Collier v Country Women’s Association of NSW

The plaintiff, Marion Collier, claims damages for defamation against the defendant, the Country Women’s Association of New South Wales (CWA, the defendant, or CWA (NSW)) (the Defamation proceedings). The matter complained of was a letter dated 13 April 2016 which was sent to 545 members or executives of the CWA (the April Letter). The defendant admits publication to the 545 recipients and that the imputations are defamatory but otherwise relies on the defences of justification (s 25 of the Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) (the Act)); contextual truth (s 26 of the Act); statutory qualified privilege (s 30 of the Act); and common law qualified privilege. The plaintiff alleges in her reply to the defences of common law and statutory qualified privilege that the publication of the April Letter was not reasonable and was actuated by malice.

The plaintiff also seeks orders against the CWA, including an order that her removal from the position of Secretary of the Wellington Branch of the CWA was illegal (the Equity proceedings). The defendant denies the allegations, contends that the resolutions sought to be impugned were passed in accordance with the CWA’s rules and regulations and that the plaintiff’s claim discloses no cause of action.

The Defamation proceeding and the Equity proceeding were ordered to be heard together because of the overlap in the evidence relevant to each.

The issues in each proceeding are distinct. However, as the narrative is potentially germane to both, I propose to set out my findings before turning to the causes of action or relief claimed. The breadth of the contextual imputation alleged by the defendant (“The plaintiff had so conducted herself as a member of the CWA as to warrant her being expelled from the CWA”) requires a detailed narrative to be set out in the reasons. Significant passages from relevant documents are extracted since it would be difficult, in the case of some documents (particularly those created by the plaintiff) to reflect either their contents or their tone by paraphrasing them.

The CWA is a not-for-profit organisation, which was incorporated pursuant to the Country Women’s Association of New South Wales Incorporation Act 1931 (Private Act) (NSW) (the CWA Act). The CWA is regulated by the Constitution of the Country Women’s Association of New South Wales Regulation and Rules (the CWA Constitution). The CWA in New South Wales is comprised of 30 regional groups which are divided into 400 local branches. The Wellington branch, of which the plaintiff was a member at relevant times, was within the Macquarie Group.

The CWA’s aims include bringing all women and families together and forming a network of support; providing a forum for the voice of all women in New South Wales; and the improvement of conditions for all women and families, especially in country areas, including by lobbying for legislative changes, helping the local community and creating a network of support for members (CWA Constitution, reg 5).

The CWA Constitution relevantly provides:

Shortly after Mrs Tanya Cameron’s election to the position of State President of CWA (NSW) in May 2013 (a position which she held for two years), the CWA finalised the document which made provision for its Grievance Handling Procedure.

The plaintiff became a member of the CWA in about October 2010. In about July 2011 she transferred from the Gulgong branch, which was in the Castlereagh Group, to the Wellington branch, which was in the Macquarie Group. She held the position of social secretary of the Macquarie Group from October 2011 to October 2013. As such, it was her responsibility to organise or co-ordinate the accommodation for members of the Wellington branch for the annual conferences which were held in May each year.

Every year the CWA held a conference. In 2012 the conference was held in Blacktown. Arrangements were made for representatives of the CWA attending the conference to stay at the Travelodge Blacktown from 5 to 11 May 2012. Ruth Cargill, who later became State Vice President and State Honorary Treasurer, became aware at about this time that many members of the Macquarie Group were concerned about the way the plaintiff spoke to staff at the Travelodge Blacktown. As far as Ms Cargill could recall, the plaintiff was not informed of the members’ concern because, as she understood it, they were “trying to protect” the plaintiff.

The CWA State conference was held in Moree in May 2013. Representatives of the CWA stayed at the Spa Village Travel Inn in Moree from 3 to 10 May 2013. The plaintiff put to Ms Cargill that there could not have been complaints about her behaviour with respect to the Travelodge Blacktown if she was permitted to do the bookings for the following year. Ms Cargill responded as follows:

The federal government made a grant of $4,105 to the CWA’s Wellington branch in 2013. The grant became an issue in the proceedings because the plaintiff, when she became secretary of the branch in October 2014 (see below), raised several issues regarding the probity of the branch’s conduct with respect to the grant. Accordingly, it is necessary to set out the evidence relating to the grant.

By email dated 28 July 2013 the then Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (FoHCSIA), which became the Department of Social Services, offered a grant to the Wellington branch of the CWA under a program known as Volunteer Grants 2013.

The terms of the funding included a term that the grantee allow the Department’s representatives the right to inspect the branch’s records relating to the grant for a period of up to 5 years from the completion date (cl 6). Clause 7 provided for circumstances in which the funding would have to be repaid, including if the amount of the grant was not spent at the completion date; the grantee was unable to spend the whole grant in accordance with the agreement; or that an amount was spent other than in accordance with the agreement. Clause 7.2 provided that if the grantee was obliged to repay an amount under cl 7.1, it must be repaid within 20 business days after a notice in writing had been given by the Department. There is no suggestion that the Wellington branch was ever given a notice under cl 7.2 to repay any money from the grant which had not been spent.

On 12 August 2013 an article appeared in the Wellington Times with the headline, “Change of time for CWA”. The following appeared in the article:

The plaintiff was concerned when she read the article because she understood that something of that gravity needed to be raised at group, rather than branch, level. According to the plaintiff she raised the article with Kathie Carolan, who had been the President of the Macquarie Group from October 2012 and held the position until October 2015. I accept the defendant’s submission that, in approaching Mrs Carolan before she had raised the matter with a Wellington branch meeting, the plaintiff breached reg 81 of the CWA Constitution (set out above).

In 2013 Ms Beverley Cameron was the secretary of the Wellington branch. On 2 September 2013, the plaintiff telephoned Mrs Carolan and complained about how long it was taking Ms Beverley Cameron to prepare the minutes of the branch meetings. Mrs Carolan explained to the plaintiff that there was no hard-and-fast rule about when the minutes of a branch meeting needed to be completed, as long as they were distributed before the following branch meeting.

The plaintiff was not able to attend the annual general meeting (AGM) of the Wellington branch on 25 October 2013 and gave her apologies. Although she expressed a willingness to continue as social secretary for another term she was not re-elected.

A CWA conference was held in August 2013 in Griffith, for which accommodation at the Kidman Wayside Inn was booked in advance for those attending. On 13 May 2013 the plaintiff emailed Debra Pinkerton, a member of the Phillip Group, in the following terms:

Mrs Pinkerton responded on the same day and told her that she would be able to advise about spare rooms once the Phillip Group have had their next meeting. It appears that Mrs Pinkerton did not update the plaintiff as foreshadowed. On 12 October 2013 the plaintiff forwarded these emails to Patricia Boyer, who was then a member of the CWA Phillip Group.

On 16 October 2013, the plaintiff sent an email to Mrs Boyer, which was copied to Mrs Carolan, in the following terms:

It was put to the plaintiff in cross-examination that the email she had sent to Mrs Boyer (extracted above) was a rude email which was critical of Mrs Pinkerton and her mother, Shirley. The plaintiff rejected the proposition and said:

The plaintiff rejected the proposition that her email to Mrs Boyer was defamatory and explained that defamation meant that you cannot say something against someone’s character that was unfounded unless it is true. The plaintiff did not accept that her email was either rude, derogatory or critical. She also rejected the possibility that Mrs Pinkerton had simply forgotten to get back to her after the next meeting of the Phillip Group, as foreshadowed in her email of 13 May 2013.

Mrs Boyer responded by email later on 16 October 2013 confirming that a reservation had been made. On 17 October 2013, Mrs Carolan emailed the plaintiff in the following terms:

The plaintiff accepted that Mrs Carolan was reprimanding her in that email but contended that the reprimand was “illegal”.

On 18 October 2013 Mrs Carolan emailed Mrs Boyer, and copied the email to Mrs Pinkerton, in the following terms:

At the AGM of the Wellington branch on 11 October 2014, Ms Beverley Cameron was elected to the positions of branch president and treasurer and the plaintiff was elected to the position of branch secretary. The term of these positions was to have been for 12 months. On her appointment the plaintiff was provided with relevant branch documents in a suitcase.

The CWA Procedures Manual contained a detailed description of the duties of a branch secretary. Regulation 107 of the CWA Constitution (set out above) also made provision for the position. For present purposes it is sufficient to note that the branch secretary reports to the branch president and is responsible for keeping the branch president informed of all matters of branch business, preparing an agenda for branch meetings, dealing with incoming and outgoing correspondence and preparing minutes of each meeting. The plaintiff had not previously been required to prepare agendas for, or minutes of, meetings. Shortly after her election to the position of branch secretary the plaintiff familiarised herself with the CWA Constitution (and in particular reg 107) and the Procedures Manual. She understood that, as branch secretary, she was to receive all correspondence on behalf of the branch, but that the president had to approve of all outgoing correspondence. She agreed that she understood that she was not to correspond with third parties without the president’s approval.

On 15 October 2014 Ms Beverley Cameron and the plaintiff provided their signatures to the Commonwealth Bank on a form entitled “Authority for Business Accounts” for the CWA’s Wellington branch.

I accept the evidence of Marjorie Blatch that the plaintiff rang her in November 2014 and asked her for guidance on the duties of a branch secretary and, in particular, how the minutes should be recorded. Mrs Blatch was then the Macquarie Group secretary, a position which she held from October 2013 to October 2015. Mrs Blatch told the plaintiff:

Branch meetings of the Wellington branch were held monthly on the second Wednesday of the month.

The first agenda prepared by the plaintiff in her position as branch secretary was prepared for the branch meeting which was scheduled for Wednesday 12 November 2014. The date was changed to Tuesday 11 November 2014 because there was a wake on Wednesday 12 November 2014. The plaintiff’s agenda was distributed to those present at the meeting, who included Anne Jones, who was then the Mayor of Wellington and also member of the Wellington branch.

The agenda which the plaintiff prepared for the November 2014 meeting contained the following item with respect to the federal grant referred to above:

The plaintiff accepted that during the meeting she noted in handwriting on her copy of the agenda next to that item, “disgussed [sic, discussed] and sorted out”.

Mrs Jones recalled that, during the course of the meeting on 11 November 2014, the plaintiff spoke over other people, including Ms Beverley Cameron who, as branch president, was chairing the meeting.

Following the meeting, the plaintiff prepared the minutes by amending and adding to the agenda which she had prepared for the meeting. The plaintiff included in the minutes for the November 2014 meeting under “General Business” the following:

Ms Chrysanthou, who appeared with Mr Dean on behalf of the defendant, asked the plaintiff in cross-examination to identify any issue relating to the grant, to which the plaintiff’s response was:

The minutes of the meeting of 11 November 2014 also contained the following item under “General Business”:

In about November 2014 Ms Beverley Cameron rang Mrs Blatch to ask for advice about the contents of the agenda and minutes which the plaintiff had prepared for the November 2014 meeting. She was concerned that the plaintiff had included “personal and inappropriate comments” in these documents. Mrs Blatch advised her to speak to the plaintiff about it and then take it up with Mrs Carolan. At about this time Patricia Bell, a member of the Wellington branch, telephoned Mrs Blatch and told her of her concern that the plaintiff was interrupting and speaking over the top of people in the Wellington branch meetings. Mrs Blatch suggested that she speak to Ms Beverley Cameron or Mrs Carolan about it.

In December 2014 it appears that Steve King, who had been the cleaner for the CWA hall in Wellington, had resigned as of 31 December 2014. Helen Norris, a Vice President of the Wellington branch, had apparently asked him to clean for the month of January 2015. Mrs Norris did not inform the executive of the Wellington branch what she had done. Separately, the plaintiff, with the concurrence of Ms Beverley Cameron and Joan Snelson, another member of the executive of the Wellington branch, had arranged for Robert Collier (the plaintiff’s ex-husband with whom she continued to cohabit), to clean the hall. Mrs Norris, who was at the time indisposed with shingles, was unaware of the separate arrangement made by the plaintiff.

On 30 January 2015 the plaintiff wrote to Mrs Norris in the following terms:

When Ms Chrysanthou put to the plaintiff that the further engagement of Mr King had nothing to do with undermining her, she responded:

The plaintiff sought to explain in her evidence why she took such exception to Mrs Norris arranging for Mr King to continue to clean after he had resigned. Her reasons appear from the following evidence she gave in cross-examination:

The plaintiff rejected the proposition that her reaction to Mr King being asked by Mrs Norris to clean the hall in January 2015 was “over the top”, although she accepted that Mrs Norris, as a member of the executive, had the same voting powers as she did. The following exchange occurred in her cross-examination:

When it was put to the plaintiff that Mr Collier was not a “proper employee” either, she sought to distinguish Mr Collier’s situation from Mr King’s on the basis that Mr Collier was only doing “minor cleaning” and was not going up ladders or doing lawns.

Due to the Christmas break, the next meeting of the Wellington branch of the CWA took place on Wednesday 11 February 2015. The agenda included the following items:

The plaintiff gave evidence that she was asked by Mrs Carolan, then President of the Macquarie Group, to locate a copy of the leases and told by Mrs Carolan that if she did not find the leases and put them in the front of the minute book she would be either “put out of [her] job” or expelled from the CWA. I do not accept the plaintiff’s evidence, which was denied by Mrs Carolan. I am satisfied that the plaintiff alone initiated a search for the leases. The plaintiff contacted the CWA’s solicitor to locate a copy of the leases, without the authority of the branch president.

In cross-examination the plaintiff explained that she was concerned that the garden beds which had been constructed outside the hall were impeding access to the footpath and had caused the loss of two parking spaces. She spoke with the General Manager of the local council, as well as the Roads and Maritime Services. Eventually she was directed to speak to Troy Grant, who was the State member for Dubbo. She was put on to a person in Mr Grant’s office and left her phone number. Some time later, a man called Darren, whom she understood to be Mr Grant’s executive assistant, rang her back and told her that the money for the garden beds had been donated by a mining concern for the beautification of the central business district.

When the plaintiff was cross-examined about item 32 in the agenda in which she had alleged that Darren had lied, she responded:

Ms Chrysanthou put to the plaintiff that it was a very serious thing to accuse someone of lying. The plaintiff gave a number of responses, some of which were non-responsive ones as follows:

The following exchange in the plaintiff’s cross-examination is one of many examples of her tendency to justify and aggravate derogatory remarks:

The plaintiff tendered a letter addressed to her from the Wellington Council dated 19 February 2015 which said:

I infer from this letter that the plaintiff made enquiries of the Wellington Council about these matters. She did so without consultation with the executive of the Wellington branch.

In cross-examination the plaintiff did not accept that she was also suggesting that Mr Tolhurst, the General Manager of Wellington Council, had also lied to her.

The plaintiff did not accept that the matters of a critical or personal nature ought not to have been included in the agenda, as appears from the following exchange:

The plaintiff did not accept in cross-examination that it was inappropriate for her to use the word “pressuring” in the agenda for this item or that it implied criticism of Mr King.

The plaintiff was cross-examined about what she had included in the agenda about the state of the CWA hall in Wellington. She asserted that the reference to the bridge group was a mistake and it should have been a reference to the Assembly of God, which also used the hall. She alleged that item 5 was in fact dealing with two separate things. She refused to accept that the paragraph meant what it said and was being critical of a group using the hall.

The meeting of the Wellington branch on 11 February 2015 was chaired by Mrs Beverley Cameron. It is common ground that, at some stage in the meeting, Mrs Beverley Cameron left the meeting in a state of emotional upset. When it was put to the plaintiff that what had caused Ms Beverley Cameron to leave the meeting was the plaintiff’s own conduct in interrupting and talking over other people, she denied that she had ever interrupted anyone or spoken over anyone at the meeting. The plaintiff accepted that Ms Beverley Cameron was emotional when she left the meeting but did not accept that the plaintiff herself was the cause.

Following the meeting on 11 February 2015 the plaintiff, as branch secretary, prepared minutes, which totalled 6 pages. The minutes included the following:

The plaintiff included in brackets matters pertaining to the grant information about a matter which did not occur at the meeting and which reflected her subsequent investigation. The plaintiff did not accept in cross-examination that she was criticising Mrs Bell, for getting the grant figure incorrect; Ms Beverley Cameron, for not providing the letter concerning the second toilet to the plaintiff for filing, for not getting the traditional dress out of the cupboard, for allowing extra funds to be used for toilet rolls, for suggesting that Debbie Wynne, a member of the Wellington branch, ought get the job of cleaning the hall and for leaving the meeting; and Mrs Wynne, for interjecting and raising the matter about the reference to the Anglican Church and not providing the treasurer’s report to her earlier. The plaintiff demonstrated no insight into the effect on others of the words she used in the minutes.

The treasurer’s report, which was tabled at the meeting of 11 February 2015, contained the following passages:

The minutes which the plaintiff had prepared following the meeting of 11 February 2015 recorded acceptance (subject to the matters referred to above) of the minutes of the meeting of 11 November 2014. The plaintiff contended that if any member had had an issue with the minutes not being a true record of what had transpired at the meeting, the member would have raised the issue at the meeting on 11 February 2014. She submitted that if she had, as alleged, interrupted or spoken over people at the meeting of 11 November 2014, someone would have raised it on 11 February 2015 and asked that it be noted in the minutes for 11 November 2015. I reject this submission, which overlooks the nature of minutes and what is to be included in them. Minutes are not intended to be a transcript of what is said at a meeting. They are to be a record of resolutions made on matters appearing on the agenda. I do not infer from the absence of any mention to the plaintiff’s speaking over or interrupting others who were present at the meeting that it did not occur. Indeed, as referred to above, I accept the evidence of Mrs Jones that that the plaintiff did speak over people and interrupt them at the meeting of 11 November 2014.

The minutes which the plaintiff had prepared following the meeting of 11 February 2015 were rewritten by Ms Cargill, who by that time was State Vice President of CWA (NSW), before the meeting of 11 March 2015 to remove personal comments which were regarded as inappropriate (see further below).

At 16.43pm on 11 February 2015 the plaintiff emailed Mrs Carolan, in the following terms:

The plaintiff followed up her email with a further email to Mrs Carolan sent on 12 February 2015 at 8.13am (which attached the treasurer’s report) which began as follows:

The plaintiff referred to the balance of the petty cash book in the following paragraphs and concluded the email with a suggestion that the group treasurer needs “to look at this”.

At about 8.30am on 12 February 2015, the plaintiff telephoned Mrs Carolan and said:

Mrs Carolan responded:

At 10.24am on 12 February 2015, following this conversation, Mrs Carolan emailed the plaintiff and informed her that she (Mrs Carolan) had asked for the Macquarie group treasurer (who was then Barbara Barrett) to be in attendance on 11 March 2015, which was the next scheduled meeting of the Wellington branch.

Later that day, in the afternoon, Mrs Carolan received two further phone calls from the plaintiff in which she complained that she had been accused of defrauding the CWA because there was a discrepancy in reimbursement of petty cash of 13c.

In cross-examination the plaintiff confirmed that she considered that she had been accused of fraud because of the $10 discrepancy in petty cash. It appears that because she was a co-signatory to the CWA’s bank account with the Commonwealth Bank, the plaintiff considered that any reference to a discrepancy in the petty cash book implicated her in an allegation of fraud. The plaintiff refused to accept that an error in calculation was not tantamount to an allegation of fraud. She denied that her allegation that she had been falsely accused of fraud was derogatory and defamatory of those whom she had accused. The plaintiff did not accept that she was in breach of regs 80 (the requirement for a branch to manage its own business) and 81 (the prohibition on putting the matter before the Group Council unless the same has been stated to a branch meeting) in communicating with Mrs Carolan about this matter.

At 9.23am on 12 February 2015, Mrs Wynne wrote to the plaintiff in the following terms:

The reference to “mental health thing” was a reference to a matter that had arisen at the meeting on 11 February 2015 at which those present were informed that there was to be an evening on mental health awareness at the Wellington Soldiers Club on Friday 20 February 2015 which was to be conducted by the Western Local Area Health District and hosted by the Lions Club. The plaintiff took great exception to the content and tone of Mrs Wynne’s email. When it was put to her in cross-examination that it was a “perfectly pleasant email”, she said:

The plaintiff explained her objections to Mrs Wynne’s email as follows: “It wasn't her [Mrs Wynne’s] place to be sending an email just in effect demanding the information.” The plaintiff also said, “It wasn't her place. She was asking - she wanted all the information on it, as if, you know - how would I put it? She was waiting [for] the information. I felt that it was very rude given that the day before she had given an inaccurate treasurer's report balance as the treasurer, and she wasn't the treasurer.”

The plaintiff responded to Mrs Wynne’s email at 11.20 am on 12 February 2015 in the following terms:

The reference in the email to Facebook was a reference to the plaintiff’s understanding that Mrs Wynne had set up a Facebook page for the Wellington branch. When the plaintiff had not received a response from Mrs Wynne by 12.09pm on 12 February 2015 (less than an hour after she sent the email extracted above) she wrote a further email to Ms Wynne which said, in part:

At 12.33pm on 12 February 2015 Mrs Wynne wrote to the plaintiff in part as follows:

At 13.12pm on 12 February 2015 Mrs Wynne wrote another email to the plaintiff in the following terms:

The plaintiff explained her reaction to this email from Mrs Wynne in the following terms:

The following day, Friday 13 February 2015, at 10.28am, the plaintiff again wrote to Mrs Wynne. She said in part:

At 14.53pm on 13 February 2015 Mrs Wynne emailed the plaintiff in the following terms:

The plaintiff confirmed in her cross-examination that she considered this email from Mrs Wynne to be “bullying”. It became one of the subjects of her complaint to Mrs Carolan referred to below. The plaintiff’s explanation for considering it to be bullying appears from the following exchange in cross-examination:

The plaintiff also confirmed that she thought “the whole intention of that [email] was to bully and she was . . . bullying a member of the executive” and that there was “nothing polite about it [Mrs Wynne’s email]”.

It was plain from her cross-examination that the plaintiff had no idea how offensive her emails were or how officious her insistence on the urgency of a response might appear to the recipients.

On about 13 February 2015 Ms Beverley Cameron rang Mrs Tanya Cameron, who was still the State President of CWA (NSW), and told her that she was having a problem with the plaintiff. She told her that the plaintiff was making defamatory and untrue comments in the meeting minutes about local members and even politicians. She also told Mrs Tanya Cameron that the plaintiff was “constantly talking over the top of other members and interrupting”. Mrs Tanya Cameron reminded her of the Grievance Handling Procedure and advised her to try to talk to the plaintiff directly about the issues. Mrs Tanya Cameron also said that if that approach did not work, she should approach Mrs Carolan in her capacity as the Macquarie Group President.

On 13 February 2015 the plaintiff rang the office of the local State Member of Parliament and was told that the grant to the Wellington branch would have been a federal grant. She then rang the local Federal Member of Parliament to ask about the grant and was given the phone number for the Department of Social Services. She rang the Department and left her details. A man named Keith rang her from the Department to answer her questions about the grant. When it was put to the plaintiff that she was not authorised to make any of those phone calls, she insisted that she was and explained that, “at the time, my president wasn’t acting like my president”. The plaintiff’s response was typical of many responses which indicated that she did not consider herself to be bound by the rules that applied to other members of the CWA.

At 2.22pm on 13 February 2015 the plaintiff sent an email to “Keith” in the following terms:

It appears that the matter was referred to the Collector of Public Monies within the Department of Social Services, which led to the Collector of Public Monies responding to the plaintiff by email sent at 7.30am on 15 February 2015. This email confirmed that a grant of $4,105 was made to the CWA on 23 September 2013 to purchase various named items and that the amount was paid into the bank account of the Wellington branch.

In her affidavit sworn 27 February 2017, the plaintiff referred to the email communication of 15 February 2015 and said that it proved that Mrs Bell, Ms Beverley Cameron and Fiona Shepherd, a member of the Wellington branch, committed a criminal act by receiving the grant. The plaintiff did not refer, in that affidavit, to the subsequent communications (which are referred to below) she had received from the Department of Social Services which confirmed that the grant had been appropriately dealt with and that no wrongdoing associated with the grant had been detected.

The plaintiff did not accept that her conduct in contacting the Department of Social Services was a breach of reg 86 of the CWA Constitution which prohibits a member approaching a Government Department without the consent and approval of the Executive Committee.

On Friday 13 February 2015 Mrs Carolan told the plaintiff that she was not to go to the Commonwealth Bank on behalf of the CWA. On 14 February 2015 at 4.08 pm the plaintiff emailed Mrs Carolan. Her email began:

Mr Collier gave evidence that he found three receipts in the CWA hall at Wellington and he photocopied them and gave them to the plaintiff.

In her email to Mrs Carolan referred to above, the plaintiff mentioned the receipts, which were apparently for rent paid by the Bridge Club and the Assembly of God, both of which hired the hall which the CWA owned in Wellington. She continued:

When the plaintiff was asked in cross-examination why she had not simply given the receipts, which had been photocopied for her by Mr Collier, to the branch treasurer, she responded that Ms Beverley Cameron was not speaking to her. The gist of the email was put to the plaintiff in the following exchange in cross-examination:

When it was put to the plaintiff that she was making serious allegations in the email about Ms Cameron and accusing her of lying her response was, “I’m not making allegations. I’m stating the fact.”

A few minutes later, at 4.30pm on 14 February 2015, Mrs Carolan emailed the plaintiff in the following terms:

The plaintiff accepted in cross-examination that she understood from this email that she was not to go to the bank.

On 15 February 2015 at 3.54pm the plaintiff sent an email to Donna Wilkins, who was the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of CWA (NSW) until April 2016. She attached to the email her emails to Mrs Carolan as well as her emails to Mrs Wynne. The plaintiff’s email to Mrs Wilkins said, in part, as follows:

The plaintiff did not accept that Mrs Carolan was dealing with her concerns by responding to her emails and phone calls and said, “She had not done a thing. . . She might have palavered, but she did not do anything to sort the matter out.” The plaintiff accepted that she had not been authorised by her branch president to communicate with Mrs Wilkins and explained that she felt nonetheless justified in sending the email:

In cross-examination the plaintiff insisted that the treasurer’s report implied that the Assembly of God was dishonest because of the mention that it was behind in its rent. The plaintiff did not accept that she was in breach of reg 81 in making a complaint to Mrs Wilkins before raising the matter at branch level.

On 16 February 2015 at 8.24am the plaintiff sent a further email to Mrs Wilkins in which she referred to the grant. She said, in part:

In cross-examination the plaintiff accepted that she had made a serious statement (that the branch had committed a criminal offence) and insisted, “my branch did engage in a criminal offence”. Once again, the plaintiff’s answer reflected her view that she was justified in making the statement because she considered herself to have proof, as appears in the following exchange concerning the allegation of fraud:

On 16 February 2015 the plaintiff sent an email to Jackie Camiller, who appears to have worked at the head office of CWA (NSW), raising concerns about two leases, for which the CWA was lessor. She told Mrs Camiller that she had forwarded the paperwork to “Donna” (presumably Mrs Wilkins) to be passed to the State President. In her evidence the plaintiff alleged that the leases were “against the CWA Constitution” and raised issues about their execution. The latter were taken up with her in the following exchange:

There were two leases in evidence which were the subject of the plaintiff’s investigation. The first was expressed to be between “Country Women’s Association of New South Wales (Wellington Branch)” and Wellington Multi-Service Centre Inc for a term of two years commencing on 1 January 2014 and ending on 31 December 2016. It was dated 29 January 2014 and signed by Mrs Bell, who was then president of the Wellington branch and witnessed by Joanne Doherty. The second was expressed to be between “Country Women’s Association of New South Wales (Wellington Branch)” and Wellington Show Society Inc for a term of three years commencing on 1 July 2013 and ending on 30 June 2016. It was dated 9 August 2013 and signed by Mrs Bell, who was then president of the Wellington branch and witnessed by Ms Beverley Cameron.

The plaintiff appeared to believe that a lease which bears a date after the commencement date is invalid, or otherwise irregular and that, accordingly, the reference to the Wellington branch in the description of the lessor was erroneous. The first point is incorrect as a matter of law. It is not unusual for a lease to bear a date after the date of its commencement. The second matter was also of no consequence. Although CWA (NSW) was the legal owner of the land, the Wellington branch was its custodian, as was explained by Mrs Tanya Cameron in her evidence. Its inclusion in the description of the lessor did not affect the identity of the owner of the land, which was CWA (NSW). The plaintiff also alleged that the execution of the leases breached s 6 of the Country Women’s Association of New South Wales Incorporation Act, which makes provision for the management of general business of the CWA as a corporation. This allegation has not been made out.

On about 15 February 2015 Mrs Wynne called Mrs Blatch to complain about the plaintiff’s behaviour in branch meetings, and in particular that she interrupted people and spoke over the top of them. Mrs Blatch assured her that she would speak to the President (Mrs Carolan). In the days leading up to 18 February 2015 Mrs Blatch had a number of conversations with Mrs Carolan about the plaintiff. In one of these conversations, Mrs Carolan told Mrs Blatch that she would speak to the State President, Mrs Tanya Cameron, to work out what to do.

At 8.32am on 16 February 2015 Mrs Carolan sent an email to Ms Cargill and Barbara O’Brien (a representative from the Macquarie Group) about the Wellington branch. She informed Ms Cargill that she had arranged a “conflict resolution meeting” for 11 March 2015 and that she would look over the books prior to the meeting. Mrs Carolan asked if she could speak with Ms Cargill and Mrs O’Brien to discuss whether could come to the meeting to help her to control the plaintiff. Mrs Carolan also asked Ms Cargill if she would chair the meeting as a State Vice President.

At 8.25am on 17 February 2015, the plaintiff sent an email to Ms Beverley Cameron in which she said, in part:

When she put the scenario set out in the email about access to keys to Ms Cargill in cross-examination, the following exchange occurred:

On about 17 February 2015 Mrs Carolan left a message for Mrs Tanya Cameron, saying that she wanted to discuss issues relating to the plaintiff as she had received a number of complaints from members of the Wellington branch concerning the plaintiff.

On 18 February 2015 the Macquarie Group held a Facts Day at Wongarbon. The Wongarbon branch was part of the Macquarie Group. The plaintiff referred to the occasion in her evidence as “the illegal Facts Day” as she contended that only the State Executive of the CWA could hold a Facts Day. There is nothing in the evidence to support this contention which was put to Mrs Tanya Cameron in cross-examination and rejected.

In the period leading up to the Facts Day Mrs Carolan became concerned about how to deal with the plaintiff as she understood that the plaintiff was known to be disruptive. She phoned Mrs Tanya Cameron and left a message asking her to ring back to discuss how the CWA should deal with the plaintiff.

When Mrs Carolan opened the Facts Day she told the assembled company that she had to leave her telephone on because she was expecting a call from Mrs Tanya Cameron. Mrs Tanya Cameron telephoned Mrs Carolan in the course of the Facts Day, which led Mrs Carolan to leave the Wongarbon Hall to take the call. Mrs Carolan told her that she needed help to work out what to do about the plaintiff as some of the local members had complained about the way she had recorded the minutes, that she constantly interrupted people during meetings and that she was making allegations about the Wellington branch. Mrs Tanya Cameron advised Mrs Carolan to speak to the plaintiff directly, to allow her to have a support person present and to explain to the plaintiff that she had to cease her duties as branch secretary while the complaints were being investigated. Mrs Tanya Cameron also referred to Mrs Carolan’s obligation, as Group President, to follow the Grievance Handling Procedure and reg 15 of the CWA Constitution.

After having received this advice, Mrs Carolan returned to the Wongarbon Hall and asked members to leave so that an in camera special meeting could be held in a room off the hall. She apologised for disrupting the Facts Day but said that an issue had arisen with the Wellington branch that needed to be dealt with. Mrs Blatch, who was still the secretary of the Macquarie Group, attended the meeting and took notes. Mrs Carolan also asked Barbara Barrett, who was the treasurer of the Macquarie Group, to attend.

Mrs Jones, who was also present at the Facts Day, was also invited to attend the meeting. Mrs Jones’ understanding, which appears to have been shared by the plaintiff and was noted in the notes Mrs Blatch made at the meeting, was that she was asked to attend as a witness. Mrs Carolan believed Mrs Jones to be a support person for the plaintiff. I am satisfied, on the basis of Mrs Jones’ evidence, that Mrs Carolan was under a misapprehension in that respect. Because Mrs Jones understood her role to be a witness for the meeting, she made notes of what occurred at the meeting. Although her notes were not in evidence, Mrs Jones had a good recollection of what occurred at the meeting, which corroborated Mrs Carolan’s evidence (apart from the misunderstanding about her role), as did the notes and evidence of Mrs Blatch.

In the course of the meeting, Mrs Carolan raised with the plaintiff that members of the Wellington branch had made complaints about the way she was conducting her duties as branch secretary and in particular her inclusion of inappropriate comments in the minutes and the number of emails she sent querying the accounts. Mrs Carolan also referred to the plaintiff’s complaints about the branch treasurer and her argument with the branch president on 11 February 2015. The plaintiff tried to speak over Mrs Carolan but was told to be quiet and listen. Mrs Carolan asked the plaintiff to stand down from her duties until the issues could be discussed at the next branch meeting on 11 March 2015. Mrs Carolan also asked the plaintiff whether she understood. When the plaintiff did not respond, Mrs Carolan repeated the question. Eventually, Mrs Jones told the plaintiff that she needed to acknowledge what she had been told. The plaintiff then said, “Fine, I understand.” Mrs Carolan then closed the special meeting.

Mrs Carolan’s evidence was corroborated by Mrs Jones’ evidence. Mrs Jones recalled that it was put to the plaintiff at the in camera meeting on 18 February 2015 that she had spoken over people at branch meetings while they were trying to give their reports. Mrs Jones was herself a member of the Wellington branch and had observed occasions on which the plaintiff had spoken over others at meetings at the Wellington branch, including at the meeting on 11 November 2014. Mrs Jones also recalled that at the meeting on 18 February 2015 the plaintiff had tried to talk over Mrs Carolan. Mrs Jones also recalled that it was put to the plaintiff on 18 February 2015 that she had had an argument with Ms Beverley Cameron at the meeting on 11 February 2015. Mrs Jones’ impression was that the meeting on 18 February 2015 had been conducted by the CWA executive in a “very professional”, “businesslike” way.

I accept the plaintiff’s admission in her documentary record (from which she read at the meeting on 3 August 2015, referred to below) that she said to Ms Beverley Cameron on 18 February 2015:

The plaintiff understood that on 18 February 2015 the Wellington branch had been asked to cease engaging in operations until the meeting of 18 March 2015. Apparently the locks to the premises were changed and tenants were required to be issued with new keys.

I do not accept the evidence of the plaintiff or Mr Collier that the plaintiff returned the keys to the CWA post box to Ms Beverley Cameron on 18 February 2015 since it appears that she still had access to mail addressed to that PO Box subsequently (see further below).

On about 19 February 2015 Mrs Carolan and Mrs Blatch went through the books and records of the Wellington branch to investigate the complaints made by the plaintiff. They found minor errors, such as typographical errors in the minutes or small discrepancies in balancing petty cash, but could not find anything of substance.

On 20 February 2015 Mrs Carolan sent an email to Mrs Tanya Cameron to report on her findings regarding the Wellington branch. She included the following passage in her email:

On 20 February 2015 at 1.17pm the plaintiff sent an email to Mrs Wilkins which attached a letter of complaint against Mrs Carolan. The 3-page letter is detailed and closely typed. It contained the following passage:

The letter of complaint concluded:

The result of the plaintiff’s letter of complaint against Mrs Carolan was that Mrs Carolan was asked not to take any further part in the investigation into the plaintiff. However, by the time the complaint was made, Mrs Carolan had already sent all the documents she had collected from the Wellington branch to the CWA (NSW) head office.

The plaintiff’s complaint about Mrs Carolan was referred to Mrs Tanya Cameron whose duties as State President included the investigation of complaints against any group office bearer. Mrs Tanya Cameron, who was aware that the plaintiff’s complaint about Mrs Carolan arose from her handling of the Wongarbon Facts Day, decided not to accept a formal complaint against Mrs Carolan until all of the other complaints concerning the plaintiff had been investigated.

By email sent at about 3.30pm on 27 February 2015 Mrs Tanya Cameron responded to the plaintiff’s letter of complaint about Mrs Carolan. Mrs Tanya Cameron referred to the record of the meeting of 18 February 2015 in which it was recorded that the plaintiff agreed to cease communications about the matter until it had been investigated. Mrs Tanya Cameron informed her of her decision referred to above not to accept a complaint about Mrs Carolan until the investigation of the other issues was complete. The letter said:

The letter concluded:

The plaintiff accepted that this request did not amount to a request that she sign a confidentiality clause in an agreement. She gave evidence that she did not believe Mrs Tanya Cameron would carry out a thorough investigation and considered that Mrs Tanya Cameron was “either lying or being lied to”. The plaintiff also gave evidence that she did not believe that the CWA “ever really investigated anything”.

By email sent on 27 February 2015 at 4.58pm the plaintiff wrote to Mrs Tanya Cameron about what had occurred on 18 February 2015. In addition to a litany of complaints and assurances the plaintiff said:

The plaintiff forwarded her complaint against Mrs Carolan to Ms Wilkins at 1.17pm on 20 February 2015.

After the plaintiff had complained about Mrs Carolan, Mrs Tanya Cameron asked Ms Cargill to step in and take over the investigation of the affairs of the Wellington branch. As part of her role, Ms Cargill examined the books and records of the Wellington branch. She examined the various grants which the branch had received from 2011 and calculated how much of the grant from the Department of Social Services had been spent and how much remained. Her analysis of the financial documents was detailed. She noted, for example, that although the funds for Mrs Wynne’s membership had been receipted on 20 October 2014, the amount had not yet been deposited into the branch’s bank account.

The plaintiff put to Ms Cargill that she had made a list of things which the branch needed to fix because of what they had done wrong, to which Ms Cargill responded:

Ms Cargill also redrafted the minutes for the branch meeting on 11 February 2015 to remove the offensive paragraphs. She provided them to the Wellington branch and told them that they would need to go through them and make any alterations and corrections. There is no evidence that the minutes of 11 February 2015 (whether those prepared by the plaintiff as secretary or those based on the further draft prepared by Ms Cargill) were ever passed as a correct record. Ms Chrysanthou confirmed that no record had been located which established that they had been passed.

I note that the plaintiff, during the course of the hearing and in her written submissions which were provided in accordance with my directions after the hearing had concluded, alleged that Ms Cargill was guilty of an offence under s 251 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) for inducing acceptance of a false document because she had altered the minutes. Section 251 has no application to the conduct of Ms Cargill. At all times it was plain why Ms Cargill was redrafting the minutes (to remove inappropriate material included by the plaintiff as branch secretary). She provided the redrafted minutes to the new executive officers of the Wellington branch in order for the branch to consider whether the redrafted minutes represented a correct record of what had occurred. Ms Cargill herself was not present at the meeting on 11 February 2015 and did not purport to do other than edit the minutes prepared by the plaintiff.

After she had received the plaintiff’s complaint against Mrs Carolan, Mrs Tanya Cameron telephoned the Department of Social Services to find out the proper processes to be followed by a local branch in acquitting the grant. She was informed by a departmental officer that once the grant had been issued and paid, there were no further records which needed to be lodged with the Department. This information accorded with the Departmental records which indicated that no acquittal was required.

In early March 2015 Mrs Blatch and Ms Cargill discussed the plaintiff’s mental health, which they believed might account for her behaviour. They decided to propose a meeting with the plaintiff and her husband to find out whether she was all right. The plaintiff cross-examined Ms Cargill about her concerns, which were ultimately the subject of a statement made by Ms Cargill to the meeting on 3 August 2015 (see below).

Ms Cargill explained the reason for suggesting a meeting with the plaintiff and Mr Collier in her cross-examination as follows:

On 4 March 2015 Marjorie Blatch rang the plaintiff, expressed concern about her state of mind and suggested that she and Mrs Carolan could meet with her to discuss it. The plaintiff insisted that there was nothing wrong with her and hung up. Following this conversation Mrs Blatch spoke to Mrs Carolan. They decided that the matter ought be passed to Mrs Tanya Cameron so that she could deal with it. Some time in the week commencing 4 March 2015 Ms Beverley Cameron rang Mrs Blatch and told her that she would resign as president of the Wellington branch if the plaintiff stayed on as secretary.

On 4 March 2015 the plaintiff sent an email to Mrs Tanya Cameron complaining about Mrs Blatch’s phone call which she alleged in the email “could only be described as, bullying and defamatory”. The plaintiff confirmed in the email:

As a result of the plaintiff’s complaint about Mrs Blatch, Mrs Blatch had no further contact with her until the Macquarie Group meeting on 3 August 2015 (see below). Mrs Tanya Cameron directed Ms Cargill not to speak to the plaintiff at all because she was concerned that, after the plaintiff’s complaints against Mrs Carolan and Mrs Blatch, there would be no one independent who could chair the Wellington branch meeting on 11 March 2015.

On Monday 9 March 2015 at 10.49am the plaintiff emailed Ms Cargill whom she understood had been appointed by the CWA to conduct a thorough investigation into the Wellington branch. The plaintiff wrote, in part:

The plaintiff’s evidence was that, although she had used the phrase “on telephoning”, she had not initiated the call to AGL. Rather, AGL had called her as she was the contact person. I do not accept her evidence. I accept her admission in the email that she was the one who initiated the contact with AGL. The AGL bill which was overdue was addressed to the CWA at its post office box in Wellington. I infer that the plaintiff “found” the AGL bill in the CWA’s letter box at some point prior to 9 March 2015, having failed to return the keys to the letterbox as she had been instructed to do on about 18 February 2015.

Further, in her cross-examination, the plaintiff made the unfounded allegation that Ms Beverley Cameron had intentionally not paid the AGL bill. She also included a gratuitous comment about Ms Cargill in cross-examination when she said that she “didn’t have much faith” in Ms Cargill because they had been on the South Pacific Area Committee together and the plaintiff “knew what she was like”.

