State of New South Wales v Mohommed Farhat

1. [1]

   On 29 January 2026 I made orders arising from a summons brought by the State of New South Wales seeking orders under the Terrorism (High Risk Offenders) Act 2017 (NSW) following a preliminary hearing which concluded in the early evening of 28 January 2026. I ordered the appointment of experts to provide reports for a final hearing and directed that the defendant attend appointments with those experts but refused to make an interim supervision order. Before making the orders, I provided very brief reasons in the form of fundamental findings and indicated fuller reasons would be provided in due course. These are those reasons.

Short form of reasons published orally on 29 January 2026

1. [2]

   The preliminary hearing was held on 28 January 2026 and I provided the following reasons on 29 January 2026:

   1. (1)

      “In circumstances of some urgency the State of New South Wales approached the Court late last week to file a summons seeking orders under the Terrorism (High Risk Offenders) Act 2017 (NSW) (“the Act”) against the Defendant, Mohommed Farhat. The matter came before me as the Common Law Vacation Duty Judge on Tuesday 27 January 2026 and leave was granted to file an amended summons in Court. Mr Farhat’s lawyers retained Mr Lange of Senior Counsel to appear at an urgent preliminary hearing yesterday (28 January 2026) and the hearing commenced at about 12:00pm (at the conclusion of the bail list) and concluded a little after 5:30pm. I indicated that due to the somewhat absurd workload of the Court this week, it would not be possible to deliver reasons today and the parties indicated they were content if orders were made with reasons to follow.

   2. (2)

      Full reasons for the following orders will be delivered next week but it is appropriate to record in the briefest terms the relevant conclusions to which I have come and the fundamental findings that I make. Those conclusions and findings are these:

   3. (3)

      The last of those conclusions, which will be explained in the context of the arguably flawed terms of the statute when I publish full reasons, means that I may not make the interim supervision order sought by the plaintiff pursuant to s 27 of the Act.

   4. (4)

      The first five of those findings mean that I must make orders appointing two experts to prepare reports and directing Mr Farhat to attend those examinations.

   5. (5)

      Accordingly, I make the following orders:

   6. (6)

      The last of those orders is made against the possibility that the District Court Judge hearing the defendant’s severity appeal today may foreshadow or make orders allowing the appeal and sentencing the applicant to a period of imprisonment which has expired or may expire very soon. Should that circumstance eventuate, the statutory pre-requisite for an interim supervision order in s 27 of the Act would be established. It may be that the Judge hearing the severity appeal would stay their orders for an hour or so, or even overnight, to allow the parties to appear again before me so that the application for orders under s 27 could be pursued further. In that regard, and for the benefit of the parties, I have reached the provisional view that the Court’s discretion to make an interim supervision order should be exercised in favour of the State but that my present thinking is that any supervision order should be subject to very few conditions, and nothing like the 29 ‘priority conditions’ identified by Senior Counsel for the plaintiff towards the end of argument late yesterday.

   7. (7)

      The Court will now adjourn but I invite the parties to notify my Associate what happens in the Downing Centre later today. I thank counsel and their hardworking instructing solicitors for their assistance and good work.”

Background to the application

1. [3]

   On 18 November 2025 the defendant was convicted in the Local Court of 15 offences and sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of 20 months with a non-parole period of 10 months. The offences were committed on 20 and 21 November 2024. The sentence was backdated to commence on 7 February 2025 and the non-parole period expired on 6 December 2025. Mr Farhat was not released at the expiration of the non-parole period because, at a private meeting on 4 December 2025, the State Parole Authority determined that he was a “terrorism related offender” and revoked the statutory parole order on the grounds of community safety: Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Act 1999 (NSW). As things stood when the summons was filed and the case was heard, the defendant will not be released until 6 October 2026.

