Lo v Gu

1. [1]

   MITCHELMORE JA: I agree with Griffiths AJA.

2. [2]

   McHUGH JA: I agree with Griffiths AJA.

3. [3]

   GRIFFITHS AJA: This application for judicial review concerns a 14 May 2025 decision of the District Court (District Court Judgment), whereby Hanley SC DCJ dismissed an appeal from a 22 April 2024 decision of Magistrate McGlynn in the Local Court (Local Court Judgment). Magistrate McGlynn issued a two-year Apprehended Personal Violence Order (APVO) in favour of Mr Chao Gu and Dr Rong Ji (the respondents in the present proceedings) and against the applicant in the present proceedings, Ms Yuk Lo. The duration of the APVO was from 22 April 2024 to 21 April 2026. In dismissing Ms Lo’s appeal, Hanley SC DCJ ordered that the APVO run from 14 May 2025 to 13 May 2027. This had the practical effect of extending the operation of the APVO by slightly more than one year. His Honour also ordered Ms Lo to pay Mr Gu’s costs in a fixed amount of $15,000.

4. [4]

   By summons filed on 8 July 2025, Ms Lo now seeks orders setting aside the District Court Judgment and orders. She contends that Hanley SC DCJ’s decision to change the dates of the APVO was in excess of his jurisdiction and/or that his Honour did not afford her a sufficient opportunity to be heard before the change was made. She also contends that the appeal judge erroneously relied on ss 99 and 99A of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) (CDPV Act) in awarding costs and failed to afford her a sufficient opportunity to make submissions on the question and quantum of costs.

5. [5]

   It should be noted at the outset that, by virtue of s 176 of the District Court Act 1973 (NSW), an application for judicial review to this Court lies only on grounds of jurisdictional error. Ms Lo must therefore demonstrate jurisdictional error (see Garde v Dowd (2011) 80 NSWLR 620; [2011] NSWCA 115 at [6]–[10] per Basten JA (Giles and McColl JJA agreeing)).

Background summarised

1. [6]

   On 23 May 2022, Mr Gu lodged an application for an APVO against Ms Lo. Mr Gu and Dr Ji, who are husband and wife, are Ms Lo’s next-door neighbours. The application was opposed by Ms Lo, who at that stage had legal representation. The application was heard by Magistrate McGlynn over two days, on 28 August 2023 and 22 April 2024. Ex tempore reasons were delivered on the latter date, granting Mr Gu’s application. As previously noted, the APVO was made for a two year period from 22 April 2024 to 21 April 2026.

2. [7]

   Ms Lo, who represented herself, filed a notice of appeal against the Local Court Judgment. In a 10-page appeal statement filed on 17 March 2025 (and accompanied by 48 pages of annexures), Ms Lo alleged that the Local Court Magistrate made no less than 13 errors. She sought orders setting aside the APVO and costs.

3. [8]

   In submissions in response dated 29 April 2025, Mr Gu identified the relevant statutory framework and legal principles governing the appeal and explained why, in his view, none of the alleged errors was properly founded. At no point did Mr Gu submit that the dates of the existing APVO should be changed.

4. [9]

   In written reply submissions dated 9 May 2025, Ms Lo took issue with various aspects of Mr Gu’s submissions and further developed her case.

5. [10]

   The appeal was heard by Hanley SC DCJ on 14 May 2025. Pursuant to s 84 of the CDPV Act and s 18 of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (NSW) (CAR Act), the hearing proceeded as a rehearing on the basis of the evidence in the original Local Court proceedings (noting that an application made by Ms Lo to adduce fresh evidence was dismissed by the appeal judge).

6. [11]

   In ex tempore reasons for judgment, the appeal judge comprehensively reviewed the evidence and submissions of the parties. Having done so, his Honour explained that “there was easily sufficient evidence to warrant the making of orders”. His Honour concluded:

7. [12]

   This passage raises some difficulties. The appeal judge purported to “confirm the magistrate’s orders”. Those orders set the duration of the APVO for a period from 22 April 2024 to 21 April 2026. However, the appeal judge also set the APVO for a period of two years from 14 May 2025, in effect extending its length by approximately a year. At no point during the hearing, or in his Honour’s ex tempore reasons for judgment, was the possibility raised that the dates of the APVO would be changed in this way, nor was this change explained.