Later that day, at 17.58pm, Ms Cargill responded in part as follows:

Shortly after she received Ms Cargill’s email, the plaintiff responded by email and included some derogatory remarks about Mrs Norris. She also asked “May I ask what you mean by phone calls?”, which I take to be a reference to the first paragraph of the email extracted above.

On 10 March 2015 at 7.01am Ms Cargill responded by confirming that the phone call to which she was referring was the one the plaintiff had apparently made to AGL and reminded her that she had been asked not to speak to anyone on behalf of the branch. Ms Cargill concluded the email by advising the plaintiff not to listen to rumours and assuring her that she was coming to try to help the Wellington branch “sort out issues that have been raised by you and other members of your branch.”

The plaintiff was aware by about March 2015 that the CWA had a no-bullying policy. However she maintained in her evidence that even before she became aware of the policy she understood what bullying meant. She gave the following description in cross-examination:

In about March 2015 the plaintiff read the policy document. She saw that the policy included the following passages:

At no point did the plaintiff accept that she had ever been the perpetrator, as opposed to the victim, of bullying behaviour. The evidence demonstrated several instances where the plaintiff engaged in repeated, unreasonable behaviour directed towards a member or members of the CWA (including by making unjustified complaints), where she engaged in obvious and aggressive behaviour (such as when she spoke over and interrupted people at meetings) and where she had engaged in intimidation by inappropriate personal comment, belittling opinions or unjustified criticism (by repeatedly inserting into agendas, minutes and correspondence gratuitous and groundless criticism of the conduct and character of particular members of the CWA).

Ms Cargill prepared the agenda for the meeting of the Wellington branch on 11 March 2015 and, as authorised by Mrs Tanya Cameron and Mrs Carolan, she chaired the meeting. It was originally intended that Mrs Blatch attend the meeting of 11 March 2015 as a note-taker. However, because of the plaintiff’s complaint about Mrs Blatch, Ms Cargill arranged for Janice Stanford to take notes.

At the beginning of the meeting Ms Cargill read from a prepared statement. Of present relevance she said:

I accept Ms Cargill’s evidence that the words to the following effect were said by those indicated at the meeting:

At the conclusion of the meeting a resolution was passed that all Wellington branch office bearer positions be vacated and new elections held. The plaintiff was the only person who voted against the resolution. Mrs Norris was elected President; Ms Beverley Cameron was elected Secretary; Mrs Wynne was elected Treasurer; and Miss Snelson was elected as branch Vice President. Ms Cargill and Mrs Stanford prepared minutes of the meeting. These minutes were adopted by the Wellington branch at its next meeting on 13 May 2015.

On 12 March 2015 at 5.52am the plaintiff emailed Mrs Tanya Cameron to complain about the branch meeting of 11 March 2015. In her email she said in part:

From 12 to 15 March 2015 Ms Cargill was made aware by Margaret Frankham from the Gollan branch and Past State President Elaine Armstrong that the plaintiff had been ringing members of the CWA, both within and outside the Macquarie Group. On 15 March 2015 Ms Cargill prepared a list of matters to be followed up and wrote to Mrs Norris, Mrs Wynne and Ms Beverley Cameron with suggestions as to what they might do to counter the problems within the branch and the plaintiff’s ongoing complaints and restore the reputation of the Wellington branch of the CWA within the local community.

At 5.57am on 12 March 2015 the plaintiff emailed the Minister for Social Services, the Hon. Scott Morrison. Her email commenced:

She made various allegations about the operations of the Wellington branch and continued:

On 28 April 2015 the Department of Social Services responded, on behalf of the Minister, to the plaintiff’s email. It confirmed that funding of $4,105 was paid to the Wellington branch on 23 September 2013 and said that it had been a Volunteer Grant, not an Emergency Relief Grant, as previously advised. It said:

The Department informed the plaintiff in the letter that it would look into the issues she had raised. The plaintiff engaged in further communications with the Department in October 2015 (see below).

On 30 April 2015 or 1 May 2015, Mrs Norris visited the plaintiff at home and brought a pot plant and some chocolates which Mrs Norris described as a “peace offering”. Notwithstanding Mrs Norris’s approach, the plaintiff did not attend the meeting of the Wellington branch on 13 May 2015.

At the meeting of the Wellington branch on 13 May 2015 the minutes of the branch meeting which took place on 11 March 2015 were passed as a true and correct record of the meeting. The branch meeting was the first time the branch had met since the new office bearers had been elected on 11 March 2015. The plaintiff submitted that she was denied access to these minutes. Even assuming that she was not provided with these minutes in draft or final form, this could only amount to an immaterial irregularity rather than anything that would entitle her to relief.

Notwithstanding the adoption of the minutes of 11 March 2015 on 13 May 2015, in August 2015 the plaintiff wrote to Mrs Stanford and asked for a copy of the minutes of the meeting of the Wellington branch on 11 March 2015. Ms Stanford responded in part as follows:

It is plain from the evidence that Mrs Stanford’s speculation was correct in that, as referred to above, the minutes of the 11 March 2015 meeting were passed at the meeting on 13 May 2015.

On 23 May 2015 the draft minutes of the meeting on 13 May 2013 were sent to Ms Cargill, who still had a role overseeing the Wellington branch. The plaintiff also received a copy of the draft minutes, which indicated (incorrectly) that she had been paid $102 as follows.

On 27 May 2015 at 14.33pm the plaintiff emailed Ms Louisa Deacon, the Membership Manager, of CWA (NSW). The title of the email was “Fraud and Bullying”. It commenced:

After making several complaints about branch members, she concluded:

Ms Deacon emailed Mrs Norris, Mrs Wynne, Ms Beverley Cameron (the then current Wellington branch office bearers), Ms Cargill, Mrs Carolan and Mrs Tanya Cameron about the latest communication from the plaintiff. Ms Cargill responded to the Wellington officer bearers and advised them that the branch only owed the plaintiff 20c and that the sum of $100 was the relevant petty cash amount. She advised them to correct the problem as follows:

On 2 June 2015 the plaintiff rang Mrs Carolan. They had a conversation which went for over an hour and a half. In the course of the conversation words to the following effect were said:

On 3 June 2015 the plaintiff wrote to Mrs Norris pointing out errors in the minutes for the May branch meeting, including that she was not mentioned as an apology. She referred item 3 which read:

Of this item the plaintiff wrote:

On 3 June 2015 the plaintiff rang Robin Godwin who was the Macquarie Group Agriculture and Environment officer. She raised the issue of the probity of the grant and also catalogued various grievances against members of her own branch and group office bearers, including Mrs Carolan and Mrs Blatch, as well as Ms Cargill. Mrs Godwin, who was unaware of the background, sent an email to Ms Cargill, in which she reported on the conversation and said that her impression was that the plaintiff was seeking to gain support for a motion to be put at the next group meeting regarding the federal grant. Mrs Godwin wrote:

There was a meeting of the Wellington branch on 10 June 2015, which the plaintiff did not attend as she was indisposed. She sent a letter of apology dated 4 June 2015.

On 17 June 2015 the plaintiff rang Mrs Carolan again and raised an issue with the minutes of the June 2015 meeting. Mrs Carolan told her that such an issue ought be resolved at branch level. Mrs Carolan also said that the branch was trying to resolve issues that had been raised but that matters had not yet been resolved. She assured the plaintiff that there was nothing malicious in the course taken by the branch.

Some time after 17 June 2015 Mrs Norris responded to the plaintiff’s email of 3 June 2015. She expressed her appreciation to the plaintiff for reading the minutes so thoroughly and assured her that the error in the petty cash amount would be rectified. Mrs Norris also wrote:

There was a further meeting of the Wellington branch on 8 July 2015 which the plaintiff did not attend.

On 19 July 2015 the plaintiff sent a letter of complaint to Mrs Carolan, alleging bullying by the Wellington branch and that her removal from the position of secretary of the Wellington branch was illegal. She said:

A copy of this letter was provided to Ms Cargill.

The Macquarie Group Council meeting was held on 3 August 2015. It was attended by the plaintiff, Mrs Tanya Cameron (who attended to support Mrs Carolan and Ms Cargill), Ms Cargill, Mrs Blatch and voting members. Initially the meeting was chaired by Mrs Carolan to deal with general agenda items. However, when it came time to deal with the plaintiff’s letter of 19 July 2015, Mrs Ruth Shanks, who was a former State President of the CWA, took the chair. At the beginning of that part of the meeting, the plaintiff’s letter of 19 July 2015 was read out.

The plaintiff had prepared a document and made copies of it. She started to read it out and gave copies of it to “the various branches”. She also gave a copy to Mrs Blatch.

At page 8 of the document from which she read, the plaintiff stated that she had made a written record of what had occurred for the three weeks from 18 February 2015. In respect of 18 February 2015, she recorded that on that day she had said to Ms Beverley Cameron:

When it was put to the plaintiff that she had said to Ms Beverley Cameron what she had put in her own record, the plaintiff would not accept the proposition and contended that she was simply recording what Ms Beverley Cameron was saying to others that the plaintiff had said. Ms Chrysanthou reminded the plaintiff that she had also included this passage in her response to the letter of 12 March 2016, which she had sent on 29 March 2016. The extract was introduced by the words, “The following were itemised as they occurred”. The plaintiff adhered to her former response: namely, she denied that she had ever said those words to Ms Cameron and insisted that Ms Beverley Cameron was putting it around that the plaintiff had said those words when she had not.

I reject the plaintiff’s evidence, which provided one of many examples of her refusing to accept the construction of a document of which she was the author when she appreciated that it was not in her interests to do so.

At the meeting of 3 August 2015, the plaintiff included on the first page of the document referred to above:

It was put to the plaintiff that she appreciated by 3 August 2015 that the grant was a Volunteer Grant, not an Emergency Relief Grant. She rejected that proposition, although it is plain from the letter dated 28 April 2015 which she received from the Department of Social Services (extracted above) that from that date she appreciated the true character of the grant and understood that the earlier reference to the grant having been for emergency relief was erroneous.

Ms Cargill reported to those present at the meeting about what had been done in the preceding six months to try to address the concerns raised by the plaintiff and other members of the Wellington branch. She read from notes which she had prepared. Her allotted time ran out before she had finished reading from her notes. In the time available she outlined what had followed from the meeting on 11 February 2015; the concerns expressed about the plaintiff’s mental health in early March 2015 and the plaintiff’s response to those concerns; what had occurred at the 11 March 2015 meeting, at which members voiced their concerns and then voted for all branch positions which had been declared vacant.

Ms Cargill said as follows with regards the plaintiff’s mental health:

Ms Cargill reported on the federal government grant as follows:

I accept this summary of the grant as being accurate and consistent with the evidence.

Mrs Tanya Cameron and Ms Cargill both informed those present at the meeting that the plaintiff’s complaints regarding the Wellington branch had been investigated and no evidence had been found to support them.

At some point in the meeting, the members of the Wellington branch, including the plaintiff, were asked to leave the meeting so that there could be a discussion about the appropriate course in their absence. Mrs Tanya Cameron, Mrs Carolan, Mrs Blatch and Ms Cargill also left the meeting at this time. Mrs Blatch prepared minutes for the meeting, which did not cover the period during which she was absent from the meeting as referred to above.

The following resolutions were passed by the Macquarie Group Council in the absence of those persons referred to above:

Following the meeting Mrs Blatch rang the Community Justice Centres (which were within the Department of Attorney General and Justice) to ask about mediation. She spoke with a woman by the name of Carmen. When Mrs Blatch told her that the dispute was within one of the branches of the CWA and also involved the Macquarie Group Executive, Carmen told her that the Community Justice Centres could not assist as it generally dealt with “disputes between neighbours like a fence dispute”. Carmen sent an email to Mrs Blatch setting out the disputes which could be dealt with by Community Justice Centres and noting that its services were provided free-of-charge.

Following this call, Mrs Blatch reported to Ms Cargill. After considering various alternatives, they visited Mrs Shanks to discuss them further. In the course of this discussion Ms Cargill suggested enquiring whether Karen Saunders from Natalie Bramble Management would be prepared to act as mediator. Ms Cargill considered that Ms Saunders would be particularly suitable as she had run workshops of conflict resolution and negotiation for the CWA and had some understanding of the CWA structure as she had helped with its Strategic Planning Workshop. Ultimately it was Mrs Shanks who decided that Ms Saunders would be a suitable mediator, if she was prepared to take on the role.

On 3 August 2015 Ms Cargill emailed Ms Saunders to ask if she would be prepared to mediate the dispute. On 4 August 2015 Ms Saunders responded saying that she would be prepared to act as mediator and proposed a rate for her services. Ms Cargill consulted Mrs Tanya Cameron by email to seek her opinion on Ms Saunders’ appointment. They agreed to check with Ms Saunders that she did not feel that there was potential for bias if she knew any of the individuals personally. To that end, Ms Cargill sent an email to Ms Saunders on 5 August 2015 in which she listed the names of those concerned to make sure that Ms Saunders did not know any of the individuals personally. On 10 August 2015 Ms Cargill sent a summary of the issues (which included a chronology) to Ms Saunders.

Between 10 and 26 August 2015 the CWA engaged Ms Saunders to consider Ms Cargill’s summary dated 10 August 2015; speak to key participants on the phone; and decide on a mediation based on the information that had been provided.

On 14 August 2015 Ms Saunders rang the plaintiff, whom she had not previously met. During the conversation, which lasted at least 45 minutes, Ms Saunders asked the plaintiff to keep the conversation confidential and asked her not to speak to other people about the issues until the mediation.

On 15 August 2015 the plaintiff sent an email, entitled “Deceit” to Mrs Shanks, which included the following passage:

It was put to the plaintiff that she had just accused a woman she had never met and with whom she had spoken over the phone for 45 minutes (Ms Saunders) of fraud. She answered:

The reference to the plaintiff’s checking Ms Saunders’ phone number was a reference to the fact that, after this telephone call, the plaintiff googled Ms Saunders’ telephone number and found out what she could about her. According to the plaintiff, her searches revealed that Ms Saunders was not a registered mediator.

