Re Adoption of E F - Anonymised

1. [1]

   These proceedings concern the adoption of E F (‘E’) in favour of I and J F (‘the proposed adoptive parents’).

2. [2]

   The Notice of Motion filed on 8 August 2019 by the Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice (‘the Secretary’) sought the following orders:

3. [3]

   At the hearing, the Secretary sought the relief proposed in orders 1, 4 and 5. The Secretary did not seek the relief proposed in order 3. A direct legal representative had previously been appointed for E and the direct legal representative was represented at the hearing. The Secretary and the proposed adoptive parents were also represented. The birth mother appeared in person.

4. [4]

   The hearing was conducted before me on 9 March 2020. At the conclusion of the hearing, I gave short reasons and made the final orders (1, 4 and 5) sought by the Secretary. I now publish my reasons in full.

Backgrounds facts

1. [5]

   E was born in July 2003 and was aged 16 years and seven months at the date of the hearing.

2. [6]

   E has lived with the proposed adoptive parents since October 2003 when she was 3 months old. Her proposed adoptive brother is K, currently aged nine. He has lived with E and the proposed adoptive parents since he was three days old and was adopted by the proposed adoptive parents in February 2017.

3. [7]

   E has maintained a connection with her birth mother through attendance at contact visits pursuant to court orders. Her birth mother is from the Dinka tribe in South Sudan and currently attends a local Catholic church. E also has four maternal half siblings.

4. [8]

   The birth father’s identity is unknown.

5. [9]

   This matter has had a long and difficult history. In 1992, the birth mother and her family fled Sudan. The birth mother was separated from her family. Eventually, she arrived at a refugee camp in Kenya. It was here that she was sexually assaulted, resulting in her pregnancy with E. The birth mother discovered that she was pregnant after arriving in Australia in March 2003. She was living near her half-brother in the western suburbs of Sydney and attempted to conceal her pregnancy from him because she was concerned about cultural attitudes in her community towards women who became pregnant out of wedlock.

6. [10]

   The birth mother was assaulted by her half-brother and was admitted to Westmead Hospital. She later moved to a refuge and had several meetings with refuge workers and Community Services officers between May and July 2003 to discuss options in relation to care for E once E was born.

7. [11]

   E was placed in temporary foster care in July 2003, four days after she was born. As noted above, she was moved to the proposed adoptive parents’ care when she was three months old.

8. [12]

   In 2004, the Director-General (as then known) commenced proceedings seeking an order that E be adopted by the proposed adoptive parents. The birth mother had provided consent to the adoption, but the Court found that her consent was ineffective under s 58(2)(d) of the Adoption Act 2000 (NSW) (‘the Act’). However, an adoption order was made on 20 December 2004, the Court having dispensed with the need for the birth mother’s consent under s 67(1)(b) and s 67(1)(c) (see Department of Community Services v D & Ors [2004] NSWSC 124 [37]-[44]).

9. [13]

   In 2005, the Court of Appeal upheld the birth mother’s appeal from the 2004 adoption order on the basis that new evidence that was not before the primary judge had rendered unsafe assumptions made at the trial and remitted the matter for further hearing (see D v Director-General Department of Community Services & Ors [2005] NSWCA 474).

10. [14]

    Following remittal, the matter came before Justice Brereton. His Honour made orders in 2007 revoking the previous consent dispense order, dismissing the application for a consent dispense order, and dismissing the application for an adoption order. However, his Honour ordered, pursuant to s 92 of the Act, that the proposed adoptive parents have parental responsibility for, and custody and care of, E.

11. [15]

    Amongst other things, Brereton J (as his Honour then was) was particularly concerned about the possible consequences of the transracial nature of the adoption and the need to empower E as she matures. At paragraphs [243]-[244] his Honour stated:

12. [16]

    E is generally of good health and has no ongoing health issues. As a young child, her developmental milestones were consistently achieved with or ahead of her peers. E sees a psychologist, Ms King, who assists her to develop skills in relation to friendships and her relationship with her birth mother and to explore, understand and manage her emotions and behaviour on a broader level.

13. [17]

    E is in year 11 at high school and is reported to be a good student. She was accepted into her school’s Duke of Edinburgh program due to meeting selection criteria based on behaviour and academic marks and was given the opportunity to travel to Japan in 2019. She is also a talented sportswoman who plays basketball at a representative level.

14. [18]

    E has a supportive group of friends but has experienced some racist bullying at school. E is also reported to respond with strong feelings to situations where she fears rejection, most often in relation to issues involving her peers or surrounding adoption.

15. [19]

    E is close to the proposed adoptive parents and they spend time with her, both individually and as a family. She has developed a caring and affectionate relationship with K. She is generally cooperative at home and school, although the proposed adoptive parents have experienced some challenges in relation to E’s mobile phone and social media use.

16. [20]

    As a child, E was not keen to engage in activities promoting her connection to Africa but is reported to have developed a clearer and more positive identity over time. The proposed adoptive parents have sought to develop relationships with families who have members of African heritage. They joined the Central Coast Australian African Network and participate in social activities formally and informally with group members, although the proposed adoptive mother has noted that E has often engaged with other adults rather than children in these settings.

17. [21]

    The proposed adoptive mother sought out Sudanese stories to read to E when she was a young child and has looked for opportunities to promote E’s contact with the local African community. For example, she has engaged with local African women to provide hair care for E, initially a Sudanese woman, and then when she had moved away, an Ethiopian woman and currently a woman from Zimbabwe. The proposed adoptive parents took E to Malawi where they had friends (rather than Sudan where ongoing conflict makes travel difficult) and to the United States where E and K had the opportunity to mix with African American cultures in a range of settings. E has recently developed a friendship with a team member from basketball whose mother is African American.

18. [22]

    On the other hand, while E is reported to have developed a pan-African sensibility and seeks out connections with African American culture, she has not developed a strong connection to her particular Sudanese heritage. Whilst the proposed adoptive parents have attempted to engage E with events that are attended by many Sudanese people, E has been increasingly reluctant to attend.

19. [23]

    In 2007, Brereton J ordered that E have contact with her birth mother as agreed between the birth mother and the proposed adoptive parents, but failing agreement:

20. [24]

    On 25 October 2011, orders were made by consent reducing contact from monthly (as required by order 5.3 above) to eight times per year and requiring contact to be supervised. This change followed an incident that occurred on 2 January 2011 when the proposed adoptive father went to collect E from the birth mother’s home. An argument between the proposed adoptive father and the birth mother developed into a physical altercation. The birth mother was charged with assault occasioning actual bodily harm and was ultimately given a good behaviour bond without proceeding conviction under s 10(1)(b) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW). E apparently witnessed the assault and it continues to impact her relationship with her birth mother; she has raised it during consultations with her psychologist (Ms King) and Community Services, and it triggered some distress in E during a meeting held between the s 91 court report author (Ms Elliott), E and her birth mother on 27 November 2017. Following the incident, Community Services made an application to the Supreme Court to stay the previous contact orders, pending an expert report into the nature and form of contact between E and the birth mother. A report was completed by Dr Christopher Lenning and dated 3 March 2011. Dr Lenning noted that the birth mother ‘has a strong possessive relationship towards her daughter, but an attenuated attachment.’

21. [25]

    Contact visits were supervised by Community Services between 2004 and July 2008, unsupervised between July 2008 and 2012, supervised by the Good Samaritans Sisters between 2012-2015, supervised by Barnardos between January 2016 and June 2018, and supervised again by Community Services from June 2018 to date.

22. [26]

    It appears that contact was conducted in accordance with the court orders up to 2018 when only five contact visits occurred. There were some difficulties in organising supervisors for contact visits at the beginning of 2018. Concerns had also been raised about E’s safety after two risk of harm reports were made in relation to the birth mother in 2017 and 2018 respectively. The first related to a domestic violence incident involving the birth mother and her partner which led to her partner being charged with assault. The second related to a conversation which was had between the birth mother and Ms Elliott (the author of the s 91 report) during which the birth mother said words to the effect of ‘not only me but others will die if E is adopted.’

23. [27]

    Contact between E and her birth mother occurred at least three times during 2019. Two of these contacts were supervised contact visits and one was by telephone.

24. [28]

    Overall, E’s relationship with her birth mother has been somewhat strained. Contact records from as early as 2007 indicate that tension has arisen in relation to the birth mother viewing herself as E’s mother and not acknowledging the proposed adoptive parents as anything other than E’s carers, which is inconsistent with E’s sense of the belonging to the proposed adoptive parents’ family. There have been several instances in which E has expressed frustration in relation to her birth mother’s attempts to parent her. For example, during the meeting conducted on 23 November 2017 between E, her birth mother and Ms Elliott, E and her birth mother discussed E shaving her hair to participate in a “Shave for a Cure” charity event in honour of her basketball coach who had recently died due to cancer. The birth mother told E that she must not shave her head as her birth parents are still alive and head shaving is a sign of mourning. The birth mother also asked E if she had begun to menstruate. E advised her that she had. The birth mother cried and tried to explain that there were important things that E needed to know, such as when she could start mixing with boys, and that there were Sudanese practices about what women should do when they had their period, including in relation to prayer. After the meeting, E told Ms Elliott that she felt that her birth mother was emphasising culture ‘because it’s the only way she thinks she can still control me.’

25. [29]

    An adoption plan was filed in these proceedings although the Secretary no longer seeks registration. It contemplates a further reduction in contact between E and her birth mother. It appears that E has been seeking a reduction in contact since at least mid-2016. The adoption plan also contemplates a continuation of contact supervision. It has been signed by the proposed adoptive parents, E, and a delegate of the Secretary, but not the birth mother.

26. [30]

    E wishes to be adopted and has consistently expressed this view to the proposed adoptive parents, the birth mother, her psychologist (Ms King), Community Services, and the s 91 court report author (Ms Elliott).

27. [31]

    Contact records indicate that during a contact visit on 9 September 2017, E spoke directly to her birth mother regarding her adoption. She stated that she wanted her birth mother to know that it was her wish to be adopted and that no one else was making the decision for her. E also said that she had thought about it and was clear in her wishes.

Legal principles

1. [32]

   When considering the potential adoption of a child, the best interests of that child is to be the paramount consideration at all times. Relevantly, ss 7 and 8 of the Act provide:

2. [33]

   The Court must not make an adoption order unless the requirements in s 90 of the Act have been complied with:

3. [34]

   In accordance with s 90(3), the Court cannot make an adoption order unless it is clearly preferable to any other action that could be taken (for example, a long-term parenting order, restoration, etc.). Brereton J said of the section, in Adoption of KH [2015] NSWSC 274 (at [46]):

4. [35]

   In Adoption of NG (No 2) [2014] NSWSC 680, Brereton J described the principles applicable with respect to s 8 (at [14]-[17]):

5. [36]

   Later at [76]-[80]:

6. [37]

   See also Adoption of Taylor-Clay [2019] NSWSC 27 at [58], in particular where Brereton J observed that:

7. [38]

   This approach to the application of s 90(3) was most recently approved by the Court of Appeal in OA v Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice [2019] NSWCA 322 at [57] (White JA, Macfarlan and Brereton JJA agreeing):

8. [39]

   As noted above, s 90(1)(d) prevents the Court from making an adoption order if consent to the adoption has not been given by every person whose consent is required under the Act.

9. [40]

   Relevantly, section 52 prevents the Court from making an adoption order in relation to a child who is less than 18 years of age unless the consent of each birth parent is obtained. However, s 54(1)(c) provides that consent is not required under s 52 if the child gives sole consent to their adoption in accordance with s 54(2). Relevantly, s 54(2) provides:

10. [41]

    The child’s consent must be given in accordance with s 55, which requires the child to be counselled in accordance with s 63:

11. [42]

    At least 14 days’ notice of the application for the adoption order must be given to the parent/s or person/s whose consent would otherwise be required (see ss 54(3)(a) and 88(1)(a)) unless the Court dispenses with the notice requirements (see ss 54(3)(b) and 88(4)). Also relevant are ss 61 and 62:

12. [43]

    Part 1 of Chapter 4 of the Act places certain restrictions on who can adopt a child in New South Wales which differ according to whether the persons seeking to adopt be an individual, couple, relative or step parent.

13. [44]

    Relevantly, section 28 sets out the following requirements in relation to adoption by a couple:

14. [45]

    ‘Couple’ is defined in the Dictionary to the Act:

15. [46]

    Section 101(1) provides that on the making of an adoption order, an adopted child who is less than 18 years of age is to have as his or her surname and given name or names such name or names as the Court, in the adoption order, approves on the application of the adoptive parent or parents.

16. [47]

    Before changing a child’s name, the Court must consider any wishes expressed by the child and any factors (such as the child’s maturity or level of understanding) that the Court thinks are relevant to the weight it should give to the child’s wishes (s 101(2)). However, the Court must not order a name change unless satisfied that the name change is in the best interests of the child (s 101(5)) and, where the child is over the age of 12, the child has provided their consent to the change (s 101(4)).

17. [48]

    As Brereton J acknowledged in Adoption of RCC and RZA [2015] NSWSC 813 at [104], re-iterating his own comments in Adoption of NG (No 2) [2014] NSWSC 680 at [109] and Adoption of BS (No 3) [2013] NSWSC 2033 at [86], ‘[t]he adoption principles set out in s 8 include, in (e), the principle that a child's given name or names, and identity, should, as far as possible, be preserved.’ However, at [105], his Honour also explained:

Evidence

1. [49]

   The Secretary relied on several affidavits. In particular, I note the affidavit annexing the s 45 and s 91 court reports of Ms Elliott (affirmed 17 April 2019). Ms Elliott has had a long term involvement with this matter and, being aware of the complexity of the issues raised and the concerns of the birth mother in relation to the proposed adoption, conducted interviews with E, the proposed adoptive parents, K, and the birth mother across a period of 11 months (September 2017 to August 2018).

2. [50]

   In her s 45 report, Ms Elliott noted that:

3. [51]

   In her s 91 report, Ms Elliott stated:

4. [52]

   In relation to maintaining the status quo (parental responsibility order), Ms Elliott stated:

5. [53]

   Ms Elliott also found that there was no prospect of E returning to the birth mother’s care, noting that ‘all parties agree that there is a significant distance between E and [her birth mother], and currently E has no desire to bridge this.’ Rather, Ms Elliott concluded that an adoption is clearly preferable and in E’s best interests, noting that an adoption order:

6. [54]

   In relation to E’s maturity and understanding, Ms Elliott found that:

7. [55]

   In relation to contact, Ms Elliott stated that:

8. [56]

   I note the affidavit of the delegate, Ms Whitbread, affirmed 7 August 2019, and the affidavit of Mr Fogarty, caseworker for Adoption and Permanency Services, affirmed 27 November 2019, which outline the matter’s history, the relationships between the relevant parties and E’s development in the care of the proposed adoptive parents. Ms Whitbread stated that during a conversation between her and E on 13 June 2019, E said words to the effect of ‘I hope that things between me and [the birth mother] improve after an adoption order is made’ but ‘[e]ven if the relationship with [the birth mother] doesn’t improve, I really want to be adopted by my Mum and Dad.’

9. [57]

   Annexed to Ms Whitbread’s affidavit is the s 63 report completed by Ms Golden on 23 October 2018. Ms Golden wrote that:

10. [58]

    I note the two affidavits of E’s long-standing clinical psychologist, Ms King, sworn on 28 June 2019 and 26 November 2019, respectively, and the associated annexures. Ms King has found:

11. [59]

    She also recorded that:

12. [60]

    I also note the affidavits of service and the affidavits of the referees.

13. [61]

    The birth mother relied on three affidavits: one affirmed by her on 13 November 2019; one sworn by Sister O P on 11 November 2019; and one sworn by Sister Q R on 11 November 2019.

14. [62]

    In her affidavit, the birth mother outlined the members of her family and noted that all of her children attend school, are doing well academically and play sports. She also stated that ‘[o]ther than in relation to E’s adoption, I have had no involvement with the Department of Community Services in relation to any of my children.’ She expressed her opposition to the adoption application, noting that she never gave consent for E to be taken away from her permanently and wants E to know that she opposes the adoption. She also expressed a belief that the proposed adoptive parents have not attempted to promote the relationship between her and E, including by interfering or frustrating contact visits. In relation to birth family contact, the birth mother stated:

15. [63]

    Sister P supported the birth mother during some contact visits, and she said that she continued to support the birth mother before and after contact visits after the proposed adoptive parents objected to her presence at visits in 2011. She included excerpts from her notes in her affidavit. In particular, she noted that the proposed adoptive parents had interrupted what was supposed to be unsupervised time between E and the birth mother during at least one contact visit. She also recorded an altercation that occurred during a contact visit in September 2008 where she said the proposed adoptive parents became aggressive towards the birth mother.

16. [64]

    Sister R has been a support person for the birth mother for 15 years and also attended contact visits prior to 2011. She described the distress and sadness that the birth mother has displayed over the years since 2004 and what she perceived as the ‘fear and anxiety [that] dominated many of the contact visits between [the birth mother] and E, with the [proposed adoptive parents] constantly questioning of [sic] [the birth mother].’

17. [65]

    The proposed adoptive parents relied on two affidavits, one affirmed by each of them on 12 November 2019, as well as the evidence filed on behalf of the Secretary. In their affidavits, the proposed adoptive parents outline their backgrounds, the ways in which they have assisted E to understand her history and adoption, and their plans for E in the event that an adoption order is made, respectively. Both stated that E has been reluctant to attend contact visits in the past.

18. [66]

    The direct legal representative relied on the evidence filed on behalf of the Secretary and the proposed adoptive parents.

Submissions

1. [67]

   Counsel for the Secretary provided detailed written submissions and a chronology to the Court and made further submissions during the hearing.

2. [68]

   The Secretary submits that the present application is predicated on the basis that none of the important people in E’s life are satisfied with the 2007 arrangements, especially E who chooses adoption. The Secretary submits that an adoption order is clearly preferable and in E’s best interests, in particular due to the need to provide E with finality around her family relationships, to provide for a relationship between E and the people who raised her that will be lifelong and extend past her 18th birthday, and because E doesn’t want to feel different because she doesn’t have an adoption order.

3. [69]

   In relation to contact, the Secretary submits that a reduction in the frequency and a continuation of supervision is something that E and the proposed adoptive parents request, however, the Secretary recognises that there is no utility in registering an adoption plan if one of the parties to the contact proposed in the plan do not want the contact as proposed.

4. [70]

   The Secretary also submits that the question of who is to blame for historical events, while not unimportant as it informs the position of each of the parties to these proceedings, is not the focus; the paramount concern must be E’s best interests both in what remains of her childhood, but also later in life, particularly taking into account her age, wishes and maturity.

5. [71]

   The birth mother provided written submissions to the Court. She also provided written amendments to the Secretary’s proposed chronology, which included allegations of physical and verbal abuse committed against her by the proposed adoptive parents. She made further statements from the bar table during the hearing which I have taken into account.

6. [72]

   In her written submissions, after responding to allegations made against her in the proposed adoptive parents’ affidavits, the birth mother again emphasises:

7. [73]

   At the hearing, the birth mother emphasised that she wants E to know that she never abandoned her and reiterated her views about future contact.

8. [74]

   Counsel for the proposed adoptive parents provided written submissions to the Court and made further submissions at the hearing.

9. [75]

   The proposed adoptive parents submit that E is very nearly an adult and has consistently offered sensible and insightful reasons for why she wants to be adopted. They submit that the proposed adoption is overwhelmingly in the best interests of E and clearly preferable, adopting the submissions of the Secretary in these respects. They further submit that the fact E has continued to attend contact has largely been due to their encouragement, however, they say that E is now at an age where they cannot compel her to attend if she does not want to.

10. [76]

    Counsel for the direct legal representative supports the submissions made by the Secretary and the proposed adoptive parents and made further submissions at the hearing.

11. [77]

    The direct legal representative submits that the proposed adoptive parents and K represent E’s entrenched psychological family; that they are the only family unit she has known and the only family unit she identifies with. The direct legal representative also drew my attention to the fact that the current order for parental responsibility ends at age 18, which for E is less than two years away. This, it is submitted, means that if anything was to happen to E, priority would not necessarily be with the people that she recognises as parents. The direct legal representative also submits that the evidence is overwhelmingly that E needs an adoption to allow her to develop a greater sense of security, to be able to develop more fully as an adolescent into an adult, and to be able to have the security and understanding that her family unit will not be removed from her at any time in the future.

Consideration

1. [78]

   The last time this matter was before the Court, Brereton J refused to make an adoption order and instead made orders for parental responsibility, custody and care. At that time, E was only four years of age. E is now more than 16 and a half years of age and has been in the care of the proposed adoptive parents for approximately 16 years. I am now of the view that an adoption order is in her best interests and clearly preferable to any other action that could be taken, considering all the circumstances and the factors contained within ss 7 and 8 of the Act. In particular, I have focused my attention on what is in the best interests of E not only now but also later in life. The interests of other relevant parties, including the birth mother in this case, whose views I hear and respect, and those of the proposed adoptive parents, are not the determinative factors before this Court. They are important. They are relevant. But they are factors to be taken into account as part of an overall consideration of the ultimate issues.

2. [79]

   E needs to feel confident and secure going forward. In my view, an adoption order, by aligning her legal position with her factual reality and securing her place in the family with which she identifies, not only during childhood but for life, will assist in achieving this. It is true that the adoption order will legally sever E’s tie with her birth mother and maternal siblings. However, it will perfect her sense of identity and allow her to tell the entire truth about her status without feeling uncomfortable or dishonest. The alternatives to adoption, including a continuation of the current parental responsibility order or an order for shared parental responsibility between the proposed adoptive parents and the birth mother, will not achieve this. They are likely to leave E feeling let down and ignored by the court system.

3. [80]

   Further, in my view, one important factor (though also not the predominant one) is E’s own wishes. In 2007 Brereton J was also very much concerned with empowering E and ensuring that she would have the ability to make choices for herself as she matures. E is now a confident, intelligent and articulate young woman who has expressed her views many times over the years that what she wants is to be legally part of the proposed adoptive parents’ family and not only to have the proposed adoptive parents has her mother and father but to have K as her brother.

4. [81]

   In 2007 Brereton J was also concerned with issues of cultural heritage. They too are important because the Act makes them so. One of the birth mother’s principal concerns, a concern which I respect fully, is that her cultural heritage is entirely inconsistent with the notion of adoption. That said, I am a Judge in New South Wales administering the law of New South Wales, which obliges me to look at cultural issues and give them important weight, but as one factor in a number of factors to be looked at. I am satisfied that the proposed adoptive parents have taken steps to assist E to develop her cultural identity and will continue to do so to the extent that E so wishes. I am also satisfied that the proposed adoptive parents have provided a loving, stable and secure environment for E and K over the years and that they are capable of meeting E’s physical, emotional and intellectual needs now and into the future.

5. [82]

   In relation to the adoption plan, I am satisfied that the arrangements proposed in the plan are in E’s best interests and proper in the circumstances, particularly having regard to E’s wishes concerning contact. However, I note that aspects of the adoption plan are impracticable given that the birth mother has not signed it, and therefore, that the Secretary does not ask for it to be registered.

6. [83]

   I note that the identity of the birth father is unknown and therefore consider it appropriate to dispense with the giving of notice of the proceedings to the birth father.

7. [84]

   I am satisfied that E is capable of giving sole consent to her adoption in accordance with s 54(2). She is 16 years old, has been cared for by the proposed adoptive parents for more than two years, and has shown that she is of sufficient maturity to understand the effect of giving consent. E gave her consent to the adoption on 30 October 2018, having been provided with the Mandatory Information on 31 January 2017 (and again on 23 October 2018) and counselled by Ms Golden in accordance with s 63 on 23 October 2018.

8. [85]

   I am of the view that the other formal requirements of the Act have been met. E was present in the State when the adoption application was filed (s 23(2)(a)) and less than 18 years of age when the summons was filed (s 24(1)(a)). The appropriate notice was given to the birth mother (ss 54(3)(a) and 88(1)(a)). For the purposes of s 87, the application was made by the Secretary.

9. [86]

   I am satisfied that the proposed adoptive parents are domiciled in the State (ss 23(2)(b) and 28(1)(a)), meet the relevant age requirement (s 28(3)) and have been living together for the requisite period (s 28(4)). I am also entirely satisfied that the proposed adoptive parents are of good repute and are fit and proper persons to fulfil the responsibilities of parents, particularly having regard to the quality of the care they have provided E with over the past 16 years.

10. [87]

    Finally, the Secretary seeks an order that the Court approves the surname “F” and given names “E C B A G”. Order 7 of the orders of 13 July 2007 permitted the proposed adoptive parents to change E’s surname to “F” provided they retain “B” as a middle name. E’s original name was “E H B”. However, in 2007, the birth mother advised that she wished E’s name to be changed to “C”, the Dinka form of “E.” Because E was familiar with the name “E” it was agreed that the names “C”, “B” and “A” would be added to her birth certificate (“A” is a name from the birth mother’s family). The birth mother also agreed that “G”, a name from the proposed adoptive mother’s family, could be added. Therefore, E already uses the proposed names.

11. [88]

    Although she has expressed frustration about the length of her name, E requested that on the making of an adoption order her name be “E C B A G F”. The given names “C”, “B” and “A” maintain an important link between E and her birth family, while the given name “G” and the surname “F” reflect her place in the proposed adoptive parents’ family. Given these circumstances, I approve the name proposed in order 5 sought by the Secretary.