8. [13]

   After delivery of the ex tempore reasons, counsel for the respondents made an application for costs, referring to both ss 99 and 99A of the CDPV Act. Costs were sought in the fixed amount of $15,000, which was said to comprise the costs of preparation and the costs of the appearances of the respondents’ solicitor and counsel. The following exchange then ensued between his Honour and Ms Lo:

9. [14]

   The appeal judge delivered short reasons on the question of costs. His Honour was satisfied that the behaviour of Ms Lo was “so vexatious, and the appeal so unmeritorious” that “costs should be awarded of a professional nature, to be a sign of indemnity for relief to Mr Gu and Dr [Ji], for what I anticipate has been an enormous [sic] money expended to deal with what I can only assess and have suggested, is irrational responses to deal with a concern that has no foundation or rationality”. Costs were ordered in the amount of $15,000, to be paid within 28 days.

10. [15]

    Before turning to the parties’ submissions in the present proceeding, it should be noted that Ms Lo was a difficult and uncooperative litigant in the District Court proceedings. Her submissions included extremely serious and unsubstantiated allegations that the Magistrate’s decision was motivated by racial prejudice. As the transcript records, Ms Lo also interrupted the appeal judge at various points, including in a raised voice.

Parties’ submissions summarised

1. [16]

   Ms Lo, who was represented at the hearing by Mr Wendler of counsel, seeks judicial review of the District Court Judgment and orders on four grounds set out in the “Orders Sought” section of her summons filed on 9 July 2025:

2. [17]

   In her written outline of submissions dated 27 June 2025, Ms Lo contends that, in extending the operation of the APVO, the appeal judge failed to have regard to s 85(1) of the CDPV Act, which provides that the “lodging of a notice of appeal under section 84 does not have the effect of staying the operation of the order concerned”. It is said the appeal judge proceeded on the erroneous assumption that the appeal was stayed by the notice of appeal and, in doing so, acted beyond jurisdiction.

3. [18]

   In their written outline of submissions in response filed on 22 August 2025, the respondents accept that the practical effect of the appeal judge’s order was to extend the duration of the APVO. However, they emphasise that, in determining an appeal, “the District Court may exercise any function that the Local Court could have exercised in the original Local Court proceedings” (see s 28(2) of the CAR Act, noting that s 3 provides that “function” includes “a power, authority or duty”). Under s 79(2) of the CDPV Act, the Local Court (and, by virtue of s 28(2) of the CAR Act, the District Court) has power to set an APVO for “as long as is necessary, in the opinion of the court, to ensure the safety and protection of the protected person”. On this basis, the appeal judge’s decision to extend the APVO is said to be well within jurisdiction.

4. [19]

   In her written outline of submissions in reply, Ms Lo accepts that the Local Court would theoretically have been entitled to impose a three-year APVO. She emphasises that its ability to do so would, however, be confined by ss 73(1) and 79 of the CDPV Act. She notes that there is no reference to these sections in the District Court Judgment and that the appeal judge does not appear to have asked himself whether it was “proper” to extend the APVO by an additional year for the purposes of s 73(1). Nor, as Ms Lo notes, is there any explicit reference in the orders or reasons to s 28(2) of the CAR Act. The appeal judge’s failure to refer to these provisions is said to indicate his erroneous belief that the APVO was stayed.

5. [20]

   It may be interpolated here that, during the course of the hearing, the Court raised with the parties whether ss 20 and/or 68 of the CAR Act were potential alternative sources of power or jurisdiction for the changed APVO made by Hanley SC DCJ. Section 20 provides:

6. [21]

   It may be noted that s 20 distinguishes between an appeal against conviction and an appeal against sentence. Notably, the District Court has a power to vary the sentence in an appeal against sentence but has no power to vary a conviction in an appeal against conviction (see Garde at [7]–[8]).

7. [22]

   Section 68 relevantly provides:

8. [23]

   The District Court’s powers under s 68 will be discussed further below (see [36]).

9. [24]

   In support of the second ground of review, Ms Lo submits that the appeal judge at no point invited her to comment or make submissions on changing the dates of the APVO notwithstanding that, in practical effect, Ms Lo would be the subject of an APVO for a total of three years. Emphasising that the duration of the APVO was clearly a matter of significance for Ms Lo’s freedom, she submits that the appeal judge’s failure to invite submissions amounted to procedural unfairness.

10. [25]

    In their written outline of submissions, the respondents concede that Ms Lo was not invited to make submissions on the utility of extending the APVO. They submit that, in these circumstances, the question for the Court is whether this was material to the outcome of the District Court Judgment. Hence the question is whether there is a realistic possibility that the decision could have been different if the error had not occurred (citing LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2024) 280 CLR 321; [2024] HCA 12 at [7]).

11. [26]

    Noting that it is incumbent on Ms Lo to demonstrate materiality, the respondents submit that any error was not material, because:

12. [27]

    In her written outline of submissions in reply, Ms Lo repeats her submission that it was procedurally unfair for the appeal judge not to have afforded her the opportunity to make submissions on the question of the duration of the APVO. It is said, more specifically, that she should have been afforded the opportunity to make submissions on the question whether, for the purposes of ss 73(1) and 79(2) of the CDPV Act, it was “necessary” and “proper” to extend the duration of the APVO.

13. [28]

    In relation to Ground 3, Ms Lo submits that the appeal judge wrongly relied on ss 99 and 99A of the CDPV Act in circumstances where s 99A had no application because Ms Lo was not a “protected person”. That the appeal judge relied on these provisions is said to be demonstrated by the fact that costs were specifically ordered on grounds that Ms Lo’s conduct was vexatious and her appeal meritless. Ms Lo submits that the only lawful basis for professional costs was s 99(3), which was not explicitly invoked by the appeal judge.

14. [29]

    In their written outline of submissions, the respondents emphasise that, under s 28(3) of the CAR Act, the appeal judge was empowered, subject to a limitation not relevant in this case, to “make such order as to the costs to be paid by either party … as it thinks just”. The respondents concede that the appeal judge wrongly relied on ss 99 and 99A of the CDPV Act in awarding costs, but submit that the error is immaterial in circumstances where the same order could have been made under s 28(3). In this respect, the respondents emphasise that the costs power conferred by s 28(3) is significantly wider than that conferred by s 99A. The fact that the appeal judge was satisfied that costs could be awarded under s 99A is said to indicate that the same order would also have been made under s 28(3).

15. [30]

    As to Ground 4, Ms Lo submits that she was denied procedural fairness by the appeal judge, who invited her to indicate whether she opposed an award of professional costs, but did not explicitly invite her to make submissions as to the quantum of costs. Ms Lo also complains that the appeal judge did not question the respondents’ counsel in relation to the quantum of costs and that he appeared to award costs on an indemnity basis. Alternatively, Ms Lo submits that procedural fairness required the appeal judge to inquire whether she wished to have the matter stood down “to become fully informed as to the Court’s intentions concerning the awarding of professional costs”.

16. [31]

    In their written outline of submissions, the respondents emphasise that Ms Lo was asked twice whether she opposed costs being awarded in the amount of $15,000 and failed to take up the opportunity both times. In these circumstances, and again noting that the District Court’s power to award costs under s 28(3) of the CAR Act is said to be “effectively unfettered”, the respondents submit that Ground 4 is misconceived and discloses no jurisdictional error.

Consideration and determination.

1. [32]

   As noted above, Ms Lo complains that, in extending the operation of the APVO, the appeal judge failed to have regard to s 85(1) of the CDPV Act, which provides that the “lodging of a notice of appeal under section 84 does not have the effect of staying the operation of the order concerned”. Ms Lo submits that it should be inferred from the appeal judge’s failure to refer to this provision that his Honour was unaware that the APVO was not stayed by the lodgement of her notice of appeal (this is because the effect of s 85 of the CDPV Act overrides the usual stay imposed by s 63 of the CAR Act, thus lodgement of a notice of appeal under s 84 of the CDPV Act does not have the automatic effect of staying the operation of the order concerned).

2. [33]

   It is regrettable that Hanley SC DCJ did not make clear in his reasons for judgment which power he was purporting to exercise in making the orders set out at [11] above. Having regard to the terms of the orders and the fact that they expressly included a confirmation of the Magistrate’s order, Hanley SC DCJ may have been acting under s 68 of the CAR Act. There appears, however, to be some force in Ms Lo’s submission that his Honour may erroneously have assumed that s 63 of the CAR Act operated to stay the APVO made by the Magistrate and that the dates of its operation therefore needed to be amended for it to be in force for two years. It may be that his Honour overlooked the fact that s 63 had no application because of s 85 of the CDPV Act. Any such misapprehension by his Honour in respect of whether the Magistrate’s APVO was stayed by the fact that Ms Lo had lodged an appeal would be an error within jurisdiction (see generally Stanley v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (2023) 278 CLR 1; [2023] HCA 3 at [55] per Gordon, Edelman, Steward and Gleeson JJ).

3. [34]

   Putting the procedural fairness complaint to one side, the issue remains, however, as to whether his Honour had the power to make those orders.

4. [35]

   There are difficulties with the respondents’ suggestion that s 28(2) of the CAR Act provides such a power. As noted above, the effect of that provision is that, in determining an appeal, the District Court is empowered to exercise any “function” that the Local Court could have exercised in the original proceeding (and noting that “function” is defined in s 3 to include, relevantly, “a power”). Despite the evident breadth of that provision, some potentially difficult issues are raised regarding the interaction between that provision and s 20 of the CAR Act. The latter draws a distinction between the District Court’s power in determining an appeal against conviction as opposed to an appeal against sentence. A question arises whether this necessarily limits the breadth of the power under s 28(2). There is a further question whether an appeal to the District Court under s 84 of the CDPV Act is to be treated as an appeal against conviction or an appeal against sentence.

5. [36]

   It is unnecessary to determine these questions here. That is because the parties ultimately agreed that s 68 of the CAR Act provided a source of power for the orders made by Hanley SC DCJ regarding the dates of the APVO. The terms of s 68(1) and (2) are set out at [22] above. Significantly, under this provision, the appeal court has the power to order that a conviction or sentence confirmed or varied on appeal (or any part of it) is to take effect “as confirmed or varied” on and from a day specified in an order. Thus, it is clear that this power is available when the appeal court is determining an appeal against either conviction or sentence. The potential difficulties presented by the interaction between ss 20 and 28(2), as referred to above, do not arise.

6. [37]

   As previously mentioned, it is not clear from the terms of the orders or reasons what particular power Hanley SC DCJ relied upon in changing the dates of the APVO. Ms Lo has not suggested, however, that any jurisdictional error is demonstrated by the appeal judge’s failure to provide adequate reasons for making the challenged orders. This may be because a failure by an inferior court to provide adequate reasons does not, of itself, ordinarily amount to jurisdictional error, unless it demonstrates a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction or some other relevant jurisdictional error (see Ming v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (2022) 109 NSWLR 604; [2022] NSWCA 209 at [40]–[46] per Kirk JA, White and Mitchelmore JJA agreeing). Mere legal error would not suffice.

7. [38]

   For these reasons, Ground 1 fails.

8. [39]

   A failure by an inferior court to accord procedural fairness to a party in a material respect constitutes jurisdictional error, procedural fairness being an essential characteristic of the exercise of judicial power (see, for example, Bangura v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [2020] NSWCA 138 at [13] per curiam).

9. [40]

   To establish jurisdictional error constituted by a breach of the fair hearing limb of procedural fairness, it must be established both that there was a denial of procedural fairness and that it was material to the decision. In their written outline of submissions, the respondents identify the relevant question for the Court as whether the appeal judge’s failure to invite submissions on whether the dates of the APVO’s operation should be changed was a material error. In identifying this as the relevant question for the Court, the respondents appear implicitly to concede that there was a denial of procedural fairness by the appeal judge.

10. [41]

    The existence of the APVO was clearly of considerable importance to Ms Lo and there is no indication that Ms Lo was ever put on notice, by the respondents or by the appeal judge, that changing the dates of the APVO was a potential consequence of her appeal. Indeed, an extension of the end-date of the APVO was not something which was ever sought by the respondents.

11. [42]

    The relationship between materiality and procedural unfairness has been considered by the High Court in several recent cases (see MZAPC v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection (2021) 273 CLR 506; [2021] HCA 17; Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs (2022) 276 CLR 80; [2022] HCA 26; and LPDT). For present purposes, it is sufficient to identify the following principles:

12. [43]

    In Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v Bell [2025] NSWCA 187 at [96], Price AJA (Payne and Ball JJA agreeing) rejected the appellant’s submission that it had been denied procedural fairness by a Personal Injury Commission Review Panel, which had refrained from inviting submissions from the parties concerning the significance of differences in the respondent’s reporting history. His Honour emphasised that “it would have been plainly obvious to the members of the Review Panel that Mr Bell’s denial was inconsistent with his prior reporting”, such that it was “difficult to see how inviting Allianz to make further submissions could have made a material difference”. Relying on both MZAPC and LPDT, his Honour also reasoned that the appellant had failed to “explain how if it was given the opportunity to make further submissions, there was a realistic possibility that a different decision could have been made but for the denial of procedural fairness” (see also Corliss v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [2023] NSWCA 263 at [54]–[55]).

13. [44]

    It might be argued that the same reasoning applies here. Ms Lo has failed to offer any explanation of how, if she had been afforded the opportunity to make further submissions on the question whether the duration of the APVO should be extended, there was a realistic possibility that a different decision could have been made. She has not pointed to anything in the record or in the evidence before the appeal judge to support the existence of such a possibility. As noted above, the question of materiality was raised for the first time by the respondents in their written outline of submissions. It was not addressed at all by Ms Lo in her written submissions in reply. In these circumstances, it might fairly be said that Ms Lo has failed to discharge her onus of proof.

14. [45]

    However, a crucial aspect of the reasoning in Allianz was that ‘[i]t would have been plainly obvious to the members of the Review Panel that Mr Bell’s denial was inconsistent with his prior reporting”. It was for this reason that the Court considered that it was “difficult to see how inviting Allianz to make further submissions could have made a material difference”. That is not the case here. There is a realistic possibility that Ms Lo may have been able to persuade his Honour that the dates of the APVO should not be changed. It may be accepted that because Ms Lo represented herself and apparently has no legal training, it is doubtful that she was familiar with provisions such as s 85 of the CDPV Act or s 63 of the CAR Act. But there is a realistic possibility that, if Ms Lo had been given the opportunity, she may have asked why the appeal judge was minded to change the dates. This may have caused the appeal judge to pause and reflect upon his power to make such a change. It is also possible that if the appeal judge responded by saying s 63 of the CAR Act applied, counsel for the respondents may have assisted the Court by drawing attention to the effect of s 85 of the CDPV Act.

15. [46]

    In all these circumstances, I consider this is a case where the Court should infer that the procedural unfairness was material. The circumstances here fit comfortably with the following statements of Kiefel CJ, Keane and Gleeson JJ in Nathanson at [33] (footnotes omitted, emphasis added):

16. [47]

    This approach is also consistent with the astute observations of Megarry J in John v Rees [1970] Ch 345 at 402 (which were approved by Heydon J in International Finance Trust Co Ltd v New South Wales Crime Commission (2009) 240 CLR 319; [2009] HCA 49 at [143]):

17. [48]

    For these reasons, Ground 2 should be upheld.

18. [49]

    Ms Lo submits that the appeal judge wrongly relied on ss 99 and 99A of the CDPV Act as the basis for the costs order made by his Honour in circumstances where these provisions are inapplicable because Ms Lo was not a “protected person”. The respondents concede that the appeal judge made this error, but they submit this error was immaterial in circumstances where the power in s 28(3) of the CAR Act was also available and would support the same outcome in regard to costs.

19. [50]

    The respondents’ submissions should be accepted. There is a well-established principle in various areas of the law that, if a power is exercised upon a mistaken belief as to its source, then this will not necessarily result in invalidity if the decision is able to be supported by another source of power. The principle was recently applied to a costs decision of the District Court in Licha v Joseph [2025] NSWCA 192. The primary ground of judicial review in that case was that it was a jurisdictional error for the District Court to have ordered costs under the CDPV Act in circumstances where its power to award costs was conferred by s 28(3) of the CAR Act, which it was said was not relied upon. This complaint was rejected on the basis that any erroneous reliance on the CDPV Act was immaterial in circumstances where s 28(3) of the CAR Act provided an alternative source of power (see at [60]–[68] per Griffiths AJA). Kirk and Ball JJA rejected the complaint on separate grounds, but agreed in the alternative with that reasoning (see at [16]).

20. [51]

    Similar reasoning applies here. The parties accept that the appeal judge erroneously relied upon ss 99 and 99A of the CDPV Act as a source of the power to award costs. However, this does not establish that the costs order itself was beyond power in circumstances where the same award could have been made under s 28(3) of the CAR Act. As observed in Licha at [75]:

21. [52]

    Mr Wendler properly acknowledged in oral address that Ms Lo’s appeal to the District Court was meritless and he confirmed that Ms Lo did not challenge the dismissal of her appeal. In those circumstances, there can be no doubt that the costs order could properly be characterised as “just” for the purposes of s 28(3).

22. [53]

    The orders do not make clear whether Ms Lo was ordered to pay costs on an indemnity basis. There is a reference in the transcript to his Honour saying that he was “prepared to make a finding that is one of those where costs should be awarded of a professional nature, to be a sign of indemnity for relief to [the respondents] …”. It is unclear whether his Honour was simply using the expression “a sign of indemnity for relief” to reflect the normal compensatory nature of an order for costs. In any event, neither party suggested that s 28(3) of the CAR Act is not broad enough to apply to an award of indemnity costs or a fixed sum costs order.

23. [54]

    I am satisfied that s 28(3) was wide enough to make the orders which in fact were made. The remarks of Kirk and Ball JJA in Licha at [15] are apposite:

24. [55]

    For all these reasons, Ground 3 is rejected.

25. [56]

    In her appeal statement filed in the District Court on 17 March 2025, one of the orders sought by Ms Lo was “Cost order – cost follow the event”. Accordingly, it may reasonably be inferred that Ms Lo was aware that there would be cost consequences depending on the outcome of her appeal.

26. [57]

    While Ms Lo may not have been aware of the nature of the costs order which would be sought by the respondents, she was present in Court when the costs application was made. The respondents’ counsel provided only scant details in support of his statement that the proposed amount of $15,000 was in fact less than the respondents’ actual legal costs. But that figure applied not only to the respondents’ legal costs of defending Ms Lo’s appeal (which, as noted by Hanley SC DCJ, required a review of the Local Court transcript over two days, the exhibits tendered in that proceeding as well as the “extensive” written submissions), but also their costs of successfully resisting Ms Lo’s motion to adduce further evidence.

27. [58]

    Finally, the appeal judge asked Ms Lo more than once (see at [13] above) whether she opposed a costs order in that fixed amount. Although she made clear that she objected, she gave no particular reason for doing so apart from her not unexpected dissatisfaction with the appeal judge’s substantive decision.

28. [59]

    Having regard to all these matters, I do not accept that Ms Lo was denied procedural fairness on the issue of costs of the District Court proceedings. The appeal judge was not obliged to go further and either stand the matter down or question the quantum of costs. No practical injustice has been demonstrated. Ground 4 fails.

Relief and costs

1. [60]

   Having regard to Ms Lo’s success in establishing Ground 2, it is necessary to set aside the APVO dated 14 May 2025.

2. [61]

   Mr Wendler also urged the Court to exercise the power under s 63 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) and make an order restoring the APVO dated 22 April 2024 so as to bring finality to the proceedings without the need to remit. This is reflected in the document styled “Applicant’s statement of orders sought”. As the Court pointed out, however, s 63 must be read together with s 69 of that Act, which is the source of the Court’s judicial review jurisdiction. In accordance with general principle, the Court would normally not make an order of the kind sought by Ms Lo in such a proceeding unless the Court was satisfied that, on remittal, no other order could be made. That high level of satisfaction cannot be attained here, particularly having regard to the obscurity of the appeal judge’s reasons for changing the dates of the APVO.

3. [62]

   Regrettably, therefore, the issue regarding the date of the APVO order made on 14 May 2025 should be remitted to the District Court. Neither party objected to Hanley SC DCJ conducting the reconsideration limited to this issue. This makes sense as his Honour is well familiar with the matter.

4. [63]

   It may well be that the parties will be able to agree consent orders in the District Court which would restore the dates in the APVO dated 22 April 2024. If agreement cannot be reached, it will be a matter for the Judge to whom the matter is allocated to give appropriate case management directions, including an opportunity for the parties to make submissions and file any evidence confined to the issue of the operative dates for the APVO.

5. [64]

   I see no reason to disturb the costs order made by Hanley SC DCJ, which appropriately reflected his Honour’s rejection of Ms Lo’s grounds of appeal.

6. [65]

   As to the costs of the present proceedings, although the normal rule is that costs follow the event, I do not consider that Ms Lo’s success in establishing Ground 2 warrants an order for costs in her favour. Her other three grounds, which occupied significant time and resources, all failed. Furthermore, as Ms Lewer (who appeared together with Ms Ramsden for the respondents) pointed out, the respondents bear no responsibility for the terms of the orders relating to the dates of the APVO as made by the appeal judge. I consider that the parties should bear their own costs of the present proceedings.

7. [66]

   I propose the following orders:

   1. (1)

      The Apprehended Personal Violence Order made by the District Court on 14 May 2025 be set aside.

   2. (2)

      The matter be remitted to the District Court for reconsideration according to law limited to the issue of the term of the Apprehended Personal Violence Order made by the Local Court on 22 April 2024.

   3. (3)

      The parties bear their own costs of the proceedings in this Court.