State of New South Wales v BG (Preliminary)

1. [1]

   By summons filed 7 August 2025 the plaintiff, the State of New South Wales, sought interim and interlocutory relief pursuant to s 7(4) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) (the “CHRO Act”) for the appointment of two qualified psychiatrists and/or registered psychologists (or any combination of two such persons) to conduct separate psychiatric and/or psychological examinations of the defendant and to furnish reports to the Supreme Court on the results of those examinations and directing the defendant to attend those examinations. Orders were also sought pursuant to s 10A of the CHRO Act that the defendant be subject to an interim supervision order (“ISO”) from 9 November 2025, pursuant to s 10C(1) of the CHRO Act that the ISO be for a period of 28 days and pursuant to s 11 of the CHRO Act directing that the defendant, for the period of the ISO, comply with certain conditions.

2. [2]

   The defendant, for the purposes of the preliminary hearing only, took no issue with the making of the orders sought, but made submissions on various of the conditions of supervision sought by the plaintiff.

3. [3]

   On 24 October 2025 I made orders in the following terms:

   1. (1)

      Order pursuant to s 7(4) of the CHRO Act:

   2. (2)

      Order pursuant to s 10A of the CHRO Act that the defendant be subject to an interim supervision order from 9 November 2025:

4. [4]

   What follows are my reasons for making those orders.

Background

1. [5]

   The defendant, who is referred to in these proceedings as “BG”, is a 64 year old man. He is currently subject to a three year extended supervision order (“ESO”) made by her Honour Justice McNaughton on 10 November 2022 which expired on 10 November 2025.

2. [6]

   The defendant has a history of serious sexual offending between 1998 and 2004 committed against female children aged between 9 and 15 years of age. His most recent conviction in 2013 relates to historical offences committed in 1998 and 1999. The defendant has consistently denied the sexual offending. Additionally, he has a criminal history which predates the index offending, consisting of convictions for car theft, driving offences and prescribed concentration of alcohol offences.

3. [7]

   He has no history of serious mental disorders, but diagnoses have previously been opined of paraphilic disorder (paedophilia), personality disorder (paranoid and narcissistic traits) and alcohol use disorder.

4. [8]

   The defendant has reported suffering from learning difficulties attributed to undiagnosed attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. Although he completed year 12, he performed poorly on the higher school certificate. His history of employment is varied, showing that his longest period of employ was as a security guard for a period of about 8 years.

The index offences

1. [9]

   The offending relevant to the application comprises three separate series of sexual offending committed on female children. Each group of offences relates to different female victims who were children at the time the offences were committed. As was conceded by the defendant each of the index offences is a “serious sexual offence” for the purposes of s 5(1)(a)(i) of the CHRO Act.

2. [10]

   On 3 September 2002 the defendant was found guilty, following a trial by jury, of one count of aggravated indecent assault contrary to s 61M(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), the circumstances of aggravation being that the victim was under the age of 16 years. The victim of that offence was the defendant’s daughter, who was 15 years old at the time.

3. [11]

   The offence occurred on an evening in November 2001 after the defendant returned home intoxicated. The defendant got into his daughter’s bed and touched her on the upper thigh under her skirt, stomach and breasts. The conduct ceased after the victim called out to her boyfriend and he entered the room.

4. [12]

   On 25 September 2002 the defendant was sentenced by Shillington DCJ to a term of 12 months imprisonment which was suspended on entering into a good behaviour bond.

5. [13]

   Following a jury trial the defendant was convicted in November 2005 of an offence of sexual intercourse with a child under the age of 10 years contrary to s 66A of the Crimes Act.

6. [14]

   The victim, who was 9 years old at the time of the conduct, lived with her family in a townhouse neighbouring the defendant’s residence. In February 2004, the defendant approached the victim’s father, engaged him in conversation and accompanied him and his children on trips to the shops, including to buy alcohol. On one of those occasions the defendant and the victim’s father remained in one another’s company during the evening whilst alcohol was being consumed. During the evening the defendant assisted the victim’s father in opening the window in the victim’s bedroom. In the early hours of the next morning the victim woke to find the defendant sitting on her bed, with his hand in her underwear and digitally penetrating her vagina. The victim reported the incident to her father the following day.

7. [15]

   On 24 November 2005 the defendant was sentenced by Boulton ADCJ to a term of 5 years and 4 months imprisonment with a non-parole period of 4 years.

8. [16]

   In November 2013, following a trial by jury, the defendant was convicted of one count of aggravated indecent assault of a person under the age of 16 years contrary to s 61M(1) of the Crimes Act and three counts of aggravated sexual assault of a person under the age of 16 years contrary to s 61J of the Crimes Act.

9. [17]

   Those offences related to a 10 to 11 year old female victim who was a friend of the defendant’s daughter and would on occasion stay at the defendant’s house for sleepovers with the defendant’s daughter. The offending, which occurred during 1998 and 1999, involved the defendant climbing into bed with the victim, touching her vagina and breasts, and engaging in digital-vaginal penetration, forced cunnilingus, and penile-vaginal penetration.

10. [18]

    On 11 November 2013 the defendant was sentenced by Norrish QC DCJ to an aggregate term of 9 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 6 years and 9 months.

Statutory framework

1. [19]

   The plaintiff’s application for an ESO is brought pursuant to ss 5B and 9(1)(a) of the CHRO Act.

2. [20]

   All of the statutory conditions for the plaintiff to make an application for an ESO in ss 54A, 5I and the pre-trial procedures set out in s 7(1) – (2) have been complied with.

3. [21]

   In accordance with s 10A(b) the Court must be satisfied that the matters alleged in the supporting documentation would, if proved, justify the making of an ESO. Accordingly, although this was a preliminary hearing, it is necessary to evaluate whether the supporting material was sufficient to justify the making of an ESO, pursuant to the relevant statutory test.

4. [22]

   Section 5B provides for the making of an ESO:

5. [23]

   The power to make an ESO pursuant to s 5B is discretionary. In that regard, the Court is guided by the objects of the CHRO Act, and the paramount consideration and matters set out in s 9 to which the Court must have regard in determining whether or not to make an ESO. Accordingly, in determining unacceptable risk the objects of the CHRO Act set out in s 3 and the factor referred to in s 9(2) are relevant considerations.

6. [24]

   Section 3 provides that the primary object of the CHRO Act is to provide for the extended supervision and continuing detention of high risk sex offenders and high risk violent offenders so as to ensure the safety and protection of the community. Another object of the Act is to encourage high risk sex offenders and high risk violent offenders to undertake rehabilitation. In determining whether or not to make such an order the safety of the community must be the paramount consideration as dictated by s 9(2). Section 9 is in the following terms:

7. [25]

   A “serious offence” is defined in s 4 and includes a “serious sex offence” and a “serious violence offence”. A “serious sex offence” is defined in s 5(1) and includes an offence under Division 10 of Part 3 of the Crimes Act where, in the case of an offence against an adult or a child, the offence is punishable by imprisonment for 7 years or more.

8. [26]

   The requirement that the defendant be a “supervised offender” for the purposes of s 5B(b) and 5I(1) of the CHRO Act is met in this case because at the time of this application the defendant was under an existing ESO.

9. [27]

   Section 5D provides that the Court is not required to determine that the risk of an offender committing a serious offence is more likely than not in order to determine that there is an unacceptable risk of the person committing such an offence.

10. [28]

    Section 7(4) provides that if following the preliminary hearing I am satisfied that the matters alleged in the supporting documentation would, if proved, justify the making of an ESO, I must make orders appointing two qualified psychiatrists and/or registered psychologists (or any combination of two such persons) to examine the defendant and furnish reports to the Court, and directing the defendant to attend those examinations.

11. [29]

    Section 10A of the CHRO Act is in the following terms:

Principles derived from case law

1. [30]

   The test in s 5B(d) requires the exercise of a discretionary judgement: Lynn v State of New South Wales (2016) 91 NSWLR 636; [2016] NSWCA 57 (“Lynn”) at [82]. The objects of the CHRO Act must be held in mind when undertaking this evaluative task: Lynn at [55].

2. [31]

   The court must be satisfied that the existence of the unacceptable risk is higher than the civil standard of proof and is “beyond more probably than not”: Cornwall v Attorney General for New South Wales [2007] NSWCA 374 at [21]. An “unacceptable risk” has been held to be one that is not tolerable or far from normal expectations or required standards: Lynn at [50] and [51].

3. [32]

   The right of an offender to their personal liberty after serving a term of imprisonment is not a relevant consideration in this evaluative task: Lynn at [44] and [55] – [58].

4. [33]

   The nature of the risk is to be assessed by reference to past conduct, the seriousness of the possible future conduct and the period over which the risk may come to fruition. The assessment must be based on an absence of protective measures. The criterion of unacceptability has been held to depend upon those matters, together with a comparison of what may be described as the background level of risk to the community: Lynn at [126]. In relation to the provision in s 5D it has been held that the court may legitimately find in some situations that a person poses an unacceptable risk for the purposes of the statutory test even if the likelihood of them committing a further serious sex offence is determined to be low: State of New South Wales v Kamm (Final) [2016] NSWSC 1 at [43]; State of New South Wales v Sleeman (Preliminary) [2018] NSWSC 562 at [13].

5. [34]

   The task involved does not require the weighing up of documentation or the prediction of the ultimate result, but rather is akin to applying a prima facie case test, taking the plaintiff’s case at its highest: State of New South Wales v Manners [2008] NSWSC 1242 at [8]; State of New South Wales v Brookes [2008] NSWSC 150 at [13].

Attitude towards the offences and engagement with treatment and programs

1. [35]

   The defendant has consistently denied committing any of the offences. In relation to the 2001 offence against his daughter he has suggested that his former wife prevailed on his daughter to make false allegations because of some unresolved financial conflict. In relation to the 2004 offence he has stated that he was set up by the victim’s family in order for them to claim victims’ compensation. He has explained that he was in the victim’s bedroom helping to adjust a window and read her a bedtime story at her request. In relation to the 1998 – 1999 sexual offences, being those for which he was most recently convicted, the defendant has continually denied committing those offences. He has been described in the community corrections report of 12 February 2021 as “displaying no insight into the impact of his sexual offending behaviour, continually placing blame on his victims”.

2. [36]

   The defendant has refused to participate in an interview for previous risk assessment reports or for the current risk assessment report dated 28 April 2025. He has refused to discuss the circumstances of the offending and his attitude to the offending with supervising officers during the course of his first ESO. As a consequence, his attitude towards the offending and his level of insight in relation to the impact of his actions on others, including his victims, remains unknown.

3. [37]

   In April 2019 the defendant was referred to the Sex Offender Program, having been found suitable to participate in the “Deniers Program”. The defendant declined the offer to participate, citing concerns about associating with another offender at the Long Bay Correctional Centre. Although the defendant remained eligible and wait-listed to participate in that program, as at March 2022 he had not completed the program or any other custodial treatment programs prior to his release in August 2022.

4. [38]

   In 2021 the defendant was referred for individual risk management intervention by the High Risk Offenders Planning Committee, due to his continued refusal to engage in criminogenic programs. During three sessions with that committee, he displayed a strong sense of victimisation, grievance with authority and suspicion towards psychologists. He declined to participate in any intervention.

5. [39]

   The defendant participated in the EQUIPS Foundation program between July 2019 and September 2019, during which he was described as being generally respectful but it was noted that he did not speak about matters that related to the session content and expressed anti-authoritarian views. The defendant declined to participate in the EQUIPS Addiction program.

6. [40]

   Between January 2021 and March 2021 the defendant participated in the RUSH program, during which he presented himself as being victimised and forced to attend. His participation was noted as often involving catastrophising, citing conspiracies which he said were being used against him.

Risk assessments

1. [41]

   A risk assessment report dated 28 April 2025 prepared by Ms Holly Cieplucha, senior psychologist for Corrective Services, summarised previous assessments and reports. She noted that in an initial risk assessment report in November 2021 the defendant was assessed as having an above average risk relative to other male sex offenders and was assessed as having a high density of criminogenic risk/need. Overall his combined risk of sexual offending was estimated to be in the well above average range.

2. [42]

   In 2022 the defendant was assessed by a consultant forensic clinical psychologist Dr Michael Davis as posing a moderate risk for sexual recidivism and further serious sex offences compared to the average sex offender. In 2022 Dr Andrew Ellis, forensic psychiatrist, said the defendant fell in the below average to average risk category for sexual reoffending. It was noted that the discrepancy between those two experts in 2022 appeared to relate to a difference in interpreting the scores of actuarial risk assessments. During oral evidence the discrepancy was clarified with both experts agreeing with the scoring. It was noted that both Drs Davis and Ellis agreed, despite the defendant’s categorical denial of all sexual offences, that his denial was not a factor that either elevated or reduced his risk factor. Rather, they considered the relevance of his denial as an impediment to him participating in treatment and rehabilitation and reducing any potential benefits from treatment programs.

3. [43]

   Ms Cieplucha concludes in her risk assessment report that the defendant falls in the above average risk range for sexual offending relative to other adult male sex offenders and that he has a moderate density of criminogenic needs which remain untreated and in relation to which he shows a lack of insight into appropriate risk mitigation strategies. She also concludes that, despite the defendant not being charged with any further sexual offences since his release, he remains untreated and demonstrates limited insight in relation to his risk and that it was possible that he could commit a future “serious sexual offence” as defined in the CHRO Act.

The defendant’s compliance with terms of supervision to date

1. [44]

   Whilst he was subject to the conditions imposed in the first ESO the defendant was given a written warning in November 2022 in relation to him accessing several social media websites without prior approval. Further he was given a written warning in March 2023 for breaching his curfew condition on six different occasions between 1 and 5 March 2023.

2. [45]

   On 16 December 2024 the defendant received a written warning for posting a comment on YouTube in response to a comment from a young person in which she stated that she was 13 years old. It should be noted however, although the defendant should not have posted a comment at all once the young person had revealed her age, the comment which he posted in response related to basketball and on its face was benign.

Whether an order for expert assessments and an ISO should be made

1. [46]

   It was conceded by the defendant that the statutory preconditions of the CHRO Act are met. I am satisfied that they are and that the concession was correctly made.

2. [47]

   For the purposes of the preliminary hearing the defendant took no issue with the making of the orders sought, but made submissions on various of the conditions of supervision sought by the plaintiff. The real question for determination is whether the proposed conditions are appropriate in the circumstances.

Matters relevant to the making of an ESO

1. [48]

   The Court must consider the factors set out in s 9(3) in determining whether the matters alleged would, if proved, justify the making of an ESO. I will address important aspects of the evidence by reference to the pertinent factors set out in s 9(3) of the CHRO Act .

2. [49]

   The defendant has been convicted in 2002, 2005 and 2013 of three separate series of serious sexual offences. The detail in relation to the circumstances of offending in the sentences imposed has already been referred to and need not be repeated. In the remarks on sentence by Norrish QC DCJ in November 2013 his Honour commented that although promotion of rehabilitation remained a relevant purpose of sentencing, there was little that could be done to promote the defendant’s rehabilitation given his defiance of the verdicts, history of offending and the fact that he will not address the issues that give rise to the commission of offences of this character.

3. [50]

   In relation to the 2004 offence the sentencing judge stated that he had been left with the impression that the defendant attached himself to the victim’s family, which he described as a “quite dysfunctional household” for motives other than having a conversation with the victim’s father.

4. [51]

   As referred to above the defendant has declined participation in sex offender programs and has had limited engagement with the EQUIPS and RUSH programs. He has generally displayed a sense of victimisation, grievances directed at authority and suspicion of psychologists and psychological programs. The details in relation to programs offered and the limited engagement in those programs by the defendant has already been referred to and need not be repeated.

5. [52]

   Reference has already been made to the risk assessment report of 28 April 2025, the report of Dr Michael Davis dated 23 September 2022 and the report by Dr Andrew Ellis dated 26 September 2022.

6. [53]

   In addition to those reports I take into account the risk assessment report of 30 November 2021 prepared prior to the imposition of the first ESO. In that report the defendant’s most likely risk scenario for further sexual offending is described as involving him exploiting either a well-established relationship or creating an opportunity for access. That report notes the defendant has demonstrated capacity to gain access to potential victims through establishing friendships with others who have children or quickly befriending vulnerable parents. It is noted in the report the defendant is not opportunistic as such and, given his history, appears least likely to offend against a complete stranger. The report also notes that although excessive alcohol consumption is not necessarily a prerequisite or primary contributing factor to sexual offending it was likely to have a disinhibiting effect and increase his risk, particularly when accompanied by access to a potential victim.

7. [54]

   Reference has already been made to formal warnings of breaches of his conditions of supervision for unapproved internet searches and access to social media in November 2022, breaching the hours of his curfew in March 2023 and posting a message to a 13-year-old girl over YouTube in December 2024.

8. [55]

   In addition the material describes that throughout his ESO, which was first ordered on 10 November 2022, his engagement has been described as being “hindered by his ongoing resistance to participate in intervention and his lack of meaningful engagement in the supervision process”. Throughout 2023 the defendant suffered from accommodation instability which resulted in him failing to engage fully in supervision. When he obtained stable accommodation in November 2023 his attitude to the conditions of his supervision showed marginal improvement.

9. [56]

   The risk assessment report of 28 April 2025 notes that defendant has displayed a significant lack of trust towards the ESO team, the police and psychologists from Corrective Services. He is described as being at times argumentative, challenging and hard to redirect and has demonstrated threatening and intimidating behaviour towards supervising officers, has been verbally aggressive and used derogatory language towards staff and has made threats of property damage towards Departmental Supervising Officers (“DSO”s) and the police. In December 2024, when it was observed that he had a hammer positioned near his front door, he stated that it was a “windscreen delete” button and described considering using it to smash a police car if the police came to his home.

10. [57]

    The risk assessment report also notes that the defendant denies any concerns involving his consumption of alcohol. Notwithstanding this, the defendant has returned two positive blood alcohol readings when tested on 25 December 2022. He initially explained that that reading resulted from him having washed his face with methylated spirits and subsequently explained that it resulted from him eating Christmas cake which contained alcohol.

11. [58]

    Although the defendant had previously commenced engagement with community-based psychologists, he has been noted in the recent risk assessment report as ceasing that engagement because of financial constraints. The defendant is also noted as deciding to stop attending appointments once he received notification of a further application by the plaintiff for an ESO and he is noted to have stated that he believed that his psychologist would assist Corrective Services in making his life difficult.

12. [59]

    A risk management report dated 5 May 2025 by a Community Corrections officer from the Extended Supervision Audit Team noted that the defendant has had only limited engagement in programs and that his engagement is usually described as “superficial”. The report also notes that the defendant continued to be resistant to engagement with interventions addressed to his risk factors and was not participating in any programs and that Community Corrections attempts to motivate or encourage him have proved to be fruitless. The risk management report also notes that the defendant remained adamant that he did not require any assistance and did not consider that any of the services being offered to him were beneficial.

13. [60]

    The defendant has been on the Child Protection Register from 12 August 2022. No concerns have been raised concerning his compliance with the obligations pursuant to that register.

14. [61]

    The defendant was subject to parole in 2009. During the four months of supervision whilst on parole no known breaches were reported.

15. [62]

    The risk management report dated 5 May 2025 details a risk management plan for the defendant involving planned accommodation, supervision conditions relating to schedule of movements and electronic monitoring and other recommended conditions.

Consideration of the criteria to be taken into account for the relief sought

1. [63]

   Given the conclusion and reasoning of Ms Cieplucha in the risk assessment report and the opinions of Drs Davis and Ellis and taking into account the statutory factors, the other reports and the other material tendered, and having regard to the paramount consideration of community safety, I am satisfied to a high degree of probability that the defendant poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision under an order.

2. [64]

   In reaching that conclusion I am satisfied that the defendant remains in the above average risk range for sexual reoffending and that he presents with a lack of meaningful insight in relation to his need for treatment and how to manage his risk factors or how to implement strategies to avoid high-risk scenarios. I am also satisfied that the material has established that the defendant continues to present with factors which underpin his prior offending behaviour, namely his possible paedophilia, his paranoid personality, unstable employment, housing and financial situation, his alcohol use and his lack of positive social supports. Those factors not only remain present but remain risk factors, notwithstanding that his housing situation has become stabilised in recent years. As a result of those risk factors, he presents with a lifestyle that is not stable or prosocial. That instability and dysregulation, combined with the other risk factors, elevates the risk of him reoffending.

3. [65]

   For all of the above reasons I am satisfied to a high degree of probability that the offender poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision under an ESO and I am satisfied that the matters alleged in the supporting documentation would, if proved, justify the making of an ESO. As I have already noted above, the defendant did not make any submissions to the contrary.

Conditions

1. [66]

   As a result of the above finding, and the defendant’s concessions about the statutory preconditions for the making of the order, the primary issue to be considered, once being satisfied of the high degree of probability required by s 5B(d) was the formulation of appropriate conditions of supervision.

2. [67]

   Section 11(1) of the CHRO Act provides that “[a]n extended supervision order or interim supervision order may direct an offender to comply with such conditions as the Supreme Court considers appropriate” and includes a non-exhaustive list of conditions that may be imposed.

3. [68]

   The plaintiff relies on a number of proposed conditions.

4. [69]

   It was submitted on behalf the defendant that some of the conditions sought by the plaintiff did not align with the defendant’s risk profile. It was further submitted that certain proposed conditions did not strike an appropriate balance between the protection of the community on one hand and encouraging the defendant to undertake rehabilitation and his right to be at liberty on the other hand.

5. [70]

   The vast majority of the proposed conditions were the subject of agreement between the parties. Submissions were made on behalf of the defendant in relation only to a very small number of the proposed conditions in relation to which alteration in fairly minor respects was suggested. In relation to a number of those proposed modifications suggested on behalf the defendant, counsel for the plaintiff and counsel for the defendant reached agreement. Having considered the submissions of the parties I am of the view that the conditions proposed by the plaintiff, with some amendments as referred to below and set out in the attached schedule of conditions, are appropriate conditions for the making of the ISO.

6. [71]

   The only contentious conditions upon which I was required to adjudicate were conditions 1, 8, 14, 27, 28, 34, 36, 42, 48 and 49.

7. [72]

   The defendant challenged the inclusion of the word “reasonable” in condition 1 relating to obeying all reasonable directions of a DSO. The condition proposed is a general condition facilitating oversight and supervision of the defendant. The requirement that he obey only reasonable directions is to his advantage and protection. If the amendment proposed by the defendant were allowed he would be faced with a requirement to obey any direction, including objectively unreasonable directions, which may expose him to charges for breaching such directions. Clearly such a condition would be inappropriate and not in the defendant’s best interests. The word “reasonable” should remain included in condition 1 in order to provide the defendant with protection from any requirement to obey directions which are unreasonable.

8. [73]

   The defendant also challenged condition 1 by requesting that additional words be inserted to avoid confusion to the defendant in the event he received conflicting instructions from other authorities. Having considered the submissions of the parties on the issue I do not propose making the addition requested by the defendant. The current condition is clear in its terms as requiring compliance with the directions of a DSO. The defendant was unable during submissions to identify other authorities or possible conflicting instructions from those other authorities which would be relevant to the proposed addition. In those circumstances I am not satisfied that the proposed addition is appropriate. Rather it would seem to me that the proposed addition would add inappropriate additional complexities and confusion to the supervision and direction regime.

9. [74]

   Condition 8 requires the defendant not to deviate from his schedule of movements except in an emergency. It was submitted on his behalf that additional words should be added to the condition to make it clear that the defendant must not stop en-route unless the stop was directly related to his travel towards his destination. Examples given included stopping at traffic signals and for public transport schedules. The defendant also submitted that that would make it clear to him that he could not stop to rest, purchase refreshments, obtain petrol or use a public bathroom en-route unless prior approval had been granted. Having taken into account the submissions of the parties I am not satisfied that the proposed addition to condition 8 is appropriate or necessary. The current condition does not prevent the defendant from stopping en-route. The condition as proposed facilitates enforcement of scheduling under the ISO and seeks to ensure that the defendant does not impulsively change his plans or engage in activities that differ from his schedule of movements. Those are protective measures to assist the defendant in reducing his risk of reoffending and to assist in his ability to comply with the conditions. Providing the defendant with non-exhaustive examples of what he can and cannot do whilst travelling en-route to a scheduled destination are unnecessary and unhelpful. In those circumstances I am satisfied that the original condition 8 as proposed by the plaintiff is appropriate.

10. [75]

    In relation to condition 14, requiring the defendant to promptly notify a DSO of any visitor entering and remaining at his approved address, the defendant wished to add a note to that condition stating that for the purposes of the condition “promptly” meant within 90 minutes. Having taken into account the submissions of the parties I am not satisfied that such a note or that any other definition of the word “promptly” is necessary or appropriate. Specifying a time limit in absolute terms does not take into account variables in any given circumstance or other subjective circumstances which may make it difficult for the defendant to comply within a specified time. That is particularly so because many of the surrounding circumstances in which the defendant may be required to give notice are likely to be out of his control. Taking into account that the proposed condition facilitates monitoring visitors to the defendant’s address so that the risks involved, particularly of associating with children, can be monitored and supervised, I am not satisfied that the proposed condition 14 requires amendment or addition. The original wording of condition 14 as proposed by the plaintiff is appropriate.

11. [76]

    Condition 27 relates to non-association with children known or reasonably suspected to be under the age of 18 other than incidentally or with written permission from a DSO. It was submitted on behalf of the defendant that definitions of “associate” and “incidental contact” should be added to the condition. Having considered the submissions of the parties I am not satisfied that the proposed amendments or additions are appropriate or necessary. “Associate” is already defined in the preamble of the schedule and the term “incidental contact” is confined by the terms of condition 27 to such contact that occurs in a public place in the course of the duties of the minor. In those circumstances I am satisfied that the original wording of condition 27 as proposed by the plaintiff is appropriate and no further definitions or amendments are necessary or appropriate.

12. [77]

    A similar objection was taken to condition 28 which prevents the defendant from associating with any person specified by a DSO. Again, the defendant submitted that the definition of “associate” should be added. For the same reasons as I have expressed in relation to condition 27, I am satisfied that the original wording of condition 28 as proposed by the plaintiff is appropriate and no further definitions or amendments are necessary or appropriate.

13. [78]

    Condition 34 requires the defendant to obey any reasonable direction by a DSO about the use of electronic devices and access to the internet. The proposed condition, with some modification, is necessary to enable a DSO to monitor and if necessary to restrict the defendant’s digital and online activity in order to assist in managing his risk. I consider that the wording in condition 34 should be amended to read “You must obey any reasonable direction by a DSO about the use of electronic devices, any device capable of connecting to the internet”.

14. [79]

    Condition 36 prevents the defendant from using, without approval by a DSO, social networking, encrypted messaging, online gaming or instant messaging. The defendant submitted that he required certainty so that the condition did not prevent him from viewing content on benign websites. Rather than add a definition of the term “social media” or a definition of the word “use” the parties agreed that it was appropriate for a note to be added to condition 36. Accordingly, a note has been added to that condition to read “Note: For the purposes of condition 36, “use” does not include viewing content on a website”. With the addition of that note, I consider that condition 36 is appropriate.

15. [80]

    Although a challenge was made to condition 42, it subsequently became the subject of agreed wording between the parties which was emailed to my chambers. The agreed position, which I accept is appropriate, has been incorporated into condition 42.

16. [81]

    Similarly, subsequent to the hearing the parties reached agreed positions in relation to conditions 48 and 49 relating to medical intervention and treatment. The agreed rewording of those conditions, which I accept are appropriate, have been incorporated into the attached schedule of conditions.

Orders

1. [82]

   Accordingly, I made the following orders on 24 October 2025:

   1. (1)

      Order pursuant to s 7(4) of the CHRO Act:

   2. (2)

      Order pursuant to s 10A of the CHRO Act that the defendant be subject to an interim supervision order from 9 November 2025: