Styles v Knox (No 2)

1. [1]

   In October 2024 I gave judgment in this matter, refusing Ms Styles leave to appeal against the refusal of Dick LCM to disqualify himself from hearing a summons in proceedings which she has brought in the Local Court against a solicitor, Mr Knox: Styles v Knox [2024] NSWSC 1331.

2. [2]

   In later correspondence Ms Styles raised a factual issue which she felt should be addressed for correctness, given what was observed at [8] and [9] of the judgment, which provides:

3. [3]

   The first, an email sent in June 2024 to Mr Knox seeking details of the judgment debt and the second, an email sent to the Local Court Registrar in August 2024, which she claimed had been placed on the file, which advised that she had no knowledge of an order made on 25 March 2024, having been out of the country until 25 April. Neither were in evidence.

4. [4]

   There has been no application pursued by motion to correct the judgment and I am satisfied that nothing more needs to be done in respect of what Ms Styles has raised.

5. [5]

   In her summons Ms Styles had sought orders that the parties each pay their own costs. The usual order under the Rules being that costs follow the event, the parties were given an opportunity to advance submissions as to why there should be a departure from the usual order: at [83].

6. [6]

   Ms Styles referred in her submissions to a complaint she has also made about Mr Knox to the Office of the Legal Services Commissioner. That also arose out of his conduct of the original proceedings in the Local Court in which Ms Styles had unsuccessfully pursued her neighbours under the Dividing Fences Act 1991 (NSW), in which Mr Knox had represented the neighbours (Local Court, Dick LCM, 22 December 2022, unrep).

7. [7]

   Attached to Ms Styles’ submission was an email which she had sent Mr Knox in May 2024, in which she:

8. [8]

   Ms Styles’ submission was that because of the pending investigation of her complaint about Mr Knox’s misrepresentation in the Local Court, the costs order she sought, that each party bear their own costs of the proceedings, should be considered.

9. [9]

   I am not persuaded that justice permits such a departure from the usual order.

10. [10]

    The Court’s discretion must be exercised on a principled basis: Northern Territory v Sangare (2019) 265 CLR 164; [2019] HCA 25 at [24]. As well as the requirements of the Rules, there is a reasonable expectation that a party like Mr Knox, who successfully resisted the appeal, will have a costs order made in his favour: Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72; [1998] HCA 11 at [67].

11. [11]

    It is correct that misconduct in proceedings can be a basis on which a costs order may be refused: Oshlack at [69]. But here it is misconduct in the 2022 fencing proceedings on which Ms Styles advanced her case, not any alleged misconduct in these proceedings.

12. [12]

    What Ms Styles relies on was not successfully advanced in the appeal from the December 2022 Local Court decision: Styles v Rowley [2023] NSWSC 1053. That she is now pursuing her complaints about Mr Knox with the Legal Services Commissioner cannot provide a basis for the departure from the usual costs order which she pursues in these proceedings, concerned as they are with whether Dick LCM erred in refusing to recuse himself from hearing the proceedings Ms Styles now pursues against Mr Knox in the Local Court.

13. [13]

    In the result, I am satisfied that no proper basis for the costs order sought having been established, the usual order must be made.

Order

1. [14]

   For these reasons I now order that Ms Styles bear Mr Knox’s costs, as agreed or assessed.