Bezzina v Director of Public Prosecutions

1. [1]

   THE COURT: At the commencement of the hearing of this judicial review application on 16 December 2025, in the order of 300 pages of material was tendered, comprising the two folders assembled by each side. The applicant, Ms Leslee-ann Bezzina, confirmed that her affidavit sworn 4 December 2025 should be treated as her submissions in reply supplied in accordance with the Court’s directions. However, immediately before oral address, the applicant asserted an entitlement to a “ruling”, without which she said she was not prepared to proceed. No prior notice had been given of the application either to the Court or to the first respondent, the Director of Public Prosecutions (the “DPP”).

2. [2]

   The form of the “ruling” sought by the applicant fluctuated during the course of her application. At various stages, she sought confirmation that each member of the Court agreed that he was bound by stare decisis, or was bound by the High Court of Australia, or “stood under” the Australian Constitution or the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic). The presiding judge indicated, expressly speaking for himself, that he regarded himself as bound by stare decisis, and by decisions of the High Court of Australia and the Constitution, but that the Victorian legislation did not apply in New South Wales. However, he also advised that so far as he was concerned a litigant had no entitlement to any “ruling” such as was sought, and that the applicant would be well advised to seek to develop her submissions that the decision of the District Court was affected by jurisdictional error. The applicant had the benefit of a short adjournment to reflect on the course she would take.

3. [3]

   After that adjournment, the applicant pressed her application, indicating that in its absence, she was unwilling to proceed. Ultimately, the formulation relied upon was “I need a ruling that I am going to be guaranteed my human rights under the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006”. The applicant was given an opportunity to advance submissions in support of her application. She relied upon Momcilovic v The Queen (2011) 245 CLR 1; [2011] HCA 34 and contended that the Victorian legislation applied in New South Wales because it had been upheld by the High Court.

4. [4]

   In response, the DPP submitted that the Victorian legislation had no application in New South Wales, and that there was no authority to the contrary. The applicant reiterated her position in reply.

5. [5]

   At the conclusion of submissions, the Court announced that the applicant’s application for a ruling was refused, and that reasons would be published in due course. These are our reasons.

6. [6]

   First, the applicant invoked the jurisdiction of this Court when she filed her summons. She has no entitlement to qualify the exercise of the jurisdiction she has chosen to invoke by any “ruling” that the members of the Court guaranteed or abided by or “stood under” any of the documents or legislative instruments she invoked.

7. [7]

   Secondly, although the applicant styled her application as being for a “ruling”, there is no existing dispute between the parties on this point which requires resolution. In substance the applicant claims an entitlement to a further acknowledgement by the members of the Court as to a poorly formulated proposition of law. She identified no principle, or authority, or statute, giving her any such entitlement. There is none.

8. [8]

   Thirdly, the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) does not apply in New South Wales, and Momcilovic is not authority that it does. The applicant was plainly aware that Victoria and Queensland have enacted legislation which in, different forms, is protective of certain human rights. New South Wales has not enacted such legislation. The legislation of other States does not apply to offences committed in New South Wales (the applicant was prosecuted for her driving in regional New South Wales). Nor does other States’ legislation apply to the prosecution of offences committed in New South Wales in the courts of New South Wales.

9. [9]

   This Court’s function is to administer the law. That function includes resolving disputed questions of law, such as whether a Victorian statute is applicable. To the extent necessary, the Court will resolve that issue. The applicant is not entitled to an upfront “ruling” on any such issue, still less is she entitled to a ruling on such issue in her favour, as a condition of her prosecuting the proceedings she has commenced.

The underlying events

1. [10]

   As evidence had been tendered and extensive written submissions exchanged, the Court indicated that it would deal with the substance of the applicant's case. The following are our reasons for dismissing that case.

2. [11]

   On 3 July 2023, New South Wales police officer Senior Constable Marsh was conducting speed enforcement duties at 8:30 am on Ophir Road at Llanarth in western New South Wales. His vehicle was equipped with traffic enforcement devices for the measurement of speed.