Mrs Shanks replied to the email, confirming that it had been agreed that Ms Saunders be engaged because of her experience in dealing with “these issues”. She said further:

Mrs Shanks forwarded to Ms Cargill the email she had received from the plaintiff and Mrs Shanks’ reply to that email.

On 26 August 2015 Ms Saunders emailed Mrs Carolan and Mrs Shanks. She referred to the work she had done to date which involved speaking with participants, including the plaintiff, by telephone. She reported that she had become aware that the plaintiff had engaged in subsequent conversations and sent an email on the topics covered by the mediation. Ms Saunders expressed her opinion that mediation would not result in a successful outcome for the branch, having regard to the plaintiff’s lack of respect for the mediation process and the circumstance that the plaintiff’s list of issues with branch members was growing. Ms Saunders concluded her email as follows:

As a consequence of this email, Mrs Tanya Cameron and Mrs Shanks decided that it would not be appropriate to proceed with the mediation. Accordingly, they did not seek a replacement for Ms Saunders.

It was not suggested that Ms Saunders had ever been an employee of the CWA or ever held office in the CWA. The company with which she was associated, Natalie Bramble Management, provided consultancy services to the CWA in the form of one-hour workshops which were conducted annually pursuant to a contract between CWA and Natalie Bramble Management. There was some suggestion that, by 2015, the contract between CWA (NSW) and Natalie Bramble Management had been on foot for about 11 years. The plaintiff contended that this circumstance meant that Ms Saunders was not “independent” and that, accordingly, she could not be retained to conduct the mediation, having regard to the terms of the resolution passed on 3 August 2015. This point did not need to be resolved by the CWA as it decided, as referred to above, that mediation would not be proceeded with.

On 9 September 2015 Mrs Tanya Cameron and Mrs Shanks wrote to the plaintiff in part as follows:

Notwithstanding that the plaintiff had been told on 9 September 2015 that the matter was considered to be closed, on 15 September 2015 she wrote an email to Mrs Carolan, Mrs Barrett, Mrs Shanks and Joan Yeo demanding certain information. She threatened litigation in the following terms:

After this email was put to the plaintiff in cross-examination, the following exchange occurred:

Also on 15 September 2015 the plaintiff sent an email to over 100 people, who were said to be CWA members. It began as follows:

In this email the plaintiff disparaged Mrs Wynne, Ms Beverley Cameron, Mrs Norris, Ms Cargill, Mrs Tanya Cameron, Mrs Carolan and Mrs Blatch, among others.

The plaintiff did not accept that she had made serious allegations about various people in the email. It became apparent in the cross-examination of the plaintiff that the only reason she did not accept the proposition was that she took exception to the word “allegation” and contended that what she had said was true. She admitted that she had said that Ms Cargill intentionally misled the President and that she had contacted the Department of Fair Trading on 17 August 2015 herself to find out who could do an independent mediation.

On 15 September 2015 at 17.35pm the plaintiff sent an email to Mrs Carolan which was copied to various persons associated with the CWA, including Mrs Barrett and Mrs Shanks, raising further issues about documentation and referring to a meeting with her solicitors, Maurice Blackburn, the following Wednesday.

On 16 September 2015 at 8.26am the plaintiff forwarded that email (her email of 15 September 2015 to Mrs Carolan) to Mrs Tanya Cameron under cover of another email which read as follows:

On 16 September 2015 at 9.24am the plaintiff sent an email which contained her emails to Mrs Carolan and Mrs Cameron (referred to above) and was sent to various people associated with the CWA, including Margaret Frankham, which was in the following terms:

On 29 September 2015 the plaintiff contacted Community Justice Centres to ask for a mediation session with Mrs Tanya Cameron and Mrs Shanks. On 26 October 2015 the Community Justice Centres contacted the plaintiff and told her that Mrs Tanya Cameron accepted her request for mediation on condition that she be provided with an email outlining her reason for the mediation session. By letter dated 18 November 2015 Community Justice Centres informed the plaintiff that mediation is a voluntary process and that the office could not compel anyone to take part in mediation. Accordingly, it told her that it could not commence the mediation process unless and until she had provided the email which Mrs Cameron had requested. The evidence does not reveal that any such email was ever sent by the plaintiff.

Ms Cargill completed the financial statements for the Wellington branch for the year ended 30 September 2015 as Mrs Wynne, who had been elected treasurer on 11 March 2015, did not feel comfortable doing so. These accounts were signed by Ms Cargill as the State treasurer and Ms Beverley Cameron as branch president. The accounts were also audited by Crowe Horwath for that year. Ms Cargill explained that every year selected CWA branches were chosen for “special audits”, which had to be done by chartered accountants and that Wellington branch had been selected for that year. Clare Wagner, the audit partner, confirmed that they “found no issues of serious concern”.

On 23 June 2015 Mrs Bell, who was then the President of the Wellington branch, wrote to the Department of Social Services in the following terms:

Mrs Bell’s letter included a statutory declaration made by Mrs Norris verifying the acquittal of the grant and listing the items purchased with the sum of $2,848.50. Two cheques were enclosed which totalled $1,256.50. These cheques constituted the balance of the grant monies of $4,105.

It was noted on the Grant Agreement Acquittal Statement signed by the Grant Agreement Manager of the Department of Social Services on 4 November 2015 that no acquittal of the grant had been required.

On 1 October 2015 the plaintiff emailed the Department again about the grant. After observing that it was unusual that the Government had told her that the grant was for emergency relief, she continued:

The plaintiff rejected the propositions put to her in cross-examination that she was criticising how other people had handled the grant and that no criticisms had been levelled at her regarding the grant, except that she had contacted government departments without the requisite authority of the CWA.

On 6 October 2015 the Department of Social Services (by its officer Kate Brown) responded to the plaintiff’s email of 1 October 2015 and said in part:

The plaintiff sent a further email to the Department of Social Services (to an officer, Tarni) at 21.06pm in the following terms:

The plaintiff sent a further email of complaint to the Department of Social Services on 27 October 2015 in the following terms:

The plaintiff did not accept in cross-examination that she had improperly communicated with a government department. She asserted, in mitigation, that her recollection of the period between March and October 2015 was poor because she had a bad lung problem in that period.

On 4 November 2015 Mrs Cameron emailed Mrs Tanya Cameron asking for the plaintiff to be expelled from the CWA in the following terms:

On 12 November 2015 Fiona Shepherd of the Wellington branch also complained to Mrs Tanya Cameron about the plaintiff and requested her expulsion. She said in part that people in Wellington had approached her to ask her what the plaintiff’s problem with the CWA was as the plaintiff “has been saying nasty things about the Wellington CWA and its members.”

On 15 February 2016 Ms Beverley Cameron emailed Ms Wilkins and Mrs Bell as follows:

Between 15 February 2016 and 11 March 2016 Mrs Tanya Cameron reviewed all of the CWA records pertaining to the plaintiff, including correspondence associated with the plaintiff, in order to prepare a notice of complaint to be issued to the plaintiff pursuant to reg 15(2) of the CWA Constitution. Mrs Tanya Cameron tried to include as much information as possible so that the plaintiff could understand the nature of the complaints made against her. She consulted the file in the NSW State office of the CWA, which contained all the information on which she relied to prepare the letter which was sent on 11 March 2016 referred to below.

On 11 March 2016 the CWA sent the plaintiff a letter of complaint in which it set out various allegations that had been made against the plaintiff. It said as follows:

The plaintiff cross-examined Ms Cargill about the evidence she had to make the allegations which were made by the CWA through Mrs Tanya Cameron in the letter of 11 March 2016. Ms Cargill explained that, although they had received many complaints from people about the plaintiff, they included (in the letter of particulars referred to below) reference to the complaints which had actually been made in writing. The plaintiff put to Ms Cargill that she could not prove the allegations in the letter of 11 March 2016 to which she responded:

Mrs Tanya Cameron explained in re-examination the reason for the CWA’s decision to allow more than 14 days for a response, which was the minimum required by reg 15(2)(b) of the CWA Constitution. She said that as the notice was sent at about 4pm on 11 March 2016, they allowed an additional four days (after 25 March 2016) to take account of the two weekends that fell in that period. She also noted that the plaintiff’s letter requesting particulars was sent on 12 March 2016, which was a Saturday. The CWA wanted to obtain legal advice on how to respond, which was not possible until Monday 14 March 2016. It then took three further days to prepare the particulars which were sent on 17 March 2016. Mrs Tanya Cameron’s view was that this timing was reasonable.

On 12 March 2016 the plaintiff responded by seeking particulars of the complaint. She concluded the letter as follows:

I am satisfied that when the plaintiff used the word “retribution” in the final paragraph of her letter of 12 March 2016 extracted above, she meant to say “restitution” as she said in her evidence that she wanted “amends for lies and defamation”.

From 12 March 2016 until 17 March 2016 Mrs Tanya Cameron prepared a lengthy response to the request for particulars and provided examples of the behaviour complained of.

By letter of 17 March 2016 signed by Mrs Tanya Cameron, the CWA provided the particulars sought by the plaintiff of the letter of complaint of 11 March 2016. I propose to reproduce only those passages from the particulars which are relevant to the question whether the imputations alleged were carried. These are:

At about 1pm on 29 March 2016, prior to the deadline of 4pm, the plaintiff provided her response to the complaint by a 56-page email. On that date she also sent a USB stick which contained a further 44 documents. As she did not post it until 29 March 2016, it did not arrive by 4pm on 29 March 2016.

On 1 April 2016 there was a meeting of the State Executive of the CWA which was chaired by Mrs Tanya Cameron and attended by State office bearers (including Ms Cargill), Ms Wilkins and a delegate from each Group. The first matter which was considered was whether the further material which the plaintiff had foreshadowed would be provided ought be considered. It was resolved by majority that the further material on the USB stick ought not be accepted as it was received after the deadline on 29 March 2016.

At the meeting on 1 April 2016 it was resolved that disciplinary action should be taken against the plaintiff and that she be expelled from the CWA.

Ms Wilkins then told the meeting that if the plaintiff decided to appeal the decision, a special meeting would need to take place at the AGM in Cowra in May 2016, which would require information to be sent out to all delegates.

Before closing the meeting Mrs Tanya Cameron reminded those present that the discussions at the meeting were to remain confidential.

By letter of 1 April 2016 the CWA wrote to the plaintiff to inform her that the State Executive was satisfied that the allegations in the complaint were true. The letter continued:

The letter concluded by informing the plaintiff of her right of appeal under reg 15(6)(i) of the CWA Constitution.

On 5 April 2016 the plaintiff lodged an appeal against the decision to expel her. She listed the following grounds of appeal: lack of procedural fairness; acting under dictation; real or apprehended bias; inflexible application of a policy; taking into account irrelevant considerations; failing to take into account relevant considerations; extraneous (improper) purpose; error of law on the face of the record; “Wednesbury” unreasonableness; no evidence; and bad faith.

On 13 April 2016 Danica Leys, who had commenced as the CEO of CWA (NSW) in early April 2016, sent the April Letter to the 545 delegates entitled to vote on the appeal. As referred to above the April Letter with its attachments comprised the matter complained of in the defamation proceedings. The April Letter comprised a covering letter dated 13 April 2016, notifying delegates of a Special Meeting convened pursuant to reg 15 in relation to the plaintiff, and enclosed the following documents:

On the same day, 13 April 2016, Mrs Tanya Cameron also provided these documents to the plaintiff. She informed the plaintiff of the following:

On 21 April 2016 the plaintiff commenced the Defamation proceedings by filing a statement of claim in this Court. By letter dated 27 April 2016 the CWA informed the plaintiff that the statement of claim and affidavit in support would not be provided to the delegates who were to attend the meeting on 3 May 2016 as the documents were too long and it was not appropriate that court documents be provided.

The plaintiff did not attend the meeting on 3 May 2016, which was chaired by Mrs Tanya Cameron. Ms Cargill attended the meeting as she was then the State Honorary Treasurer of CWA (NSW). Mrs Blatch also attended the meeting as she was, as Macquarie Group President (a position which she had held since October 2013), a delegate with voting rights. Mrs Blatch was given the opportunity to address the meeting. She said words to the following effect:

The result of the special meeting was communicated to the plaintiff by Ms Leys by email sent at 5.05pm on 3 May 2016 in the following terms:

Mrs Tanya Cameron concluded her term as CWA (NSW) President in May 2016.

The pleadings comprised the statement of claim, the defence and the reply. In the usual course they would define and confine the issues in the proceedings. However, it became clear when the plaintiff was cross-examined that she took a particular view of certain allegations, which influenced her response in the reply.

For example, in paragraph 9 of the defence, the CWA pleaded the defence of justification under s 25 of the Act, that is, that the imputations alleged by the plaintiff were substantially true. Particular (d) to paragraph 9 alleged:

In her reply, the plaintiff answered, in response to (d), “The Plaintiff disagrees with ‘The Defence’”. It became clear in cross-examination that the plaintiff disagreed with particular (d) to paragraph 9 because she considered that the words “from time to time” implied a degree of casualness to which she took exception since she only missed meetings when there was a reason for her absence. Moreover, she explained in her answers in cross-examination that the paragraph implied that she did not attend meetings of any other branch when, in fact, she attended functions organised by other branches. The plaintiff’s evidence also made clear that she considered that, since the defendant had particularised that she became a member of the CWA on about 1 October 2010, it was not correct to refer solely to her attendance at the meetings of the Wellington branch as she had formerly been a member of the Gulgong branch.

Ms Chrysanthou’s cross-examination of the plaintiff included the following exchange:

It emerged in the cross-examination that the plaintiff considered that every allegation in the defence, including the particulars, was necessarily to be viewed with suspicion and as a criticism. The following passage illustrates her perspective:

The plaintiff’s view of the meaning of defamation was also illustrated by her response to particular 9(g) of the defence of justification in which it was alleged that from time to time she included insulting and defamatory comments about public figures in Branch agendas and minutes (the three instances were taken from the minutes of 11 February 2015). Although the plaintiff did not dispute that the minutes she prepared included the statements alleged, she disagreed, on the ground that they were true, that they were insulting, derogatory or defamatory.

The plaintiff confirmed her evidence that she had never said anything defaming, disrespectful, derogatory against any person, whether a member of the CWA or not.

The plaintiff and Mr Collier met in 1973, were married in 1976 and divorced in 1999. By 2001 they were living under the same roof again, although it is not clear on what terms. On about 28 March 2017 Mr Collier left, although he returned to look after the house and the dogs while the plaintiff was appearing in these proceedings. Mr Collier explained in his evidence that since problems started between the plaintiff and the CWA in 2015, it had caused a lot of stress and distress, torment and arguments between him and the plaintiff. Mr Collier blamed their eventual “split up” “mainly on the CWA”. When cross-examined about their recent separation he said:

Mr Collier admitted in cross-examination that in July 2017 he had posted a Facebook entry in which he described the plaintiff as a “self-opinionated, self-righteous, egotistical scumbag of a woman”. He said that he had deleted the comments but, in further cross-examination, he admitted that he had only deleted them on 7 November 2017. Ms Chrysanthou put to him that he had only removed the posts when he was told, on 7 November 2017 by the plaintiff that she had been asked some questions about the Facebook posts. I do not accept Mr Collier’s evidence that he did not speak to the plaintiff about these proceedings and am satisfied from the circumstance referred to above that he did.

It was plain from the plaintiff’s evidence that she regarded herself as responsible, in her role as branch secretary, for whatever had gone on before she was elected to that position. She took it upon herself not only to investigate the grant but also to check the leases to the various organisations that occupied the hall owned by the CWA.

She found error wherever she looked and felt obliged to point it out, not only to members of the Wellington branch and others associated with the CWA but also to counsel for the defendant whom the plaintiff accused of having “got muddled up” and of being “dyslexic” when she referred to Steve King (the cleaner, see below) as Stephen King.

The plaintiff regarded herself as a stickler for proper procedure and detail. She was quick to leap to the conclusion that others had behaved improperly, even criminally, where there was no basis for any inference other than, in some cases, that people had been mistaken. She appeared to be fixated with the secretary’s responsibility for preparing the minutes and took great exception to the steps taken by Ms Cargill to remove offensive or inappropriate material from the minutes which the plaintiff had prepared so that the official records of the CWA would not be infected by such comments. The plaintiff alleged that the preparation of minutes by anyone who did not hold the position of secretary was unauthorised.

The plaintiff also identified the “minutes” which had been provided to the Commonwealth Bank to establish the positions held in the Wellington branch by those who were nominated as signatories to the account held by the CWA in Wellington and contended that they were not a complete copy of the minutes of the meeting on the relevant day. She concluded that there was something untoward about providing a document to the Commonwealth Bank which was, in effect, an extract from the minutes rather than the full minutes. She also took exception to the description on the document provided to the bank of “extraordinary general meeting” on “11 March 3015” when the meeting was, in fact, a general monthly meeting of the Wellington branch on 11 March 2015. Her reaction was one of many examples in the evidence to her way of thinking, which was to find error (including where there was none) and assume that any perceived error or irregularity was deliberate, malevolent and, on some occasions, criminal. Indeed, in her written submissions she, without any proper basis, accused those who prepared the minute which was forwarded to the Commonwealth Bank of inducing acceptance of a false document contrary to s 251 of the Crimes Act.

The plaintiff reacted to perceived conflict in a grandiose manner. Her response when she learned that Mrs Norris had asked Mr King to clean for another month was to accuse her of “undermining” her position as secretary. The plaintiff’s response to this, and other matters, was rude, unreasonable, disproportionate and provocative. She displayed no compunction in belittling others.

The reason for the plaintiff’s disposition as described above is not clear. There was no expert evidence to connect it with any mental illness, although this possibility was hypothesised by Ms Cargill, Mrs Carolan and Mrs Blatch.

It was put to the plaintiff on several occasions that she had deliberately lied in her evidence. Although her evidence was, on several occasions, inconsistent with objective facts or incontrovertible evidence, I do not infer from that disparity that the plaintiff actually lied. Rather, it was my impression that the lens through which she viewed the world was affected in some way such that she genuinely believed, or came to believe, in the truth of what she was asserting. In the main, the inconsistencies between her evidence and those of others arose because she could not accept that something was a mere typographical mistake (as in the reference in the document provided to the Commonwealth Bank as to the positions occupied by those authorised as signatories to the bank account to 11 March 3015, instead of 2015); a mistake in description (as in the minutes being described as being for an extraordinary general meeting, rather than a general meeting); or something which the plaintiff believed to be a mistake, but which was not a mistake at all (such as the circumstance that the leases bore a date after their commencement dates).

The plaintiff’s investigation of the federal grant which was paid to the Wellington branch in September 2013 was as persistent as it was misguided. Her description of what occurred with the grant as “a complete scenario of weird events” says much about her state of mind and nothing about the objective facts which have been recounted elsewhere in these reasons.

These matters made her an unreliable, though not necessarily untruthful, witness. I do not accept her evidence on any matter unless it was corroborated, accepted by the defendant, or against interest.

I note for completeness that I observed that the plaintiff tended to speak over people in Court (witnesses, Mrs Chrysanthou, and myself). She also tended to be critical of any errors made by others in court (as to page numbers or names). She was also, at times, rude. I confirm that I have not taken into account any of these matters in determining whether the plaintiff was telling the truth as she saw it or whether the defendant had established the truth of the imputations alleged.

Mr Collier admitted that he had read the pleadings and the evidence in these proceedings. Indeed, he had copies of affidavits sworn by the CWA’s witnesses with him when he gave evidence by telephone. As referred to above, I do not accept his denial that he did not discuss the case with the plaintiff. I did not regard him as a reliable witness because of his obvious allegiance with the plaintiff and the extent to which he had involved himself in the litigation. The words and phrases he used in his evidence bore such a striking resemblance to those used by the plaintiff, and were frequently identical, as to make the inference of collaboration irresistible.

I accept the evidence of the remaining witnesses, Ms Leys, Mrs Tanya Cameron, Ms Cargill, Mrs Carolan (called by the defendant) and Mrs Jones (called by the plaintiff). I also accept the evidence of Mrs Blatch, who is in a separate category because she could not be cross-examined due to a personal reason. Her evidence was corroborated by other witnesses whose evidence I accept and by contemporaneous documents. Although the circumstance that she was not cross-examined has the potential to affect the weight given to her evidence, I discern no reason to reduce the weight of her evidence, having regard to the other evidence in the proceedings. The minor differences in the evidence of the witnesses referred to above, such as the capacity in which Mrs Jones attended the in camera meeting on 18 February 2015, was consistent with the credibility of each.

I note that Ms Leys was present in court for the whole proceedings. Objection was taken to her presence by the plaintiff from the outset. Ms Chrysanthou contended that as her role was as CEO of the CWA (a position which she has held since April 2016) and her evidence was largely formal, she ought be permitted to remain in Court as she was, relevantly, the human agent of the CWA and the source of its instructions to its legal representatives. On this basis, I permitted Ms Leys to remain in court, notwithstanding that she was also a witness. I do not consider that her presence in court affected her evidence, which, as I have said, was largely formal and not affected by the evidence given by other witnesses. Her evidence established that the documents referred to were provided to the head office of CWA (NSW), which formed the subject of the letter of 11 March 2016, the letter of particulars dated 17 March 2016 and, ultimately, the matter complained of (the letter of 13 April 2016).

The plaintiff’s claim in defamation is limited to the publication of The April Letter (dated 13 April 2016) to delegates in anticipation of a special general meeting of the CWA to be held on 3 May 2016.

The defendant relies on the defences of common law qualified privilege, statutory qualified privilege, justification and contextual truth. In reply to the statutory and common law defences of qualified privilege the plaintiff relies on malice.

The plaintiff alleged the following imputations:

The plaintiff also included, in [29] of the statement of claim, at the end of imputation v (set out above), the following:

This sentence must be excised from imputation v. since it is a statement relating to others and does not amount to an imputation against the plaintiff. It forms part of the narrative and is addressed in my findings set out above.

The plaintiff also alleged, as imputations, the following in [33] and [34] of her statement of claim:

As the allegations in [33] and [34] do not amount to imputations, I do not propose to deal with them as such. They appear to amount to the plaintiff’s version of the narrative, which was addressed in her evidence in any event. My findings of fact relevant to these allegations are set out in the narrative above.

I turn now to address the imputations set out in the above table. The first step is that the plaintiff must satisfy the Court, on the balance of probabilities, that the hypothetical ordinary reasonable reader would understand the matter to have the meaning articulated in the pleaded imputations. The plaintiff bears the onus of proof. It is well established that each imputation relied on by the plaintiff has to be considered in the context of the entire matter complained of: Mirror Newspapers Ltd v World Hosts Pty Ltd (1979) 141 CLR 632 at 646 (Aickin J); [1979] HCA 3.

The second step is to determine, in respect of any imputation found to have been carried, whether the imputation is defamatory. An imputation is defamatory if it tends to lower the plaintiff’s reputation in the minds of “right thinking ordinary members of the community”: Reader’s Digest Services Pty Ltd v Lamb (1982) 150 CLR 500 at 505-506 (Brennan J); [1982] HCA 4.

I am satisfied that imputation a. was carried as it corresponds with the combined effect of the findings made in the letter of 1 April 2016. Imputations b, c and d. were carried by the first paragraph of the letter of 1 April 2016. Imputation e. was carried by paragraph 1(e) of the letter of 17 March 2016.

Imputation f. does not make sense and is not carried. However, as the defendant accepted, its essence, that the plaintiff falsely claimed that she had been maliciously defamed, was carried by paragraph 1(f) of the letter of 17 March 2016. In these circumstances, and having regard to the defendant’s attitude to the imputation as drafted, I shall treat imputation f. as if it alleged an imputation in the following terms: “that the plaintiff falsely claimed that she had been maliciously defamed”.

Imputation g. was carried by the particulars in paragraph 2 of the letter of 17 March 2016 and is limited to those particulars. Imputations h., i. and j. (which do not differ in substance) were carried by the particulars in paragraph 3 of the letter of 17 March 2016 and are limited to those particulars. The sting of each of imputations h., i. and j. was that the plaintiff accused members of the CWA of bullying and unacceptable behaviour towards her.

The sting of imputations k., l., m. and n. (which do not differ in substance) was carried by paragraph 4 of the letter of 17 March 2016 but the details about the dates and words were not carried. The sting of each was that the plaintiff inserted insulting and defamatory comments about public figures in CWA documents.

Imputation o. does not make sense and was not carried. However, the defendant accepted in its submissions that the imputation which was carried by paragraph 5 of the letter of 17 March 2016 was that the plaintiff resisted and derailed attempts to assist her with issues she had raised and then she refused to accept the findings of the investigations. In these circumstances, and having regard to the defendant’s attitude to the imputation as drafted, I shall treat imputation o. as if it alleged an imputation in the following terms: “that the plaintiff resisted and derailed attempts to assist her with issues she had raised and then she refused to accept the findings of the investigations.”

I accept that imputation p. was carried by paragraph 5 of the letter of 17 March 2016 but only in the context of the plaintiff’s refusal to accept findings of investigations that arose from her complaints.

Imputation q. was carried by paragraph 6 of the letter of 17 March 2016. Imputation r. does not make sense but, to the extent that some meaning can be discerned, it does not differ in substance from imputation p. as it contains the same sting.

Imputation s. was neither carried nor defamatory. Although paragraph 7 of the 17 March 2016 letter asserted that the plaintiff was instructed to keep matters confidential, this does not correspond with imputation s. Imputation t. was not carried as the matter complained of does not refer to an agreement that matters be kept confidential as opposed to an instruction that they be kept confidential.

Imputations u., v., w., and x. were not carried.

The imputations which I have found carried and defamatory are a., b., c., d., e., f. (as amended), g., h., i., j., k., l., m., n., o. (as amended), p. and q.

It is accordingly necessary to address the defences raised by the CWA.

The defence of common law qualified privilege protects communications between persons that arise from a common duty or interest: Bashford v Information Australia (Newsletters) Pty Limited (2004) 218 CLR 366; [2004] HCA 5 at [9]–[10] (Gleeson CJ, Hayne and Heydon JJ); [136]–[137] (Gummow J) and at [53] per McHugh J (dissenting). It is a defence which is founded on public utility. The rationale for the defence of qualified privilege appears from the oft-cited passage from Parke B’s judgment in Toogood v Spyring (1834) 149 ER 1044 at 1050, (approved by the majority in Bashford v Information Australia (Newsletters) Pty Limited at [9]):

The defence of qualified privilege has a particular relevance to relationships between members of associations in the handling of grievances. In Brown on Defamation (Canada, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, United States) (formerly The Law of Defamation in Canada)(2nd ed 1994, Carswell) at 13-275–13-276, the principles relating to grievance proceedings were summarised as follows at [13.6(3)(d)(v)(C)] of the loose-leaf edition (2010):

The matter complained of, the April Letter, was sent only to delegates who were entitled to vote on the appeal lodged by the plaintiff pursuant to reg 15(6) of the CWA Constitution. It was necessary that such persons be apprised of the matters germane to the question whether to confirm the resolution of the State Executive Committee to expel the plaintiff from the CWA. The documents which comprised the matter complained of fell into the following three categories:

Each of the documents in the three categories was required to be brought to the attention of those entitled to vote in order as a matter of procedural fairness. The purpose of the provision of the documents was, evidently, to implement the appeal process which the plaintiff had set in train by exercising her right of appeal under reg 15(6) of the CWA Constitution. Each of the delegates had a common duty to consider the documents before determining how she was to vote on the appeal and an interest in receiving them by reason of the person’s position as delegate. The publication to the delegates was required by, and did not go beyond, the exigencies of the occasion. To the extent to which others may have been privy to the matter complained of (and there is no evidence of this), this would amount to incidental publication, which would have the same protection as publication of the April Letter to the delegates.

The authorities are replete with instances where the common law defence of qualified privilege has been found to protect publication of defamatory material within the confines of a club or association. For example, in Khan v O’Dea [1985] Hong Kong L.R. 237 (H.C.), Hunter J considered the defence of qualified privilege at general meetings of a club and said:

To borrow the language from Toogood v Spyring, I am satisfied that the CWA’s publication of the April Letter was fairly warranted by its duty to decide the plaintiff’s appeal in the conduct of the CWA’s own affairs in controlling its membership following complaints having been made by other members. The matter complained of was published precisely for the purpose for which the protection of qualified privilege is granted.

As appears from the passage from Toogood v Spyring the publication must also have been “honestly made”. There is a presumption of honesty, or proper purpose, as a result of which the plaintiff bears the onus of proof of malice, which, in this context, means improper motive: Roberts v Bass (2002) 212 CLR 1; [2002] HCA 57 at [96]-[97] (Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ).

The relevant principles relating to malice were articulated in Roberts v Bass at [76] (Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ):

The person who decided to publish the April Letter was its author, Mrs Tanya Cameron. Accordingly, to prove malice, the plaintiff must prove that Mrs Tanya Cameron had a predominantly improper motive in publishing the April Letter. The plaintiff’s written submissions contain several allegations of malice. However none of these allegations (for which no proper basis has been established) are germane to the defence of qualified privilege since the underlying conduct alleged is distinct from the publication of the matter complained of.

In her reply the plaintiff alleged:

The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) have no application to an appeal under reg 15(6) of the CWA Constitution. The Country Women’s Association of New South Wales Incorporation Act does not contain any time frame of present relevance. In so far as the allegation is based on the proposition that a failure to comply with applicable time frames could amount to malice in the present case, I reject it. In any event, the plaintiff has not established any failure on the part of the CWA to comply with its Constitution and, in particular, with reg 15.

The CWA Executive Committee received the complaints (referred to above) seeking to have the plaintiff expelled from the CWA. On 11 March 2016 the plaintiff was given notice of these complaints in accordance with reg 15(2)(a) and the plaintiff replied to that notice on 12 March 2016. The plaintiff was given an opportunity to provide submissions in response to the complaints by 4pm on 29 March 2016, a period of 18 days after the notice on 11 March 2016, which was longer than the 14 day period under reg 15(2)(b).

On 1 April 2016, the CWA Executive Committee resolved to expel the plaintiff under reg 15(3). It notified the plaintiff of her appeal rights on the same day. The plaintiff lodged her appeal on 5 April 2016. In accordance with reg 15(6)(iv), the CWA convened a general meeting on 3 May 2016, within 28 days of the lodgment of the appeal. The plaintiff was given notice of that meeting and her rights to be heard on 13 April 2016. At the general meeting, the expulsion of the plaintiff was confirmed.

Although the defendant, by reason of the presumption, was not obliged to prove proper purpose, I am satisfied that the April Letter was published for proper purposes. As referred to above, its publication was necessitated by the plaintiff’s appeal which required the delegates to be privy to the material before a vote was taken. I accept the evidence of Mrs Tanya Cameron that she considered all of the material and believed that she was proceeding in accordance with the regulations (and I have found she was). The CWA sought legal advice on compliance with the Constitution and followed that advice. The CWA accorded procedural fairness to the plaintiff by giving her the opportunity to respond orally and in writing to the allegations made against her.

For these reasons I am satisfied that the publication of the matter complained was protected by common law qualified privilege.

This is sufficient to determine the defamation proceedings. There will, accordingly, be judgment in favour of the defendant in those proceedings. However, as the trial judge, I am obliged to determine all relevant factual and legal issues: Wolfenden v International Theme Park Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 78 at [3]-[6] (Giles JA, Hodgson JA and Windeyer J agreeing). Accordingly, it is necessary for me to consider all the other defences raised and to assess damages.

Section 30 of the Act relevantly provides:

Plainly, the delegates had an actual interest in the content of the April Letter given the imminent vote on whether to confirm the plaintiff’s expulsion. The April Letter was published to each delegate in the course of giving each delegate information on the subject of the matter for resolution.

The principal issue relevant to the defence of statutory qualified privilege in the present case is whether the defendant’s conduct in publishing the matter complained of was reasonable in all the circumstances, taking into account everything it knew and everything it believed.

The plaintiff contended that the defendant’s conduct was unreasonable in that it refused to consider material that had been provided after the deadline of 4pm on 29 March 2016. She relied on the circumstance that she was required to attend the internment of her eldest sister in Newcastle on 30 March 2016 and that an extension ought to have been granted to allow her at least 14 days after receipt of the letter of particulars on 17 March 2016. I regard these matters as irrelevant to the question of reasonableness in so far as it relates to the defence of statutory qualified privilege. The relevant act which must be reasonable for the defence to be established is the publication of the matter complained of.

As referred to above in the context of the common law defence of qualified privilege, the only people to receive the Letter were those entitled to vote on the plaintiff’s expulsion as a member of the CWA. I regard the publication of the matter complained of to each delegate as not only reasonable, but also required, for the reasons given above in respect of the common law defence of qualified privilege. The plaintiff has failed, for the reasons given above, to prove malice. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the statutory defence of qualified privilege under s 30 of the Act has been established.

Section 25 of the Act provides:

The task of determining whether the defendant has proved that the imputations of which the plaintiff complains are substantially true is not to be performed by too narrow a focus on the particular form in which the plaintiff has articulated the imputation. Rather, the truth or otherwise of the imputations is to be determined in context, by construing the words complained of as a whole: Greek Herald Pty Ltd v Nikolopoulos (2001) 54 NSWLR 165; [2002] NSWCA 41 at [26] (Mason P, Wood CJ at CL agreeing).

I am satisfied that the defendant has established the truth of each of the imputations which I have found both to be carried and defamatory. As my reasons for this finding largely appear from the detailed narrative above as well as my findings regarding the plaintiff’s credibility, it is not necessary to do more than summarise my reasons for finding that the defence of justification has been made out in respect of each such imputation.

As to imputation a., the defendant has proved that the plaintiff persistently and wilfully acted in a manner prejudicial to the members of the defendant. Her conduct at meetings caused members distress and consternation. Her enquiries of banks, solicitors, public authorities and government departments affected members by association. The gratuitous insults with which she peppered the agenda and minutes she prepared and the emails she sent caused anxiety, as did the baseless complaints she made against those members with whom she dealt.

As to imputations b. and c., the defendant has proved that the plaintiff has been disrespectful to members of the defendant and derogatory to members of the Wellington branch. These imputations are, in substance, a subset of the previous one and their truth is established by much of the same evidence. The plaintiff was quick to deride other CWA members. For example, she alleged that Ms Beverley Cameron was “no clean potato”; she vilified Mrs Wynne for being a new member and preparing a treasurer’s report although she was not the treasurer; and she showed a complete lack of respect for Mrs Pinkerton and her mother, whom she denigrated for not getting back to her with details of accommodation for the CWA conference to be held in Moree. She abused Mrs Norris for asking Mr King to keep cleaning the CWA hall in Wellington in January 2015 although he had resigned as at 31 December 2014. On 18 February 2015 she berated Ms Beverley Cameron in the following words:

The plaintiff’s unreasonableness in demanding immediate responses from women who were occupying voluntary executive positions, or who were simply members of the CWA, was disrespectful. Without a shred of proper evidence she insinuated that several members, including Ms Beverley Cameron, were lying. The plaintiff’s treatment of Ms Carolan and Ms Cargill was grossly disrespectful, particularly in circumstances where she knew that both women were spending considerable time (for which they were not remunerated) investigating complaints which she had made.

As to imputation d., that the plaintiff has been discriminatory to members of the CWA, the defendant has proved that the plaintiff was wont to discriminate between members of the CWA by reference to seniority. The plaintiff’s email of 17 February 2015 to Ms Beverley Cameron demonstrates the extent to which she was conscious of seniority and acted accordingly. The plaintiff also sought to justify her treatment of Mrs Wynne, following her enquiry about the mental health event, by reference to Mrs Wynne’s status as a mere member, and a new one at that. The CWA Constitution draws a distinction between members and life members in that the latter are exempt from certain fees but it provides no warrant for treating members differently on the grounds of seniority. I understood Ms Cargill’s rejection of the notion of “senior” vice-president in the passage from her cross-examination extracted above as conveying that such considerations of seniority were inappropriate in the context of the CWA and inconsistent with its aims. The defendant has proved that imputation d. was true.

The defendant has also proved the truth of imputation e. Indeed, its truth can almost be proved by its terms in the context of the Wellington branch. The email was sent on 13 February 2015 to Mrs Wynne, who was then a member, but not an office bearer, of the Wellington branch. The plaintiff knew, from previous emails, that Mrs Wynne was interested in the mental health event and that, on 12 February 2015, Mrs Wynne had been volunteering at Bloomfield in Orange, which was a distance of over 100kms from Wellington. Mrs Wynne had no obligation to respond to the plaintiff’s email at all, except as a matter of courtesy. The tone of the plaintiff’s emails was such as to deter a response. The plaintiff’s rebuke to Mrs Wynne was, in this context, both hostile and bullying.

The substance of imputation f. (as referred to above) is that the plaintiff falsely claimed that she had been maliciously defamed. As appears from the narrative set out above, the minutes of the meeting on 13 May 2015 included, incorrectly, a reference to the plaintiff having asked to be reimbursed $102 for petty cash. The plaintiff’s response was to allege that she had been accused of fraud. She had made similar accusations to Mrs Carolan in emails in February 2015, which led to Mrs Carolan inviting the Macquarie Group treasurer to attend the meeting on 11 March 2015. The error in the minutes was plainly an arithmetical error and ought to have been understood as such by the plaintiff. The plaintiff falsely alleged that the mistake amounted to an allegation of fraud (which would itself have constituted malicious defamation in the circumstances). The defendant has established the truth of imputation f.

As to imputation g., that the plaintiff defamed Wellington branch members within the local community, the evidence is replete with examples of the plaintiff defaming members of the Wellington branch to others, including to members of the Macquarie Group of the CWA, such as Mrs Carolan, who were not members of the Wellington branch but who, being in the same area, were within the local community. The plaintiff’s email of 15 September 2015, which was sent to over 100 people, disparaged several members of the Wellington branch, including Mrs Wynne, Ms Beverley Cameron and Mrs Norris. I infer that at least some of the persons who received the email belonged to the local community. I am satisfied that the defendant has proved that imputation g. is true.

Imputations h., i. and j. can be considered together as they do not differ in substance. There are several examples in the narrative set out above of the plaintiff accusing others of bullying her.

For example in her email to Mrs Carolan sent on 14 February 2015 at 4.08 pm the plaintiff accused Ms Beverley Cameron and Mrs Wynne (both members of the Wellington branch) of bullying her. The plaintiff’s email to Ms Deacon sent on 27 May 2015 at 14.33pm was entitled “Fraud and Bullying” and referred to the conduct of Mrs Wynne and Ms Beverley Cameron in preparing minutes which contained the arithmetical error regarding petty cash. The victims of her allegations were made aware of her characterisation of them when Ms Deacon forwarded the email to Mrs Norris, Mrs Wynne, Ms Beverley Cameron (who were the then current Wellington branch office bearers), Ms Cargill, Mrs Carolan and Mrs Tanya Cameron. On 19 July 2015 the plaintiff sent a letter of complaint to Mrs Carolan, alleging bullying by the Wellington branch.

In her email to Mrs Tanya Cameron sent on 4 March 2015 the plaintiff complained that Mrs Blatch’s phone call (raising the plaintiff’s mental health) “could only be described as, bullying and defamatory”. Mrs Blatch was then secretary of the Macquarie Group. In the plaintiff’s email of 15 September 2015, she made accusations against the State President, State Treasurer (then State Vice President), Group President and Group Secretary.

The defendant has established the truth of imputations h., i. and j.

The sting of each of imputations k., l., m. and n. (which do not differ in substance) is that the plaintiff inserted insulting and defamatory comments about public figures in CWA documents. The narrative set out above contains several instances of this. The following examples suffice to provide reasons for my conclusion that the defendant has proved the truth of the common sting of these imputations. The minutes were public documents. Although the agendas, unlike the minutes, were not pasted into the public minute book, which could be inspected by persons who were not branch members, as well as by branch members, copies of the agenda were handed out to members at the beginning of the branch meeting and could be taken home by them. The agendas could, accordingly, be read by others although they were not strictly speaking public documents.

In the agenda for the meeting on 11 November 2014, the plaintiff included insulting and defamatory comments about Mr Tolhurst, the general manager of Wellington Council, in connection with the garden beds which she alleged were “ridiculous” and asserted that there had been no consultation before their construction. The minutes for the meeting on 11 November 2014 also included reference to Mr Tolhurst not having consulted the Wellington branch, the Museum or the Catholic Church before the garden beds were constructed.

In both the agenda and the minutes for the meeting on 11 February 2015, the plaintiff included matters critical of Mr Grant, the State Member of Parliament for the area. She also insinuated that Mr Tolhurst had lied to her at the meeting on 13 November 2014 when he told her that it was the Roads and Maritime Services which had provided the money for the garden beds.

As referred to above, the sting of pleaded imputation o. is that that the plaintiff resisted and derailed attempts to assist her with issues she had raised and then refused to accept the findings of the investigations. The truth of this imputation has been amply proved by the evidence of Ms Cargill, who was appointed to investigate the Wellington branch following the complaints which the plaintiff had made against Mrs Carolan and Mrs Blatch. The meticulous work which Ms Cargill carried out established that, although there had been some minor errors in some respects, there was nothing which materially affected the finances of the branch. Further, Ms Cargill investigated the grant of $4,105 to ascertain how each dollar that had been spent was spent and what sum from the grant money remained. Although no acquittal was required by the Department of Social Services, the Wellington branch returned the unused part of the grant and send photographs of the items bought to the Department to establish that the monies had been spent as accounted for. Notwithstanding the thorough investigation and the subsequent acquittal, the plaintiff continued to assert that there was wrongdoing, including fraud, associated with the grant.

As referred to above, the substance of imputation p. is limited by the context and is accordingly confined to the plaintiff’s refusal to accept findings of investigations that arose from her complaints. The defendant has established the truth of this imputation by various instances referred to in the narrative above, including the evidence referred to with respect to imputation o. where the plaintiff refused to accept that there was no impropriety associated with the grant, about which she had made a complaint.

The plaintiff’s complaint about the reckoning of petty cash is another example. Even after Ms Cargill had accounted for all aspects of the plaintiff’s complaint about Mrs Carolan’s handling of issues relating to petty cash, she refused to resile from making similar allegations in further correspondence.

Imputation q. is that the plaintiff failed to abide by a resolution of the August 2015 Group Council, of the Macquarie Group of the defendant, causing the independent mediation to be derailed by the plaintiff. The evidence establishes that after Ms Saunders had spoken to the plaintiff about the proposed mediation on the basis that the conversation would be kept confidential, she learned that the plaintiff had divulged the contents of the conversation to others, thereby derailing the mediation process which had been initiated to deal with the issues she had raised. This led Ms Saunders to advise the CWA that mediation would be fruitless.

The plaintiff sought to justify her actions by alleging that Ms Saunders was, by reason of her contract to provide workshop services to the CWA, not independent as required by the resolution made on 3 August 2015. I do not regard the contract between Natalie Bramble Management and the CWA as having the consequence that Ms Saunders was not independent of the CWA since she was neither a member nor an employee of the CWA. Further, the time spent in providing annual workshops was relatively small and she could not, accordingly, be said to have been financially dependent on work from the CWA to any material degree. It is of significance that the plaintiff did not refuse to speak with Ms Saunders on the ground that she was not independent. Rather the plaintiff took up about an hour of Ms Saunders’ time and then divulged the contents of the conversation to third parties, thereby derailing the mediation. I am satisfied that the defendant has proved the truth of this imputation.

Section 26 of the Act provides:

In the present case, the defence of contextual truth does not arise as I have found that the defence of justification has been made out in respect of all the imputations alleged by the plaintiff which I have found to be carried and defamatory. It is therefore not possible to undertake a comparison between those of the plaintiff’s imputations which have not been found to be true (since there is none) and the contextual imputation alleged by the defendant. However, I am in a position to make some relevant findings concerning the defence.

By reason of the wording of s 26(a) of the Act, the contextual imputation must differ in substance from the plaintiff’s imputations. A general imputation can qualify as a contextual imputation where the imputations pleaded by the plaintiff are specific: Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd v Zeccola (2015) 91 NSWLR 341; [2015] NSWCA 329 at [83] (McColl JA, Macfarlan JA and Sackville AJA agreeing).

The CWA pleaded the following contextual imputation:

The grounds for complaint (which could lead to expulsion) were provided for in reg 15(1). The point of the April Letter was to canvas the plaintiff’s conduct as a whole which warranted her expulsion. I accept the defendant’s submission that the contextual imputation, as a general allegation about the plaintiff’s conduct as a whole, arises “in addition to” the specific imputations pleaded by the plaintiff. The contextual imputation is plainly defamatory.

The narrative set out above and the consideration of the defence of justification are sufficient to explain why I am satisfied that the defendant has proved the truth of the contextual imputation alleged. By the time of her expulsion in May 2016, the plaintiff’s continued membership was very deleterious to the CWA. The morale and goodwill of its members was jeopardised by the plaintiff’s conduct. The plaintiff’s continued membership was also inconsistent with the aims and methods of the CWA. The evidence established that the plaintiff’s conduct disturbed those who encountered her and made members of the executives of the Wellington branch fearful of taking responsibility lest they be sued by her. Mrs Wynne’s reluctance to sign the accounts of the Wellington branch for the year ended 30 September 2015 was an example of this. The trouble the plaintiff caused by her aggressive and inappropriate conduct and her propensity to allege criminal conduct without foundation, took up the time, energy and goodwill of others within the CWA, who expended considerable time (for which they were not paid) in trying to address her complaints and rectify alleged irregularities.

The CWA’s Constitution provided that any woman living in New South Wales or the Australian Capital Territory could become a full member of CWA (NSW). The evidence indicated that, but for the plaintiff’s conduct, the CWA was an inclusive organisation to which women of different ages, background and experience, particularly those living in rural areas, were attracted. Its members appeared to interact in a generally courteous manner.

Section 34 of the Act provides:

The three purposes of the award of damages for defamation are consolation for hurt feelings; recompense for damage to reputation; and vindication of the plaintiff’s reputation: Carson v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1993) 178 CLR 44 at 60-61 (Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ); [1993] HCA 31. Section 35 of the Act provides for a cap of $250,000 for non-economic loss. The maximum damages amount has been increased, from 1 July 2017, to the sum of $389,500 (declaration published in the NSW Government Gazette No 56, 26 May 2017, at 1782).

The defendant is entitled to rely in mitigation of damages on any evidence that was primarily directed to the plea of justification, even if, in some respects, the plea of justification fails: Pamplin v Express Newspapers Ltd [1988] 1 WLR 116 at 120A-E per Neill LJ. Matters relied upon in mitigation must fall within the same “sector” of the plaintiff’s reputation as the imputations found to have been defamatory: Australian Broadcasting Corporation v McBride (2001) 53 NSWLR 430; [2001] NSWCA 322 at [16]-[30] (Ipp AJA, Beazley JA agreeing).

In the present case, I have found that the defendant has proved the defence of justification in respect of all of the plaintiff’s imputations and has also proved the truth of its contextual imputation. It follows that damages can be assessed, if at all, only on a hypothetical basis. I have encountered such significant difficulty in formulating the appropriate hypothesis on which to assess the damages that I am not persuaded that I am required to do so in the present case.

If I were to assess damages on the hypothetical basis that the defendant has not proved the truth of any of the plaintiff’s imputations but has proved the truth of the contextual imputation, there would an unreality about the hypothesis since the contextual imputation (which is general) covers the field in which the plaintiff’s specific imputations are to be found. If, on the other hand, I were to assess damages on the basis that none of the imputations (whether the plaintiff’s or the defendant’s) had been established to be true, it would be nigh impossible to reconcile this hypothesis with the principle referred to above that the evidence led with respect to the truth of imputations that can be taken into account in mitigation of damages.

The requirement that a trial judge determine all issues, even hypothetical ones, is not absolute. The question was considered by McCallum J in Dansar Pty Ltd v Byron Shire Council [2013] NSWSC 17; (2013) 196 LGERA 39; (the question did not arise on the appeal, (2014) 89 NSWLR 1; [2014] NSWCA 364, which was dismissed). Her Honour said at [98]:

Although the defendant’s submissions did not specifically address this conundrum, the defendant urged me to assess damages not only on the basis of my obligation as trial judge to decide all issues, including hypothetical ones, but also because it submitted that the assessment of damages had utility in the event of an appeal since if the damages were assessed at less than $100,000, leave would be required.

In light of the issues I have raised and the arbitrariness of adopting any of the assumptions identified above, I decline to assess damages. I consider, however, that the findings of fact I have made above and the further findings set out below, are sufficient such that, if damages are ever required to be assessed, the assessment can be made under s 75A of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) without any further evidence being adduced.

I consider the relevant “sector”, being that part of the plaintiff’s reputation capable of being harmed by the matter complained of, to be her reputation as a citizen of New South Wales.

The plaintiff’s conduct within the local community of Wellington, its surrounding area and to persons within the wider area of New South Wales, as established by the evidence, showed her to be belligerent, rude and overbearing. She caused significant upset to many women at branch, group and State level by making unjustified allegations of serious misconduct or criminal conduct. From the time her conduct towards the Travelodge at Blacktown was observed with dismay in May 2012, it became known by members of the CWA, including those outside the Macquarie group, that she was both difficult and discourteous. Those impressions can only have been reinforced by her subsequent conduct. The evidence revealed that the plaintiff’s conduct, the reason for it and the distress and anxiety it caused, were the subject of much discussion both at branch, group and State level. In these circumstances, the April Letter can have had little impact on the view of the plaintiff held by those who were already acquainted with her and familiar with her way of dealing with others. The plaintiff did not call any evidence of her reputation in the community other than her own evidence, which, for reasons given above, I do not accept.

As for the submission that the plaintiff’s relationship with Mr Collier ultimately came to an end as a result of the matter complained of, I am not satisfied that this was the case. The plaintiff and Mr Collier were divorced decades ago and yet have continued to have an association of sorts. There may be several causes for their separation in March 2017. As referred to above, their recent co-operation extended to Mr Collier’s familiarising himself with the documents associated with these proceedings and staying at her residence in Wellington to look after the property and the dogs while she was in Sydney conducting the litigation. For reasons given above, I did not find Mr Collier to be a particularly credible witness. I am not satisfied that the publication of the matter complained of caused any permanent or substantial rift in their relationship.

I am not satisfied that the publication of the matter complained of caused any substantial hurt to the plaintiff’s feelings in that she appears to have an unshakeable belief in both the righteousness of her own conduct and the ineptitude or wrongdoing of others. This belief does not appear to have been affected at all by the publication of the matter complained of. While her expulsion from the CWA, of itself, may have caused her distress, this is to be distinguished from the publication of the matter complained of.

In these circumstances I am not prepared to conclude that an award of more than nominal damages would have been justified although, for the reasons given above, I am unable to formulate a realistic assumption as to what imputations ought be taken into account in that assessment.

In her summons filed on 8 March 2017 the plaintiff claimed the following:

On 12 May 2017 the plaintiff filed a statement of claim in the Equity proceedings in which she restated her claims for relief in the summons (without amendment) and set out the allegations on which she relied for her claims for relief.

The principal objection to this Court entertaining the plaintiff’s claims for relief is that courts will not generally intervene in the affairs of voluntary associations, unincorporated or incorporated: Re NSW Bar Association [2014] NSWSC 1695; (2014) 315 ALR 146 at [24] (Brereton J). The principle is well-established: Cameron v Hogan (1934) 51 CLR 358. This general principle is subject to the exception that a court may intervene where the plaintiff establishes either interference with his or her property rights or interests or breach of contract: Re NSW Bar Association at [24]. Mere reputational impact, which is what is alleged here, is not sufficient to attract the court’s intervention: Re NSW Bar Association at [66].

Although the court may have jurisdiction to address a procedural irregularity which has occasioned prejudice to the plaintiff as a matter of due process, this applies only to relevant resolutions of the CWA and not to its conduct generally: In the matter of Pioneer Energy Holdings Pty Ltd [2013] NSWSC 425 at [12] and [15] per Black J and Campbell v Crawford (1985) 12 FCR 317 at 341-342 (Wilcox J). However, although prayers 1, 2 and 3 of the summons, are not expressed in terms of an application for declaratory relief, they could be read as a claim for such relief. This Court’s wide power to grant declaratory relief pursuant to s 75 of the Supreme Court Act enables me to consider whether the plaintiff has established that the relief claimed ought be granted: see, for example, Rose v Boxing NSW Inc [2007] NSWSC 20 at [55]-[60] (Brereton J). In these circumstances, I propose to address the plaintiff’s claims for relief in turn.

The plaintiff submitted that she was illegally removed from her position as secretary of the Wellington branch on 18 February 2015. The difficulty with that submission is that the evidence established that on 18 February 2015 the plaintiff was not removed from her position but was asked to cease and desist from her duties until the next branch meeting on 11 March 2015 so that all issues with the branch including the plaintiff’s complaints could be discussed. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s claim for declaratory relief in prayer 1 of the summons has not been made out since its factual premise has been proved to be incorrect.

The plaintiff submitted that the election of office bearers at the Wellington branch on 11 March 2015 was illegal. The evidence does not reveal any proper basis for this submission. The evidence established that at the Wellington branch meeting on 11 March 2015, the members passed a resolution by majority (the plaintiff’s vote being the only one against the motion) that the positions of all office bearers be vacated, following which elections for new office bearers were held. Reg 80 of the CWA Constitution provides that all branches shall manage their own affairs within the aims and subject to the CWA Constitution. The plaintiff has raised no arguable basis on which it could be concluded that the resolution to vacate the positions of all office bearers was not properly passed. Accordingly, no factual basis has been established for her claim for declaratory relief in prayer 2 of the summons.

The plaintiff submitted that the defendant unlawfully cancelled the resolution for mediation which had been passed on 3 August 2015. The relevant resolutions passed on 3 August 2015 are set out above. A mediator, Ms Saunders, was appointed by Mrs Shanks pursuant to the resolution. The mediation process commenced. The mediator advised, after having spoken with the plaintiff and others, that mediation would be futile, having regard to the plaintiff’s attitude. In those circumstances it was decided that the mediation not be proceeded with. Mediation is a process which requires co-operation and confidentiality. Where these elements are absent, mediation is inevitably unsuccessful. The passage of the resolutions on 3 August 2015 did not require the defendant to participate in a solemn farce of a mediation in circumstances where the mediator it had appointed had advised that it would be futile. The plaintiff has failed to make out any factual basis to support her claim for declaratory relief in prayer 3 of the summons.

No juridical basis for the plaintiff’s claim for a forensic audit of the accounts of the Wellington branch has been identified. The evidence established that the accounts for the financial year ended 30 September 2015 were signed by Ms Cargill, who was then the Honorary Secretary of CWA (NSW). They were also audited by Crowe Horwath, chartered accountants, who reported, as referred to above, that they “found no issues of serious concern”. Even if I were persuaded that I had the power to order the accounts to be audited (and I am not), I do not discern any proper basis on which the order ought be made in the present case.

The plaintiff requests that the court refer the alleged illegality to the relevant authorities. Courts have a discretion to refer apparent illegality to the relevant authorities, including the Director of Public Prosecutions. The evidence does not establish any illegality, much less any that would warrant such referral. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s request (which does not amount to a claim for relief) is declined.

The plaintiff has not pleaded any legal, equitable or factual basis for this claim for relief. There is no relevant justiciable relationship between the plaintiff and the CWA such as would justify any pecuniary award. Moreover, as referred to above, no illegality or other breach of statute has been established.

For the reasons set out above the plaintiff’s claim in the Equity proceedings will be dismissed.

In the ordinary course, costs would follow the event. As the defendant has been wholly successful, the plaintiff would ordinarily be ordered to pay the defendant’s costs of the proceedings. However, the defendant has asked for costs to be reserved.

For the reasons set out above I make the following orders: