R v Noufl

The accused, Nirmeen Noufl, is charged with the murder of her husband, Mamdouh Noufl. The Crown alleges that the deceased was murdered in May 2023. It is alleged that although his body has not been found, various enquiries of his bank, border control, Medicare and other public searches on data bases indicate that the deceased has not shown any activities consistent with life since May 2023, including that he has not engaged in banking transactions, used Medicare or attempted to leave the country.

It is part of the Crown case that, although his body has not been found, there may be witnesses available to be called by the Crown who are expected to give evidence which may establish that the accused dismembered the deceased’s body and disposed of his body parts in plastic garbage bags at various locations around suburban Sydney.

By Notice of Motion filed on 12 February 2026, the Commissioner of Police for New South Wales (“the Commissioner”) seeks that certain of the Crown witnesses intended to be called in the prosecution case be the subject of orders protecting the disclosure of their identity, suppressed pursuant to s 7 of the Court Suppression and Non-publication Orders Act 2010 (NSW) (“the Court Suppression Act”). The orders sought include orders that two witnesses be known by pseudonyms, that the Court be closed for the duration of the evidence of those two witnesses, that there be a restricted retention order and that the orders sought continue throughout the Commonwealth of Australia until 18 December 2074.

The Commissioner has submitted that the orders are necessary on the basis of one or more of the grounds set out in s 8(1)(a), (c) and (e) of the Court Suppression Act.

Affidavit evidence in support of the application comprises an open affidavit and a confidential affidavit. The open affidavit was sworn by Paul Dunstan on 24 March 2026. Mr Dunstan is the Acting Assistant Commissioner of Police for New South Wales. On that same date, Acting Assistant Commissioner Dunstan swore a confidential affidavit which has been placed before me. The open affidavit has been served on representatives of the Crown and the accused. The confidential affidavit has been disclosed only to the Court.

The Commissioner relies on written submissions, which have been provided to the Court and to the parties. Although the Crown and the accused have not consented to the orders, the application was not expressly opposed. Neither the Crown nor the accused have made any submissions.

The affidavit evidence refers to the two subject witnesses by the pseudonyms “Witness A” and “Witness B”, and indicates that Witness A in particular has expressed concerns for their safety and has been offered by the police some preliminary indication of the likelihood of suppression orders. On the basis of that preliminary indication, Witness A has given an induced statement in the form of an interview.

Witness B is in a similar position in that this witness has provided two statements. The first statement was provided at a time when the deceased was regarded as a missing person. The second statement made was in relation to the murder charge.

Without going into the detail, for obvious reasons, of the content of the confidential affidavit, I am satisfied that Witness A and Witness B fall into one or other of these following categories. Witness A may be regarded in some sense as a rollover witness in the strict sense. Alternatively, Witness A may be regarded as something akin to a rollover witness. It is expected that Witness A’s evidence will be crucial to any successful prosecution in the sense that Witness A’s proposed evidence, as referred to in the Crown Case Statement, relates to that person’s observations of the accused in the possession of knives and what is described as something appearing like a chainsaw and with tarpaulins, plastic bags, blood and what are described in the Crown Case Statement as “pieces of meat”. Witness A’s proposed evidence also suggests that the accused and Witness A, at the accused’s direction, were then involved with disposing of the pieces of meat into plastic bags, taking them in a motor vehicle and disposing of them in various wheelie bins and industrial bins throughout suburban Sydney.

Witness B falls more into a category of someone akin to a rollover witness. It appears that the Crown intends to rely on evidence from Witness B regarding conversations that this witness had with Witness A, after the alleged murder and after the alleged disposal of items in wheelie bins around Sydney.

The Commissioner relied on the affidavit material in the confidential affidavit in establishing concerns for the safety of Witness A and Witness B, various potential risks to those witnesses, the impact on the administration of justice if orders of the type sought were not made and the need for Closed Court orders.

The non-publication orders sought by the Commissioner are referred to in the confidential affidavit as being for a period of 50 years. The Notice of Motion seeks orders for a slightly shorter period, until 18 December 2074. I understand the reason for the shorter period is so that any order made in this Court is for the same period as an order made in the Local Court in December 2024. At that time, an order was made for a period of 50 years.

The Commissioner has submitted that the suppression of Witness A and Witness B’s identities is necessary in order to minimise risk to those witnesses, prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice, protect the safety of witnesses and in the alternative, or in addition, necessary in the public interest, which the Commissioner submits significantly outweighs the interest in open justice in the circumstances of this case.

Although the orders ultimately sought by the applicant were not opposed by either the Crown or the accused, it is nonetheless necessary that I be satisfied that in making the orders sought an appropriate balance is struck between the need to protect the safety of Witnesses A and B, the need for a fair trial and the overriding principles of open justice. Sections 6, 7 and 8 of the Court Suppression Act provide as follows:

Each of the grounds set out in s 8 of the Court Suppression Act imports a test of “necessity”. It has been held that the word “necessary” in that context should not be given a narrow construction: Fairfax Digital Australia and New Zealand Pty Ltd v Ibrahim (2012) 83 NSWLR 52; [2012] NSWCCA 125.

In that case, adopting earlier observations, including in R v Kwok (2005) 64 NSWLR 335; [2005] NSWCCA 245, the Court held that the consideration of what is meant by “necessary” to secure the proper administration of justice must be considered in that context. The word does not mean that if the relevant order is not made, the proceedings will be unable to continue. Often, even if orders of the type sought are not made, proceedings can continue. In the circumstances of this case, there is some significant importance to the prosecution case that Witness A can give evidence. It may be that Witness A’s evidence is fundamental to the Crown case. Without the protective orders sought, Witness A may not give evidence. If that were to occur, the prosecution may be unable to continue.

In any event, it is not necessary for me to be satisfied that the proceedings will come to an end if the orders sought are not made. What is necessary to determine is, if the orders of the kind sought are not made, will that result in a consequence that is “unacceptable” in the sense that the powers to make these orders make them necessary to the proper function of the Court.

The consequences of the type that have been previously held as unacceptable involve cases in which hardship to informers, blackmail victims or police officers would arise from identification of those witnesses. In addition, it has been held that unacceptable consequences include impeding the future supply of information from such persons or impeding investigations. Unacceptable consequences have also been held to include making it more difficult to obtain evidence or intelligence from such persons to bring people alleged offender before the courts to be dealt with.

The administration of justice in s 8(1)(a) has been held to extend to the investigation and detection of crime and obtaining evidence against suspects, with protection of the identity of informers being a key aspect of those functions: see Attorney-General for New South Wales v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (2007) 73 NSWLR 635; [2007] NSWCCA 307.

As was submitted by Mr Bhalla on behalf of the applicant, a person’s safety as referred to in s 8(1)(c) is to be assessed in terms of a calculous of risk. As was held by the Court of Criminal Appeal in AB (A Pseudonym) v R (No 3) [2019] NSWCCA 46, that requires the Court to consider the nature, imminence and degree of likelihood of harm occurring to the relevant person. If the prospective harm is very severe, it may be more readily concluded that the order is necessary even if the risk does not rise beyond a mere possibility.

In Hamzy v R [2013] NSWCCA 156, Harrison J stated the test under s 8(1)(c) as follows:

Applying the principles derived from those decisions to the applicable legislation, I am satisfied, based on the material in the confidential affidavit, that the concerns currently held by the police have a proper basis and it is appropriate to suppress the names of Witness A and Witness B. In particular, I am satisfied on the basis of the material in paragraphs [15] to [39] of the confidential affidavit of the risks to the safety of Witness A and Witness B and that the concerns expressed in those paragraphs are well-founded in the circumstances.

I am also satisfied, on the basis of the material in paragraphs [40] to [45] of the confidential affidavit, that the orders are necessary to ensure the proper administration of justice. I am satisfied, on the basis of the material in paragraphs [46] to [49] of the confidential affidavit, that the orders are necessary such that the Court should be closed during the giving of evidence of Witness A and Witness B.

Further, I am satisfied in the circumstances of this case that the public interest in open justice is outweighed by the significant public interest in the administration of justice operating such that the identities of Witness A and Witness B in this case – given the serious nature of the allegations, the serious threat to the safety of each of Witness A and Witness B and the likelihood of any ongoing threat to them if their identities are revealed – are such that the administration of justice requires that the orders be made notwithstanding the public interest in open justice.

For those reasons, based on the material before me, I am satisfied that the orders sought in the Notice of Motion are appropriate.

In relation to duration of the orders, s 12 of the Court Suppression Act provides as follows:

It seems to me, based on the confidential material and the nature of the risk posed to Witness A and Witness B, that the suppression order in the circumstances of this case needs to be for a significant period of time, and well after the resolution of the criminal proceedings against the accused and notwithstanding the outcome of those criminal proceedings. I note that in the case of DRJ v Commissioner of Victims Rights [2020] NSWCA 136, the Court of Appeal held that such orders should not be open ended in duration. I am convinced in the circumstances of this case, that an order which is not open ended but for a significant period of time is well made out on the material and justified in circumstances.

For those reasons, I make orders in terms of the Short Minutes of Order as follows: