SO v LL

HIS HONOUR: I made interim orders in this matter on an urgent ex-parte basis on the afternoon of Friday 6 March 2026. Those orders were for return of the summons instanter permitting for short service of the summons and supporting evidence and listing the matter for hearing before me today to consider the plaintiff’s application for interim relief by way of interlocutory injunction including take down orders.

The documents were duly served in accordance with the orders I made and when the matter came on for hearing before me today, Ms Chrysanthou SC and Mr Olsen appeared for the plaintiff and LL appeared in person.

Ms Chrysanthou raised with me at the outset the question about whether LL might be an appropriate candidate for referral for legal advice under rule 7.36 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) on a pro bono basis, at the same time making clear that the plaintiff wished to proceed with the application for interim relief and also for an order for anonymisation of the proceedings under the provisions of sections 7 and 8 of the Court Suppression and Non-publication Orders Act 2010 (NSW) (“the Act”). I made such orders under section 10 of the Act on an interim urgent basis when the matter was before me on Friday.

I will not go into the details of the alleged defamation, suffice it to say for present purposes that the defendant has made statements about the plaintiff online on various platforms which, on their face, clearly involve egregious imputations about the plaintiff’s conduct. They are, on their face, clearly defamatory. They are capable of being considered to be defamation of a very serious kind.

It is not clear to me that the defendant has any valid defence by way of justification or otherwise, either at common law or under the provisions of the Defamation Act 2005 (NSW), but I have a concern that he should be given the opportunity, if he wishes to take it up, to obtain advice whether defences may be available to him.

I have come to that conclusion because, as Ms Chrysanthou and Mr Olsen have, with great respect, accurately set out in their written submissions, traditionally the law has been very reluctant to resolve defamation actions by way of injunction rather than by way of the traditional common law remedy of an award of damages.

The historical reasons for that reluctance, including the former absence of a common law court’s power to injunct, are fully discussed in the leading Australian judgment of recent times of Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57; [2006] HCA 46 (“O’Neill”). It is unnecessary for me to expand upon the expositions of the Justices in that case. Suffice it to say, I agree with the submission of counsel for the plaintiff that the legal effect of O’Neill is that the ordinary rules as to granting interlocutory judgments apply. However, the matters of policy which animated older English decisions such as Bonnard v Perryman [1891] 2 Ch 269 continue to have force as discretionary factors informing the arguable case and balance of convenience questions to be considered and applied in each defamation case where an interlocutory injunction is sought.

LL made quite clear that he consented to the making of the interlocutory injunctions in the terms sought. He also informed me that he has commenced taking down his publications from the online platforms where they were posted. Indeed, LL made clear to me he would rather have the whole case over and done with by consenting to final orders today. But, like Ms Chrysanthou, I am reluctant to accept that at this early stage lest it be a decision he would repent at leisure.

In any event, I would have been satisfied, quite apart from LL’s consent, that this was an appropriate case to make interim orders sought. As I have said, the case of defamation on the face of it seems very strong and there are no obvious defences springing out of the facts so far as I could tell. I should not be understood as having finally determined that no defences are available, only that the case for interim relief is very strong.

I propose to make the orders sought and would have been persuaded they are appropriate in any event, absent LL’s consent.

Orders are also sought, as I have said, under the Act. I was initially resistant to continuing the orders I made on Friday on an interim basis. However, I have been persuaded that there is merit in the application and, in particular, I am of the view that the ground found in section 8(1)(e) of the Act applies so that it is otherwise necessary in the public interest for the order to be made and that that public interest significantly outweighs the public interest in open justice.

In brief, my reasons for coming to that conclusion are that first, as the plaintiff has abandoned his claim for damages, there is no real mileage in the idea that he and LL should be named in order to vindicate the plaintiff’s reputation by the making of final orders if that is what ultimately occurs.

LL has told me that he is not in a position to engage lawyers privately to defend the matter and with no disrespect to him whatsoever, I take that to be a statement about the expense of litigation. I interpolate that the same concern would extend to the expense of having to pay damages. I doubt very much whether LL would have a sum of money at his disposal where he could promptly pay any damages that might be awarded.

Secondly, it seems to me, therefore, that, as Ms Chrysanthou submits, requiring the parties to be named would only have the effect, as it is were, of aggravating the alleged defamation, because these types of imputations tend to stick. It also occurs to me that there are other factors, for instance, the mention (although not naming) of the plaintiff’s wife in a manner and context which is potentially defamatory of her. The plaintiff is a person who is likely to be well-known in certain circles and likewise his wife.

Thirdly, there is the reputation of a deceased person who is said to be a victim of egregious misconduct by the plaintiff. That person is named in the publications. It seems to me unfair that her name should be connected with the imputations made in the plaintiff’s publications. The provisions of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) would protect her identity had criminal proceedings been brought.

Accordingly, for those reasons it is in the interests of justice that the order made be continued on that ground.

Further, I am persuaded that it is in the interests of the administration of justice that LL be given the opportunity to obtain pro bono advice, if it can be arranged for him. He is sui juris so whether he takes that opportunity is fully a matter for him but given all of the circumstances, including the matter coming on urgently and the ill-health he complained of, an order for referral out will be made. If he doesn’t wish to take the opportunity well, so be it, and the matter can be dealt with when it is next before the Court on a final basis if he persists in his present thinking. I will make on order referring him to the Registrar for referral to the Bar Association under the Pro Bono Assistance Scheme.

In accordance with these reasons and the short minutes of order prepared by Ms Chrysanthou and Mr Olson, I make the following orders: