PX v Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Archdiocese of Canberra and Goulburn

1. [1]

   The plaintiff seeks orders varying or supplementing orders made by the District Court (at a time when these proceedings were pending in that court) restricting access to certain documents to the defendant and to solicitors and counsel and restricting disclosure of certain matters.

2. [2]

   The orders at issue, which were made by the District Court on 19 March 2025, are in the following terms:

3. [3]

   The orders were made by the District Court because these proceedings were pending in the District Court until they were transferred to this Court on 7 July 2025.

4. [4]

   The orders were made to protect the confidentiality of sexual abuse complainants, in line with Garling J’s decision in Storer v State of New South Wales [2023] NSWSC 1043.

5. [5]

   The proceedings concern a claim for damages arising from alleged sexual abuse when the plaintiff was a 6- or 7-year old student at a school operated by the defendant in 1996 to 1998.

6. [6]

   The application relates to documents produced by the defendant on subpoena requiring production of the final report of an Archdiocesan Professional Standards Officer, source documents for that report and documents relating to any other complaints of sexual misconduct by the alleged perpetrator.

7. [7]

   The orders having been made by the District Court, the plaintiff seeks leave to use documents that are the subject of those orders for the following purposes:

   1. (1)

      to obtain an expert opinion on liability; and

   2. (2)

      to seek to make contact with the complainants.

Leave to use the documents to brief an expert

1. [8]

   As to the first purpose, the plaintiff has retained a proposed expert witness with experience as a school principal in Catholic schools.

2. [9]

   The plaintiff proposes to seek an expert opinion on matters relevant to at least liability in these proceedings.

3. [10]

   The defendant consents to orders facilitating this, subject to the protection of the identity and confidentiality of complainants alleging sexual misconduct.

4. [11]

   I will make the orders in the form consented to.

Contacting the complainants

1. [12]

   Turning next to the second purpose for the orders sought today, that is, contacting the complainants. The documents produced include allegations of inappropriate conduct by the alleged perpetrator towards other students.

2. [13]

   The defendant neither consented nor opposed these orders, but said there should be safeguards.

3. [14]

   The plaintiff wishes to explore the possibility of tendency evidence, noting the defendant denies that the abuse occurred.

4. [15]

   My attention was drawn to Mansour v Trustees for the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Parramatta [2026] NSWSC 186. In that case, in which Storer-style orders had been made, Coleman J granted leave to the solicitor for the plaintiff to contact persons identified as complainants in documents produced under a notice to produce.

5. [16]

   Leave was conditional on the contact being only by the plaintiff’s solicitor himself, and the persons being told that the grant of leave does not oblige those persons in any way to communicate with the plaintiff’s solicitor. I will impose a similar condition.

6. [17]

   The defendant contended – and by the end of the hearing before me the plaintiff did not contest – that my orders should also include a condition or conditions similar to that imposed by McCallum CJ in BFS v Corporation of the Society of the Missionaries of the Sacred Heart [2024] ACTSC 408. Those conditions relate to contact through solicitors if the complainants are known to have legal representation and a condition about a subpoena not being issued without first obtaining the leave of the Court.

7. [18]

   Following the debate before me, the parties agree that if I was persuaded to make orders, then the conditions of the kind I am about to impose are appropriate conditions to accommodate the concern and introduce the safeguards that are appropriate, while enabling the plaintiff to explore the possibility of obtaining evidence in an appropriate manner. I am accordingly satisfied that the orders are appropriate in the form that I am about to make.

8. [19]

   There was no dispute that following the making of those orders, the plaintiff’s notice of motion should be dismissed and the costs of the motion should be costs in the cause.

9. [20]

   Accordingly, I make the following orders:

   1. (1)

      Grant leave to the plaintiff’s legal representatives to disclose to the plaintiff’s liability expert, in unredacted form, the following documents (“Relevant Documents”) for the purpose of preparing an expert liability report:

   2. (2)

      The liability expert is directed, and is to be instructed by the plaintiff, to use pseudonyms so as not to identify by name any complainant (alleging sexual abuse or misconduct) whose name appears in the Relevant Documents. For the avoidance of doubt, the expert may refer to a complainant’s age and gender at the time of the alleged abuse, and the general circumstances in which the abuse allegedly occurred.

   3. (3)

      Subject to the following conditions, grant leave to the plaintiff’s solicitors to contact complainants alleging sexual abuse or misconduct by [the alleged perpetrator] and other persons identified in the Relevant Documents as having given information or evidence as to his conduct (“Possible Witnesses”), for the purpose of obtaining information or statements relevant to the plaintiff’s case.

   4. (4)

      In respect of Possible Witnesses who are complainants known to have had legal representation, any contact is to be made as follows:

   5. (5)

      In respect of all Possible Witnesses:

   6. (6)

      The parties are not to issue any subpoena for the attendance of a Possible Witness without first obtaining leave of the Court unless the Possible Witness has consented to the issuing of a subpoena or provided a statement in these proceedings served by the plaintiff.

   7. (7)

      Dismiss the balance of the plaintiff's notice of motion filed 30 January 2026.

   8. (8)

      Costs of the plaintiff’s notice of motion be costs in the cause.