The application of JABW Pty Ltd atf the Win Williams Investment Trust

This is an application pursuant to s 63 of the Trustee Act 1925 (NSW) by the plaintiff (JABW Pty Ltd) as trustee of the Win Williams Investment Trust.

By summons dated 19 February 2026, the plaintiff seeks the opinion, advice and direction of the Court as to whether it is justified in taking certain steps in respect of proceedings currently before the Federal Court of Australia (FCA). For the reasons which follow, the Court will give the advice sought.

The plaintiff was represented by Mr R D Marshall of Senior Counsel with Mr T Arnold of Counsel.

As counsel’s written submissions in support of the application state, the present circumstances are part of what can only be described as a very sad story. It is sad because it is the continuation after the death of Ms Winifred Williams, the economic settlor of the Trust, of a dispute with her only son, Mr Alexander Williams, that dominated the last years of Ms Williams’ life. It is not necessary for me to set out the history of proceedings before NCAT and in this Court (resulting in judgments by several judges of this Division) between Mr Williams and his late mother.

Ms Williams, who was the principal beneficiary of the Trust, died on 29 December 2024. By her will, Ms Williams left the bulk of her estate to her grandsons, being Mr Williams’ three sons. Her grandsons and their descendants and associated entities are also beneficiaries of the Trust. Her former solicitor and accountant, respectively Messrs Solari and McCarthy, were nominated as the executors of her will. Those gentlemen are also directors of the plaintiff. Ms Williams made no secret of the fact that she was organising her affairs so that her son would get nothing from her estate, including if he were to make an application for a family provision order.

On 11 March 2025, Messrs Solari and McCarthy filed a summons for probate of Ms Williams' will.

On 8 August 2025, the grandsons commenced proceedings in probate seeking to have Messrs Solari and McCarthy passed over as executors, and for an independent person to be appointed instead.

There is prima facie evidence that the estate owes a substantial debt to the Trust. It is also clear from the evidence that, on any view, the estate is insolvent.

In an endeavour to proceed in a cost-efficient way, the plaintiff commenced bankruptcy proceedings against the estate by filling a creditor’s petition in respect of the debt in the FCA which was returnable on 25 September 2025.

It is also important to note that while it appears the estate is insolvent, its largest asset is constituted by costs orders against Mr Williams in connection with the various proceedings he brought against or concerning his mother. An application for assessment of those costs values them at slightly in excess of $1,000,000.

On 25 September 2025, the petition came before Registrar Morgan in the FCA. The registrar made orders on the plaintiff's application under s 244 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) that the estate be administered under Part 11 of that Act, and noting that Mr Henry Kazar had provided his consent to act as trustee with the Official Receiver. Mr Kazar is now the trustee in bankruptcy of the estate.

On 17 November 2025, the grandsons filed an interlocutory application in the bankruptcy proceedings seeking to be joined to them; to review Registrar Morgan's orders; to have leave to seek a review out of time; to set aside Registrar Morgan's orders; and, to be permitted to file a notice of opposition to the petition.

The grandsons' interlocutory application named the plaintiff, Messrs Solari, McCarthy, and Kazar, as respondents to it.

The plaintiff's present application relates to the next steps which the plaintiff wishes to take in relation to meeting the grandsons' application in the FCA.

In short, the plaintiff wishes to continue to prosecute the petition, resist the notice of opposition, and be able to meet its own legal costs and disbursements of those steps, and any adverse costs orders made against it in the bankruptcy proceedings, from the assets of the Trust.

As is usual in an application of this kind, it is supported by an opinion of counsel, in this case Mr S Golledge of Senior Counsel, dated 18 March 2026. Mr Golledge SC is known to the Court as a specialist in bankruptcy matters. His opinion traverses the facts and the applicable principles with great care, and concludes that, in his view, the plaintiff would be justified in taking the steps which it wishes to take to which I have referred in the preceding paragraph.

The Court has also been assisted by a very helpful and thorough set of written submissions prepared by counsel.

The justification for the steps which are now sought to be taken may be shortly stated.

The plaintiff, as trustee of the Trust, has an obligation to act in the best interests of its beneficiaries. The estate owes a substantial amount of money to the Trust.

The best, if not the only, prospect of the estate being put into funds to enable some kind of return to creditors, including the plaintiff, is for the costs assessment against Mr Williams to be prosecuted. Mr Kazar has, in fact, prepared the application for that assessment to which I referred in [10] above.

Given the very regrettable and long family history of this matter, there is a significant interest in the Trust, and I would venture to say in all interested parties, having a completely independent person in charge of the process of getting in the assets of the estate in the interests of creditors, including the plaintiff. There is no apparent reason why that independent person should not be Mr Kazar.

It follows that I accept that it is a proper discharge of the plaintiff's duties as trustee to seek to maintain its petition, and to resist any application that would result in Mr Kazar's appointment being set aside.

In reaching that conclusion, I express no view as to the likely outcome of what is next to occur in the FCA. It is sufficient for present purposes that Mr Golledge SC has expressed the view, with which I respectfully agree on the material to which I have been taken, that there is a reasonable basis for the plaintiff to be taking the course which it proposes to do, in the interests of the Trust and its beneficiaries.

For these reasons, the Court will give to the plaintiff the advice that is sought.

The orders of the Court are: