4. [82]

   A complicating factor in this sentencing exercise is the fact that Mr Majak has not spent any time in custody referable to the contempt charges.

5. [83]

   On 7 December 2023, he was charged with a number of serious offences, including wound with intent to murder, and refused bail. His trial, along with other co-offenders, proceeded in November 2025 in the District Court and resulted in a hung jury. The retrial is listed to commence on 24 August 2026.

6. [84]

   Mr Majak had entered custody on 10 November 2023. He served short sentences from that date (backdated) until 9 June 2025. Since that date, he has been in custody solely on remand for his outstanding charges. He has not at any time been held on remand in relation to the contempt charges. This is a factor relevant to the commencement date of the sentence I impose.

7. [85]

   It was common ground at the hearing that any sentence imposed should commence from the date of sentence.

Conclusion

1. [86]

   The contemnor comes before the Court as a young man with a criminal history, who provided no explanation for his contumelious behaviour. There was nothing put before the Court capable of reducing his moral culpability for the offending. He did not rely on the principles derived from Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 571; [2013] HCA 37. Nor did he rely on any mental health issues: Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v De La Rosa (2010) 243 FLR 28; [2010] NSWCCA 194 at [177]. It was Dr Nielssen’s conclusion that the contemnor has “a fairly unpromising record and his prognosis would have to be described as guarded”.

2. [87]

   I have had regard to the factors enumerated in Wood v Staunton (No 5) as well as the other relevant sentencing principles to which I have referred. As with any sentencing exercise, I have identified and considered all factors relevant to the sentence and, ultimately, made a value judgment as to what is the appropriate sentence given all the factors in the case: Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357; [2005] HCA 25 at [51] per McHugh J; confirmed by the Court in Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120; [2011] HCA 39 at [26].

3. [88]

   It was not submitted by either party that any punishment by committal to a correctional centre should be suspended: Supreme Court Rules Pt 55, r 13(3). As a matter of practical reality, a fully non-custodial option is unavailable in any event, even putting to one side the seriousness of the offending, given that the contemnor will remain in custody until at least August 2026.

4. [89]

   As there are four contempts, the totality principle is to be applied in fixing the sentence in this matter. I am required to arrive at a sentence for each contempt, fix a total sentence and then review it to determine whether it is “just and appropriate”: Mill v The Queen (1988) 166 CLR 59 at 63; [1998] HCA 70. Although there were four separate charges, I am satisfied they were all part of the same course of conduct and there will be a considerable degree of notional concurrence.

5. [90]

   The question arises as to whether a separate period of commitment should be specified for each charge. In Dowling v Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (2018) 99 NSWLR 229; [2018] NSWCA 340, the Court of Appeal fixed one sentence for all of the contempts. Despite this, it did not appear to proscribe such a course. In Council of the New South Wales Bar Association v Rollinson [2022] NSWSC 407, Beech-Jones CJ at CL (as his Honour then was) observed at [94] that “in order to enhance transparency” his Honour would impose one sentence but indicate the individual periods considered appropriate for each contempt.

6. [91]

   I propose to adopt the course favoured by Beech-Jones CJ at CL (as his Honour then was). After applying a discount of 25% in relation to each of the four charges for the early pleas of guilty, I would propose punishment of commitment for 10 months comprised of a sentence of 4 and a half months for each of the four charges. I am satisfied that the total period of custody reflects the overall culpability of the contemnor’s conduct: Cahyadi v R (2007) 168 A Crim R 41; [2007] NSWCCA 1 at [27].

7. [92]

   Unlike many offenders who receive a sentence of full time custody for contempts of this nature, I have not been able to impose the sentence to be served partially concurrently with the sentence he is already serving despite the fact that he is presently in custody. As stated above, this is because he was not bail refused on these contempt charges. Should the contemnor be acquitted of his pending charges, he will be released at the expiration of this contempt sentence without any period on parole. Should he be convicted, it will be a matter for the sentencing judge in the District Court the extent to which that sentence is served concurrently with this contempt sentence.

8. [93]

   Although the Prothonotary sought an order for costs, I do not propose to make such an order given that the contemnor has received a custodial term.

Orders

1. [94]

   Accordingly, the Court makes the following orders:

   1. (1)

      The Court declares that Emmanual Majak is guilty of contempt of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in that, on 1 July 2024, he wilfully refused to attend court to give evidence at a pre-trial hearing in the proceedings (“the pre-trial hearing”).

   2. (2)

      The Court declares that Emmanual Majak is guilty of contempt of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in that, on 2 July 2024, he wilfully refused to take an oath or affirmation when called to give evidence at the pre-trial hearing.

   3. (3)

      The Court declares that Emmanual Majak is guilty of contempt of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in that, on 19 August 2024, he wilfully refused to attend court to give evidence in the joint trial of Mr Diallo, Mr Karise, AD and AG (“the joint trial”).

   4. (4)

      The Court declares that Emmanual Majak is guilty of contempt of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in that, on 22 August 2024, he wilfully refused to attend court to give evidence in the joint trial.

   5. (5)

      For these four contempts of the Court, the Court orders that Emmanual Majak be committed to a Correctional Centre and detained for a period of 10 months commencing on 11 February 2026 and expiring on 10 December 2026.