Rogers v Ribes

Two sets of proceedings were listed before me for directions this morning, Friday, 19 December 2025, the last day of the law term. These proceedings were (with abbreviation):

Mr J Armfield appeared for the plaintiff in the s 66G proceedings and the defendant in the Family Provision proceedings. Mr R Antill appeared for the defendant in the s 66G proceedings and for the plaintiff in the Family Provision proceedings.

The Family Provision proceedings are listed for hearing before me on 16 and 17 February 2026. This listing was made on 11 September 2025. Noting that today is the last day of the law term, I note that the hearing is to take place in the third week following the commencement of the 2026 law term.

On Wednesday, 17 December 2025, by email at 4:35pm, the defendant in the Family Provision proceedings (who is also the plaintiff in the s 66G proceedings) provided my Chambers with a set of written submissions, together with affidavits which set out the orders the defendant proposes to seek in relation to both sets of proceedings. The legal representatives for the plaintiff in the Family Provision proceedings were copied in on that email.

In these reasons, and for consistency, I will refer to the moving party on the application, Julie-Anne Ribes, as the defendant, noting that she is the defendant in the Family Provision proceedings only. I will refer to Ruben Rogers as the plaintiff. That is, references to the plaintiff and the defendant below are references to the parties in the Family Provision proceedings.

In the defendant’s written submissions, the orders sought were set out at paragraph [3] and are as follows:

Notwithstanding the provision of submissions and an indication as to the orders sought, no formal Notice of Motion had been filed. At the commencement of the hearing, I granted leave to the defendants to move orally on the motion to vacate the hearing date. Counsel for the plaintiff did not object to that course being taken and indicated he was able to deal with the application this morning.

Before the commencement of the formalities of the application, counsel for the plaintiff indicated that whilst the plaintiff opposed the orders in relation to vacating the hearing date, he did not oppose to the making of proposed order (iv), that is, an order for the s 66G proceedings to be heard at the same time as the Family Provision proceedings.

The reading of the affidavit evidence and tendering of documents, together with oral submissions, took place this morning. I indicated to the parties that I would provide my decision and give oral reasons for that decision at 3:00pm this afternoon.

In relation to the value of the estate, which is the subject of the Family Provision proceedings, there is agreement between the parties that the estimated net distributable estate of Arthur’s (Arthur Doone Rogers) estate is in the order of $278,000.

Having regard to the evidence before me, the submissions made by each of the parties and applying the relevant legal principles, I am of the view that it is in the interests of justice to reject the defendant’s application to vacate the hearing date and I propose to order that the s 66G proceedings be heard at the same time as the Family Provision proceedings.

I note that this outcome was the alternative sought by the defendant in any event and the orders were not opposed by the plaintiff.

To follow are the reasons for my decision. I have sought to deliver these reasons as expeditiously as possible and without the benefit of the transcript, given today is the last day of term and once the new law term starts there are only a further two weeks before the hearing of these matters commences. Accordingly, in providing these reasons I will focus on the main issues in contention between the parties, and on the concerns of the Court going to what is just, quick and cheap and in the interests of the administration of justice.

Part of the relevant background has been set out in the written submissions of the defendant. The submissions refer to the parties and other persons relevant to events by their first name. I will also do that without any intended disrespect or undue familiarity. I will refer to that summary, however, noting that most of the fundamental background facts are not in dispute.

At paragraph [6] of the defendant’s written submissions, it was said:

At paragraph [7] of the defendant’s written submissions, it was said:

Paragraph [8] of the defendant’s written submissions says:

Paragraph [9] of the defendant’s written submissions says:

Paragraph [10] of the defendant’s written submissions says:

Neither party addressed me on the legal principles to be applied when considering the issues before the Court.

Having said that, the legal principles to be applied when a party makes an application to vacate a hearing date are unlikely to be in dispute. I have set out those principles, which are to be applied here, in The Estate of Tabain (No 2) [2025] NSWSC 985 (Tabain). At [93] I said:

In relation to those provisions of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) (CPA), in Tabain, I said this:

At paragraph [14] of her written submissions, the defendant submits that:

At paragraph [15(a)] of her written submissions, the defendant submits that proceeding on the basis of a valuation runs the real risk of prejudice to the beneficiaries of Arthur’s estate because:

I do not accept this submission. Most broadly, family provision and much other litigation regularly proceeds on the basis of estimates of the value of property rather than the market price actually paid following a sale. This is so even when the property is the main asset of an estate.

More specifically, I do not accept that there is a significant disparity between the market price referred to in the valuation to which the defendant refers and the market price referred to in the market appraisals for the Yarrawonga Park property.

I accept the submissions of the plaintiff on this issue. There is one valuation by an accredited valuer before the Court which estimates a value of $580,000. For her part, the defendant has provided a market appraisal as recently as 18 December 2025, which gives an estimate of the sale price in the range of $600,000 to $650,000. In my view, if you take an average of that range as $625,000, I do not consider that estimate to be materially or concerningly different from the valuation of $580,000 such as to doubt the estimate of the value of either the valuation or the appraisal.

At paragraphs [15(b), (c) and (d)] of her written submissions, the defendant makes the following submissions:

I note the submissions of both the defendant and of the plaintiff on the issues raised in paragraphs [15(b), (c) and (d)] of the defendant’s written submissions, and I accept they raise issues of considerable complexity. I do not accept, however, having regard to both sets of submissions, that any of these issues will be solved by deferring the hearing of the Family Provision proceedings.

Both parties agree that the issues are complicated, and I agree with those submissions.

The defendant submitted that all of the outcomes are complicated and that any decision will only result in the “least worst result” and I agree with that also.

Given this, I do not propose to set out the terms of the various submissions in relation to paragraphs [15(b), (c) and (d)]. I do find, however, that the issues are complex and, as I have already said, I accept the submission of the defendant that all of the outcomes will still be complicated.

The plaintiff opposes the application to vacate the hearing date submitting, amongst other things, that it is two years since the Summons was filed. The hearing date for the Family Provision proceedings has been set down since 11 September 2025.

In further support of his opposition, I was taken by the plaintiff to evidence going to the earlier views held by the defendant in relation to the mediation and the hearing, as expressed in communications between the parties, the transcript of what was said in Court on previous occasions and the written submissions.

I am of the view that a material issue, when I come to consider this application, is that this is the first formal application on the part of the defendant, and at a relatively late stage, that has been made to have the hearing date vacated. This is a factor which I consider militates against the granting of the application to vacate.

The plaintiff also drew the Court’s attention to the size of the likely net distributable estate, being in the order of $278,000. Whilst it is clearly regrettable that the parties have not been able to settle this matter, I am of the view that the small size of the estate also militates against vacating the hearing dates, which will just further delay the hearing of the matter and where there will likely be costs incurred already in preparation for that hearing.

Having regard to the evidence before me and the submissions made by each of the parties, and having regard to the relevant legal principles, I am of the view it is in the interests of the administration of justice that I reject the application to vacate the hearing date. I propose to order that the s 66G proceedings be heard at the same time as the Family Provision proceedings.

Accordingly, the Court: