Newman v Whittington

Jasmin Newman (‘the plaintiff’) alleges that Adam Whittington (‘the defendant’) defamed her on 12 separate occasions following publications about her by him in WordPress articles, on Facebook and on Twitter in the period December 2019-October 2021. The plaintiff complains that these publications essentially amount to a campaign against her by the defendant, albeit that the evidence about why he has done so was, possibly unusually, rather confined: the campaign appears to be a ‘response’ to a book published by the plaintiff that referred to the defendant – presumably in a manner that displeased him. She seeks damages, including aggravated damages, interest and costs to remedy the damage and loss she claims to have suffered from those publications as well as injunctions – mandatory and permanent – to prevent such publications from recurring.

The plaintiff commenced proceedings by statement of claim filed 8 February 2021. A number of amended versions have been filed. The current iteration is described as the fourth amended statement of claim filed 25 March 2024 (‘the 4ASOC’), although, despite its title, it appears that seven versions of the pleading have, to date, been served. The pleading extends to some 53 pages and contains 59 defamatory imputations that are alleged to have arisen in consequence of the 12 publications.

The defendant did not appear when the matter was called on the first day of the hearing. He did not appear after the matter was called outside Court. He did not appear on the subsequent days when the matter was listed for hearing and called outside Court.

The plaintiff sought to proceed in the absence of the defendant. The plaintiff submitted that, as the defendant was notified of the hearing of the action, she was entitled to proceed.

The plaintiff relied upon her affidavit sworn 12 February 2025 to establish the giving of such notice. It was submitted that the defendant was advised of the hearing, essentially as follows. Pursuant to order 4 made by the Court on 5 September 2024, the plaintiff, through her counsel, approached the Court, via email sent 11 December 2024, to secure a hearing date copying in the defendant via his email address – being: [REDACTED] (plaintiff’s affidavit sworn 12 February 2025, annexure H).

It should be noted that the email address used to communicate with the defendant in the above email (and the one sent by the plaintiff on 10 February 2025: see [8] below) is the one that the defendant used to communicate with the Court on 3 September 2024 and with the plaintiff and her counsel on 12 December 2024 (see, for example, plaintiff’s affidavit sworn 12 February 2025, annexures D and I).

The defendant responded to that email chain, by email sent to the plaintiff’s counsel on 12 December 2024, advising, inter alia (plaintiff’s affidavit sworn 12 February 2025, annexure I):

The plaintiff directly advised the defendant of the hearing date, pursuant to orders that I made on 10 February 2025, by email sent on 10 February 2025 at 10:41 am (plaintiff’s affidavit sworn 12 February 2025, annexure N).

Mr Armitage, who appeared for the plaintiff, confirmed, and I accept, that no response was received to that email. It was further confirmed by the plaintiff in her affidavit sworn 24 February 2025, par 39.

Section 161 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) creates a presumption in relation to electronic communications other than those referred to in s 162 (a section that is not presently relevant). The term “electronic communication” is defined in the Dictionary and relevantly extends to an email: see, in this last respect, by way of example, Osborne v Boral Resources (NSW) Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 155 at [17]-[18]; Kegran Pty Ltd v Warrik Pty Ltd [2018] NSWSC 1357; (2018) 19 BPR 38,665 at [30].

By s 161(1), it is presumed “unless evidence sufficient to raise doubt about the presumption is adduced” that the email: (1) was sent in the form of the email dated 10 February 2025 (s 161(1)(a)); (2) was sent by the plaintiff to the defendant (s 161(1)(b)); (3) was sent on 10 February 2025 at 10:41am (s 161(1)(c)); (4) was “received at the destination to which it appears from the document to have been sent” (s 161(1)(d)); and (5) as it appears from the email that the sending concluded at the time identified, “was received at that destination at that time” (s 161(1)(e)).

As I have noted above, no email or other communication was received by the plaintiff or her counsel to indicate that this email had not been delivered to the defendant’s email address. There is, I accept, no evidence sufficient to raise doubt about the presumption. Accordingly, the presumption created by s 161(1) establishes service of the email and notification of the hearing date.

Accordingly, given the plaintiff was notified of the date of the hearing, it has proceeded in the absence of the defendant. Separately, I add, I am satisfied, given the defendant’s interactions with the Court in connection with the entry of default judgment on 5 September 2024 and his response to the plaintiff’s counsel’s email dated 11 December 2024, that the defendant did not, and does not, intend to participate in the final hearing of the plaintiff’s claim. That is confirmed (as is notice of this hearing) by a further matter. The hearing did not complete on 14 February 2025 and was stood over for further hearing on 5 (and, subsequently 26) March 2025. Following the adjournment on 14 February 2025, my Associate confirmed the orders with the parties by email (to be clear, to the email address provided by the defendant), to which there was no reply or ‘bounce back’. Thus, the defendant, despite that further notice, did not appear. Additionally, notwithstanding that notice (and of the proceedings generally), he has continued to publish matters about the plaintiff (notably, on 18 and 23 February 2025: plaintiff’s affidavit sworn 24 February 2025, pars 37 and 38, annexures 8 and 9) – a matter upon which it will be necessary, later, to return.

In addition to the matter proceeding in the absence of the defendant, it is also proceeding as a trial for the assessment of damages under r 30.1 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (‘the UCPR’). It is proceeding in that way because on 5 September 2024, the Court, on the application of the plaintiff, entered default judgment against the defendant pursuant to r 16.3 of the UCPR. The orders made by the Court were:

The plaintiff submitted that it followed, from the first order made on 5 September 2024, that she was relieved of the need to establish, in relation to each defamatory publication, the following matters: that the defendant was the author of each of the publications and that he published them – in fact, and in the wider, bilateral, sense of being “comprehended by somebody other than the plaintiff” (relevantly in Australia): Sims v Jooste (No 2) [2016] WASCA 83 at [9]; Dow Jones & Co Inc v Gutnick (2002) 210 CLR 575; [2002] HCA 56 at [11]; that the publications were about the plaintiff; and that the publications conveyed each of the imputations alleged by her – that is, the publications were defamatory of the plaintiff. Put simply, the submission was that the orders made dispensed with the need for the plaintiff to establish the three elements at common law to a successful defamation claim: see, in this respect, David Rolph, Rolph on Defamation (2nd ed, 2024, Lawbook Co.) at [6.10] (‘Rolph on Defamation’). (Given the terms of the first order made, no question arises about any defence; defences can thus be put to one side). I accept, generally, what the plaintiff submitted, subject to the following.

Whilst I accept that the defendant authored each of the publications, and that they were “published” (in both senses), it remains necessary for the plaintiff to demonstrate that they conveyed each of the imputations alleged and, in connection with damages, it remains necessary for the plaintiff to relate her injuries, loss and damage suffered to one or other of those defamatory imputations. The plaintiff, I add, contested the first proposition, but accepted the second.

I will explain briefly why I consider it necessary for the plaintiff to demonstrate that each of the imputations were defamatory of her, notwithstanding the entry of default judgment.

In defamation proceedings, where a default judgment is entered in circumstances where no defence has been filed, whilst the facts pleaded are taken to be admitted, it has nevertheless been considered “appropriate” for the Court to “consider the legal question reserved for the Court at final hearing”, being “whether the matters complained of are reasonably capable of conveying the pleaded imputations” prior to entering default judgment: Al Muderis v Duncan [2016] NSWSC 1726 at [3] (‘Al Muderis’); Szymczak v Balijepalli (No 2) [2019] FCA 1093 at [5]; Tribe v Simmons [2021] FCA 930 at [16]. The explanation for this approach lies in the fact that it remains a question of law, to be determined by the Court, whether an imputation “is reasonably capable of arising from the matter complained of” and, as a consequence, a failure to make that determination may result in a judgment in favour of the plaintiff “in respect of a claim that was bad in law”: Al Muderis at [4].

The immediate difficulty with the approach urged by the plaintiff is that it is apparent from the reasons of the Court, when entering default judgment, that no consideration was given to any of the alleged defamatory imputations, nor – importantly – is it apparent that the Court was asked to do so. To be clear, there is no finding that all, or indeed any, of the matters complained of are reasonably capable of conveying the pleaded imputations – and, to the extent that any reference was made to “the merits of liability”, the reasons indicate that the Court was not dealing with them. Accordingly, it follows, in the present circumstances, that it remains to be determined whether each of the 59 imputations were defamatory.

The plaintiff relied upon the following affidavit evidence to support her claim for damages:

In addition to the evidence contained in her affidavits, the plaintiff also gave evidence at the hearing – evidence that was principally directed to the impact of the defamatory imputations upon her. I will make reference to the plaintiff’s oral evidence, later, when addressing damages. The plaintiff was also granted leave to re-open her case (on two occasions) to rely upon additional evidence, essentially directed to the issue of the (potential) wider “readership” of the defendant’s publications. That evidence was contained in the plaintiff’s affidavits sworn 24 February 2025 and 4 and 14 March 2025.

Separately, the plaintiff tendered a bundle of documents (totalling 161 pages) – those that were annexed to the 4ASOC – which contained, with the exception of what I later describe as the second matter, the defendant’s publications (exhibit F).

I set out below the background facts. They reflect my findings and what I consider follows from the entry of default judgment.

The plaintiff is a family dispute resolution practitioner and accredited in that role with the Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department.

The defendant is: (a) an Australian citizen who, at least at some point in the past, resided overseas, either in Sweden or in Russia, although precisely where he now resides is unknown; (b) the founder and Chief Executive Officer of a Swedish company which operates a Facebook page called “Child Abduction Recovery International”; and (c) the founder of what is said to be a “charity” known as “Project Rescue Children”.

A number of the defamatory “matters” pleaded – notably, the second, third, fourth, fifth, eighth, ninth and tenth matters – were published online on social media pages not by a description referable to the defendant, but to organisations that, in substance, were controlled and operated by the defendant. This, I accept and find, extends to the following at all relevant times:

I also accept, and find, that the defendant operated the following at all relevant times:

The principles applicable to determine whether a publication conveyed defamatory imputations are well-established. They have been helpfully summarised in a number of decisions including in Hockey v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (No 2) (2015) 237 FCR 33; [2015] FCA 652 at [63]-[73] (‘Hockey’) and Rush v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (No 7) [2019] FCA 496 at [70]-[85].

In Eppinga v Kalil [2023] NSWCA 287 at [95] (‘Eppinga’), Payne JA remarked in relation to those principles:

Ordinarily, once a plaintiff establishes each of the elements of the cause of action (relevantly here, that the defamatory imputations alleged were conveyed), the onus shifts to the defendant to establish any defence(s). Self-evidently that will not here arise, given the orders made on 5 September 2024 (which were made, at least in part, because the defendant failed to file a defence, contrary to orders of the Court that he do so).

Before turning to address whether, applying the above principles, the defamatory imputations were conveyed as alleged, I will outline the approach.

The plaintiff has, as I have earlier noted, alleged that she was defamed in 59 ways (that is, by the 59 imputations pleaded) by the defendant in his various publications. The particulars of each imputation are contained in the Schedule of Imputations dated 28 February 2025 (MFI 1). In respect of each of the defamatory imputations, the plaintiff commonly argued that they were conveyed in multiple ways – both within the one publication, and also across different ones. Thus, for example, in relation to the imputation that the plaintiff was “dishonest” (4ASOC, par 7(1d)) the plaintiff relied upon what was more or less a clear statement to that effect in the article posted on the defendant’s WordPress site (exhibit F, page 11) but also, additionally, relied upon seven other references within that document, that are said to convey that same imputation. In the interests of economy, these reasons will refer to the principal manner in which the imputation was conveyed, albeit that specific consideration has been given to each and every way that the imputation was argued by the plaintiff to have been conveyed.

The first defamatory matter relied upon by the plaintiff is described as an article, headed: “Andrew (Andy) Gough aka Rae Asun-Schein aka Jimmy McGill & associates”: 4ASOC, par 7. The article is 114 pages of text and images and dated, and first published on, 29 December 2019 “to WordPress and then nine additional times to Facebook”: 4ASOC, par 19. The WordPress site had the name: “Adam Whittington”: 4ASOC, par 19(a).

The publication is contained within exhibit F, pages 1-114.

It is accepted that the article was removed from the internet on 17 February 2021 and, further, the “extent of readership is unknown”: 4ASOC, pars 19(a)(xii) and (xiii).

In relation to the publication of this article on Facebook, this was “linked” from posts published on the Facebook page “Adam Whittington” on 11 and 16 February 2020: 4ASOC, pars 19(b) and (c); on 22 February 2022: 4ASOC, par 19(d) (note: the date in the 4ASOC is incorrect as the post published on this Facebook page was on 22 February 2020, not 2022: exhibit F, page 117); on 17 March 2020: 4ASOC, par 19(e); on 12 April 2020: 4ASOC, par 19(f); on 22 April 2020: 4ASOC, par 19(g); on 19 May 2020: 4ASOC, par 19(h); and on 21 and 24 October 2020: 4ASOC, pars 19(i) and (j). These publications are contained within exhibit F, pages 115-122 and 124. During the hearing on 5 March 2025, the plaintiff disavowed reliance upon par 19(i) – that is, the plaintiff did not rely upon any suggested linking of the WordPress article from a post published on the Facebook page “Adam Whittington” on 21 October 2020.

The plaintiff alleges that, in “its natural and ordinary meaning”, the “first matter” conveyed nine imputations each of which was defamatory of the plaintiff: 4ASOC, par 7. Those imputations were that the plaintiff:

Given the language used in the publication, little discussion is warranted about whether the defamatory meanings were in fact conveyed to the ordinary reasonable reader: I am well-satisfied and find that the matters complained about by the plaintiff conveyed – clearly and unambiguously – each of the defamatory imputations, as argued.

The second defamatory matter relied upon by the plaintiff is described as an article, headed: “Parental Child Abduction Frauds, Scammers + Associates”: 4ASOC, par 8.

The publication is contained within exhibit F, pages 125-131. As noted elsewhere, this publication was originally published within a larger publication, approximately 200 pages in length (MFI 1, par 4).

This material was published to a separate WordPress site titled “CARI – Child Abduction Recovery International” on 5 April 2020: 4ASOC, par 20(a); MFI 1, par 4; “pinned” on Facebook pages “Child Abduction Recovery International”, “Child Abduction Recovery International CARI – Information Page” and “Child Abduction Recovery”: 4ASOC, pars 20(b)-(d); and posted on the Twitter page “CARI – Child Abduction”: 4ASOC, par 20(e). The publications on Facebook (on 8 April 2019) or on Twitter (on 16 October 2021) are contained within exhibit F, pages 132-135.

The plaintiff alleges that, in “its natural and ordinary meaning”, the “second matter” conveyed eight imputations each of which was defamatory of the plaintiff: 4ASOC, par 8. Those imputations were that the plaintiff:

Given the language of the publication, I am satisfied and find that the matters complained about by the plaintiff conveyed – clearly and unambiguously – each of the defamatory imputations, as argued.

The third defamatory matter relied upon by the plaintiff is described as a publication on the Facebook page “Child Abduction Recovery International CARI – Information Page” on 16 May 2020: 4ASOC, pars 9 and 21.

The publication is contained within exhibit F, pages 136-137.

The plaintiff alleges that, in “its natural and ordinary meaning”, the “third matter” conveyed eight imputations each of which was defamatory of the plaintiff: 4ASOC, par 9. Those imputations were that the plaintiff:

Given the language of the publication, I am satisfied and find that the matters complained about by the plaintiff conveyed – clearly and unambiguously – each of the defamatory imputations, as argued.

The fourth defamatory matter relied upon by the plaintiff is described as a publication on the Twitter page “CARI – Child Abduction” on 30 June 2020: 4ASOC, pars 10 and 22.

The publication is contained within exhibit F, page 138.

The plaintiff alleges that, in “its natural and ordinary meaning”, the “fourth matter” conveyed four imputations each of which was defamatory of the plaintiff: 4ASOC, par 10. Those imputations were that the plaintiff:

Given the language of the publication, I am satisfied and find that the matters complained about by the plaintiff conveyed – clearly and unambiguously – each of the defamatory imputations, as argued.

The fifth defamatory matter relied upon by the plaintiff is described as a publication on the Twitter page “CARI – Child Abduction” on 30 June 2020: 4ASOC, pars 11 and 23.

The publication is contained within exhibit F, pages 139-143.

The plaintiff alleges that, in “its natural and ordinary meaning”, the “fifth matter” conveyed two imputations each of which was defamatory of the plaintiff: 4ASOC, par 11. Those imputations were that the plaintiff:

Given the language of the publication, I am satisfied and find that the matters complained about by the plaintiff conveyed – clearly and unambiguously – each of the defamatory imputations, as argued.

The sixth defamatory matter relied upon by the plaintiff is described as a publication on the Facebook page “Adam Whittington” on 1 October 2020: 4ASOC, pars 12 and 24.

The publication is contained within exhibit F, pages 144-147.

The plaintiff alleges that, in “its natural and ordinary meaning”, the “sixth matter” conveyed five imputations each of which was defamatory of the plaintiff: 4ASOC, par 12. Those imputations were that the plaintiff:

Given the language of the publication, I am satisfied and find that the matters complained about by the plaintiff conveyed – clearly and unambiguously – each of the defamatory imputations, as argued.

The seventh defamatory matter relied upon by the plaintiff is described as a publication on the Facebook page “Adam Whittington” on 24 October 2020: 4ASOC, pars 13 and 25.

The publication is contained within exhibit F, page 148 and the plaintiff’s affidavit sworn 4 March 2025, annexure 1 (which contains a slightly clearer version).

The plaintiff alleges that, in “its natural and ordinary meaning”, the “seventh matter” conveyed three imputations each of which was defamatory of the plaintiff: 4ASOC, par 13. Those imputations were that the plaintiff:

I am satisfied and find that the matters complained about by the plaintiff conveyed – clearly and unambiguously – each of the defamatory imputations, as argued. Although, viewed in isolation, the first imputation does not expressly refer to the plaintiff, in my view, it is clear from viewing the post as a whole that it includes her: the identification of the “parasites and those who support them over social media” is, when the balance of the post is considered, plainly referring to those the subject of that “new video” – which includes the plaintiff.

The eighth defamatory matter relied upon by the plaintiff is described as a publication on the Facebook page “Child Abduction Recovery Australia” on 15 December 2020: 4ASOC, pars 14 and 26(a).

The publication is contained within exhibit F, page 149.

The material was also published on the Facebook page “Child Abduction Recovery International CARI – Information Page” on 15 December 2020: 4ASOC, par 26(b); and on the Facebook page “Child Abduction Recovery International” on 15 December 2020: 4ASOC, par 26(c). The further publications are contained within exhibit F, pages 150-151.

The plaintiff alleges that, in “its natural and ordinary meaning”, the “eighth matter” conveyed two imputations each of which was defamatory of the plaintiff: 4ASOC, par 14. Those imputations were that the plaintiff:

In relation to each of the above imputations, the plaintiff alleges that she is identified by way of the inclusion of “#JasminNewman” at the conclusion of the body of text within each Facebook publication (4ASOC, par 33; exhibit F, page 149).

I am satisfied and find that the matters complained about by the plaintiff conveyed – clearly and unambiguously – each of the defamatory imputations, as argued and, to be clear, identified the plaintiff by the inclusion of, following the defamatory remarks, a reference to the plaintiff thus: “#JasminNewman”.

The ninth defamatory matter relied upon by the plaintiff is described as a publication on the Facebook page “Child Abduction Recovery International” on 31 March 2021: 4ASOC, pars 15 and 27.

The publication is contained within exhibit F, page 152.

The plaintiff alleges that, in “its natural and ordinary meaning”, the “ninth matter” conveyed six imputations each of which was defamatory of the plaintiff: 4ASOC, par 15. Those imputations were that the plaintiff:

Given the language of the publication, I am satisfied and find that the matters complained about by the plaintiff conveyed – clearly and unambiguously – each of the defamatory imputations, as argued.

The tenth defamatory matter relied upon by the plaintiff is described as a publication on the Facebook page “Child Abduction Recovery International CARI – Information Page” on 31 March 2021: 4ASOC, pars 16 and 28.

The publication is contained within exhibit F, page 153.

The plaintiff alleges that, in “its natural and ordinary meaning”, the “tenth matter” conveyed six imputations each of which was defamatory of the plaintiff: 4ASOC, par 16.

The plaintiff accepted that the publication “is identical to the ninth matter and hence it conveys the same imputations” (MFI 1, par 21). Those imputations were that the plaintiff:

Given my conclusion in relation to the ninth matter, it follows that I am equally satisfied and find that the matters complained about by the plaintiff conveyed – clearly and unambiguously – each of the defamatory imputations, as argued.

The eleventh defamatory matter relied upon by the plaintiff was described as a publication on the Facebook page “Adam Whittington” on 21 October 2021: 4ASOC, pars 17 and 29.

The publication is contained within exhibit F, pages 154-155.

The plaintiff alleges that, in “its natural and ordinary meaning”, the “eleventh matter” conveyed three imputations each of which was defamatory of the plaintiff: 4ASOC, par 17. Those imputations were that the plaintiff:

It should be noted that the publication of this matter occurred after the amendments to the Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) (‘the Act’) that commenced on 1 July 2021.

Given the language of the publication, I am satisfied and find that the matters complained about by the plaintiff conveyed – clearly and unambiguously – each of the defamatory imputations, as argued.

The twelfth defamatory matter relied upon by the plaintiff is described as a publication on the Facebook page “Adam Whittington Advocate” on 21 October 2021: 4ASOC, pars 18 and 30.

The publication is contained within exhibit F, pages 158-159.

The plaintiff alleges that, in “its natural and ordinary meaning”, the “twelfth matter” conveyed three imputations each of which was defamatory of the plaintiff: 4ASOC, par 18.

The plaintiff accepted that the publication “is identical to the eleventh matter and hence it conveys the same imputations” (MFI 1, par 24). Those imputations were that the plaintiff:

Like the eleventh matter, the publication of this matter also occurred after the amendments to the Act that commenced on 1 July 2021.

Given my conclusion in relation to the eleventh matter, it follows that I am equally satisfied and find that the matters complained about by the plaintiff conveyed – clearly and unambiguously – each of the defamatory imputations, as argued.

The plaintiff sought general and aggravated damages, interest on any damages awarded, together with a gross sum costs order in connection with counsel’s fees.

Before dealing with the plaintiff’s entitlement to, and the assessment of, damages for those heads, I will set out the relevant principles that apply to this task.

The principles relating to an award of damages, including those for non-economic loss, in defamation proceedings are settled. They were discussed in Ali v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 183 at [70]-[85] (‘Ali’), from which the following summary is principally drawn. These principles are supplemented by, and subject to, provisions within the Act, to which reference will be made.

An award of damages for defamation serves three overlapping purposes: first, “consolation for the personal distress and hurt caused to the plaintiff by the publication”; secondly, “reparation for the harm done to the plaintiff’s personal and (if relevant) business reputation”; and, thirdly, “vindication of the plaintiff’s reputation”: Ali at [70], citing Carson v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1993) 178 CLR 44, 60-61; [1993] HCA 31 (‘Carson’); Rogers v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (2003) 216 CLR 327; [2003] HCA 52 at [60] and [69] (‘Rogers’). The first and second purposes “are frequently considered together and constitute consolation for the wrong done” to the plaintiff, whereas the third – vindication – “looks to the attitude of others to the [plaintiff]: the sum awarded must be at least the minimum necessary to signal to the public the vindication of the [plaintiff’s] reputation”: Carson at 60-61; Ali at [70].

In terms of vindication, damages are not assessed solely by reference to circumstances “past and present; the amount must be sufficient to vindicate the plaintiff’s reputation in the… future”: Carson at 70; Ali at [75]. Thus, the damages awarded for defamation must take into account that the defamation “driven underground, emerges from its lurking place at some future date” (Cassell & Co Ltd v Broome [1972] AC 1027, 1071 (‘Cassell’)) or what is called the “grapevine effect”: the metaphor used “to help explain the basis upon which general damages may be covered in defamation actions” (Palmer Bruyn & Parker Pty Ltd v Parsons (2001) 208 CLR 388; [2001] HCA 69 at [88]), and expressed in Ley v Hamilton (1935) 153 LT 384, 386 in these terms:

The grapevine effect recognises that “the dissemination of defamatory material is rarely confined to those to whom the matter is immediately published” and that the “‘poison’ of a libel may spread beyond the immediate recipients of the initial publication”: Hoser v Pelley [No 3] [2023] VSCA 257 at [221]; Crampton v Nugawela (1996) 41 NSWLR 176, 194-195.

The assessment of damages “involves an understanding of the nature and seriousness of the imputations and the [defendant’s] conduct”: Ali at [76], citing Coyne v Citizen Finance Ltd (1991) 172 CLR 211, 241; [1991] HCA 10. To that end, relevant considerations to the assessment of damages include “the gravity of the libel, the social standing of the parties and the availability of alternative remedies” (Carson at 60, citing J Fleming, Law of Torts (8th ed, 1992, Lawbook Co.) at 595), as well as the extent of the publication. As to that last matter, and the conduct of the defendant, a court may also take into account the fact that the defamatory statement “was never retracted, that no apology was ever offered to the [plaintiff], and that the statement had been persisted in to the end”: Herald & Weekly Times Ltd v McGregor (1928) 41 CLR 254, 263; [1928] HCA 36; Ali at [76].

Damage to the reputation of the defamed person need not be proved; rather, it is presumed: “The law presumes that some damage will flow in the ordinary course of things from the mere invasion of the plaintiff’s right and calls it general damage”: Ratcliffe v Evans [1892] 2 QB 524, 528-529; Andrews v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1980) 2 NSWLR 225, 258; Bristow v Adams [2012] NSWCA 166 at [20]-[31]. Notwithstanding the presumption that some damage will flow, evidence may be – and typically is – given of actual damage to the plaintiff; undoubtedly that is because although some harm is presumed, “the extent of that harm is not”: Eppinga at [100]. (In relation to the publication of defamatory matters after 1 July 2021, there is a need to consider the “serious harm” threshold: s 10A of the Act; see [105], below. That provision is, however, only relevant to the eleventh and twelfth matters).

The award of damages must reflect the effect that the particular defamation had on the plaintiff: Rogers at [69]. Further, it has been recognised that a person publishing defamatory material must take the plaintiff as they find them, with the consequence that it is appropriate to have regard to any particular sensitivities of the plaintiff: Ali at [77].

In addition to damages for non-economic loss, an award of aggravated damages is also available. Exemplary (punitive) damages cannot be awarded: s 37 of the Act.

Aggravated damages are a form of general damages, given by way of compensation for injury to the plaintiff, which may be intangible, resulting from the circumstances and manner of the wrongdoing: State of New South Wales v Ibbett (2006) 229 CLR 638; [2006] HCA 57 at [31]. They are awarded for injury to the plaintiff’s feelings caused by insult, humiliation and the like: Lamb v Cotogno (1987) 164 CLR 1, 8; [1987] HCA 47. That is, they are awarded when the harm done by the wrongful act was aggravated by the manner in which the act was done: Uren v John Fairfax (1966) 117 CLR 118, 130 and 149; [1966] HCA 40. (Where malice is involved, s 36 of the Act is relevant: see [104], below).

Aggravated damages thus may be awarded where “the defendant has acted in a manner which demonstrates a lack of bona fides or in a manner which is improper or unjustifiable”: Triggell v Pheeney (1951) 82 CLR 497, 514; [1951] HCA 23; Ali at [79]; KSMC Holdings Pty Ltd t/as Hubba Bubba Childcare on Haig v Bowden (2020) 101 NSWLR 729; [2020] NSWCA 28 at [150]. Conduct of this kind, which will increase the harm caused by the defamation and may be considered, includes “a failure to apologise, and the conduct of the defendant right up to the [moment] of verdict are all matters which may be taken into account”: Korean Times Pty Ltd v Pak [2011] NSWCA 365 at [126]; Ali at [81]-[83], [85].

As aggravated damages, like compensatory damages, are directed towards injury to (or hurt) feelings or to the plaintiff’s reputation (Ali at [80], citing Waterhouse v Broadcasting Station 2GB Pty Ltd (1985) 1 NSWLR 58, 75), the Court must take care not to ‘double-count’. This means that, if damages are awarded for hurt feelings or to the plaintiff’s reputation as part of ordinary compensatory damages, the award of aggravated damages must only be for the difference justified by this approach; that is, an award of so much as is necessary to bring the damages up to the upper end of the available range: Ali at [84]; State of New South Wales v Radford (2010) 79 NSWLR 327; [2010] NSWCA 276 at [95]-[96]. That has been described as the “conventional approach”; that is, if aggravated damages are to be awarded, a separate sum is not awarded because “it is not a discrete head of damage” (Herald & Weekly Times Ltd v Popovic (2003) 9 VR 1; [2003] VSCA 161 at [385]; Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Rush [2020] FCAFC 115; (2020) 380 ALR 432 at [380] (‘Rush’)) and, further, a separate award “would usually be difficult to assess”: Rush at [380] and the authorities there cited. (In relation to publication of defamatory matters after 1 July 2021, and the awarding of aggravated damages to such matters, the manner in which an award is to be made is dealt with in s 35(2B) of the Act: see [105], below).

Reference should now be made to the relevant provisions of the Act that inform, and constrain, the assessment of damages. Before doing so, it should be noted that the amendments to the Act brought about by the Defamation Amendment Act 2020 (NSW), which commenced on 1 July 2021, are accepted by the plaintiff to apply to the eleventh and twelfth matters, given that those matters were published after that time, as earlier noted: see [82] and [88], above.

The statutory provisions relevant to the assessment of damages are as follows. First, in “determining the amount of damages to be awarded… the court is to ensure that there is an appropriate and rational relationship between the harm sustained by the plaintiff and the amount of damages awarded”: s 34. Secondly, the amount of non-economic loss is capped to “the maximum amount” prescribed: ss 35(1)-(2). The current maximum amount is $478,500 (as from 1 July 2024): New South Wales Government Gazette, No 245, 28 June 2024, at 9. Thirdly, the Court is to disregard the malice of the defendant at the time of the publication or at any other time, except to the extent that the malice affects the harm sustained by the plaintiff: s 36. Fourthly, as earlier noted, the plaintiff cannot be awarded exemplary damages: s 37. And, finally, if a court finds for a plaintiff in relation to more than one cause of action, damages may be assessed “in a single sum”: s 39.

However, in the form following the commencement of the Defamation Amendment Act, two further constraints are relevant. The first is the serious harm element – that is, the requirement that the “publication of defamatory matter about a person has caused, or is likely to cause, serious harm to the reputation of the person”: s 10A. The second is that, in relation to aggravated damages, any award of aggravated damages “is to be made separately to any award of damages for non-economic loss to which [s 35](1) applies”: s 35(2B).

The plaintiff’s damages submissions focused upon three matters: first, the inherent seriousness of the imputations; secondly, the “scope of publication”; and, thirdly, the evidence adduced by, or on behalf of the plaintiff, about the impact the defamatory matters have had, and continue to have, upon her.

The plaintiff drew attention to some authorities, submitting that they provided guidance “in respect of the appropriate quantum of damages”: plaintiff’s submissions dated 12 February 2025, pars 21-24. Whilst, in point of principle, it is considered appropriate to give comparable authorities some consideration when assessing damages for defamation, there necessarily are limits to their use – fixing an appropriately proportionate sum of damages necessarily has as its focus the subjective effect of the defamation on the particular plaintiff.

In relation to the seriousness of the imputations, I accept, as was submitted, that each of the imputations are inherently serious on their own – particularly those that falsely suggested that the plaintiff supports paedophiles; sympathises and/or is connected and/or associates with paedophiles; and seeks to protect paedophiles from being brought to justice (and like matters). Imputations of this broad kind (which form part of the first, second, third, fourth, sixth, seventh, ninth, tenth, eleventh and twelfth matters) are considered to be, and I accept are, grave or extreme imputations: Whittington v Newman [2024] NSWCA 27 at [42]-[43] (‘Whittington’), citing D Rolph, “A serious harm threshold for Australian defamation law” (2022) 51(2) Australian Bar Review 185 at 197. Although the balance of the imputations conveyed are of a qualitatively different kind, that is not to downplay their seriousness: the imputations nonetheless strike at the heart of the plaintiff’s integrity, honesty and professional competence – matters that are, given her professional calling, undeniably of importance. Further, I have also had regard, when assessing the seriousness of the imputations, to the nature and extent of the defamatory imputations in each publication. For example, for the third matter, there were eight defamatory imputations conveyed by that publication: see [44]-[47], above.

In relation to the eleventh and twelfth matters, consideration must also be had to the operation of s 10A of the Act. As earlier noted, by that provision, it “is an element… of a cause of action for defamation that the publication of defamatory matter about the person has caused, or is likely to cause, serious harm to the reputation of the person”. The defamatory imputations conveyed by these matters were the same – namely, that the plaintiff supported a particular paedophile, and was closely connected with paedophiles, as well as being “dishonest” (see [81] and [87], above).The serious harm element was discussed by the Court of Appeal in Whittington, notably from [42]-[51]. I am satisfied that the publication of these matters is likely to have caused serious harm to the reputation of the plaintiff. Although, so far as the eleventh and twelfth matters were concerned, the evidence, specifically directed to this particular element was limited, I am, nevertheless satisfied that this element has been established. The defamatory imputations conveyed by these matters – essentially that the plaintiff was a supporter of a particular paedophile, and closely connected with paedophiles, as well as being dishonest – are imputations the character of which that I am prepared to infer is likely to have caused serious harm to the reputation of plaintiff: see Whittington at [42]-[43]; Peros v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (No 3) [2024] QSC 192 at [58] and [81] (‘Peros’).

In relation to what the plaintiff described as the “scope of publication”, or as it has been described in the authorities the “extent of publication”, the plaintiff submitted that although the number of “persons to whom the publications have been made cannot be determined with precision”, it is nevertheless possible to assess this in broad terms, having regard to the evidence about the numbers who have interacted with the matters online (‘the interactions’) as well as giving consideration to the overall “readership of the relevant social media page” (‘the followers’ – plaintiff’s submissions dated 12 February 2025, par 20). In this context, it was submitted that the overall “readership” should be understood as, and ascertainable by, the number of “followers” of the page.

Although argued this way, the evidence directed to each of these matters was not fully addressed in the plaintiff’s affidavit sworn 12 February 2025. The plaintiff sought, and was granted, leave to adduce further evidence about it, resulting in the plaintiff’s affidavit sworn 24 February 2025. The plaintiff relied on the content of that affidavit, aided by what was contained in the Schedule of Interactions dated 28 February 2025 (MFI 2), to establish the interactions and the followers.

The content of MFI 2 was relatively easy to follow (albeit that there were some minor inconsistencies within that document about the number of interactions said to have been recorded) and, thus, comprehend. However, the form of the evidence about “readership” in the plaintiff’s affidavit sworn 24 February 2025 was a little difficult to follow: the affidavit did not address the alleged “readership” of each of the matters sequentially, nor did it do so in any readily identifiable order, and the terms of the evidence in parts was less than clear. There were confined submissions about the specifics of this “evidence”.

In order to understand the plaintiff’s submissions, and to make findings about the interactions and the followers, it is necessary to set out the evidence on those two matters in relation to each of the 59 imputations. However, before doing so, it should be emphasised that the plaintiff, aside from setting out these matters, and inviting the Court to make the broad findings identified, did not, during submissions undertake any specific analysis of the particular platform where the defamatory imputation was published so as to secure more specific findings. Rather, it was left in the general way that it was. Given the plaintiff’s approach, I do not propose to sift through the material and make granular findings about each and every suggested interaction with a particular publication, nor to undertake that task in relation to the followers. In conformity with the way in which it has been approached, and argued, I will set out the interactions and the followers and illustrate some of the limitations in the evidence and overall approach.

The first matter was the publication on the WordPress site “Adam Whittington”. That publication, which was removed from the internet in 2021, was republished on a number of occasions as it was linked from posts on the Facebook page “Adam Whittington”: see [33]-[35], above.

The evidence is that the Facebook page had followers ranging between 19,000 and 24,000: plaintiff’s affidavit sworn 24 February 2025, pars 8-12.

The evidence did not address whether the WordPress site utilises a system of followers, or something akin to that.

The actual interactions, on what was described in submissions as this “blogsite”, was one: plaintiff’s affidavit sworn 24 February 2025, par 5. This is confirmed in MFI 2 – which refers to exhibit F, page 101, where there is a single “comment” about the plaintiff. MFI 2, page 1 relates this particular comment to matter 1(a), without explanation. By its terms, the “comment” refers to the plaintiff, and in a very general sense it may be accepted that the person who commented has read at least something about the plaintiff – quite what is unknown – in the WordPress article. Thus, aside from the fact that there was that one comment about the plaintiff, it is not possible to make a more specific finding (and I expressly do not) about the interactions on the blogsite itself.

MFI 2 (pages 1-3) deals with the balance of the interactions relating to the first matter as recorded on the Facebook page “Adam Whittington” – and is said to involve:

The second matter was published to a separate WordPress site titled “CARI – Child Abduction Recovery International”, “pinned” on Facebook pages “Child Abduction Recovery International”, “Child Abduction Recovery International CARI – Information Page” and “Child Abduction Recovery Australia” and posted on the Twitter page “CARI – Child Abduction”: see [39]-[41], above.

The evidence is that the “Child Abduction Recovery International” Facebook page had followers ranging between 19,000 and 20,000: plaintiff’s affidavit sworn 24 February 2025, pars 16-19, annexure 3; the “Child Abduction Recovery International CARI – Information Page” Facebook page had around 1,400 followers: plaintiff’s affidavit sworn 24 February 2025, pars 20-23, annexure 4; the “Child Abduction Recovery Australia” Facebook page had followers ranging between 446 and 474 followers: plaintiff’s affidavit sworn 24 February 2025, pars 24-28, annexure 5; and the “CARI – Child Abduction” Twitter page had followers ranging between 737 and 773: plaintiff’s affidavit sworn 24 February 2025, pars 29-33, annexure 6.

The plaintiff’s submissions did not draw attention to any evidence directed to the followers of the WordPress site, and so far as I have been able to ascertain (noting that the entire “blog” was not in evidence), there is no such evidence.

MFI 2 (pages 3-4) deals with the interactions on the pages (other than the WordPress site) – and is said to involve:

The third matter was posted on the Facebook page “Child Abduction Recovery International CARI – Information Page”: see [44]ff, above.

The number following this page has been earlier noted – namely, around 1,400: see [120], above.

MFI 2 (page 4) deals with the interactions on this page – and is said to involve 5 “likes”, 5 “comments” and 5 “shares” (exhibit F, page 137).

The fourth matter was a publication on the Twitter page “CARI – Child Abduction”: see [48]ff, above.

The number following this page has been earlier noted – namely, ranging between 737 and 773: see [120], above.

MFI 2 (page 4) deals with the interactions on this page – and is said to involve 1 “retweet” (exhibit F, page 138).

The fifth matter was a publication on the Twitter page “CARI – Child Abduction”: see [52]ff, above.

The number following this page has been earlier noted – namely, ranging between 737 and 773: see [120], above.

MFI 2 (page 5) deals with the interactions on this page – and is said to involve 1 “quote tweet” (exhibit F, page 139).

The sixth matter was a publication on the Facebook page “Adam Whittington”: see [56]ff, above.

The number following this page has been earlier noted – namely, ranging between 19,000 and 24,000: see [115], above.

MFI 2 (page 5) deals with the interactions on this page – and is said to involve: 92 “likes”, 34 “comments” and 18 “shares” (exhibit F, page 144-145).

The seventh matter was a publication on the Facebook page “Adam Whittington”: see [60]ff, above.

The number following this page has been earlier noted – namely, ranging between 19,000 and 24,000: see [115], above.

MFI 2 (page 5) deals with the interactions on this page – and is said to involve: 4 “interactions” and 2 “comments” (exhibit F, page 148).

The eighth matter involved publication on the Facebook pages “Child Abduction Recovery Australia”, “Child Abduction Recovery International CARI – Information Page” and “Child Abduction Recovery International”: see [64]ff, above.

The number of followers of the “Child Abduction Recovery Australia” Facebook page ranged between 446 and 474; the followers of “Child Abduction Recovery International CARI – Information Page” Facebook page was around 1,400; and the followers of “Child Abduction Recovery International” Facebook page ranged between 19,000 and 20,000 respectively: see [120], above.

MFI 2 (pages 5-6) deals with the interactions on these pages – and is said to involve:

The ninth matter was a publication on the Facebook page “Child Abduction Recovery International”: see [70]ff, above.

The number of followers of this page has been earlier noted – namely, ranging between 19,000 and 20,000: see [120], above.

MFI 2 (page 6) deals with the interactions on this page – and is said to involve: 2 “likes” and 1 “share” (exhibit F, page 152).

The tenth matter was a publication on the Facebook page “Child Abduction Recovery International CARI – Information Page”: see [74]ff, above.

The number following this page has been earlier noted – namely, around 1,400: see [120], above.

MFI 2 (pages 6-7) deals with the interactions on these pages – and is said to involve: 2 “likes”, 1 “comment” and 1 “share” (exhibit F, page 153).

The eleventh matter was a publication on the Facebook page “Adam Whittington”: see [79], above.

The number of followers of this page has been earlier noted – namely, ranging between 19,000 and 24,000: see [115], above.

MFI 2 (page 7) deals with the interactions on this page – and is said to involve: 581 “likes”, 15 “comments” and 284 “shares” (exhibit F, page 155).

The twelfth matter was a publication on the Facebook page “Adam Whittington Advocate”: see [84]ff, above.

The evidence is that the “Adam Whittington Advocate” Facebook page had followers ranging between 4,100 and 4,445: plaintiff’s affidavit sworn 24 February 2025, pars 34-36.

MFI 2 (page 7) deals with the interactions on this page – and is said to involve: 12 “likes” and 2 “shares” (exhibit F, page 159).

Having referred to the evidence relating to the interactions with, and followers of, a particular page I will now address the plaintiff’s submissions about these matters and make findings about them.

As is apparent from the summary of the 12 matters, two of them (the first and second matters) involved the “direct” posting of defamatory material by the defendant online (to what has been described as WordPress), albeit that those two matters were also posted on social media via Facebook or Twitter or both; that is, the posts themselves contain the defamatory material. The balance of the matters involved posting defamatory material on social media.

In relation to the first matter, it is a little difficult to accept that many people would have read much of what is written, less still all of it. I raise this not to undercut or qualify the finding that I have earlier made, that what is contained in this article was defamatory of the plaintiff, but to emphasise that I entertain some doubt that, given the form and content of this document – which, so far as I can see, is little more than impenetrable and unbalanced ramblings – it is (or was) likely to have any significant “readership” in fact. In particular, I entertain some not inconsiderable doubt about whether any potential reader of the document would have in fact made it through any significant amount of this document, less still all of it – which is important given that, putting to one side those defamatory imputations contained on page 11 of exhibit F, the balance of them are largely around pages 75-79 (of 114). I am mindful that this article was ‘forwarded’, ‘linked’ or ‘shared’ on multiple occasions (hence its reach may be somewhat greater) but, notwithstanding this occurred, I still entertain considerable doubt about how many people actually read the WordPress article, for the reasons that I have given. I am unpersuaded, in the circumstances – which include the fact that the publication was taken off the internet on 17 February 2021 (see [35], above) – that the material defamatory of the plaintiff was in fact read by any significant number of individuals. (No submissions were made about when this publication was first “posted” on the WordPress site, but I infer it to be around the time it is dated – namely, 29 December 2019: see [33], above).

The second matter, like the first matter, was published to a separate WordPress site “CARI – Child Abduction Recovery International”: see [41], above. As I have earlier noted, the plaintiff described the “second matter” as forming part “of a larger blog of some 200 pages of which the offending second matter is a component”: plaintiff’s affidavit sworn 24 February 2025, par 13. (The larger blog was not in evidence, as I have also earlier noted). This publication was posted on a number of the defendant’s social media platforms – for example, the Facebook page “Child Abduction Recovery International”: plaintiff’s affidavit sworn 24 February 2025, par 14; exhibit F, page 132. Given the publication of the defamatory material on social media was by a link to the article, my reasons and findings about the first matter (specifically, the publication to the WordPress site) apply equally to the second matter.

I turn now to deal first with the interactions, and then to the followers for the remaining matters.

In relation to the interactions, I consider there to be limitations in the evidence and I am not prepared to find, as the plaintiff argued, that the “readership” of the defamatory material should invariably be equated to the interactions recorded on the particular online platform. That is for the following reasons.

First, although the evidence directed to the interactions demonstrates that these interactions (or ‘hits’) occurred and is thus some evidence directed to the “size of the audience” by the numbers involved, the evidence does not descend to identifying, and thus permitting a finding about, the precise number of individuals who had those interactions with each publication.

I will explain this, by reference to exhibit F, page 115 – which is a post on the defendant’s Facebook page dated 11 February 2020. That publication, which linked the WordPress article comprising the first matter, records 39 total interactions – 24 “likes”, 5 “comments” and 10 “shares”. Thus, although there are those number of interactions, it is not known whether one person simultaneously “liked, commented and shared” this post – a possibility which casts doubt on the likelihood that the extent of publication is necessarily no lower than an exact “readership” of 39. As Mr Armitage very fairly accepted, it is difficult to be precise about the true reach of this publication, or indeed any of the publications, by reason only of the recorded interactions.

Secondly, the inference that the plaintiff seeks to draw is that because of those interactions, and irrespective of what else is posted on the particular page, it necessarily followed that access was had to, for example, the WordPress article and, more particularly, the defamatory imputations within it. That is not an inference I am prepared to draw or a submission that I accept. The point can be illustrated by reference to exhibit F, page 118. On that Facebook post, as the plaintiff pointed out, there were 136 “likes”, 115 “comments” and 4,900 “views” of an embedded video. But that says nothing about whether any particular numbers of, say, those that viewed the video posted (which is not suggested in any way to refer to, or be about, the plaintiff) also decided to access the link to the WordPress article and, having done so, come across the defamatory imputations dispersed throughout the back end of that 114 page document. In my view, the interactions, absent any evidence that establishes or tends to establish a greater level of engagement, merely give an indication of those who actually went to the Facebook (or, for that matter, any other social media) page – in contrast to people who were merely followers of the particular page. However, it says nothing about what they read or what they interacted with.

Nevertheless, I am prepared to accept that – although the plaintiff’s submissions did not seek to differentiate between any of the interactions, and the respective posts containing the defamatory imputations – where the subject matter of the post has the plaintiff as its principal subject matter or is otherwise confined, that there were interactions broadly in the order of what is recorded. But, even then, there are considerable differences in those interactions and, quite often, the interactions involve small numbers: see, for example, exhibit F, page 149.

In terms of the “readership” based upon the followers, again as Mr Armitage accepted, it is difficult to make a firm finding about whether, and if so to what degree, the wider following in fact engaged with the defendant’s publications at all. Self-evidently, the evidence about the wider following says nothing about whether those followers actually read the material. To be clear, I am not prepared to find, as the plaintiff argued, that the followers of a particular online platform invariably equates to what the plaintiff argued was the “readership” – that is, that those followers in fact read the material, rather than there being a mere potential for that to have occurred.

Further, there is a degree of tension between, on the one hand, suggesting that the “readership” equates to the followers and, on the other, seeking to prove that matter through the interactions. Thus, for example, in connection with the twelfth matter (see [84]-[89], above, and exhibit F, page 158), the plaintiff submitted that because the followers of that page was around 4,000 then that demonstrated the extent of the “readership”, but also sought to rely upon the interactions which were 12 “likes” and 2 “shares” – these interactions being some evidence suggesting that the actual “readership” is appreciably more circumscribed. Thus, whilst I accept that the number of followers demonstrates the potential “readership” of each particular “post”, I am unable (and unwilling) to make any firm finding about actual “readership”.

It should also be noted that, at least initially, there was no particular evidence or submissions directed to where any of those “followers” of the defendant on his social media sites in fact resided – albeit that there was evidence from the plaintiff’s daughter, Madeline Allgood, Louise Halford and Alexandra Betts that they had accessed the defendant’s social media sites. The plaintiff’s daughter is an Australian resident, as was Ms Allgood from late 2020 (she resided in England before then), whereas Ms Halford and Ms Betts each resided in England at all relevant times. The plaintiff sought leave (which was granted) to adduce further evidence, and make further submissions, about this topic. The plaintiff’s further evidence is contained in her affidavit sworn 14 March 2025.

The plaintiff’s further submissions broke down what were described as “Australian interactions” across each of the defamatory imputations (plaintiff’s submissions dated 20 March 2025, par 8), and the essential submission advanced was that whilst the “scale of the Australian readership forms one aspect of the analysis”, overall “readership” nevertheless remains important (plaintiff’s submissions dated 20 March 2025, par 9). I generally accept this submission. These matters inform the assessment of damages, particularly in connection with reputational harm.

In my view, the evidence of “Australian interactions” by and large establishes that, to the extent known, those interactions with the publications were extremely limited and, for many of the matters, there were none.

To the extent there were interactions, it is useful to illustrate some of the limits to the evidence:

I add the following. There was no evidence establishing that anyone within the plaintiff’s professional field (or in any area related to, or in any way connected with, it) read any of the defamatory publications. Nor was it suggested that any of those identified as having interacted with the publications or followed the social media accounts had any connection to, or were known by, the plaintiff. In each respect, and by way of limited qualification to those matters, I have not overlooked the evidence from Ms Allgood, Ms Betts and Ms Halford (albeit this evidence was not referred to during submissions), who have read the defamatory material. Ms Allgood, who describes herself as a “breathwork practitioner” and an acquaintance of the plaintiff since around late 2023, now resides in Bathurst, New South Wales, having formerly resided in the United Kingdom; Ms Betts, who resides in the United Kingdom, also describes herself as an “acquaintance” of the plaintiff – albeit precisely for how long was not explained; and Ms Halford, a “friend” of the plaintiff who practices as a solicitor in the United Kingdom (and who deposes to having had the publications drawn to her attention by the plaintiff).

It was not suggested that any of the “Australian interactors” resided – at any time – in the plaintiff’s community.

To sum up: the plaintiff has not persuaded me that the “readership” (that is, the extent of the publication) was most likely anything other than limited, albeit with some – essentially unquantifiable – potential for it to be greater (as I have earlier found); to the extent there was evidence directed to establishing the “Australian interactions”, those interactions were limited and, for many of the “matters”, no such interactions were established (again, as I have earlier found); and I am not satisfied that the “readership” extended to any person in her area of work or her community more generally.

In relation to the impact of the defamatory matters upon the plaintiff, in her affidavit and oral evidence, she spoke about her feelings and reactions to the publications and the conduct of the defendant towards her. I accept her evidence. In particular, I accept and find that the defendant’s publications have had a “terrible impact upon” her (plaintiff’s affidavit sworn 12 February 2025, par 5); that she had concerns over her, and her family’s, physical safety (plaintiff’s affidavit sworn 12 February 2025, par 6); have caused her “anxiety and stress” that has resulted in insomnia and poor concentration and necessitated her seeking psychological assistance on five occasions during the period September 2021-December 2022 (plaintiff’s affidavit sworn 12 February 2025, pars 8-9). I do not doubt that the publications have caused her hurt and distress – over the period of time during which they have been published.

The impact of the defamatory matters upon the plaintiff has, I accept, been exacerbated not only by the defendant’s failure to apologise, but by his continuing publication of defamatory matters (the ninth to twelfth matters) after the plaintiff commenced these proceedings on 8 February 2021. Indeed, I accept that he has continued to do so more recently – on 13 January and 18 and 23 February 2025: plaintiff’s affidavit sworn 12 February 2025, par 24 and annexure J; plaintiff’s affidavit sworn 24 February 2025, pars 37-38, annexures 8 and 9.

The plaintiff gave evidence on 14 February 2025 that largely aligned with her affidavit evidence. Notwithstanding the hearing has proceeded without any participation by the defendant, no attempt was made to overstate the impact of these defamatory imputations; rather, my impression was that she tended to understate them. I have no doubt that they have caused her anguish, anxiety, hurt and distress.

As to the assessment of harm to the plaintiff’s reputation, it should be noted that the evidence was somewhat limited. The plaintiff spoke of her concerns that the defamatory posts may impact upon her work as a family mediator: plaintiff’s affidavit sworn 12 February 2025, par 5. Given the nature of the defamatory posts, I accept that those (subjective) concerns are not unreasonable. But there is very little material upon which to objectively assess the materiality of those concerns. For example, there was no evidence that, say, if the plaintiff’s name was put into a search engine on the internet, the results would include the defamatory posts. Further, to the extent there was some specific evidence directed to the plaintiff’s reputation following publication of the defamatory matters, it did not suggest any particular impact upon it. For example, there was evidence to the effect that “the plaintiff is a successful family mediator…” (affidavit of Alexandra Betts ‘dated’ 10 February 2025, par 6). I am, therefore, unpersuaded that the defamatory material has had any significant impact upon her work as a family mediator. Notwithstanding the limits in the evidence, I have made allowance for the fact that there has been a degree of harm to the plaintiff’s reputation.

I add the following in relation to my assessment of damages. I have also taken into account that the harm suffered by the plaintiff was prolonged and intensified by the absence of any apology by the defendant, that the defamatory matters were never retracted (albeit that the first matter was removed from the internet, as earlier noted) and have been persisted in during the course of these proceedings: Ali at [76]. Further, the plaintiff is entitled to damages for the harm done to her reputation (as I have accepted, above); in this respect, the plaintiff can point to the judgment of the Court as vindication not only of her reputation, but to demonstrate the “baselessness of the charge”: Cassell at 1071. The plaintiff has succeeded – wholly – in vindicating her reputation, so far as the law can provide this. Finally, when assessing damages, I have also had regard to the fact that I propose to grant a permanent and mandatory injunction restraining the defendant from repeating the defamation: Zaia v Eshow [2017] NSWSC 1540 at [117] (‘Zaia’).

It is appropriate to allow as well (and I do) for the grapevine effect: although the evidence about the extent of the publication had some limits, I accept “by the ordinary function of human nature, the dissemination of defamatory material is rarely confined to those to whom the matter is immediately published”: Belbin v Lower Murray Urban and Rural Water Corporation [2012] VSC 535 at [217].

The plaintiff also sought an award of aggravated damages. The plaintiff submitted that the defendant’s conduct towards the plaintiff justified such an award having regard to the following (plaintiff’s submissions dated 12 February 2025, par 28): first, the gravity of the imputations and the failure of the defendant to defend them; secondly, the material – except in relation to the first matter – “remains online to this day”; thirdly, the defendant has never apologised to the plaintiff; fourthly, the defendant’s conduct in the litigation – in particular, the circumstances of the defendant’s non-participation that led to the default judgment being entered on 5 September 2024; and, fifthly, the defendant’s continued publication of defamatory material after the appeal proceedings, and the entry of default judgment – and, it should be added, the more recent publications to which I have earlier referred.

The recent publications were dated 13 January and 18 February and 23 February 2025: plaintiff’s affidavit sworn 12 February 2025, par 24 and plaintiff’s affidavit sworn 24 February 2025, pars 37 and 38. The first is on a number of the defendant’s social media pages and may fairly be described as having persisted in repeating many of the matters that I have found to be defamatory of the plaintiff. The second is on the defendant’s Twitter page (“Adam Whittington Advocate”) and stated: “What do you think paedophile sympathiser #JasminNewman hiding behind your fake account…”. The third is on the defendant’s Twitter page (“CARI Child Abduction”) and, after referring to the plaintiff, stated: “that’s why she supports so many known paedophiles now…#JasminNewmanScammer”.

I am satisfied that this is a case that warrants an award of aggravated damages. That is because the defendant has not only failed to apologise but has not removed (except the first matter) the publications from the internet and, importantly, has recently published further matters relating to the plaintiff that are clearly defamatory of her. Further, I accept, as the plaintiff essentially submitted, the circumstances of the defendant’s non-participation in these proceedings also amounted to conduct that should be considered to be aggravating: he chose not to file a defence to the 4ASOC, he chose not to defend the proceedings, and he chose not to participate. In my view, the proper characterisation of the defendant’s conduct, including his participation (or, more accurately, lack of participation) is that it lacks bona fides, is improper and is unjustifiable in the sense discussed by the authorities. In short, the conduct of the defendant “rubs salt in the wounds inflicted by the libel sued upon”: Sutcliffe v Pressdram Ltd [1991] 1 QB 153, 170; Greenwich v Latham [2024] FCA 1050 at [265] (‘Greenwich’).

Given the purposes served by an award of damages and the principles to which I have referred, including the need for there to be an appropriate and rational relationship between the harm sustained by the plaintiff and the amount awarded (s 34), and the findings that I have made, I assess non-economic loss at $150,000.00 – that is, as a single sum (s 39). Adopting the “conventional approach” (see [102], above), I have included, within this amount, an amount for aggravated damages – in respect of the first to tenth matters, but not the eleventh and twelfth matters, for reasons which I will next explain.

As I have earlier indicated, s 35(2B) of the Act requires any award of aggravated damages “to be made separately to any award of damages for non-economic loss…” to which s 35B(1) applies: see Greenwich at [264]. The plaintiff accepted that the effect of s 35(2B) of the Act was that, whilst I could assess any award of aggravated damages as part of a single overall sum with damages for non-economic loss in respect of the first to tenth matters (in line with the principles referred to in [102], above), that could not occur for the eleventh and twelfth matters: for those matters it was necessary, if aggravated damages were to be awarded, that they be separately identified from the award of damages for non-economic loss.

There are difficulties with awarding aggravated damages for the eleventh and twelfth matters, given the evidence. Those matters, it will be recalled, involve the same publication posted on different social media pages of the defendant: see [79]-[89], above. The difficulties are these. First, the task of separating out the evidence to support an award of aggravated damages directed towards injury to (or hurt) feelings or to the plaintiff’s reputation when that evidence is relevant also to compensatory damages is by no means straightforward, as the authorities recognise. It is not straightforward in the present case, given the evidence did not descend into separately dealing with the eleventh and twelfth matters. Secondly, and following on from the first difficulty, the overall approach by the plaintiff in connection with damages, although accepting the need to comply with the terms of s 35(2B) of the Act, has been that it is the overall effect of the defamatory imputations that have caused her injury, loss and damage, entitling her to compensation, rather than any particular ones. Put a little differently, the plaintiff’s case on damages has not descended to separating out the particular effects of any one of the defamatory imputations. It is, I should emphasise, readily understandable why the matter has been approached in that way, and what I have said is in no way intended as any criticism, merely an explanation for the present difficulties.

In the circumstances, I decline to make an award of aggravated damages in respect of the eleventh and twelfth matters.

The plaintiff is entitled to interest on the amount awarded for non-economic loss in accordance with MBP (SA) Pty Ltd v Gogic (1991) 171 CLR 657, 663-664; [1991] HCA 3; Metropolitan Meat Industry Board v Williams (1991) 24 NSWLR 54, 58-59. I note these principles were applied, in defamation proceedings, in Ryan v Premachandran [2009] NSWSC 1186 at [142].

For purposes of calculating interest, I allocate 67% of those damages to the past (which takes into account that the events occurred between 3-5 years ago), and the reduction in rate (from 4% to 2%) is to reflect the fact that I am allowing the interest over the entire period (approximately 5 years) for all of the damages, notwithstanding that it relates to all publications. The plaintiff accepted the appropriateness of approaching the calculation of interest in this way.

The calculation, therefore, is: 2% x $100,000.00 x 5 = $10,000.00.

The plaintiff sought, in addition to damages, a permanent injunction to restrain further publication by the defendant (4ASOC, prayer for relief par 3), as well as a mandatory injunction designed to require the defendant to remove the offending publications from all online platforms where they remain (4ASOC, prayer for relief par 4).

Although the plaintiff has established that defamatory imputations were conveyed, it does not follow that a permanent injunction will be ordered as a matter of course. Rather, ordinarily it is necessary to demonstrate the presence of an additional factor such as “an apprehension that the [defendant] may, by reason of irrationality, defiance, disrespect of the Court’s judgment or otherwise, publish allegations similar to those found to be defamatory unless restrained from doing so”: Hockey at [15]; Carolan v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (No 7) [2017] NSWSC 351 at [18]-[20].

In relation to a mandatory injunction, it has been said that an injunction of that kind “may be appropriate to order when defamatory material continues to be available online”: Rolph on Defamation at [17.150]. There is, as Professor Rolph has noted, limited authority dealing with the relevant principles that inform whether, in the present context, a mandatory injunction should be granted.

In Doe, Fagan J ordered a mandatory injunction, given the defendant’s lack of co-operation with the Court (which extended to the continued publication of the defamatory material during the course of the proceedings: at [73]) and the impracticability of the defendant removing the references to the plaintiff in that material (at [74]):

In O’Reilly v Edgar [2019] QSC 24 the granting of a permanent and a mandatory injunction turned, at least in part, upon findings relating to the conduct of the defendant – namely, that there was a high prospect that the defendant would republish the defamatory posts, that no assurance was given that the defamatory material would be removed and that, throughout the trial, the defendant continued to maintain that the posts were justified and true “despite having no evidence capable of proving that to be the case”: at [240].

In my view, a permanent injunction should be granted. Given the defendant’s conduct – including the terms of the email sent to the plaintiff’s counsel on 12 December 2024 (see [7], above) and the fact that he has continued to post material about the plaintiff notwithstanding his knowledge of the hearing – I am well-satisfied that the defendant will continue to publish allegations similar to those I have found to be defamatory, unless restrained from doing so. It follows that I am satisfied that an injunction is reasonably necessary to prevent that occurring.

The terms of the permanent injunction I propose to order is broadly similar to that ordered by McCallum J in Zaia and by Fagan J in Doe v Dowling [2019] NSWSC 1222 (‘Doe’).

In my view, a mandatory injunction should also be granted given my findings about the defendant’s conduct and, further, consistent with what Fagan J held in Doe, it would be unrealistic to expect the publications to be redacted or adjusted to remove the defamatory imputations.

The plaintiff seeks an order that the defendant pay the plaintiff’s costs. That order will be made.

Additionally, however, the plaintiff seeks an order that, in relation to counsel’s fees (counsel has been acting pursuant to a referral made by the Court under rr 7.36-7.41 of the UCPR), the Court make a gross sum costs order in the amount of $184,745.00. I am satisfied that the plaintiff’s counsel is entitled to recover those fees under r 7.41(2) of the UCPR.

An order was made by Sackar J for a referral to the NSW Bar Association Legal Assistance Referral Scheme on 13 August 2021. The professional fees claimed by the plaintiff’s counsel commence after that order for referral was made – namely, on and from 23 November 2021 (plaintiff’s affidavit sworn 12 February 2025, annexure M).

Section 98 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) (‘the CPA’) grants the Court discretion to award costs. By s 98(4)(c), the Court is entitled to make a gross sum costs order in place of assessed costs:

The guiding principle, in an application for a gross sum costs order, is that the “power should only be exercised when the Court considers that it can do so fairly between the parties, and that includes sufficient confidence in arriving at an appropriate sum on the materials available”: Harrison v Schipp (2002) 54 NSWLR 738; [2002] NSWCA 213 at [22] (‘Harrison’). The relevant principles were summarised in Ahern v Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd (No 2) [2022] NSWCA 39 at [14]-[18] (‘Ahern’) in these terms:

In my view, the following matters demonstrate that this is an appropriate case for the exercise of the Court’s discretion, under s 98(4)(c) of the CPA, to make a gross sum costs order. First, it will avoid the delay, cost and expense of the assessment process. Secondly, there remains some doubt about the defendant’s capacity – putting to one side his willingness – to meet his liability in costs. In relation to this matter (and the first), the evidence from the plaintiff in her affidavit sworn 12 February 2025, par 24 and annexure I records the defendant’s assertion that the plaintiff “won’t get one cent”. Thirdly, in the event that there was a requirement to have the costs assessed, putting to one side the inevitable delay that would result if that were to eventuate, it is quite likely – given what has occurred in the proceedings to this point – that there would be “aggravation” (in the sense described in the authorities, earlier referred to) involved in such process. Fourthly, the power is appropriately exercised where – as here, I find – “a party’s conduct has unnecessarily contributed to the costs of the proceedings”, particularly, “where the costs incurred have been disproportionate to the result of the proceedings”: Ahern at [17].

Although I have found that the circumstances are such that it is appropriate for the Court to give consideration to the exercise of its discretion to make a gross sum costs order under s 98(4)(c) of the CPA, the power “should only be exercised when the Court considers that it can do so fairly between the parties and where an appropriate sum can be determined from the available materials”: Harrison at [22]; Ahern at [17]. I am satisfied as to the existence of both matters.

I turn now to the quantification of the plaintiff’s costs (relating to counsel’s fees). This needs to be an informed assessment so as to permit the Court to make a “logical, fair and reasonable” estimate: Beach Petroleum NL v Johnson (No 2) (1995) 57 FCR 119, 123; [1995] FCA 350. In undertaking that assessment, however, the Court applies a “broad brush”, mindful that the process is not to take on the characteristics of a formal costs assessment – something that would defeat the purpose of the order: Ahern at [18].

The amount claimed for the gross sum costs order reflects the involvement of the plaintiff’s counsel across what has been described as four “parts”: first, the involvement of the plaintiff’s counsel in the matter, including multiple appearances, before Sackar J; secondly, the involvement of the plaintiff’s counsel in the matter, including multiple appearances, before Rothman J; thirdly, the involvement of the plaintiff’s counsel in the matter, including multiple appearances, in the Court of Appeal; and, fourthly, the involvement of the plaintiff’s counsel in the matter, including multiple appearances, leading to and including the current hearing.

The amount claimed across each part is: first part – $62,200.00 plus GST; second part – $32,500.00 plus GST; third part – $29,600.00 plus GST; and fourth part – $43,650.00 plus GST. The total is: $167,950.00, plus $16,795.00 GST = $184,745.00 (plaintiff’s submissions dated 20 March 2025, par 15). The daily and hourly rates charged by counsel are: $3,500.00 plus GST per day (for periods, the daily rate was $3,000.00) and $450.00 per hour (for periods, the hourly rate was somewhat less).

Given the seniority of counsel (who was admitted to the Bar in 2013 and as a solicitor approximately four years prior to that (Tcpt, 5 March 2025, 41(5))), I consider these rates to be reasonable and compare favourably with the Guidelines of the New South Wales Costs Assessment Rules Committee dated 24 October 2023. I also consider that, consistent with the earlier mentioned directive in the authorities to approach the matter in a “broad brush” way, having regard to the Court file, the nature of the issues in dispute and the history of the matter generally, the amount claimed by counsel reasonably reflects the work required to be, and in fact, undertaken.

Generally speaking, as was explained in Ahern at [42]-[43], courts have applied a discount when assessing costs on a gross sum basis:

That general rule recognises that “the aptness of a discount primarily depends on the accuracy and reliability of the costs evidence available to the Court”: Ahern at [18].

In my view, consistent with the authorities to which reference has been made, it is appropriate to discount the costs claimed given the costs orders made, and to be made, entitle the plaintiff’s costs to be payable on a “party/party” (or “ordinary”), and not an indemnity, basis and, further, there is nothing to suggest that the “usual outcome” would not apply if these costs were assessed. In the circumstances, I propose to discount the costs claimed by 20% – that is, the amount ordered will be $147,796.00.

There remains one further issue – relating to the costs referable to the “third part” (being work referable to proceedings, and appearances, in the Court of Appeal), being the amount of $29,600.00 plus GST. Specifically, whether any gross sum can extend to those costs that were ordered to be paid, following the defendant’s unsuccessful appeal to that Court (the order made by the Court of Appeal on 16 February 2024 was: summons seeking leave to appeal filed 10 January 2023, dismissed with costs). The position of the plaintiff was, at least initially, that any application for a gross sum costs order in respect of the Court of Appeal costs required an application to that Court. During the course of submissions, however, and in light of the decision of Campbell J in Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Goater [2016] NSWSC 216 (‘Goater’), the plaintiff submitted that an order could, and should, be made.

In my view, there is no impediment to this Court dealing with those costs incurred in connection with the appeal to the Court of Appeal. In short, that is because any gross sum costs order made does not involve any variation to (or inconsistency with) the order of 16 February 2024, nor does it, in substance or in form, alter it; rather, the order is merely a supplemental one that implements the “earlier costs order, by providing an alternative mode of enforcing it”: Short v Crawley (No 45) [2013] NSWSC 1541 at [33]; Beau Timothy John Hartnett trading as Hartnett Lawyers v Anthony Robert Bell as Executor of the Estate of the late Mabel Dawn Deakin-Bell (No 2) (2023) 113 NSWLR 381; [2023] NSWCA 311 at [38]. That approach is also consistent with the reasoning of Campbell J in Goater at [14]-[15] (a decision which held that it was open to a Judge in the Common Law Division to make an order that costs payable by order made by the Court of Appeal be payable forthwith).

For these reasons, I propose to order that the defendant pay the costs relating to the plaintiff’s counsel as claimed, albeit discounted by 20%.

The plaintiff was represented by Mr R Armitage, of counsel, on a pro bono basis.

I wish to record my gratitude for him doing so, and for the assistance that he provided to the Court. The administration of justice is enhanced by the willingness of counsel, and those that provide their services through the Legal Assistance Referral Scheme, to appear on this basis.

For the above reasons I make the following orders: