Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales v Gow

1. [1]

   BELL CJ: I have had the benefit of reading the reasons of Adamson JA. I agree with those reasons and the orders her Honour proposes.

2. [2]

   ADAMSON JA: By amended summons filed on 18 December 2024, the Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (the applicant) seeks a declaration that the respondent, Samantha Gow (the respondent) is not a fit and proper person to remain on the roll of legal practitioners (the roll) and an order that the respondent’s name be removed from the roll.

3. [3]

   This Court has original jurisdiction to make these orders under its inherent jurisdiction: s 264 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW).

4. [4]

   Although the respondent was served (having consented to service by email) and has had several interactions with the applicant since the original summons was filed on 24 June 2024, she neither filed an appearance, nor attended any directions hearings, nor filed any evidence, nor took any steps to actively oppose the orders. I am satisfied that the applicant, through the Crown Solicitor’s Office, has made ample attempts to make the respondent aware of the proceedings, including the detail of, and evidence supporting, the allegations made against her. No substantive response has been received from the respondent, although she sent an email to the applicant’s solicitor on 2 September 2024, asking that her appearance at the directions hearing be “excused”. The applicant has received no further communication from her. The respondent has failed to engage with these proceedings. Accordingly, this matter is to be determined on the papers.

5. [5]

   Although the respondent has not appeared to oppose the orders sought, this Court must satisfy itself independently not only that she is presently unfit to practise but also that she is likely to be unfit in the indefinite future such that the removal of her name from the roll is appropriate: Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v XX [2025] NSWCA 4 (XX) at [15]; Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Duncan [2024] NSWCA 147 at [3] (citing Council of the NSW Bar Association v Power (2008) 71 NSWLR 451; [2008] NSWCA 135 (Power) at [9], Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Parente [2019] NSWCA 33 at [33], [45] and Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Zhukovska (2020) 102 NSWLR 655; [2020] NSWCA 163 at [99]).

6. [6]

   For the reasons given below, I am persuaded that the applicant has discharged his onus of proving that the respondent is not a fit and proper person to remain on the roll and that, accordingly, the respondent’s name ought be removed from the roll.

7. [7]

   This Court is obliged to set out the findings of fact on the basis of which a practitioner’s name has been removed from the roll: see the summary of authorities in Council of the New South Wales Bar Association v Einfeld [2009] NSWCA 255; (2009) 258 ALR 768 at [12]-[16]. There are two reasons for this. First, in the event that the respondent applies to be returned to the roll, the Court hearing such an application is required to take into account the conduct on the basis of which the order for removal was made: Bridges v Law Society of New South Wales [1983] 2 NSWLR 361 at 362-363 (Moffitt P). Secondly, the making of detailed factual findings serves to educate the profession as to the conduct which has been found to be inconsistent with continued practice.

8. [8]

   The applicant relies on 27 particulars in support of the relief sought in the amended summons. He contends that these particulars cumulatively demonstrate that the respondent is not a fit and proper person to remain on the roll. The particulars can be summarised as follows:

   1. (1)

      2021 convictions in the Magistrates Court of Queensland (particulars (a)-(e));

   2. (2)

      2014 findings of guilt in the Magistrates Court of Queensland (particulars (f) and (g));

   3. (3)

      2024 Local Court of New South Wales findings of guilt (particulars (h) and (i));

   4. (4)

      2017 Law Society of NSW finding that the respondent was not a fit and proper person to hold a practising certificate and its refusal to renew her practising certificate (particulars (j)-(m));

   5. (5)

      2018 conduct in continuing to act as a solicitor in:

   6. (6)

      2018 Law Society of NSW finding of dishonest act or omission of the respondent resulting in a claim by Mrs Ferguson against the Fidelity Fund (particulars (s)-(aa)).

9. [9]

   The particulars include conduct both in New South Wales and Queensland. The Legal Services Commission in Queensland conducted its own investigations into the respondent’s conduct in purporting to act as, and holding herself out as, a solicitor and also her criminal conduct. It provided that material to the applicant to support the present application.

10. [10]

    I propose to address the particularised allegations in chronological order.

Background: the respondent’s admission to practice and right to practise

1. [11]

   The respondent was born in 1979. On 15 February 2013, the respondent, then 33 years old, was admitted as a lawyer to the Supreme Court of New South Wales and her name was entered on the roll. She has not been admitted elsewhere.

2. [12]

   The respondent held a practising certificate as an employee of a legal practice (supervised) from 11 March 2013.

3. [13]

   In March 2016, the respondent applied for a variation to her practising certificate to practise as a Principal of a Legal Practice of an Incorporated Legal Practice. Her then current practising certificate was subject to condition 3, which required her to complete a Practice Management Course. On 25 March 2016, the respondent gave a solicitor’s undertaking, to complete the next available Practice Management Course. On the basis of that undertaking, condition 3 was removed and condition 4, which recorded the undertaking, was imposed. Thereafter, the respondent was issued with a practising certificate as a Principal of a Legal Practice.

4. [14]

   From April 2016, the respondent practised through a law practice known as “Gow Group Global Legal Services”, which was operated through a company, Sam Gow Pty Ltd as trustee for the Gow Family Trust, later known as 1189 Properties Ptd Ltd (the Gow company), of which the respondent was the sole director and shareholder.

5. [15]

   The respondent was granted numerous extensions of her undertaking. However, when she still had not done the Practice Management Course as at 30 June 2017, her practising certificate was not renewed for the following practice year (1 July 2017-30 June 2018). On 14 December 2017, the Council of the Law Society refused to renew the respondent’s practising certificate for the 2017/2018 year. The applicant appears to accept that the respondent held a practising certificate up to 14 December 2017.

6. [16]

   The respondent’s failure to comply with her undertaking to complete the Practice Management Court and associated conduct is relied on by the applicant in support of the relief sought and will be addressed below.

The conduct relied on in support of the application

1. [17]

   On 29 May 2014, the respondent pleaded guilty to the offences of breach of bail undertaking (s 29 of the Bail Act 1980 (Qld)); being drunk in a public place (s 10 of the Summary Offences Act 2005 (Qld)); and committing public nuisance (s 6(1) of the Summary Offences Act). Although the Queensland Magistrates Court in Southport ordered that no conviction be recorded, fines were imposed for all offences.

2. [18]

   As referred to above, despite non-compliance with her undertaking to complete the Practice Management Course, the respondent’s practising certificate was renewed and extensions granted for her to complete the course. However, as at 30 June 2017, she had still not complied with her undertaking and no further practising certificate was issued. She was referred to the Law Society’s Professional Standards Department for failing to comply with her undertaking.

3. [19]

   On 14 December 2017, the Council of the Law Society refused to renew the respondent’s practising certificate for the 2017/2018 year, resolving that she was not a fit and proper person to hold a practising certificate. Its reasons for its resolutions included the following:

4. [20]

   On 14 December 2017, the Law Society appointed Richard Flynn as manager of the respondent’s law practice. On 16 December 2017, Mr Flynn informed the respondent by telephone that she was no longer permitted to practise as a solicitor, hold herself out as a solicitor or operate a trust account. In a letter dated 20 December 2017, Mr Flynn confirmed his appointment and what he had told her in the telephone conversation.

5. [21]

   As referred to above, the respondent’s practising certificate for the year ended 30 June 2017 was not renewed and no further practising certificate was issued.

6. [22]

   On 15 August 2017, the respondent offered to act as solicitor for Mrs Ferguson, aged 72 years and retired, who wanted to buy a unit in Surfers Paradise with an associate for $125,000. The respondent gave Mrs Ferguson her trust account details and asked her to transfer $57,500 (for her half-share in the unit less the deposit) into that account, which she did on 4 September 2017. At the time of this transfer, the respondent’s trust account had a nil balance.