2. [4]

   However, the defendant lodged an appeal against the severity of the sentence and that appeal was listed for hearing at the Downing Centre on 29 January 2026. Against the possibility that the appeal may result in the defendant’s imminent release, the State of New South Wales sought orders under the Terrorism (High Risk Offenders) Act 2017 (NSW) (“the Act”). The application was said to be urgent and came before the Court in the middle of the vacation duty list on Tuesday 27 January 2026. As I noted earlier, the defendant managed to retain Senior Counsel (Mr Lange) who was available to appear at the preliminary hearing on 28 January 2026. The parties agreed that, for the orders to have any practical effect, they had to be made before the District Court hears Mr Farhat’s appeal which was listed at 10:00am on 29 January, the day after the preliminary hearing proceeded over five or six hours concluding at around 5:30pm.

3. [5]

   In the ultimate, the State seeks an order under Pt 2 of the Act that Mr Farhat be subjected to an extended supervision order for a period of one year. At the preliminary stage, it sought an interim supervision order under s 27 as well as orders under s 24(5) to facilitate the final hearing of the matter. That is, it sought orders:

   1. (1)

      Appointing two experts to conduct psychological or psychiatric examinations and provide reports to the Court; and

   2. (2)

      Directing Mr Farhat to attend those examinations.

Finding that Mr Farhat is an “eligible offender”

1. [6]

   The offences to which the defendant pleaded guilty involved three offences of entering building/land with intent to commit an indictable offence (Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 114(1)(d)), two offences of destroying property using fire (Crimes Act, s 195(1A)(b)) and ten offences of destroying or damaging property (Crimes Act, s 195(1A)(a)). While the matters were dealt with summarily in the Local Court, each offence is an indictable offence. Mr Farhat was born in late March 2004 and is currently 21 years old and serving the sentence imposed for those offences.

2. [7]

   Accordingly, Mr Farhat is an “eligible offender” as that expression is defined in s 7 of the Act.

Finding that Mr Farhat is a “convicted NSW terrorism activity offender”

1. [8]

   Mr Farhat is not a “convicted NSW terrorist offender” under s 8. However, the State submitted that he is a “convicted NSW terrorism activity offender” in accordance with s 10 of the Act which provides:

2. [9]

   While there is room for debate as to Mr Farhat’s motivations in committing the offences, and important distinctions between anti-Semitism and criticism of the state of Israel discussed by Dr Rodger Shanahan in his expert report dated 7 January 2026, [1] the following matters establish that the defendant falls within the definition in s 10:

3. [10]

   The terms of s 10(1A)(a)(ii) means Mr Farhat falls within the definition of a convicted NSW terrorism activity offender.

4. [11]

   Section 11 of the Act provides that in determining whether an eligible offender is a convicted NSW underlying terrorism offender or convicted NSW terrorism activity offender, this Court may have regard to the views of the sentencing Court. The views expressed by the sentencing Magistrate are also to be considered in deciding whether to make a supervision order. Some relevant findings made by Magistrate Nash included:

5. [12]

   These findings support the conclusion urged by the State that the defendant is a “convicted NSW terrorism activity offender”. However, at this stage of the inquiry – that is, in determining whether the statutory pre-requisite that Mr Farhat falls within the definition of the type of offender who may be subject to orders under the Act – it was sufficient that the State had established that he has a tattoo depicting the symbol of a prescribed terrorist organisation (Hezbollah) and that the graffiti with which he defaced the cars and buildings referred to another prescribed terrorist organisation (the PKK).

Time limits and formal requirements

1. [13]

   The application and conduct of the preliminary hearing complied with the formal requirements of the Act.

2. [14]

   The summons was brought while the defendant was serving a sentence for a NSW indictable offence and was not made until the last 12 months of the offender’s current custody: s 23(1) and (2). It was supported by documentation addressing the matters in s 25(3) including a report from a psychologist (Ms Kara Thomson) addressing the likelihood of Mr Farhat committing a serious terrorism offence: s 23(3).

3. [15]

   The application was served on the defendant within two business days of it being filed in this Court and the documents and reports on which the State relied were disclosed to Mr Farhat and his lawyers: s 24(1) and (2).

4. [16]

   The preliminary hearing was held within 28 days of the filing of the application: s 24(4).

The test on the preliminary hearing

1. [17]

   Before making orders appointing experts or subjecting Mr Farhat to an interim supervision order, the Court must be satisfied “that the matters alleged in the supporting documentation would, if proved, justify the making of an extended supervision order”: see (and contrast) the terms of ss 24(5) and 27(b). There is a slight difference in the wording of those sections to which it will be necessary to return. Section 24(5) requires the court to be “satisfied” while s 27 invites the inquiry whether “it appears to the Court”. I am unpersuaded that these different formulations are of any real significance despite the submissions of Senior Counsel for the State.

2. [18]

   On either formulation, the test requires the Court to consider the material tendered on the application by reference to the proof required to make an extended supervision order. The relevant test is found in s 20 of the Act. Putting aside the formal requirements, the Court must be “satisfied to a high degree of probability that the offender poses an unacceptable risk of committing a serious terrorism offence if not kept under supervision under the order”.

3. [19]

   The legislation is in similar terms to other “high risk offender” legislation and the tests to be applied at both a final hearing and at the preliminary hearing have been subject to many binding pronouncements of the Court of Appeal and has been discussed by single judges on countless occasions by reference to the facts of the specific case. It is unnecessary to repeat the statements of principle made in past cases, but a few things must be borne in mind:

The material tendered on the preliminary hearing

1. [20]

   Two volumes of material were tendered at the preliminary hearing and I have considered this material although I have placed more weight on parts of the material than others.

2. [21]

   The first volume, paginated from page 1 to 502, was an exhibit to an affidavit of [a lawyer from the Crown Solicitor’s Office] affirmed on 23 January 2026. The second volume, styled “Judge’s Working Folder”, was not paginated but comprised of around 400 pages, separated into 13 tabs including further affidavits by [a lawyer from the Crown Solicitor’s Office] and other deponents.

3. [22]

   Annexed to the affidavits were various documents including parts of the prosecution brief for the index offences, statements, stills of CCTV footage, risk assessment and other reports, custodial records, intelligence (and COPS) reports, material establishing contact between the defendant and others said to have criminal connections along with criminal histories and other records relating to these “associates” of the defendant.

4. [23]

   The defendant tendered one document during the hearing. It was an unredacted copy of a police intelligence report that was provided in a heavily redacted form in the State’s bundle. That document was relevant (i) to a consideration of the psychologist’s second risk assessment report because Ms Thomson did not have the unredacted version when she prepared her report and (ii) to the question of whether the defendant was motivated by ideology or may have committed the index offences because he was paid (in money and/or drugs) as a reward for committing the offences.

5. [24]

   The State also provided detailed written submissions, a summary of the plaintiff’s case and an evidence summary relating to the defendant’s associations. Mr Lange provided brief written submissions in which he set out the areas of dispute on the preliminary hearing.

6. [25]

   The evidence to which I gave the most weight on the preliminary hearing were the facts of the index offences, the Magistrate’s findings as to those offences, the psychologist’s reports, and various assessments of risk found scattered throughout the material.

Is the statutory test under ss 24 and 27 established taking into account the test and relevant considerations on the final hearing (ss 20, 25)?

1. [26]

   I was satisfied that the material was capable of establishing that the offences to which Mr Farhat pleaded guilty were targeted and politically motivated.

2. [27]

   I accept there is an alternative argument that will need to be considered on the final hearing but considering the material through the prism of the plaintiff’s case, there was ample evidence to establish the political motivation for the crimes. This included evidence that he had searched for the locations of various Jewish institutions in the period leading up to the offences, the fact that the offences were committed in an area where there is a large Jewish community and the use of the expression “Fuck Israel” and “PKK coming”. Given the conflict between the PKK and the government of Turkiye, the proximity of the offences to the Turkish Consulate may also favour a political motivation.

3. [28]

   The finding of some political or ideological motivation was supported by the opinion evidence provided by Dr Shanahan even though Dr Shanahan emphasised correctly and thoughtfully the distinction between an anti-Semitic ideology on the one hand and concerns and protests arising from the actions of the State of Israel in Gaza and the occupied territories in Palestine.

4. [29]

   The offences demonstrated a readiness to act on those political views by inflicting property damage and committing arson. Other evidence in the material suggested that Mr Farhat was capable of resorting to violence although, ironically, the most graphic example arose from his threats to murder the perpetrator of the recent Bondi tragedy. However, he has also made threats and derogatory comments directed to the plaintiff’s legal representatives and “the governor” (I assume of the gaol in which he is incarcerated). As Ms Thomson’s report contemplates, these angry and inappropriate comments may have been no more than empty words arising out of frustration and distress but that is a matter for consideration at a final hearing. At the preliminary stage those comments are capable of giving rise to real concerns as to Mr Farhat’s future actions, highlight the need for more focussed expert opinion and risk assessment, and emphasise the desirability of some form of supervision upon his release.

5. [30]

   I also determined that Mr Farhat’s susceptibility to the influence of others is a matter that raises concerns about his future conduct. Ms Thomson’s first report included the opinion that his “susceptibility to influence, control and indoctrination is considered [to be] high”.

6. [31]

   Similarly, the evidence of his connections to various men associated with well-known criminal organisations is of concern, although I accept Mr Lange’s submission that this material does not, of itself, speak to a future risk that he will commit a serious terrorist offence. However, those connections may place him in a better position to commit acts constituting such offences.

7. [32]

   The relationship Mr Farhat has formed with Ms Ellie Nagel, a member of the Jewish community and a Youth Director at the Central Synagogue, is a matter of real encouragement and her support of the defendant may be a very important protective factor in the future. I considered closely Ms Nagel’s letter of support, her facilitating meetings with two Rabbis when Mr Farhat is released, and her report of the defendant’s reaction when discussing the Bondi Hanukkah murders.

8. [33]

   There are other positive – or in the parlance of this area of discourse, “pro-social” – influences in Mr Farhat’s life. He has a good and supportive family and Ms Thomson’s second report notes that his parents are strongly discouraging of his ongoing associations with his negative peer group. I take this to be a reference to those who encouraged or directed him in the commission of the index offences. Ms Thomson’s first report described him as being on a “disengagement trajectory, evidenced by the estrangement of prior peer influences, ongoing abstinence from substance use, genuine expressions of remorse” and his engagement with Ms Nagel. While she walked back from this assessment in the second report, there remain several positive factors for consideration by the Court that ultimately determines this application.

9. [34]

   Mr Lange submitted that I would not be persuaded that the offences were motivated by any political or extremist viewpoint but were, as the defendant submitted before the Magistrate, the result of bad associations and an offered reward (drugs and/or money) to perform the acts in question. As the Magistrate observed, this assertion was not supported by evidence capable of being tested. It was seen by the sentencing Magistrate as self-serving hearsay that received no solid support in the evidence. In this Court there was an investigator’s note suggesting that at least one police officer (Detective Senior Constable Coelho) found this alternative motivation to be plausible (Ex A Tab 8, p 48). This is relevant to the question of risk assessment and to the more general question that arises as to whether a supervision order (whether extended or interim) should be made. However, if that question can be resolved, it will be resolved at the final hearing. At this stage, the evidence of a political motive is quite strong, or at least capable of giving rise to the suggestion of extremist ideation.

10. [35]

    Ms Thomson initially assessed Mr Farhat’s risk profile for “violent extremism” as in the “Low to Moderate” range: Ms Thomson’s report dated 13 January 2026. Once she was provided with more information about his associations, she revised the opinion, stating he “remains of Moderate risk grievance-fuelled violence”: Ms Thomson’s report dated 24 January 2026.

11. [36]

    In addition to Ms Thomson’s reports, I have also considered the opinions expressed in the Reintegration Management Report prepared by Mr Banton from the Extended Supervision Order Team although that report was not an independent risk assessment but relied on the findings made by Ms Thomson. A police officer from the High Risk Terrorist Offenders Unit, Mr Michael Wright, also expressed some opinions in a risk management report dated 14 January 2026.

12. [37]

    The sentencing Magistrate was impressed with the proposed post-release supervision recommenced by the author of the Sentencing Assessment Report dated 4 November 2025. The report recommended fortnightly interactions with Community Corrections and a supervision plan with various referrals. The Magistrate foreshadowed (and structured the sentence to facilitate) a long period of parole during which there would be interventions directed to drug and alcohol abuse and mental health issues. Due to the revocation of the statutory parole period, that extended period of supervised parole has not occurred. There is to be a review of that decision in the next month.

13. [38]

    The material before the Court on the present application refers to more specific programmes calculated to address any extreme or radical ideology in which Mr Farhat may continue to be interested.

14. [39]

    Mr Farhat has a very limited criminal history, with only traffic matters on his record before the events of November 2024 and his arrest on the index offences. However, as noted, he appears to have some negative peer group associates, and his youth, immaturity and psychological profile may make him susceptible to their influence. The defendant has two recorded gaol infringements and one of those (on his account) involved him defending himself from an aggressive inmate.

15. [40]

    I accept the thrust of Mr Lange’s submission that the index offences, while considered by the Magistrate to be “hate crimes”, were far removed from the kinds of actions generally considered to amount to serious terrorism. Even so, I cannot retreat from the view that the offences had an obvious political and ideological flavour and that the risk of escalation is such that the primary object of the Act and the protection of the community must guide the Court in a meaningful way. Further, by reference to the relevant provisions of the Criminal Code (Cth), the definition of serious terrorism offence casts a wide net.

16. [41]

    The matter may ultimately be seen as finely balanced, and the resolution of the final hearing will be difficult and complex. There are some very positive signs along with some worrying aspects of the case. It is far from a straightforward case.

17. [42]

    Taking account of all relevant considerations, I was (and remain) of the view that the material in the supporting documentation would, if proved, justify the making of an extended supervision order.

It did not “appear to the Court” that Mr Farhat’s current custody “will” expire before the present proceedings are determined

1. [43]

   I accepted Mr Lange’s submission that, contrary to the plaintiff’s position, the statutory requirement for the making of an interim supervision order in s 27(a) was not established.

2. [44]

   To repeat myself, that section provides (with my emphasis on the relevant part of the provision):

3. [45]

   As things stand, Mr Farhat’s current custody will not expire until 6 October 2026. If the Parole Authority rescinds its decision to revoke the statutory parole order, he will be released to parole and the period of supervision will not expire until 6 October 2026.

4. [46]

   Whether the defendant remains incarcerated, or is released to parole, this Court is in a position to determine these proceedings by 6 October 2026 and there was no suggestion to the contrary.

5. [47]

   The State’s position was that there was a District Court severity appeal listed for hearing on 30 January 2026 and one possible outcome was that the Judge would allow the appeal and make orders allowing for Mr Farhat’s immediate or imminent release. That possibility was said to establish that it would appear to the Court that his current custody “will” expire before the Court could determine the plaintiff’s summons. I was not persuaded by the submissions made in support of that proposition.

6. [48]

   After an extended lunch hour, Senior Counsel made the following argument:

7. [49]

   Reference was then made to a decision of N Adams J (as the Chief Judge at Common Law then was) in State of New South Wales v Holt (Preliminary) [2021] NSWSC 1076. Emphasis was placed on passages at [13], [144]-[145] and [151]. Those passages concern the proper exercise of the discretion to make an interim order in the peculiar circumstances that arose in that case. They do not illuminate, or even touch upon, the meaning of the words “appears to the Court – that the offender’s current custody or supervision will expire”. State of New South Wales v Holt was not a case about the relevant statutory pre-requisites for the making of the order.

8. [50]

   While the phrase “if it appears to the Court” may give rise to some greater flexibility than, for example, language such as “if it is established” or “if it is proved”, I am unable to accept that the use of that phrase can change the meaning of the word “will” in this statutory context.

9. [51]

   The primary object of the Act in s 3 is important, but the proper application of that object cannot change the plain meaning of the statute. The circumstances in the case of Attorney General for New South Wales v Haines (BHT Barbara Ramjan) [2025] NSWCA 231 were very different. In that case, Kirk JA decided at [31]-[40] that certain time limits under the Mental Health and Cognitive Impairment Forensic Provisions Act 2020 (NSW) could be applied with flexibility by reference to the objects of that Act and purpose of the orders under contemplation. The Full Court (Adamson, McHugh and Ball JJA) held that the approach taken by Kirk JA was “open on the wording of the Act and is consistent with its purpose”: Attorney General for New South Wales v Haines (by his tutor Ramjan) (No 2) [2025] NSWCA 248 at [63]. The reasoning and construction adopted in that case cannot be applied in the present circumstances.

10. [52]

    In two cases arising under s 22B of the Bail Act 2013 (NSW), the Court of Criminal Appeal considered the meaning of the expression “will be sentenced to imprisonment to be served by full-time detention”: Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Van Gestel (2022) 109 NSWLR 136; [2022] NSWCCA 171 (“DPP v Van Gestel”) and Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Day [2022] NSWCCA 173 (“DPP v Day”). In DPP v Van Gestel, Gleeson JA concluded at [44]:

11. [53]

    The other judges agreed with his Honour and the same reasoning was applied in the case of DPP v Day at [23].

12. [54]

    I applied those cases, and that interpretation of the word “will”, in the context of making orders in a special hearing into a criminal defendant’s fitness to be tried. It was necessary to decide whether the man “will become fit” within the ensuing twelve-month period: Mental Health and Cognitive Impairment Forensic Provisions Act, s 47(1)(b) and 48(1); R v Woodham [2022] NSWSC 1154 at [21]-[23]. I also referred to the decision of Beech-Jones J in R v Risi [2021] NSWSC 769 where his Honour said at [55] that the use of the word “will” in that provision meant that the relevant finding “should only be made if there is a real certainty as to the accused’s lack of fitness during the relevant 12-month period.”

13. [55]

    These decisions give effect to the ordinary meaning of the word “will”; it is a word that alludes to inevitable or certain future events. Even giving full effect to the objects of the Act and allowing for some flexibility arising from the expression “appears to the Court” in s 27, the statute requires more than a mere possibility of an eligible offender being released and contemplates something closer to a realistic inevitability.

14. [56]

    For those reasons I was not satisfied that the statutory requirement in s 27(a) was not established and refused to make an interim supervision order.

15. [57]

    It seems likely that the circumstances that arose in this case were not contemplated by the legislature in settling on the terms of s 27(a). There may be a lacuna or glitch in the statute.

16. [58]

    A simple amendment to the provision – whereby the word “will” is replaced by the word “may” – would rectify the apparent glitch in the legislation. That amendment would ensure the Court has the power to make an interim supervision order in circumstances such as the present where there is a contingency (like an appeal against sentence or an application for parole) that means there is no realistic inevitability that a sentence or period of supervision will expire before the Court determines the application.

Conditions

1. [59]

   There was a dispute between the parties as to the conditions that should attach to an interim supervision order if one was made. As I indicated in argument and in the short judgment delivered last Thursday, I was provisionally of the view that a bare minimum number of conditions would be required to fulfil the task of protecting the community.

2. [60]

   I did not consider that all of the default conditions prescribed in s 29(1A) would be required and did not agree with the 29 conditions enumerated by Senior Counsel as constituting the “minimum” amount of conditions that ought to be imposed. [3] I noted the Magistrate’s view of the suitability of the treatment and supervision plan contemplated in the sentencing assessment report and was of the view that something embracing that kind of regime may be sufficient.

3. [61]

   However, it was unnecessary to reach a conclusion as to the appropriate conditions because no supervision order was made.

Orders and postscript

1. [62]

   For those reasons, I made the orders set out above at paragraph [2](5) at 9:30am on the morning after the preliminary hearing was conducted.

2. [63]

   A day later, the parties notified my Associate that the District Court dismissed Mr Farhat’s appeal against sentence on Friday 30 January 2026 and the urgency in the case evaporated.

3. [64]

   Looking forward, the matter will be case managed by Yehia J in the High Risk Offenders’ list and Mr Farhat will appear before the Parole Authority on 10 February 2026 for it to decide whether he may be released to parole before the expiration of the sentence.