3. [12]

   Constable Marsh observed a white utility vehicle driven by the applicant, Ms Bezzina, at the top of the hill of Ophir Road, a residential “built-up” area. A photograph tendered in the Local Court showed a 50-kilometre speed sign on the road. Constable Marsh commenced tracking the vehicle using his traffic enforcement devices for the measurement of speed. The vehicle was travelling at 70 kilometres per hour. He tracked it for eight seconds during which time the vehicle speed increased to 80 kilometres per hour. There were no other vehicles present. Constable Marsh activated his in-car video and started his warning lights to stop the vehicle. Once stopped, he ordered a registration check of the applicant. He had a conversation with the applicant:

4. [13]

   Upon receiving the penalty notice, the applicant elected to contest the matter in the Local Court.

5. [14]

   On 18 January 2024, the applicant appeared in the Local Court at Bathurst. The prosecutor gave a short opening address and tendered a statement from Constable Marsh which included the account at paragraph [12] above and accompanying documents in the brief. Those documents included certificates made under s 137 of the Road Transport Act 2013 (NSW) which certified that each of two traffic enforcement devices used by Constable Marsh on 3 July 2023 were “approved for speed measurement” and had been tested, sealed, and on the day in question were tested and operating correctly.

6. [15]

   Section 137 of the Road Transport Act provides:

7. [16]

   The definition of an “appropriate inspection officer” relevantly includes a police officer: s 135(1)(a)(i). Speed measurement devices are subject to calibration and accuracy certification procedures for the approved traffic enforcement device, at least every 12 months: s 137 of the Road Transport Act and cl 29(1) of the Road Transport (General) Regulation 2021.

8. [17]

   As already noted, two certificates were tendered confirming that the devices were tested on 29 November 2022 (radar) and 5 June 2023 (calibrated digital speedometer), each within 12-months on the date of the offence, 3 July 2023.

9. [18]

   The effect of s 137 is that the valid certification of an approved speed testing device, tested by an appropriate inspection officer, is admissible prima facie evidence that the device was working correctly and recording accurately. To rebut this evidence that the device was working accurately and operating properly, the defendant is required to prove by their own expert evidence that the device in question was inaccurate or not working properly.

10. [19]

    Sections 140 and 141 of the Road Transport Act provide:

11. [20]

    The combined effect of ss 137, 140 and 141 is that only expert evidence, if accepted by the tribunal of fact, is legally capable of raising doubt that the radar used on 3 July 2023 was not reliable, or accurate, or operating correctly: Roads & Maritime Services v Noble-Hiblen [2019] NSWSC 1230 at [16]-[25] per Campbell J.

12. [21]

    The police prosecutor said that he had spoken to the applicant and that “I’m sure she will correct me if I’m wrong, [but] that the conversation that was relayed in Senior Constable Marsh’s statement is accurate”. Accordingly, the prosecutor did not tender the videos taken by Constable Marsh. The prosecution case was closed without any witness being called.

13. [22]

    Magistrate Stapleton carefully explained to the applicant the elements of the offence, the onus of proof on the prosecution and explained that the applicant could give evidence if she wished but did not need to do so. The applicant said, “I’ve written… an affidavit Your Honour to hand in…”. The Magistrate explained that “you have to do things on your- the basis of your best recollection today”. The applicant chose to give oral evidence and was sworn as a witness.

14. [23]

    In her evidence in chief, elicited by open ended questions from the Magistrate, the applicant said that the speed limit applicable was 50 kilometres per hour and that she was the driver of the vehicle. As to the speed she was driving, the applicant said, “I thought it was 60 but its actually 50… so it was-would have been somewhere between...”

15. [24]

    The applicant said in her evidence in chief that she had driven in excess of 50 kilometres per hour by mistake and that she was “trying to stick to around the 60… sort of below-ish 60, yeah”.

16. [25]

    At the close of the applicant’s evidence, Magistrate Stapleton told the applicant she was excused from the witness box and that “we’ll get on to the legal points of the case”. After the submissions from the prosecutor, the applicant commenced her submissions.

17. [26]

    The applicant argued she was not speeding because the “Road Rules guidelines, they have never been properly enacted”. The applicant said she wanted to tender more evidence. She outlined that evidence as being:

    1. (1)

       That the prosecution had not shown there was a properly enacted law to convict the applicant under and therefore she was “not speeding” but was “driving faster, okay”. That is, there was no properly enacted law that forbids driving faster than 50 km/hour in a 50 km/hour zone;

    2. (2)

       A “Notice of Objection” sent to Senior Constable Marsh to which the applicant had not received a response. The applicant asserted that the legal effect of a failure to reply to what the applicant styled as a “Notice of Objection” was, “if there’s no reply, he who does not deny, admits”. The applicant apparently wished to submit that the absence of a response was an “admission” by Senior Constable Marsh that there is not “a properly enacted law [the applicant] can be convicted under” and in the lack of response there was a failure to show “these [speed measurement] devices meet Australian Standards and meet the conditions of the National Measurement Act 1960” and that they were working properly;

    3. (3)

       The applicant asserted that Senior Constable Marsh did not follow the “guidelines for site criteria selection” to measure speed and also submitted, “I wonder whether there was interference by the sewer station… and the tall telegraph poles”.

18. [27]

    The Magistrate informed the applicant that it was “too late to tender any photographs and there’s no relevance in what you’ve put, in any event”. Her Honour explained that the applicant had been given an opportunity to test the prosecution case and “[y]ou didn’t cross-examine the officer to suggest that he didn’t use his device accurately or anything like that. You accepted Mr Prosecutor could tender the statement and you didn’t require the officer for cross-examination”.

19. [28]

    The Magistrate said to the applicant “I’ve given you a fair opportunity to make submissions. Please sit down, I’m about to give [a] decision and reasons for the decision”. The Magistrate then gave an ex tempore judgment and found the applicant guilty of the offence beyond reasonable doubt. In the penalty phase the applicant stated, of her capacity to pay a fine, “I object to the whole process your Honour”. A fine of $660 was imposed. The sheriff was called as apparently the applicant would not leave the Court. Before the recording ceased the applicant repeatedly demanded to be provided with a “written copy of the judge’s oath of office”.

20. [29]

    The applicant appealed her conviction to the District Court pursuant to s 11 of the Crimes Appeal and Review Act 2001 (NSW) (“CAR Act”). On 3 May 2024, the applicant’s District Court appeal was listed for mention before Musgrave DCJ. Her Honour explained the procedure for hearing the appeal and asked the applicant if she wanted to put on fresh evidence, to which the applicant responded that she had been denied the opportunity to put on evidence in the Local Court but that the evidence she wished to rely on was not “fresh”. Musgrave DCJ carefully and patiently advised the applicant that her written submissions did not contain an application to adduce fresh evidence. If the applicant wanted to adduce fresh evidence which was not before the Local Court, she would need to give a copy to the DPP, tell the DPP why she believed it should be before the Court, and would need to file it. Her Honour set out a timetable for the filing of written submissions on the appeal.

21. [30]

    On 12 September 2024, the applicant’s appeal came on for hearing. At the outset of the hearing, Musgrave DCJ asked the applicant if she wanted the opportunity to obtain legal advice. The applicant declined. Her Honour asked if the applicant had made or intended to make an application for fresh evidence to be adduced. The applicant responded, as she had in May 2024, that she did not think that the additional evidence which was not before the Local Court was fresh. Her Honour, twice, carefully and patiently explained to the applicant that if material was not before the Magistrate, it was fresh evidence. Her Honour again explained to the applicant the steps she must take if she wished to rely on fresh evidence. The applicant advanced a number of reasons to the contrary, seemingly in the belief that s 80 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) was somehow relevant and that it had “overruled” the CAR Act.

22. [31]

    The following exchange then took place:

23. [32]

    The prosecution then tendered the appeal bundle consisting of the material which had been before the Local Court. The applicant objected to the tender and said:

24. [33]

    The Prosecutor explained that her submissions were sent the day before the hearing but that the bundle being tendered were sent to applicant “weeks ago”. The bundle was admitted and marked Exhibit A.

25. [34]

    The applicant’s “affidavit” of 27 August 2024 was treated as a submission and marked MFI 1. The applicant’s written submissions dated 20 August 2024 were marked MFI 2. The applicant was invited to clarify or emphasise anything she had said in writing.

26. [35]

    After informing Musgrave DCJ that she had made complaints to the Judicial Commission and the Independent Commission Against Corruption about the non-provision of the recording of the proceedings on 3 May 2024, the applicant made a number of oral submissions. The essence of those submissions was that by reason of Senior Constable Marsh’s non-response to three letters allegedly sent by the applicant, (a notice of discovery, a notice of objection and a notice to produce) “we would agree to a contract that I was not guilty and that he could not prove my guilt, that I’d committed an offence, and that his devices were not correct, and the laws were not valid… and apparently he sought advice from his superiors but his superiors told him to ignore those letters and they are a legally binding contract”.

27. [36]

    The applicant next outlined her submission that Senior Constable Marsh had “disobeyed” the Commonwealth and NSW Interpretation Acts by measuring her speed not “on a level flat plane”.

28. [37]

    The applicant next asserted that Senior Constable Marsh had failed to follow NSW Police Site Operation Procedure guidelines and the NSW Police Code of Conduct and Ethics.

29. [38]

    The appeal was adjourned part heard to 22 October 2024. On 22 October 2024, the applicant sought to tender photographs that had not been before the Local Court. Musgrave DCJ refused the tender on the basis that there had been no application to adduce new evidence.

30. [39]

    The applicant complained of abuse of process by the late submission of documents by the prosecution. Musgrave DCJ noted that the matter had been adjourned since 12 September and that the applicant had more time that she would have had, had the documents been filed on time and heard in one day.

31. [40]

    The prosecution relied on their submissions. The applicant made further, lengthy oral submissions responding to those written submissions.

32. [41]

    In an ex tempore judgment, her Honour said each submission made by the applicant had been closely reviewed and carefully considered. Her Honour said relevantly:

33. [42]

    Her Honour dismissed the appeal and confirmed the conviction and orders of the Magistrate.

Grounds of Review

1. [43]

   By notice of motion filed 10 February 2025, the applicant sought an extension of the three-month time limit to commence judicial review proceedings. A summons seeking judicial review of Musgrave DCJ’s orders was filed on 10 February 2025.

2. [44]

   By a second amended summons filed on 6 May 2025, the applicant advanced the following grounds of review:

3. [45]

   The orders sought are as follows:

Consideration of Grounds of Review

1. [46]

   There is no appeal from a judgment of the District Court on an appeal from the Local Court. The present proceedings were brought by way of judicial review of the District Court judgment, pursuant to s 69 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW). Because of the privative provision in s 176 of the District Court Act 1973 (NSW), the exercise of this Court’s supervisory jurisdiction depends upon a finding of jurisdictional error. The jurisdictional error identified by the applicant was an alleged abuse of process or denial of procedural fairness by Musgrave DCJ.

2. [47]

   Although the applicant’s written submissions were somewhat opaque, and she declined to make any oral submissions, we have attempted to identify and address each of the separate complaints which may be discerned.

3. [48]

   The applicant’s first complaint is that Musgrave DCJ ignored an alleged abuse of process by the solicitor for the first respondent who provided her written submissions on 11 September 2024, after the date they should have been filed in compliance with the relevant practice note. This complaint is without merit. As is clear from the above chronology, the appeal was adjourned part heard to 22 October 2024. Her Honour was correct in recording that the applicant had “more time than [she] would have had had the submissions been filed in accordance with the practice note prior to the first time the matter was listed”.

4. [49]

   The applicant’s real complaint appears to be that there would have been a breach of procedural fairness if the matter had been completed on 12 September 2024. There is no breach of procedural fairness by reason of a hypothetical injury. Procedural fairness is designed to avoid practical injustice: Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex Parte Lam (2003) CLR 1; [2003] HCA 6 at [37] per Gleeson CJ. The applicant did not lose any opportunity to advance her case. There was no abuse of process or denial of procedural fairness: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZARH (2015) 256 CLR 326; [2015] HCA 40 at [57] per Gageler and Gordon JJ.

5. [50]

   Secondly, the applicant submitted that Musgrave DCJ was biased by “try[ing] to get me to say I was exceeding the speed limit”. This complaint is without merit. The applicant admitted in her evidence before the Local Court that she was exceeding the 50 kilometre per hour speed limit. The applicant’s evidence in the Local Court was that upon being told by Senior Constable Marsh that she had been recorded travelling between 70 and 80 kms per hour, she was “in shock” and said she was trying to stick “sort of below-ish 60”, to which her Honour responded, “Are you able to be more accurate about sort of below-ish 60?”. The applicant replied, “Well I mean the needle was, it looks just below, you cant tell exactly”. Musgrave DCJ was entitled to have regard to the evidence the applicant had given in the Local Court. No breach of procedural fairness has been shown in her Honour doing so. The applicant’s assertion that the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) applies in this case must also be rejected.

6. [51]

   Thirdly, the applicant submitted there was a breach of procedural fairness in the solicitor appearing for the first respondent submitting that the applicant failed to challenge evidence tendered in the Local Court. We have set out the history above. The applicant’s complaint that she was denied the opportunity to question Constable Marsh and submit photos in the Local Court is without merit. The applicant was given a reasonable opportunity at the beginning of the hearing on 18 January 2024 to decide whether or not to question Constable Marsh or object to the brief of evidence. The applicant chose not to do either thing. The reference to Transport for NSW v Chapoterera (2022) 300 A Crim R 327; [2022] NSWSC 976 does not assist the applicant. In Chapoterera the Magistrate refused to allow any evidence or submissions at all as the Magistrate in that case thought it was a waste of the Court’s time. Nothing like that occurred here.

7. [52]

   More importantly, Musgrave DCJ clearly and carefully explained to the applicant the steps she would need to take if she wished to rely on evidence which was not before the Magistrate. The applicant, having heard and understood that explanation, did not seek to tender any evidence which had not been before the Magistrate. Both grounds of the summons seeking judicial review are addressed, correctly, to the decision of Musgrave DCJ. No abuse of process or breach of procedural fairness has been shown in her Honour's decision.

8. [53]

   Fourthly, the applicant asserted that Musgrave DCJ “supressed evidence” by refusing the applicant’s tender of photos. That assertion must be rejected. Musgrave DCJ carefully, patiently and correctly explained to the applicant what she must do if she wanted to rely on any evidence in the District Court appeal which had not been before the Magistrate. On 23 May 2024, well in advance of the hearing, her Honour explained to the applicant the procedure for making an application to call fresh evidence. On 12 September 2024, at the beginning of the appeal, her Honour again carefully and patiently repeated that explanation.

9. [54]

   The applicant’s response was a non sequitur, namely, that the CAR Act (of New South Wales) did not apply as it was “overruled” in some unidentified way by the Judiciary Act of the Commonwealth. Musgrave DCJ cannot be held responsible for fundamental legal misunderstandings held by the applicant.

10. [55]

    On 22 October 2024, her Honour correctly declined to have regard to the applicant’s proffered photographs. There had been no application (let alone a successful application) by the applicant to adduce fresh evidence. Her Honour had explained the necessity of such an application if the applicant wished to rely on evidence not before the Magistrate on numerous prior occasions. No error has been shown. There was no abuse of process or denial of procedural fairness.

11. [56]

    Fifthly, the applicant submitted that Musgrave DCJ ignored matters concerning s 38 of the Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) and the measurement of speed on a hill. Musgrave DCJ did not ignore the applicant’s arguments about interpretation statutes. As her Honour pointed out, the applicant relied on provisions relating to measures of distance. What was measured in this case was speed, on a device tested according to statutory rules and certified to comply with the standards set out by those rules. The suggested inconsistency with s 38(b) of the Interpretation Act does not arise. Even if it did, there was compliance with the clear terms of the Road Transport Act. No error has been shown, let alone an abuse of process or denial of procedural fairness.

12. [57]

    Sixthly, the applicant submitted that Musgrave DCJ ignored her contentions regarding police standard operating procedures. The complaint is without merit. Her Honour observed, correctly, that police standard operating procedures did not have the force of law. No error has been shown.

13. [58]

    Seventhly, the applicant submitted that Musgrave DCJ ignored her arguments about the accuracy of the speed measurement devices used by Senior Constable Marsh. We disagree. Her Honour addressed the applicant’s argument concerning the accuracy of the speed measurement devices engaged in this case by reference to the relevant provisions of the Road Transport Act. Her Honour was correct in doing so. As we have earlier noted, two certificates were tendered pursuant to the Road Transport Act. The combined effect of ss 137, 140 and 141 of the Road Transport Act is that only expert evidence, if accepted by the tribunal of fact, is legally capable of raising doubt that the speed measurement devices used on 3 July 2023 were not reliable, or accurate, or operating correctly. The applicant was not an expert. The various assertions made in her submissions do not raise any doubt or question for the purposes of Road Transport Act. The applicant’s submissions that the evidence was insufficient to establish the offence do not establish any error, let alone any jurisdictional error.

14. [59]

    Eighthly, the applicant submitted that Musgrave DCJ ignored the applicant’s allegation of “intimidation” by the Magistrate. This is not correct. Musgrave DCJ explicitly addressed the allegation made regarding the Magistrate’s conduct including an allegation that the Magistrate failed to allow the applicant the opportunity to give her version of events. The incident referred to by the applicant was one in which the applicant asked the Magistrate to provide her oath of office and occurred after the judgment had been delivered. It did not involve any “intimidation” on behalf of Magistrate Stapleton. No error on the part of Musgrave DCJ has been shown, much less was it shown there was an abuse of process or denial of procedural fairness.

15. [60]

    Ninthly, the applicant submitted that the radar used by Senior Constable Marsh did not comply with the National Measurement Act 1960 (Cth) and that this somehow gave rise to an inconsistency within the meaning of s 109 of the Constitution. That argument is plainly colourable and does not given rise to a constitutional question that may otherwise preclude this Court from hearing the matter and despite the absence of s 78B Notices that would otherwise need to be issued pursuant to s 78B of the Judiciary Act.

16. [61]

    Section 10 of the National Measurement Act has nothing whatever to do with the measurement of speed for road safety purposes. Section 10 does not affect the admissibility of certificates pursuant to s 137 of the Road Transport Act or the operation of the Road Transport Act more generally. Section 4(2) of the National Measurements Act makes clear that the Act and the regulations do not apply to the exclusion of any law of a State or Territory except in so far as that law is inconsistent with an express provision of this Act or of the regulation: Millington v Police [2015] SASC 52 at [24]. There is no s 109 inconsistency by reason of the operation of the National Measurements Act. No error has been shown.

17. [62]

    Tenthly, the applicant also submitted that there was an inconsistency between the order of events recorded in the statement of Senior Constable Marsh and the events on the video recording (which was not in evidence before the Local Court). No error has been shown. The video recording was not in evidence before the Local Court and no application was made to adduce that evidence in the District Court. In any event, the applicant’s complaints address the merits of the claim and do not, on any view, establish jurisdictional error. No abuse of process or denial of procedural fairness has been shown.

18. [63]

    In an affidavit filed on 5 December 2025, which contained the applicant’s submissions in reply, addressed a number of issues, all of which fell outside the grounds of review in the second amended summons. Those issues may be addressed shortly:

    1. (1)

       (paragraph 1) the applicant’s submission that “this affidavit is now a question of fact, and if not rebutted will require a jury trial in a Chapter III Court” is legally incoherent and does not raise any arguable error by Musgrave DCJ;

    2. (2)

       (paragraph 2) the applicant’s submission that the applicant is “under the protection” of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) must be rejected. The Victorian statute does not apply to the construction of NSW statutes. The complaint does not raise any arguable error by Musgrave DCJ;

    3. (3)

       (paragraph 3) the applicant’s suggestion that the imposition of a penalty notice for speeding infringed any principle recognised by the High Court in Port of Portland Pty Ltd v Victoria (2010) 242 CLR 348; [2010] HCA 44 cannot be accepted and does not raise any arguable error by Musgrave DCJ;

    4. (4)

       (paragraph 4) the applicant’s suggestion that the NSW Police Force have acted judicially in causing a penalty notice for speeding to be issued is legally unsustainable. The allegation is colourable and no s 78B Judiciary Act notice is required before we reject the claim;

    5. (5)

       (paragraph 5) the applicant’s suggestion that the penalty notice sent to the applicant was a “payment for unsolicited services” in contravention of s 40 of Schedule 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) is without foundation and does not raise any arguable error by Musgrave DCJ;

    6. (6)

       (paragraph 6) the applicant’s observation that Australia is a constitutional monarchy is correct but irrelevant. The applicant repeats her submission that by reason of Senior Constable Marsh’s non-response to three letters allegedly sent by her, (a notice of discovery, a notice of objection and a notice to produce) an “admission” was made that the applicant was not guilty, that his devices were not correct, and the laws were not valid. This submission cannot be accepted;

    7. (7)

       (paragraph 7) the applicant’s submission that the Imperial Acts Application Act 1922 (Vic) requires “proof from the ODPP NSW that the oaths of the solicitors, lawyers and barristers involved in my case were sworn to the Monarch” must be rejected. A litigant, such as the applicant, is not in a position to demand proof of any such thing. In Collis v Bank of Queensland [2021] VSCA 17, the Victorian Court of Appeal said of a similar argument, “The judge held that whether or not counsel for the First Respondent has taken an oath of allegiance is not relevant to the case. The judge commented that it was not clear how s 88 of the Imperial Acts Application Act 1922 is relevant to the case and commented that the provision had been repealed”, adding that the primary judge was correct (at [66]-[67]). The same conclusion should be reached here. No arguable error by Musgrave DCJ has been identified by this complaint;

    8. (8)

       (paragraph 8) the applicant’s submission that the Local Court of New South Wales is a “commercial business” is baseless. No arguable error by Musgrave DCJ has been identified by this complaint;

    9. (9)

       (paragraph 9) the applicant’s complaint about the election writ for Senators for NSW in 2022 is irrelevant to any issue before the Local Court, Musgrave DCJ or this Court on judicial review;

    10. (10)

        (paragraph 10) the applicant’s complaint about the application of s 33 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) to Senior Constable Marsh’s statement is misconceived. That section had no application in the present case where the statement was tendered without objection. The complaints about the speed measurement devices must be rejected for the reasons given at [58] above;

    11. (11)

        (paragraph 11) the applicant’s submission that Senior Constable Marsh has made a “false claim” is completely without foundation and must be rejected. No abuse of process or denial of procedural fairness has been shown;

    12. (12)

        (paragraph 12) the applicant’s invocation of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) has been rejected at the outset of these reasons. No error in the decision of Musgrave DCJ has been shown.

Conclusion and orders

1. [64]

   The applicant accepted in her evidence in the Local Court that she was travelling above 50 kilometres per hour in a 50 kilometres per hour zone on 3 July 2023. The applicant had an extensive hearing in the Local Court. The applicant had an appeal hearing over two separate days in the District Court.

2. [65]

   Neither of the grounds seeking judicial review advanced by the applicant have been established.

3. [66]

   The Court makes the following orders:

   1. (1)

      Extend time to file the summons seeking judicial review to 10 February 2025.

   2. (2)

      Summons dismissed.

   3. (3)

      Applicant to pay the respondent’s costs.