7. [23]

   On 16 September 2017, the respondent met Mrs Ferguson in a car park, showed her a contract on her mobile phone and asked her to sign it electronically. Mrs Ferguson did so, believing that it related to her purchase of the unit. She received no information from the respondent and was unable to contact her after November 2017, despite repeated requests for the return of the money.

8. [24]

   Of the sum of $57,500 which Mrs Ferguson had deposited into the respondent’s trust account, the respondent transferred a total of $20,500 to her office account as follows.

9. [25]

   The respondent’s office account showed that withdrawals were made from the office account for the respondent’s personal expenses totalling $10,343.43.

10. [26]

    The respondent admitted that the office account was overdrawn immediately prior to the first transfer referred to above on 21 September 2017.

11. [27]

    On 27 January 2018, Mrs Ferguson sent the respondent an email in the following terms:

12. [28]

    On 10 May 2018, Peter Edwards, who had been appointed by the Law Society to investigate the matter, interviewed the respondent. A transcript was made of the interview. The respondent informed Mr Edwards that Mrs Ferguson was still a client of hers, admitted that she had authorised the transfer of a total of $20,500 from the trust account to the office account but maintained that the transfers were made to enable payment for “services rendered” and that she had issued invoices for each amount. When it was put to the respondent that she had not issued any invoices to Mrs Ferguson, she responded, “That is not true”.

13. [29]

    On 20 July 2018, Mr Edwards reported to the Law Society on his investigation. He expressed the view that the respondent had breached the following provisions of the Uniform Law:

14. [30]

    Ultimately, on 26 July 2018, Mr Flynn attended the Manly branch of the Bank of Queensland (BOQ) to arrange to transfer the funds from the respondent’s trust and office accounts to repay Mrs Ferguson. He was advised that there was nothing in the accounts. Subsequently, Mr Flynn learned that, on 19 July 2018, the respondent had gone to the BOQ’s Coolangatta branch and withdrawn all the funds from the trust and office accounts of her practice, in return for bank cheques which totalled $47,120.02. At Mr Flynn’s request, the BOQ put a stop to those cheques to prevent the respondent from having access to these funds. He arranged for further bank cheques to be drawn in favour of Mrs Ferguson and posted them to her under cover of letter dated 31 July 2018.

15. [31]

    By letter dated 31 July 2018, Mr Flynn advised Mrs Ferguson of her right to make a claim on the NSW Law Society Fidelity Fund for the disparity (in the order of $10,000) between what she had paid and what Mr Flynn had been able to recover. Mrs Ferguson lodged a claim which was received by the Law Society on 16 August 2018.

16. [32]

    Kathryn Byron was appointed to investigate Mrs Ferguson’s claim against the Fidelity Fund. In her report of 15 November 2018, she identified the following issues: first, whether the respondent performed any relevant work; second, whether any work performed was of value to Mrs Ferguson and, if so, how that value might be offset; and, third, whether the respondent had acted dishonestly or made dishonest omissions.

17. [33]

    As to the third matter, Ms Byron relevantly found:

18. [34]

    At a meeting on 15 November 2018, the Fidelity Fund Management Committee (FFMC) resolved that the Presiding Administrator of the Fidelity Fund be provided with the FFMC’s initial view of the claim, which was to:

19. [35]

    The Presiding Administrator’s Final Report dated 29 November 2018 agreed with the findings of fact made by the FFMC and with the course proposed, and said at paragraph 20:

20. [36]

    On 13 December 2018, the FFMC resolved to accept the recommendation in the Final Report and paid Mrs Ferguson the amount claimed together with interest.

21. [37]

    On 12 March 2018, Volkswagen Financial Services Australia Pty Ltd (VW) filed an application in the Queensland Magistrates Court at Cleveland (the Cleveland Magistrates Court) for delivery of goods, being an Audi motor vehicle (the Audi) of which the Gow company was the lessor and the respondent was the guarantor under the lease.

22. [38]

    On 15 March 2018, the magistrate, by order, authorised the repossession of the Audi. VW repossessed the Audi on 24 March 2018.

23. [39]

    On 10 April 2018, the Gow company and the respondent applied to set aside or stay the order for repossession. Their application came on for hearing in the Cleveland Magistrates Court before Magistrate Sarra on 18 April 2018. In the course of the hearing, the respondent said of the Audi:

24. [40]

    When the Magistrate asked the respondent what her client files were doing in the boot when they “[should] … be in a filing cabinet secured in [her] office”, the respondent said that she had “been on a matter in the Supreme Court”. When the Magistrate asked her what her occupation was, she said that she was “a solicitor”. She added:

25. [41]

    When the Magistrate asked the respondent how many files were in the car, she answered:

26. [42]

    At the conclusion of the hearing, the Magistrate set aside the application to injunct the sale of the vehicle; directed that the files be retrieved from the vehicle within a specified time; ordered the respondent (Ms Gow) to pay costs of $600; and noted that the matter would be referred to “the Legal [Services] Commission” for its consideration.

27. [43]

    On 11 June 2018, at the Magistrate’s request, the Administration Officer of the Local Court at Cleveland emailed the transcript and the orders made to the Legal Services Commission, which investigated the conduct.

28. [44]

    On 7 March 2018, the prosecution of Vaughn Hadfield was listed for review before Boddice J of the Supreme Court of Queensland at Brisbane. Mr Hadfield’s then solicitors, Hannay Lawyers, sought and were granted leave to withdraw from representing him. The matter was stood down as Mr Hadfield was not present in Court, in breach of a condition of his bail.

29. [45]

    When the hearing of the matter resumed at 2.02pm, the respondent sought leave to appear on behalf of Mr Hadfield. She did not explain why leave was required but informed the Court:

30. [46]

    Justice Boddice adjourned the matter to 21 March 2018 for review on the basis that Ms Gow was his legal representative. Before adjourning the matter, his Honour directed the following remarks to Mr Hadfield:

31. [47]

    On 21 March 2018, Ms Gow again sought leave to appear for Mr Hadfield. The transcript recorded that she said:

32. [48]

    The respondent also said:

33. [49]

    On the basis of the respondent’s representations to the Court that the funding for representation was still being sorted out, Boddice J adjourned the matter again and listed it for review on 2 May 2018.

34. [50]

    The Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Qld) informed the Legal Services Commissioner (Qld) that there was no electronic record at that office of any communication having been received by that office on that day.

35. [51]

    The appearance on 21 March 2018 was the last occasion on which the respondent appeared on behalf of Mr Hadfield.

36. [52]

    On 1 May 2018, the respondent filed a statement of claim in the Local Court of New South Wales at Tweed Heads (the Tweed Heads Local Court) in which she alleged that VW’s repossession of the Audi on 24 March 2018 was unlawful. The statement of claim was served on VW on 8 May 2018. On 30 May 2018, the respondent filed an application for default judgment (which was premature as VW had 28 days from service of the statement of claim within which to file a defence: Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), (UCPR), r 14.3). VW filed a notice of motion seeking that the proceedings be struck out as an abuse of process or, in the alternative, on the basis that they were frivolous or vexatious. The notice of motion was served on the respondent on 7 June 2018 and listed for hearing on 26 June 2018 before Dunlevy LCM.

37. [53]

    In the course of the hearing, the following exchange occurred between Dunlevy LCM and the respondent:

38. [54]

    At the conclusion of the oral hearing on 26 June 2018, Dunlevy LCM dismissed the respondent’s proceedings on the bases that the decision of the Cleveland Magistrates Court was res judicata and also that the proceedings were an abuse of process.

39. [55]

    On 16 September 2021, the respondent pleaded guilty in the Queensland Magistrates Court at Southport to the following four charges contrary to s 488(1)(a) of the Queensland Criminal Code.

40. [56]

    The statement of facts tendered on sentence was accepted by the respondent. The following is a summary of these facts.

41. [57]

    The respondent and [DW] were married in 2002 and had children, including SW, who was born in 2004. They divorced in 2008. There was an informal arrangement between them as to custody of, and access to, the children. SW lived with the respondent and went to a local school (the Local School). However, in January 2018, SW told her father that she wanted to live with him. DW agreed and, on 23 January 2018, enrolled her in a school which SW had previously attended (the College).

42. [58]

    On 29 January 2018, the respondent sent the following text to DW:

43. [59]

    At the time this and subsequent texts (see below) were sent, there were no relevant court proceedings on foot.

44. [60]

    On or about 30 January 2018, DW received a text message from the respondent which attached a document which purported to be parenting orders made by “Judge Jarrett” of the Circuit Court with respect to SW in respect of file number ZB3062/201 (the first orders). The document identified DW as the respondent to the proceedings but did not show the respondent (Ms Gow) as a party. The first orders included an order that SW live with Ms Gow, that DW submit to psychological assessment, and that SW attend the Local School. The first orders purported to be signed by “Judge Jarret” (Jarrett J) of the Circuit Court (paragraph 10 of the statement of facts).

45. [61]

    After sending the first orders to DW, the respondent sent the following text to him:

46. [62]

    This court order was uttered to induce DW to act in a way detrimental to his lawful right to have custody of SW at the relevant time.

47. [63]

    On 6 February 2018, the respondent went to the front office of the College and handed a document which purported to constitute orders of the Circuit Court to a staff member of the College (the second orders). The orders were in the same terms as the one referred to above but, in this version, the respondent was listed as the applicant. The staff member informed the respondent that SW had left school that day. The respondent left the document with her and said that she would return the following day.

48. [64]

    On 7 February 2018, the respondent attended the College and demanded that SW be sent home with her. She referred to the second orders and alleged that DW had “stolen” SW. The principal telephoned DW, who attended the school. An agreement was reached, as a result of which SW went home with the respondent.

49. [65]

    On 20 February 2018, the respondent contacted the principal of the College to arrange for SW to be collected so that she could be enrolled in the Local School. The principal said that he would honour “the document” (being the second orders). The respondent collected SW from the College.

50. [66]

    The second court orders were uttered to induce the College to act in a way detrimental to a legal right it enjoyed, which was, in effect, to have SW, who was enrolled in the College, attend the College.

51. [67]

    In mid-February 2018, DW contacted the Circuit Court to discuss the first orders and cited the file number for its reference. He was told that no orders had been made in any matter involving DW or the respondent on 30 January 2018; the file number did not exist in the court records; and a similar file number (ZB 3602 of 2001) related to the matter between the parties in 2001.

52. [68]

    On 24 May 2018, a search warrant was executed at the respondent’s residence in her presence and in the presence of her solicitor. Her mobile phone and computer files of MS Word documents similar in appearance to the first and second orders were seized. On 8 June 2018, a search warrant was executed at the College, in the course of which the second orders and documents relating to SW’s enrolment were seized.

53. [69]

    On 16 September 2021, the respondent was sentenced (for the four offences) to a term of imprisonment of nine months, which was suspended after 70 days in custody (which equated to the pre-sentence custody from 8 July 2021 to 15 September 2021).

54. [70]

    On 21 June 2019, the respondent entered into a bail undertaking in the Queensland Magistrates Court at Brisbane to appear at Southport on 1 July 2019 and subsequently, whenever the matter was listed. The address at which she was to reside for the purpose of her bail was her residence in Banora Point, Queensland. The matter was listed before the court on 7 January 2021. On 6 January 2021, the respondent emailed the prosecutor saying that she could not attend court as she was living in New South Wales and was prevented by COVID-19 restrictions from attending. The prosecutor endeavoured to obtain information about the respondent’s then current address, without success.

55. [71]

    When the respondent failed to appear at the Local Court at Southport on 7 January 2021, a warrant was issued for her arrest. The police facts recorded:

56. [72]

    The respondent pleaded not guilty to the charge of failure to appear in accordance with her undertaking contrary to s 33(1) of the Bail Act 1980 (Qld). On 9 March 2021, the respondent was convicted of that offence and fined $500.

57. [73]

    On 11 April 2024, the respondent was convicted by the Local Court at Tweed Heads (following her plea of guilty) of an offence of common assault contrary to s 61 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), committed on 5 July 2023 against the respondent’s mother.

58. [74]

    MacMahon A/LCM’s remarks on sentence included the following narrative, based on the police facts:

59. [75]

    The respondent was convicted and sentenced to a Community Corrections Order (CCO) pursuant to s 8 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) for a period of 12 months, expiring on 10 April 2025. The CCO was subject to conditions, which included that the respondent be subject to supervision by a Community Corrections Officer, undertake a mental health assessment and undertake any treatment or programs recommended by that assessment and to undertake a drug or alcohol program as recommended. An Apprehended Violence Order was made against her for the protection of her mother and two other named persons for a period of two years.

60. [76]

    On 28 October 2024, the respondent was convicted of the following offences in the Magistrates Court of Victoria at Sunshine:

61. [77]

    On 28 October 2024, the respondent was sentenced for these offences by an aggregate order which imposed a fine of $1,000 without conviction. Further, her driver’s licence was cancelled and she was disqualified from driving in Victoria for 12 months.

Consideration

1. [78]

   The gravity of the allegations made by the applicant against the respondent is such that they need to be proved on the balance of probabilities to the Briginshaw standard (Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336; [1938] HCA 34): see, for example, The Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales v Sukkar [2007] NSWCA 341 at [16]; Power at [40]; and Carr v Council of the Law Society of New South Wales [2020] NSWCA 276 at [112]. However, the inferences for which the applicant contended can more readily be drawn in circumstances where the respondent has chosen not to give evidence refuting the evidence adduced against her. This is not a case where the respondent’s right to silence might operate to moderate the duty of candour which she owes to this Court: cf. Power at [28] (Hodgson JA, Beazley and McColl JJA agreeing).

2. [79]

   The evidence adduced on behalf of the applicant which forms the basis of the findings made above is sufficient to prove the particularised allegations made in support of the claim for relief to the requisite standard.

3. [80]

   In New South Wales Bar Association v Cummins (2001) 52 NSWLR 279; [2001] NSWCA 284 at [20], Spigelman CJ explained why legal practitioners must conduct themselves in accordance with the highest standards of integrity:

4. [81]

   The evidence establishes that the respondent is not a fit and proper person to remain on the roll.

5. [82]

   The respondent’s extended and repeated failure over a period of almost 18 months (from March 2016 to December 2017) to comply with her undertaking to the Law Society to complete a Practice Management Course demonstrates that she cannot be trusted to do that which she has undertaken to do and that she is cavalier about compliance with obligations associated with her right to practise.

6. [83]

   The respondent’s breaches of bail undertakings in 2014 and subsequently in 2021 indicate, together with other evidence, a disregard of her obligations to the courts before whom she appeared as a party and as a legal representative. They are consistent with other evidence which indicates that she is prepared to put her personal interest and convenience ahead of her duties to the court.

7. [84]

   At least from 14 December 2017, the respondent ceased to be a “qualified entity” within the meaning of s 6 of the Uniform Law since, as she did not have a current practising certificate, she was no longer an “Australian legal practitioner”. After that date, the respondent was prohibited from engaging in legal practice (s 10 of the Uniform Law) or representing that she was entitled to engage in legal practice (s 11 of the Uniform Law). Further, she became uninsured, thereby exposing those for whom she acted to deception and to the risk of obtaining professional legal services from an uninsured entity. She also misled the courts before whom she appeared by using language which was apt to imply that she was entitled to act as a legal practitioner or failing to express the reason why the leave to appear which she sought was required. She acted, not only in breach of the statutory prohibitions, but also in breach of the trust which courts are entitled to repose in legal practitioners who appear before them.

8. [85]

   The respondent’s appearances in respect of her own matters against VW (in the Cleveland Magistrates Court and the Tweed Heads Local Court) and when purporting to appear on behalf of Mr Hadfield in the Queensland Supreme Court constitute breaches of the statutory prohibition.

9. [86]

   It might be observed that even if the respondent was entitled to take instructions from Mrs Ferguson in August 2017 (on the basis of the applicant’s concession that the respondent had a right to practise until 14 December 2017), she was required to cease to act for her as soon as the decision was made by the Law Society on 14 December 2017 not to renew her practising certificate. After that date she was prohibited from representing that she was entitled to engage in legal practice. However, the only conduct particularised by the applicant in respect of Mrs Ferguson is the respondent’s conduct which gave rise to the claim on the Fidelity Fund. Accordingly, I do not take into account her continuing to act for Mrs Ferguson after 14 December 2017 (if indeed she did so) against the respondent.

10. [87]

    The respondent’s conduct in inducing Mrs Ferguson to pay $57,500 into the respondent’s trust account and then treating the money as her own by paying it into her office account and using it for general expenses is particularly serious. In XX, the Court said of misappropriations by legal practitioners of clients’ funds:

11. [88]

    While Mrs Ferguson received financial compensation from the NSW Fidelity Fund (because of the finding that the respondent had acted fraudulently), her trust in the legal profession was damaged by the respondent’s conduct. Mrs Ferguson suffered considerable stress over a lengthy period as a result of the prospect of losing her life’s savings. But for the diligence of the NSW Law Society, the money which had not yet been dissipated may not have been recovered from the respondent.

12. [89]

    The respondent’s conduct in forging and uttering documents in January and February 2018 (in connection with the custody of SW to make it appear as if they were generated by the Circuit Court) is egregious. She deliberately misled innocent persons, DW and the staff of the school where SW was enrolled and caused DW to relinquish custody of SW, who had expressed a desire to live with him rather than the respondent. DW and the school staff acted immediately to comply with what appeared to be court orders but which were, in fact, fake documents which the respondent had produced with a view to obtaining a result which suited her. The respondent’s conduct had the consequence of undermining the trust which the community is entitled to place in documents which appear to be court orders. Her conduct in forging and uttering purported court orders was a deliberate and premeditated attempt to influence people to act (on pain of contempt of court) in a way that suited her.

13. [90]

    The respondent’s convictions for breach of her bail undertaking in 2021 and common assault in July 2023, when taken together with the other established conduct are consistent with a pattern of disregard for the law.

14. [91]

    The driving offences committed by the respondent in December 2023 and January 2024 also exhibit a disregard for the law. The evidence does not reveal when, or in what circumstances, the respondent was disqualified for driving at the time of the offences or when the vehicle which she was driving became deregistered. However, her preparedness to drive in these circumstances was not only illegal but also irresponsible. Taken together with other evidence, it tends to indicate that she is prepared to breach the law for her own convenience and that she cannot be trusted to abide by the law.

15. [92]

    The cumulative effect of the conduct proved against the respondent is that she is not a fit and proper person to remain on the roll. Further, the respondent's conduct in relation to Mrs Ferguson and the misuse of the trust account and her separate conduct in forging and uttering court orders of the Federal Circuit Court would each independently have warranted her removal from the roll.

Proposed orders

1. [93]

   I propose the following orders:

   1. (1)

      Declare that the respondent is not a fit and proper person to remain on the Roll of Australian Lawyers.

   2. (2)

      Order that the name of the respondent be removed from the Roll of Australian Lawyers.

   3. (3)

      Order the respondent to pay the applicant’s costs of the proceedings.

2. [94]

   McHUGH JA: I agree with Adamson JA. I would add one observation. For a lawyer to forge and utter any document is extremely serious. Such conduct discloses not only dishonesty but a willingness to manipulate others for personal advantage. But for a lawyer to forge and utter what purport to be court orders is, as Adamson JA says, egregious. The respondent’s conduct discloses a lack of insight into, and a disregard for, the administration of justice itself. It demands her removal from the roll.