Quach v New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal (No 2)

1. [1]

   MEAGHER JA: I agree with Gleeson JA.

2. [2]

   GLEESON JA: Application is made by Mr Michael Van Thanh Quach by notice of motion filed 5 April 2022 to set aside an order made by the Court on 20 October 2017 under s 8(7)(b) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW) (the Act) prohibiting Mr Quach from instituting a further proceeding in New South Wales relating to:

3. [3]

   Mr Quach also sought relief in par [2] of his motion, relevantly, that I recuse myself for apprehended bias on the ground of prejudgment given my participation in an earlier decision of the Court in November 2020 dismissing a previous application by Mr Quach seeking the same relief. By judgment delivered on 9 September 2022, I declined the recusal application. [2] Insofar as par [2] of the motion also sought the recusal of some other judges of the Court, none of those judges is a member of the court hearing the present application.

4. [4]

   The respondents to the application are the New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal (the Tribunal) and the New South Wales Health Care Complaints Commission (the Commission). Only the Commission was an active respondent.

5. [5]

   Mr Quach and the Commission each filed written submissions. The Registrar informed the parties that the Court would deal with the application on the papers.

6. [6]

   The Commission’s position is that the Court should decline to consider the motion pursuant to s 9(4) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act or otherwise dismiss the motion as being an abuse of process.

Background

1. [7]

   It is of assistance to explain briefly the background to the present application.

2. [8]

   On 21 April 2015, the Tribunal made orders including cancelling Mr Quach’s registration as a medical practitioner. [3] Mr Quach unsuccessfully sought judicial review of that decision. Not being satisfied with the decisions of this Court rejecting his applications for judicial review, Mr Quach sought to reagitate his contentions by making further applications by notice of motion filed in this Court. Each of those further applications was unsuccessful. The relevant procedural history is set out in the judgment of this Court delivered on 20 October 2017 [4] in which the vexatious proceeding order was made.

3. [9]

   Mr Quach has sought, unsuccessfully, to set aside this order on four occasions: 9 August 2018, [5] 20 March 2019, [6] 15 August 2019, [7] and 18 November 2020. [8]

4. [10]

   Subject to one new contention, the present application proceeds on similar grounds to Mr Quach’s last application which was dismissed in 2020.

5. [11]

   First, Mr Quach submitted that a vexatious proceeding order cannot be made in interlocutory proceedings, referring to the decision of the Full Federal Court in Zetta Jet Pte Ltd v The Ship “Dragon Pearl” (No 2). [9] As this Court said for the reasons given in its 2020 judgment, there is no such limitation in the Vexatious Proceedings Act, s 8, nor is the Dragon Pearl authority for the proposition contended for by Mr Quach. [10]

6. [12]

   Second, Mr Quach raised what he asserts is a constitutional question. He says, without expressly identifying any Commonwealth law, that the vexatious proceeding order is inconsistent with Commonwealth law and is therefore invalid pursuant to s 109 of the Constitution.

7. [13]

   In his submissions, Mr Quach referred to Quach v MLC Limited (No 4) [2020] FCA 532 in support of the constitutional question. The subject matter of those proceedings is a claim by Mr Quach against MLC Ltd (MLC) in the Federal Court of Australia that MLC had failed to indemnify him under an income protection policy providing cover in the event of total and permanent or partial disability and critical illness, and that MLC had breached its duty of utmost good faith under s 13 of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth). That claim was dismissed by Rares J on 2 March 2021, [11] however, Mr Quach has appealed from that decision as is evident from a decision of Cheeseman J on 20 May 2022 who ordered that he provide security for costs in respect of his appeal. [12]

8. [14]

   Plainly, there is no inconsistency between the duty of utmost good faith implied in contracts of insurance by s 13 of the Insurance Contracts Act and the power of the Supreme Court to make an order under s 8 of the Vexatious Proceedings Act. The suggestion to the contrary which is implicit in Mr Quach’s submissions is frivolous and unarguable.

9. [15]

   In these circumstances, although there is no evidence that Mr Quach has given notices to the Commonwealth and State Attorneys-General pursuant to s 78B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), there is no basis for staying this application pursuant to s 78B for that to occur because of the mere reference in Mr Quach’s written submissions to the Constitution. As French J said in Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Warwick (No 2) [13] :

10. [16]

    The new contention raised in Mr Quach’s supplementary submissions filed 30 June 2022 is that the decision of the Tribunal in 2015 to cancel his registration as a medical practitioner is stayed pursuant to s 34B(4)(b) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) (Tribunal Act) by virtue of the proceedings and appeals brought by Mr Quach in the Federal Court, which can be taken to be a reference to the proceedings against MLC.

11. [17]

    Section 34B of the Tribunal Act is contained in Pt 3A (“Federal proceedings”) of that Act. Pt 3A was introduced on 1 December 2017 following this Court’s decision in Burns v Corbett; Gaynor v Burns (2017) 96 NSWLR 247; [2017] NSWCA 3 which held that the Tribunal cannot exercise federal diversity jurisdiction because it is not a court invested with such jurisdiction by the Judiciary Act. The High Court affirmed this Court’s decision: Burns v Corbett; Gaynor v Burns (2018) 265 CLR 304; [2018] HCA 15.

12. [18]

    The effect of s 34B is that where the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to determine an original application or external appeal because to do so would involve an exercise of federal jurisdiction, a person with standing to make such an application or external appeal may, with leave of the Local Court or the District Court, make the application or appeal to the court instead of the Tribunal: ss 34B(1) and 34B(2)(b).

13. [19]

    Section 34B(4), upon which Mr Quach relies, relevantly provides:

14. [20]

    The effect of s 34B(4) is to constrain the power of the Local Court or District Court to determine an application or appeal that the Tribunal cannot determine because it involves the exercise of federal diversity jurisdiction, but only if there is a separate appeal properly before the Tribunal in relation to a matter which is also in issue in such an application or appeal.

15. [21]

    This provision has no present relevance to the Tribunal’s decision in 2015.

16. [22]

    First, the disciplinary proceedings against Mr Quach in the Tribunal did not involve federal jurisdiction. Second, there is no application or appeal before an authorised court. Third, there is no relevant separate appeal before the Tribunal brought by Mr Quach. Fourth, the Federal Court proceedings and the appeal brought by Mr Quach in that Court have no legal effect on the Tribunal’s 2015 decision.

Conclusion

1. [23]

   This fifth application by Mr Quach to set aside the vexatious proceedings order made in 2017 should be dismissed as an abuse of process.

2. [24]

   There is no reason why costs should not follow the event of the motion: Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), r 42.1. A costs order should be made in favour of the Commission, which was the only active respondent to the motion.

Orders

1. [25]

   For the above reasons, I propose the following orders:

   1. (1)

      The applicant’s notice of motion filed 5 April 2022 be dismissed as an abuse of process.

   2. (2)

      The applicant to pay the second respondent’s costs of the motion.

2. [26]

   MITCHELMORE JA: I agree with Gleeson JA.